


STATE, RESISTANCE, TRANSFORMATION

anthropological perspectives on the dynamics of power in contemporary global realities

edited by

BRUCE KAPFERER

STATE, RESISTANCE, TRANSFORMATION

We gratefully acknowledge the funding of the following bodies, and thank them for making this publication possible.

First published in 2018
Sean Kingston Publishing
www.seankingston.co.uk
Canon Pyon

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Version 1.1

Ebook ISBN 978-1-907774-50-8

DOI 10.26581/B.KAPF01

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In Memoriam

Georg Henriksen

Colleague, Participant and Friend in the Research Programme of which this volume is a result.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This volume grew out of debates among social anthropologists in the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Bergen, whose collective comparative historical and especially ethnographic understandings, in a diversity of different regional contexts, addressed a variety of key issues concerning the relation of local populations to state processes under the conditions of contemporary globalization. Contributors to this volume took part in regular seminars and the occasional workshop on the matter of the state, and this book is in numerous ways the result of their collective effort. Other members of the department also often participated, notably Reidar Grunhaug, Edvard Hviding, Hanna Skartveit and Tone Sissener.

Georg Henriksen, to whom this volume is dedicated, was a particularly active and enthusiastic participant in discussion, and was a key researcher among us. His life was tragically cut short part way through the project – a loss to all of us, though his spirit remained an inspiration. Georg was a founding organizer of IGWIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), which is directly engaged with the plight of indigenous communities that are frequently in a marginal relation to state practice and the forces of globalization. Georg's work in Africa (among the Turkana) and North American Indian communities (especially the Naskapi) is well known, particularly his classic monograph, *Hunters in the Barrens*. He was a major activist in the defense of the interests of indigenous peoples and his insights gained from intensive ethnographic experience remain in the forefront of contemporary anthropological understanding.

The idea for the book achieved substance and support (for fieldwork and for workshops which enabled the participation of scholars from outside the department) from the Norwegian Research Council award to Bruce Kapferer for the project which he organized under the title Challenging the State. This was later supplemented by the EU Advanced Grant Egalitarianism project directed by Bruce Kapferer, which in key aspects extended ideas developed in the Challenging the State project. Funding for the Open Access publication of this volume was provided by University of Bergen Open Access Publication Fund.

The contributors wish to thank the Department of Social Anthropology and the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Bergen for the use of facilities in the course of discussion and research for this volume.

Particular expressions of thanks are given to Sean Kingston by all the contributors to the book. Sean is not only the publisher but gave his extensive

expertise in copy-editing. One of his many abilities is that of being an outstanding anthropologist in his own right. He engaged this knowledge to our collective benefit and we are all in his debt.

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INTRODUCTION

Crises of power and the state in global realities

Bruce Kapferer

This volume concentrates on the crises of communities and populations as these are mediated through the nation-state. This, of course, is a highly heterogeneous assemblage or formation moulded in different, if often intersecting, histories involving myriad socio-cultural processes. The territorial integrity and sovereignty of nation-states is highly contingent. These are dependent on an array of considerations relating to the internal distribution and organization of authority and power (including the way these are ideologically articulated and legitimated) and the way states are positioned within encompassing global dynamics. In a broad sense, nation-states – from the strongest to the weakest – are in a continual crisis of formation. That of specific nation-states is refracted by the communities and populations that are variously incorporated or related (in conformity or resistance) within their ordering processes, including those of the global forces impinging on them.

Overall, the essays in this book explore, ethnographically, dimensions of a perennial anthropological issue, the relation between the state (power) and society. Anthropology has been concerned with this matter virtually from its beginnings as a recognized academic discipline, the relation revealing a variety of possibilities in different socio-cultural and historical circumstances. As such, anthropology provided a fertile field for the development of a general critique of the relation between society and the state, especially as seen from positions in Europe and North America that are widely conceived to be the centres for the initial emergence of the contemporary nation-state.

My aim in this introduction is to present a broad outline of the significance of the state/society problematic in anthropology, and some of the key analytical and theoretical approaches. The relation between the state

and society has import beyond the narrow fields of political anthropology or philosophy, and underpins conceptual formations and critical thinking to a considerable degree throughout the discipline. It is a problematic that has never found resolution and the dynamic of its dialectic can be conceived as the underlying energy of enquiry within anthropology as a whole.

The questioning of the relation between the state and society reached a particular intensity at a time when the nation-state was becoming established in many aspects of its modern form. It has now reached a new plateau of critical concern as a variety of forces within the global environment of the state (the nation-state being the more or less universal political form) are affecting its viability, or forcing the orders of states in particular directions. This is particularly so in the European and North American heartlands of the various formations of the nation-state – where neoliberal ideologies and corporatizing processes have bearing on global realities and processes elsewhere (see Kapferer and Gold 2018). My discussion will outline some of these changes which are giving renewed significance to the enduring matter of the problematic relation between the state and society.

State and society: Hobbes and Rousseau

The opposed views of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the relation of the state to society are virtually paradigmatic in anthropological discourse regarding socio-political systems. For Hobbes, the order (or harmony) of society is conditional on the power of the state; while Rousseau regards society and its capacity to serve the interests of its members as a whole to be continually threatened by the state. Effectively, state and society are in irresolute contradiction. The Hobbes/Rousseau dialectic encompasses most of the questions concerning the state/society relation that have arisen in the social sciences and political philosophy since their time, despite shifts in analytical and theoretical approaches in anthropology and other related disciplines.

Of course, the relation of the state to society is an issue throughout recorded history, and is by no means original to Hobbes and Rousseau. However, they gave what may be regarded as age-old questions concerning the state/society relation (which finds manifold expressions in historical, philosophical and religious texts throughout the ancient world) new and particular vigour in the context of major socio-political upheavals and reconfigurations of socio-political orders in Europe and America. They wrote in the wake of the turmoil of the European wars of religion, of political revolution, of massive social dislocation and emigration, and of the global expansion of conquest and trade associated with the birth of Euro-American capital.

The differences between Hobbes and Rousseau, as well as the kinds of questions they raised, were thoroughly part of the socio-political conjuncture in which they lived. In the view of many commentators then and since, Europe and America (and by extension the world) were on the cusp of modernity and in problematic relation with what was conceived to be tradition, the orders of the past. What Hobbes and Rousseau effectively disputed was integral to the social and political re-imagination and reconfiguration of their realities, and by extension those of the world as a whole. That their questions have an enduring relevance for anthropology is not surprising, for the subject that began to take shape at the same time, with the figure of Rousseau being particularly significant in the history of the discipline.

Anthropology, moreover, became discursively established as the subject of the conjuncture, thoroughly directed to the study of traditional realities as these were defined in relation to and critically engaged with Euro-American modernity, as this was imagined. It was in the ethnographic study of other traditions that anthropologists found sources for an, at least, implicit critique of what was conceived as the commanding directions of the Western metropoles.

The state/society question in ethnography

The Hobbes/Rousseau paradigm of much anthropological discourse with reference to the state – specifically its threat to society – achieved new intensity in the human annihilations and social devastations of two world wars and in the violence of imperial expansion and the struggles of decolonization. These events sharpened the point of the comparative orientation of anthropology, and of the significance of the critiques that are immanent within the conjunctural impetus of the discipline. Anthropologists were, and still are, engaged in expanding or questioning Euro-American values through the socio-cultural systems of those at the margins of Western expansion but inescapably drawn within Western historical trajectories.

Major anthropological studies from the turn of the nineteenth century and, particularly, following the Second World War are concerned with communities at the perimeter of nation-states. Anthropological ethnographies examined societies that did not manifest the centralized systems of power epitomized by states, or else explored those shaped within state systems whose principles of order appeared to be differently conditioned from those of Euro-American state systems. The broad question of a sociological and philosophical kind in which anthropology was/is oriented relates to what is generally presented as 'the problem of order' – the issue at the centre of the discourse framed by Hobbes and Rousseau. So-called modernist approaches (those of Durkheim, Weber and Marx) have maintained a degree of dominance. They defined the

state of the art, as it were, and the critiques and reactions to the perspectives of these modernists have sustained their relevance.

By and large these perspectives (modernist, post-modernist, post-structural), including the various critiques of the state that they raised, were/are conditioned in the circumstances of the European and North American nation-state (and its imperialist thrust). The explicit and implicit evolutionism of modernist approaches especially (where Western systems effectively constitute the measure of all others) has been well attacked, particularly by post-structuralists, notably Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari, and in a post-colonial anti-Orientalism (Chakrabarthy 2000; Said 2003). Nonetheless, the distinction of many anthropological approaches is that they advance critiques of the state, at least implicitly, from positions at least partly outside the terms of the nation-state as constructed in European and North American history and its imperial realizations.

There are a number of classic anthropological monographs of the state that exemplify dimensions of the anthropological approach and critique of the state that I have been discussing. I present a small selection of some of the more significant ones for the state/society relation.

Edmund Leach's (1954) classic study of the Kachin focuses on the intimate relation of the state with society, one in which the order of each is immanent in the other. He describes a repetitive cycle of dynamic irresolution, where the egalitarianism of community gives way to hierarchical state determinism and vice versa. Leach's ethnography achieved significance in the context of the historically recent experiences of Nazism and Stalinism. Max Gluckman's (1963) research on the Zulu received much of its import from his attention to internal socio-political principles that Shaka Zulu manipulated transforming a Zulu chieftainship (tempered by the demands of kinship and community interest) into a brutal and tyrannical dictatorship. His work is also concerned with the capacity of Zulu chiefs to represent the interests of their people in the overwhelming circumstances of the White-dominated apartheid state of South Africa. Gluckman's (1955) later work in the Lozi Kingdom of Zambia examined the parallels between the judicial processes of a traditional state with the ideals of the law in a liberal democratic nation-state. Thus, Gluckman demonstrates how the jurisprudential concept of 'the reasonable man' corresponds with the legal process and flexibility of judgement in Lozi courts. In other words, the apparatuses of a traditional African state are not necessarily at variance with the order of the modern liberal (and colonial) state. Western modernity is not necessarily an advance on traditional society. More generally, Gluckman's approach, as with anthropology widely, examined the problematics of supposedly advanced state systems in America and Europe through state/

society realities at the edge of their experience or otherwise regarded in some way or another as subordinate them.

Eric Wolf's major works (e.g. 1982) address issues that certainly gain their impetus in the context of the over-determining, dehumanizing and socially destructive forces unleashed by imperializing states in the twentieth century. But he also demonstrates the presence of similar dehumanizing forces throughout history and in the spaces occupied by those peoples referred to as 'outside history'. James Scott's studies (e.g. 2011) extend on this kind of anthropological understanding of the oppressive orders of states and the modes of non-state resistance that may threaten state orders.

Marshall Sahlins's (2005) analyses acutely and generally exemplify anthropology as the discipline of the conjuncture, but with major implications for erstwhile centres. He explicitly explores the Hobbes/Rousseau problematic in his *Apologies to Thucydides*, where he compared the dynamics of state overreach in the ancient and traditional states of Greece and Fiji, engaging particularly with Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian Wars (significantly, first translated into English by Thomas Hobbes). Sahlins sees parallels in the events of ancient Greece, Fiji at the cusp of colonial rule and the self-destructive risk (and dangers to democracy) in the current situation of imperial overreach of the USA and its embroilment in a growing patchwork of wars throughout the globe.

While the Hobbes/Rousseau question of the state/society relation, the matter of their mutual threat, persists in much anthropological discourse, there has been some modification in post-modernist and post-structuralist approaches. There is a shift to a tighter concern with state/society entanglement (in numerous ways similar to Marxist, especially Gramscian, perspectives) and that the social is infused with statist processes and with practices that are state effects (e.g. the disciplinary dynamics of family, medicine, work). In other words, the destructive forces of state and society are mutually immanent – a point that was explicit in the much earlier work of Leach. The well-known distinction that Deleuze and Guattari draw between hierarchical/tree dynamics (usually associated with state processes) and those laterally spreading dynamics of the rhizome can be read as a reissuing of the Hobbes/Rousseau problematic but with some key differences. There is a shift away from opposing the political to the social to an interest in examining distinct structural dynamics (of a potentially mutually subversive kind) that cuts across political/society or state/society distinctions. The newer directions in the anthropology of the state, influenced by Foucault and Deleuze especially, reflect the forces of contemporary globalization and express a break away from a sociology that refracted an ethos of the nation-state (often Kantian

in spirit, as with the work of Durkheim) and of bounded social communities characteristic of much anthropology hitherto.

Globalization and the crisis of the state

The present global political context – in which globalization is a catchword – is one of particular crisis for the nation-state. All states have immanent within them a high expansionist potential that is facilitated by the already global world in which they are situated, and to which they themselves have contributed. Globalization is an effect of economic processes (such as trade) but also of political, especially state, power. The contemporary era of globalization has much to do with the close relation between economic forces and expanding state forces connected to the emergence of sovereign nation-states, and their expansion and limitations of their control. As Jonathan Friedman (1998; Friedman and Friedman 2008) has long argued, the world has always been global – a position that he initially developed in a critique of Leach's Kachin study, by showing how the oscillation in social political structures was linked to patterns of global trade. This point does not overlook the particular cultural dynamics or logics of assemblage (the ideo-logics of state formation), but stresses the enmeshing of state processes within more encompassing processes. This, of course, is a dimension of any socio-political system and is a major corrective of that anthropology of the isolated (island) society kind (see Kapferer 2000) of which historically-oriented anthropologists have long been critical (e.g. Gluckman 1963; Wolf 1982).

The current global crisis affecting states is directly related to their contemporary globalized situation, which is qualitatively distinct from other times. This is largely connected to the intensification and further transmutation of capital (see Kalb, this volume) that has expanded contradictions between the dynamics of capital flow and the relatively fixed and territorially located centres and institutions of state control (see Dumont 1980; Polanyi 2001[1944]). The flow of capital (which can ignore borders and bypass regulatory control, extremely expressed by criminal cartels, see Nonini, this volume), and its intensification, is thoroughly connected to technological developments in communication, particularly digitalization and the creation of cyberspace. These have produced the space/time compression of contemporary globalizing processes (Harvey 1991) and, perhaps just as significantly, if not more so, new domains (e.g. the virtualities of cyberspace) of flow outside state territories. In effect, states have been reduced in their potency vis-à-vis corporate organizations and general capitalist corporatizing processes. Furthermore, and very broadly, the globalizing interconnecting and rhizomic forces of capital, variously entangled with the dynamics of nation-state orders, constitute major impetuses for the transmutation or transmogrification of the dominant global

form (or frame) of the nation-state into what might be called the corporate state (see Kapferer 2010a; Kapferer and Taylor 2012; Kapferer and Gold 2018).

In the foregoing processes, the sovereignty of nation states has been reduced, power has been subordinated to the economic, and the economic – in the shape of corporate entities which were once subordinated to the political – is now subordinating the political. This has grown apace since the Second World War and the extraordinary speed of technological innovation driven by digitalization. Rather than the political-economic, we now have the emergence of the economic-political!

The emergence of society as corporation in nation-state formation

In general terms, a once dominant global system based in sovereign territorial power has yielded to economic forces, chiefly the complexities of capital, whose individualist ideologies of self-interest and of the sovereign individual have broken free from their political harnessing and subjugation to the transcendent authority and power of the state. Furthermore, such challenges to the state intensify social and communal opposition to state power. Moreover, the development of mega monopolies (especially following the dot.com boom) such as Google, Facebook etc. have created the circumstances for the breakdown of state order, or rather a reconfiguration of the structures of social relations in some instances rivalling the power of hitherto established state systems (see Kapferer and Gold 2018).

In a way, Hobbes predicted this, and it underpins his advocacy of the transcendent order of the state over what he identified as the forces of society, which he conceives in economistic and individualist terms and as grounded in nature – the position strongly contended by Rousseau. In the perspective of Rousseau, the state brings forth the savagery of society, of the social in resistance to the state, by the state's denial of society and the autonomy of its orders and persons within it. This is an argument that Pierre Clastres (1974) was to develop in a critique of anthropological perspectives on political processes in societies outside the domains of Western history. If, in Rousseau's terms, society has legitimate fear of the state, Hobbes provides a not thoroughly dissimilar view from the position of the state. The fear that Hobbes had for the state was present in what he conceived to be its necessary incorporation of society within its order. His view was precisely that the social is based in self-interest, a conception fostered in a historical moment when the modern nation-state was taking shape in the context of the birth of capitalism. Immanent in Hobbes's orientation is the idea of society as a kind of body corporate in which the economic, an emergent bourgeois capitalist enterprise, contradicts the ordering power of the state (see too Hobbes 1990).

In *Utopia*, Sir Thomas More gives clear expression to this perspective, in many ways affirming the virtue of traditional orders (Peru was one instance) encountered in the early adventurist years of Western mercantile expansion, in criticism of what he saw as the glimmerings of modernity of Tudor England.

When Hobbes was writing there were intimations of the shape of modern corporatism and of processes threatening to state sovereignty. Let me cite from Philip Stern's *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India*. He is writing of the corporation as a long-term assemblage having its roots deeply into the European past – an aspect, of course, famously described by Max Weber and other historians of Europe.

> All corporations possessed and employed distinct forms of franchise, ceremony, privileges, and overt and secret rituals that created social bonds and shaped institutional cultures. Such practices inevitably generated their own allegiances and identities. Corporations frequently resented, resisted, and, from the (English) Civil War to the American Revolution, even rebelled against that hierarchy: "like some Frankenstein," the twentieth century political theorist Harold Laski waxed sardonically, "showing ingratitude to their creators". Thomas Hobbes, for one, believed the largest and most well-armed municipal corporations to be such a threat to sovereignty of his Leviathan that he regarded them as an "infirmity" in the body politic and, in his famous phrase "lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a natural man.
>
> (Stern 2012:8)

Hobbes saw the corporation as a very individualist and self-interested free-wheeling entity, with different logics of control from those of the transcendental order of the state. Corporations were connected to the concerns of the group rather than to the rational interests of the whole that is embodied in the person of the monarch and the rule of law enshrined in cosmic order. Hobbes's image and reductive understanding of society is mirrored in that of the self-interested and profit-oriented corporation. Ironically, this has bearing on the contemporary legal definition of the corporation. Thus, from the position of the law, they are to all intents and purposes the equivalent of autonomous individuals, subject effectively to the same legally defined rights and responsibilities as individual persons in society (see Bakan 2011). Hobbes's fear has in many ways materialized: the forces of contemporary globalization driven by states in league with corporations have generated circumstances that are threatening the hegemonic structures of state sovereignty and influencing

the reconfiguration (or re-territorialization) of socio-political and community relations within states.

The corporatization of society: the example of Manchester United FC

Some illustration of the corporatization of the social, or the corporate as the new shape of the social, is provided by Manchester United and its manager, Sir Alex Ferguson. The club achieved fame in the immediate post Second World War era under the aegis of Sir Matt Busby. It was a staunchly local and working-class club, and strongly Roman Catholic in identity. Manchester United symbolized, for England as a whole, community courage and solidarity in the face of adversity following the loss of its first team in the 1958 Munich air disaster, in which the pride of the new post-war generation of youthful players died. In 1986 Sir Alex Ferguson became the manager, and over 26 years he was to transform the club into a major international corporation now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Its players, as with most football clubs everywhere, are no longer local, but from numerous ethnic and national backgrounds. Their tie to the community is in the brand (notably, in its nostalgia) rather than any real identity, for the players are highly mobile, being bought and sold with great regularity. Ferguson created a club uniquely successful in the market – a mere semblance of its former communal/social self, although constantly playing on the memories of the past.

Manchester United has been transmuted, as an exemplar not only of economic man, but of the society of the corporation as the ideal of society as a whole. Ferguson embodies this. Post retirement he has many engagements as a purveyor of the ideal managerial corporate spirit. He is a CEO, a strategic manipulator of risk, but no less a natural man: a man of the people epitomizing natural leadership qualities – what the socio-biologists might recognize as a Silverback, aggressively asserting his controlling and managerial dominance. When he retired in 2013 it was an event that consumed the national media. Significantly, the day he chose was that on which the Queen delivered her annual Queen's Speech to the nation at the re-opening of Parliament, when she outlines the government programme for the parliamentary session. Indeed, Ferguson's retirement eclipsed the speech (some said purposefully so). That is, he staged it to compete with an event overseen by the current Tory government – for Ferguson presents his sympathies to be with Labour and the working class. If so, it was also an event that indicated that the institutions of the corporate state are the new ideals of government and of society rather than those of the nation-state (which therefore should be corporatized) and the ordering transcendent potency of the monarchy.

In the *Guardian* newspaper, Nick Robinson, principal political correspondent for the BBC, wrote that Ferguson, a socialist, had accepted an invitation to the Harvard Business School to present his views as a model corporate manager and to be pressed for his secrets to success, and that further: 'I (Nick Robinson) declared Sir Alex Ferguson to be the "greatest living Briton". That's right – not Tim Berners Lee or Stephen Hawking; nor Her Majesty the Queen or JK Rowling or the numerous other worthy candidates that instantly filled my Twitter stream.' (Robinson 2013).

In their *Ethnicity Inc* (2009), John and Jean Comaroff have written about the corporatization of ethnic identity and community. However, they conceive of this as merely a further instance of the transmutations following upon the relentless march of capital – the growing dominance of the economic. But it is more than this. What they describe is a particular shaping of the economic within the reimagination of identity and the social that masks, as it facilitates, a specific economic impetus. It is a dimension of the re-territorialization and re-codings of society (effectively a cultural-economic re-imagination of the social) attendant upon the emergence of the corporate state from out of the shell of the nation-state. The consequence is the continuity, even intensification, of problematics conjured in the era of the nation-state, giving them original potencies.

Thus, the community as imagined and constituted through the power of nation-states continues, as with the Manchester United brand, but with the corporatizing (privatizing) process hollowing out of the institutions of nation-state control integral to the society guaranteed by the political order of the state and central to its legitimacy. In this, the potencies of the new are supported by the fantasies of the past. The rise of the corporate state – and the restructuring of the governing institutions of the nation-state – is apparent in the events of the 2008 crash and its fallout. This is highlighted, moreover, by the Occupy Now movement, whose pattern of opposition found impetus in the very processes of corporate state formation.

Resolutions and redirections in state/society relations in the context of corporatism

The broad thrust of the argument being advanced here is that critical challenges to the state (or the nation-state and the ideological, institutional and social relational structures formed in its domain) are connected to its corporatization and to the corporate potencies of essentially economic organizations that have, in large measure, become free of state political control or which have infiltrated its apparatuses. The threat to the state is both external and internal. Corporations operating in the global arena are reducing the sovereignty of nation-states, whose political and socio-economic interests

are subordinated to economic corporate demands. Moreover, crises in the global economy, as a function of corporate fortunes within it, obviously have socio-political effects for the communities embraced by states, as the global financial fluctuations of the Great Depression and the recent Great Recession more than exemplify. This is especially so these days, as the forces of capitalist globalization have brought most populations, even the most remote or isolated, within the money economy and the orders of power (state and non-state) built upon it. But the stress in this introduction is upon the reconfigurations of socio-political relations within states and the weakening or subjugation of state political hegemony in the face of the corporatization (privatization) of its apparatuses, and subjugation also of the populations of states that are drawn within the economic political control of corporate orders. These orders have come to have major effects on states, as they increasingly gain influence over state functions and services, especially in North America and in Europe.

The processes I am discussing, I suggest, exceed what is glossed in the concept of 'neoliberalism', which, ideologically, certainly reflects and motivates the marked economization of the political and of the social that is taking place (the economic as ontology see). This situation, as the work of Hobbes and others were effectively observing, has long been in the brewing: neoliberalism as the ideological apotheosis of what was immanent, from the word go, in the conjunction of capital with the formation of the nation-state. Neoliberalism embraces notions such as free-market economism, privatization of public institutions, austerity, individualism etc. But it is also part and parcel of a restructuring of state processes, the creation of a corporate state, that intervenes as a particular resolution of the state/society contradiction integral to the dynamic of the nation-state.

The relation of the state to society is reconfigured through the economic that becomes constitutive of the social, of society, and the political or organizations of authority and power. This corporatization of the state (and of society) is a dynamic of contemporary globalization and one which also changes the socio-political landscapes of particular nation-states. I leave to one side the circumstances or conditions of such corporatization (which also constitutes as it facilitates its process, e.g. the de-industrialization of erstwhile industrial centres, the redeployment of production from the global north to the south, the managerialization and hierarchialization of bureaucracies). A major feature of the corporatization of the state, or the new unity of the state and society (i.e. the closing of the public/private distinction), is that the state and its society of the state is defined and totalized as a corporate body (indeed, after the manner of a corporation), as also are the individual units within it. If the business or industrial corporation is regarded as an individual (at least legally), it might also be that in the processes of the corporatization

of the state, individuals and society are re-conceived as corporations, or as continually dynamic and re-arrangeable components of them. Sociological re-conceptualizations (or re-codings) in contemporary post-structural and post-human perspectives, such as those of the assemblage (also socius instead of society) in the Deleuzian-influenced studies of Bruno Latour and Manuel DeLanda, might be regarded as refracting dimensions of the corporatizing re-territorialization that is taking place (for notions of networking, and the universalization of the organizational business model by DeLanda, see Kapferer 2010b). It is noteworthy that the explicit intention of these scholars is to replace concepts and orientations that were indeed established in the modernist era of the nation-state. That such approaches or models are of particular interest to business and management studies is of significance for the argument I present.

In so far as the state/society contradiction or dilemma is met or, to a degree, resolved (overcome better describes the process) in the course of corporatization, this gives rise to new contradictions, exclusions and schismatic tendencies. Thus, the socio-political totality of the corporatized state effectively casts to its margins, or places outside its perimeters, those who do not conform to, or otherwise resist, the economic principles of social and political corporate coherence. Gated housing communities provide one image of the idea I am presenting, as do the intensity of security and policing (of a privatized kind) that is often associated with them. The state/society, on the one hand, protects itself from the elements of society that it excludes, on the other hand. The socio-polity is divided into two – those who are part of the corporatized order and those who are outside it – a division that, of course, is far from equal, in that the corporatized order has hegemony over that which it excludes. This division cuts across other dynamics associated with class, ethnic and gender differentiation, among numerous others. Many contemporary events can be seen as manifesting such processes, aligning elements of populations who in other analyses might otherwise seem to be opposed (see Kapferer 2016).

The European Union is a corporatizing political economic entity that exemplifies the contradictions born of the transition of nation-states into such a union. Political movements such as Syriza and Podemos, at least in their initial stages until they fell victim to the corporatizing hegemony of EU bureaucracy, reflected the kinds of division in socio-political orders to which I have been referring. They defined and organized a heterogeneity of followers that were socio-economically reduced by their being cast outside the regulatory order of the EU. A similarity can be found in the dynamics underpinning the decision for Brexit in Britain and the enthusiasm in the USA for Donald Trump. These manifest a fury at the political-economic

establishment by those effectively excluded from it. It is an opposition between the out-classes (outcasts or outcastes), on the one hand, and the in-classes on the other, or those who are the instruments and the beneficiaries of the corporatization of socio-political orders. This last group may be conceived as a new kind of power elite that comprises a heterogeneous collectivity of persons of varied backgrounds and socio-economic positions that participate in the interest of the re-structuring of socio-political worlds along the lines of the corporation, perhaps the organizational form of the post-human. The very character of anti-establishment fury – the chauvinism, patriotism and nationalism that are its collectivizing expressions – invokes fantasies of the past paradoxically associated with the hegemonic potency of the nation-state in its heyday, though provoked in the fractionalizing of its decline.

A similarity and a contrast might be drawn between my arguments here regarding contemporary corporatizing processes and Karl Marx's analysis of the events of 1848 and following in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*. (Marx 2003) Both express the hegemonic crisis of nation-states on the cusp of radical changes and transformation – the former at a moment in the decline of the nation-state and the rise of the corporate, the latter at a time when the nation-state was gaining strength. Marx's analysis demonstrates how class contradictions and divided bourgeois economic interests are resolved in a political conservatism, the dictatorial affirmation of Louis Napoleon. He describes a confused and somewhat liminal dynamic of cross-cutting and shifting alliances linking persons and groups with frequently opposed social and political agendas. There is a marked resonance with contemporary processes of crisis, though with a major difference. Marx presents a process in which the economic is suborned within the political: the highly evolved executive powers of the state to which the bourgeoisie gave up, too easily in Marx's view, their capacity to rule. In the situation of corporatizing processes, the executive powers of the state have been brought thoroughly within largely bourgeois corporate control, or else form an identity with it that either supplants such power and/or reduces its capacity. Hobbes's nightmare of society as a composite body corporate at war within itself achieves realization. The farce, if not the tragedy, of contemporary realities is that whichever way they turn they are caught in the tendrils of the corporate that assumes the shape of the political state and the circumstances of social existence (see Kapferer 2016).

The chapters

In the first substantive chapter of the volume, Don Kalb ('Challenges to the European state') develops a thorough understanding of the state/capitalism nexus and the dynamics of financialization (integral to what I have discussed

as corporatization) as a force of globalization and its crises. Kalb's work on financialization expands from a critical appreciation of the work of Jonathan and Kajsa Friedman (2008) on the double polarizations of class and cultural identity that gains much relevance in the current crises of the state reflected upon above. Kalb examines the continuities from the European past into the present and, in particular, new twists in financing processes of the state/capital nexus for class conflict and ethno-national populisms. The chapter operates comparatively, examining in their historical specificities social reactions to the state/capital nexus as they have formed in different nation-state circumstances.

Hege Toje's chapter ('State formation, territorialization and the challenge of movement') addresses a central issue in the state/society relation, the concern of the state to limit, fix or otherwise control the movement and mobility of its populations. She goes to the heart of the differentiating and striating (bounding) dynamic of state processes. As in Kalb's work, Toje sets her analysis firmly in historical context, in this case the emergence of the Russian state, and traces continuities into the present. She stresses the consistency of state practice across different administrative regions, contesting some recent perspectives on the state that stress greater fluidity and internal variation. The oppressive dimensions of the establishment of the Russian state in relation to steppe populations and the Gulag system receive particular attention.

The issues that Toje addresses concerning Russia and the Soviet Union have everything to do with state formation within a long-term imperial dynamic – one not only preceding that of Western Europe but bridging East and West. Similarly, the situation of Lebanon addressed by Anh Nga Longva, grew out of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the mandate given to France over Syria in 1920. Longva ('The state? What state?: state, confessionalism and civil society in Lebanon') concentrates on the constitutional principle of 'confessionalism' (originally a Muslim institution) that guarantees the rights of religious communities. This thoroughly pervades everyday life and is central to understanding the citizen/state relation in modern times and, of course, contemporary patterns of conflict. Lebanon is sometimes characterized as a case of a 'weak state'. This is a highly problematic term and in my view imbued with Western secularist bias, if not shades of a neo-colonialist/imperialist attitude. Longva effectively confirms this, showing how confessionalism shapes a religion-based communitarianism. The discussion of this chapter has major implications in relation to the Western-based and frequently individualist orientations regarding the character of the modern state.

At this juncture, it might be noted that Longva's discussion has relevance for aspects of what Deleuze and Guattari (see also Kapferer and Taylor 2012) term the rhizomic (and contradictory) dimensions of the hierarchical orders

of states (in this regard compare Longva's ethnography with the chapter by Gulbrandsen in this volume). This is especially so with the kinship element of the community/citizen relation in Lebanon. It is a feature that underlies the formation of the contemporary corporate state as commented on earlier in this introduction. Indeed, the emergence of the corporate state extends on the rhizomic dimensions of nation-state orders. This, I suggest, is especially so in nation-states that have been formed as a consequence of relatively recent colonial imperialism, where 'traditional' orders have been incorporated into modern state formation (see Gulbrandsen, this volume). This has relevance to the two following chapters on Indonesia. What I suggest is that the rhizomatic dimensions of tradition-based, for want of a better term, contemporary state formations may have implications for the way they insert into modern globalization processes. In some cases globalization can lead to the intensification of rhizomatic forces that are a legacy of the past and which are continued through the transformations of modernity into the present. This was, in certain ways, the argument developed in Geertz's Indonesian studies (e.g. 1963a, 1963b).

This is the case also in Eldar Braten's ('"Yoga Inc.": transformed kingship in decentralizing Indonesia') fascinating account concerning the transformation of kingship in the context of decentralization in Indonesia following the end of Suharto's rule in 1998. Of particular interest is how democratization processes superficially associated with certain aspects of modern globalization actually have the effect of strengthening more tradition-related hierarchical forces. Braten shows how the Sultan has jockeyed between a number of different perceptions of the Sultan's role and, in certain instances, effectively transformed critical dimensions of the kingship to take advantage of shifting circumstances. In one sense, the Sultan has corporatized the kingship, giving it controlling influence over commercializing developments in the context of globalization. In this situation, the economic does not undermine the political – as I think is increasingly the case in Western contexts – but is drawn into closer conformity with it. But the effect might be similar. That is, the corporatization of the state leads to a reversal of the democratizing processes that was the intention of the movement for reform in the post-Suharto era. However, it must be stressed, as Braten suggests in his conclusion, that the Sultan may nonetheless risk a reduction in his powerful role.

If Braten takes a view of Indonesia in relation to an institution at the top, as it were, Olaf Smedal ('Resistance as problem: an ethnic minority and the state in twenty-first century Indonesia') examines situations in post-Suharto Indonesia from the bottom. Concentrating on the Lom, a small ethnic group on the island of Bangka, Smedal examines two available economic strategies: that of tin mining and that offered by an oil-palm plantation company. He

compares two small settlements, one established for forest dwellers who were largely swidden cultivators; and another established for Lom living near the shoreline, who marketed fish, coconuts and pigs. The forest Lom have opted for tin mining and have resisted palm oil cultivation. Their strategy, on the surface, looks to be the rational one, for the forest Lom have prospered largely because of the deregulation of state control on tin mining and the rise of the value of tin on international markets. This is not so for the shoreline Lom, who have less available tin, and who support the move to oil palm. Closer inspection shows this latter decision to be probably the most rational, as Smedal shows that tin mining is far from as good a choice as it looks, with the apparent prosperity of the forest Lom being on the back of corruption or graft, one factor in their resistance.

Smedal effectively expands on an issue at the heart of this volume – the relation of the state to community and social autonomy, further complicated by processes of state transformation in the larger context of neoliberalism and the corporatization of the political as an aspect of globalization. He indicates that state-mediated corporatization may offer a sounder choice than the free-floating anything-goes kind, such as the one I indicated in the discussion of Thomas Hobbes. The livelihood of local communities – certainly regarding the effects of ecological degradation on subsistence – are better safeguarded in the oil-palm choice rather than in tin mining. Smedal makes a further and important larger point on the basis of his material. He directly challenges the romantic anthropology (often pursued by NGOs) that presumes for a Rousseau-esque anti-state (anti-corporate) resistant attitude when, indeed, a state-mediated programme would protect against social destructive forces that are likely to flow from neoliberal processes encouraging open slather individualism.

In the next three chapters we move from Asia to Africa. Leif Manger's essay ('Sovereignties in the making: reflections on state and society in the Sudan') raises central issues concerning the concept of the state in relation to the meaning and nature of sovereignty. This is explored with specific reference to the Sudan, but also with general reference to colonial processes and their post-colonial legacy for Africa generally. Manger concentrates on the relativistic dimensions of sovereignty – that what defines sovereignty is dependent on historical positioning and larger global forces. A broadly accepted definition of sovereignty is that which refers to the right to self-government without external interference. This understanding (that links up with other concepts such as autonomy) is everywhere open to question in practice. Certainly, as Manger discusses, Western imperial expansion into Africa, while conscious of its own sovereign concerns, had little regard for the sovereignty of other socio-political orders and defined sovereign rights

over territory with little attention to local distinctions to sovereignty and autonomy. This relationship, of course, varied according to the colonizers concerned and the populations encountered. In general, those peoples whose socio-political hierarchies could somehow be appropriated within Western terms fared somewhat better than others being subject to Western imperial expansion (e.g. Australian Aborigines had no sovereign rights, but New Zealand Maoris received greater consideration). But the sovereign territorial orders that emerged from imperializing processes had consequence for the peoples concerned even though they had little say in their establishment. Manger shows how the current tragedy of Sudan is the manifest legacy of an imperialism and neo-imperialism in which local sovereignties were of little count. Manger's chapter also opens out to issues concerning different orientations to the nature of sovereignty relative to historical-cultural context.

Eria Onyango's essay ('Pastoralists at war with the state: historical armed violence in the shadow state of north-eastern Uganda') presents an excellent ethnographic investigation of the post-colonial situation of Uganda, where Karimoja pastoralists are resisting the sovereign claims of the Uganda state. The situation that Onyango unfolds is repeated in different ways globally. What he describes for the Karimojong – their creation of a 'shadow state' – has some similarity, for example, with the Zapatistas in Mexico and with the anti-state tribal movements in Asia (see Scott 2011). Their resistance builds, as it transforms, along traditional lines. Of particular interest in Onyango's analysis is the formation of stereotypes concerning the Karimojong. These thoroughly reflect a European (colonial) statist attitude. Onyango's essay has relevance for other theoretical discussions of state processes, especially that of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2002), as the pastoralist Karimojong excellently manifest the rhizomic contradiction of hierarchical state processes. Onyango does not essentialize this opposition (a risk of the Deleuze/Guattari perspective), but demonstrates how this took form historically, and is largely a product of the marginalization of the Karimojong by the Uganda state. It might be noted that Onyango's analysis has relevance for an understanding of the kind of parallel formation, along rhizomic lines, of corporate-state assemblages or formations (see also Nonini, this volume). These can have the effect of subverting state orders even as they are intertwined with hierarchical state processes. The mutually annihilating violence that can result from the full realization of their contradiction (hierarchy versus rhizomic dynamics) is well illustrated by the Karimojong material.

Themes of violence and counter state violence are the focus of Bruce Kapferer and Roshan de Silva-Wijeyeratne's analysis of the dynamics of Sri Lanka's recently concluded civil war ('Buddhist cosmological forms and the situation of total terror in Sri Lanka's ethnic civil war'). In certain ways the

Tamil resistance to Sinhala state hegemony involved the formation of a kind of shadow state whose increasingly more overt state manifestation in relation to the overbearing build up of Sinhalese state force created, for a while, a total situation of terror in which society, for all parties concerned, was in the balance. The challenge to the Sinhala state by the Tamil minority created a war in which the annihilating force of the state over society was all too evident. Tamil resistance initially took a potently rhizomic dynamic (a dimension of political terror in state contexts generally) that was ultimately crushed by the hierarchical force of the state. The nature of hierarchy (its conceptualization) is culturally variant and the authors direct attention to the importance of its cultural logic as appropriated by state machineries. The passions of state forces (and of resistance) were articulated in relation to a mytho-logic born of ancient myths interpreted into relevance in a largely post-colonial and highly nationalized ethnic context involving Sinhalese and others contesting their hegemony. As the authors discuss, the hierarchical logic of the state grew in dimension as the war progressed, assuming at the end, and in the violence of the peace, a virtually corporate form in which not only Tamil society was crushed but also Sinhalese social relations were threatened in the autocracy that eventuated.

Ornulf Gulbrandsen's chapter ('Inside and outside the state in Italy and Botswana: Historical and comparative reflections on state apparatuses of capture and rhizomic forces') contrasts processes in the post-colonial formation of Botswana with the long history underpinning the transformations of Sardinia within various state systems, up to the present. Gulbrandsen's account bears out critical points on sovereignty opened by Manger, with Botswana contrasting strongly with the Sudan and Uganda cases. A major distinction is that Botswana was a protectorate within the colonial system that enabled the dominant Tswana polity to maintain its hegemony and adapt its institutional arrangements to the nation-state form (see Gulbrandsen 2013 for an extended discussion). The Tswana system traditionally integrated the rhizomic dynamic that is often associated with cattle-based pastoral societies (the Karimojong are one classic example) into a hierarcho-centric political order (*merafe*) that was also distinctively egalitarian in many of its functions. This latter fact may have been important in facilitating a particular transformational synchrony of rhizomic and hierarchializing dynamics (what Gulbrandsen describes as an apparatus of capture) in the formation of the colonial and then post-colonial Botswana state. This did not occur in the Sardinian case, where a long history of conquest and different forms of imperial intervention created a systematic culture of resistance in which rhizomic forces were elaborated. These processes and the patterns of banditry antagonistic to state control that developed also influenced the way communities in Sardinia were articulated

into wider criminal networks (e.g. the mafia) operating on a more global scale and antagonistic to or undermining of state authority.

Most of the chapters in the volume have focused on the forces and problematics of nation-state formation at the periphery of Western Europe and North America as this further complicated within contemporary globalization. It is in the context of globalization that the nation-state, as it took form in Western contexts, is itself undergoing radical transformation. One key facet of this is corporatization, in which neoliberal austerity and privatization policies (in the global arena – structural adjustment pushed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund) are key factors. The recent and ongoing Brexit crisis in England is a particular example (see Kapferer 2016). The final two chapters in this volume focus on critical aspects of corporatizing and privatizing processes.

Judith Kapferer ('Arts for the people: public support and private patronage') examines processes of privatization and the reconfiguration of state structure in England as this is highlighted in relation to policies concerning the arts. These may be considered a touchstone of ideological claims that the political order of the state safeguards public (i.e. the collective social) interest. The state/society relation (the key problematic of the volume as a whole) is highlighted in state policy and practice concerning the arts. It is in this context, certainly in the United Kingdom, that corporatizing forces also manifest recent dimensions of the financialization examined in Don Kalb's opening chapter. Interestingly, Kapferer, working with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the 'apparatus of capture' (as does Gulbrandsen in the preceding chapter), indicates how the corporate involvement with the arts becomes a key means of corporate infiltration within the public function of the state – appropriating a vital state role and, in effect, legitimating the emergence of the economic as dominant over the political, as discussed in the opening sections of this Introduction. Although Kapferer's focus is on the arts in the United Kingdom she places the processes she examines within the broader comparative scene of Europe and North America.

Donald M. Nonini's essay ('Repressive ententes, organized crime and the corporate state') concentrates on the Camorra in Italy, and powerfully brings the volume full circle. He argues strongly that the formation of the corporate state as an institutionalization of rhizomatic dynamics (a key aspect of Kalb's understanding of financialization) is a global phenomenon (and there is a sense of this in many of the particular ethnographic cases presented).

The Camorra operates outside the executive and institutional orders of the state, subverting it through corruption (a time-worn means of corporate infiltration within the regulatory state apparatuses) and in outright conflict with its ordering judicial and policing functions. While the Camorra presents

an extreme (criminal) case, its corporate dynamic and structure shares much with corporate processes in general that are in constant tension with the political apparatuses of the state. Nonini develops this proposition, challenging, furthermore, the social-contract perspectives of the state developed in different ways by Hobbes and Rousseau. The state is premised on violence and the Weberian notion that the state ensures order through the monopolization of violence also implies that the state is founded on violence. The corporate state and definitely organizations such as the Camorra and the Mafia (drug cartels in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere are other obvious examples), if rhizomic, lateral and transnational in organization, have their order founded in violence. In this the corporate state threatens the order of states at root and, in Nonini's view, de-mythifies or demystifies the social-contract thesis of the state. In other words, the state is, as Rousseau argued, at root anathema to the interests of society and should be subject to the democratic control of the social or the political in the full sense of the term (see Ranciere 2006). Further, through his extended analysis of the Camorra, Nonini casts light on global processes of globalization and neoliberal ideology and policy, all of which are giving rise to what may be generally called the oligarchic-corporate state, which is indeed born from out of the chrysalis of the nation-state.

As whole, this volume examines through a set of specific ethnographic cases in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa the nature of the nation-state and its constitutive processes and socio-political effects in different cultural and historical contexts, with a concern to engage with its fundamental contradictions and unfolding dilemmas. Above all, the chapters examine the state as a project in continual transformation and, in particular, the changes of a global nature that are engendering an increasingly undemocratic corporate-state form.

Jonathan Friedman's Afterword expands on these aspects excellently, opening up dimensions that demand discussion. This Introduction was written from the understanding that the nation-state, as the political formation of Western modernity in particular, was in crisis – the nature of this crisis being tied to new configurations of capital affected by specific socio-cultural and historical circumstances. Since the chapters for the volume were written, the crisis of the nation-state has expanded, as exhibited in extremist populism and a general social and political dissatisfaction with the dynamics of capital and its transformations, driven by corporatism in which the digital and related technological revolutions are playing a critical role. The dilemmas at the peripheries of capital growth are coming home to roost at their centres. Friedman draws attention to such processes and, significantly, to the role of ideological forces (not merely neoliberal ones of an economistic kind but, for example, the role of the politics of identity and its connection to the

fragmentation of social orders in the transformational power/capital nexus of state systems). The powerful argument that Friedman presents indicates the cyclical and repetitive processes of state expansion and the decline of state orders. This highlights a scenario to which Friedman's Afterword and this volume as a whole must be unavoidably open. We may be, I suggest, on the cusp or threshold of a historical moment (a Weberian switch point) in which state and politico-social configurations and their dynamics are taking radical new directions away from the patterns of the past. These will demand new forms of conceptualization that are the enduring potential of the kind of anthropological approaches that the essays in this volume present.

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CHAPTER 1

Challenges to the European state

The deep play of finance, demos and ethnos in the new old Europe

Don Kalb

Given the lowly status of anthropology amidst other social-science disciplines, one could allow oneself these days perhaps some little, though certainly futile, shots of *Schadenfreude*. The 'unexpected' electoral choice for Britain's exit from the EU in June of 2016 (Brexit), and the 'surprise' emergence of Donald Trump with his neo-nationalist 'Trumpism' as the Republican candidate for US president, make a set of long-running social processes transparent that have been analyzed for years by anthropologists (Friedman 2003, 2015; Friedman and Friedman 2008a and b; Holmes 2000; Kalb 2002, 2005, 2009a and b, 2014; Kalb *et al.* 2000; Kalb and Halmai 2011), but which have been ignored, denied or shoved aside as 'extremism' by economists, political scientists and others that have been in demand as 'experts'. First, in the aftermath of the credit crunch of 2008, with its draconian bankers' socialism plus popular austerity, they had already been forced to admit, in the face of popular insurrection (the worldwide popular risings of 2011) that neoliberal financialized capitalism[1] had in the end not been 'lifting up all boats' via 'trickle-down' effects, as they had argued previously – compare for example Lawrence Summers over the years, or Martin Wolf 2005 and 2014. Inequality was now finally allowed on the agenda, even of Davos and similar events, in the form of a sanitized reading of capitalism and wealth effects over time, e.g. Thomas Piketty (2014). With Brexit and Trump these liberal pundits have been forced to take the next step, and connect the dots that anthropologists had been discussing for a long time: class polarization and 'middle-class stagnation'. In other words, dispossessed

1 By financialized capitalism I mean a system of capitalist accumulation in which the pool of liquid capital increases faster than the pool of fixed capital.

and disenfranchized working and middle classes, are setting themselves up as 'angry populists' against liberal-cosmopolitan elites, in the West and the not so West. Not just on the European continent – with its proverbially suspect histories – but also in the historical heartlands of anglo-liberalism. And this is progressing in ways that threaten to flush out institutional certainties that were assumed to be fundamental.

In this chapter on 'challenges to the European state', I take this hot conjuncture merely as a background, and will retreat into a scholarly reflection on the merits and shortcomings of Jonathan and Kaysa Friedman's (2008b) *Anthropology of Global Systems* (AGS), a set of interlinked theses that has been hugely predictive with respect to the rise of ethno-nationalist sensibilities (not necessarily electoral outcomes) in the context of globalized finance and Western decline. In my empirical discussion, I will focus on the European core and on Central-Eastern Europe; not on the Eurozone South in crisis, as some might have expected. I will note though that political processes in the South are not anticipated at all by the AGS, which does not leave room for a left-wing revival. But rather than highlighting that obvious and theoretically significant omission (see Kalb 2013), my focus on the North and the East makes a critique and further specification possible of precisely the strongest features of the AGS thesis, ones that have proven themselves to be powerfully predictive.

Opening points for an anthropology of the state

The anthropology of the state has always been based on a fundamental disbelief in Max Weber's vision of the state as literally an apparatus – bureaucratic, hierarchical, rational, specialized – separated from the wider society, and only tangentially touched by its social underbelly of needs, contradictions, myths and magic. Where Weber saw a separate public mechanism, anthropologists saw a whole social and cultural organism. There has therefore always been an elective affinity between anthropological ideas of the state as an 'illusion' (Asad 2004) and a 'fiction of philosophers' (Radcliffe-Brown cited in Gulbrandsen 2011) and the post-functionalist view of a hardly transparent set of social interactions that may sometimes be forced to call itself the state, may sometimes voluntarily do so, and then again cunningly seeks to deny the public responsibilities that come with it (Sampson 2003; Tilly 1985). Anthropologists have turned the relationship between the state and society around and made it, as they ought to, much more complex and fluid. Kapferer's idea of the state as the point where potentialities embedded in social relationships are assembled, focused and made socially efficacious in the form of collective will, is an excellent starting point (1997). However, this does not yet systematically address the all-important issue of asymmetric and contradictory social relationships, of extraction, appropriation and

domination, in short, of class, and its consequences for the projection of power, as Eric Wolf was seeking to do as he moved from *Europe and the People* (1982) to *Envisioning Power* (1999).

Marxists, like anthropologists, have always rejected the independence and natural rationality of the state, seeing it, in nuanced or less nuanced ways, like Marx, as 'the executive committee of the bourgeoisie', the tool of the ruling class. The state was no more rational than the bourgeois economy itself, the logic of which was supposed to lead to nothing less than its own collapse. The Western bourgeoisie after Marx, however, began sinking its wealth into large specialized factory complexes, supported by urban infrastructure and public institutions, for which extensive tax bases and public financial structures were built (for a summary vision see Kalb 2015). Thus the state grew more entangled with a society of workers and learnt to make compromises on behalf of its self-reproduction in the long run. It developed alliances, for example with Weberian charismatic feudal rulers in Germany and Japan; or more broadly, with popular movements and 'common sense', as in Gramsci's Italy; or with productivity and consumerism, as Gramsci described for American Fordism; and with labour in general in the construction of the modern welfare state in the West and the developmental states in the global South and East. Thus the state, for Marxists, was not the self-centred organization of bureaucratic rationality, but rather the institutional condensation of class struggle, contradictions and compromise, including the hegemonic organization and *mise-en-scène* of myths and rituals of collective being, belonging and 'futurity' (Hobsbawm 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). Indeed, for this it was seen as more superbly and collectively rational than the bourgeoisie as executive committee on its own could have made the state to be. Class struggle from below gave, or could potentially give, the capitalist state some rationality (or rather rationalities) against its own repressive and destructive inner self. This was, arguably, one of the things that Marx meant with the possibility of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' (rather than one-party-statism, see Luxemburg 2009).

Anthropologists and Marxists since the 1980s have been affected by, and have reflected upon, what has commonly been called globalization, a process that is incontestably and deeply impacting – though differentially so – on both the myth and the fact of the nation-state. Globalization has boosted the doubts of Marxists and anthropologists about the fetish of the Weberian state. Anthropologists, among others, have focused on the intensified local/global assembling of cultural and often violent political forms beyond the developmental state (e.g. Bayart 2009; Collier and Ong 2004; Ferguson 2006; Friedman 2003; Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2003; Geschiere 1999; Reyna 2003; Sampson 2003), and have pictured states as hybrid cultural formations within uneven transnational flows (Appadurai 1996; Hannerz 1991, 1996), flanked by

the re-invigoration of sorcery (Geschiere 1999; Kapferer 1997, 2002), myth and religion. Kapferer has called attention to the increasing corporatization and oligarchization of the state (Kapferer 1997, 2005, 2009). Marxists, among others, have focused on the decline of developmentalism, Fordism and the welfare state (Harvey 1989, 2005; Jessop 2002; MacMichael 2008); on the financialization, credit and the space-making projects of surplus capital, including the new imperialisms (Arrighi 1996, 2000; Harvey 2003, 2005, 2010); and on the potentialities of and for resistance (Harvey 2003; Silver 2003; Waterman 2001; outside Marxism, see also Tarrow 2005). Neoliberalism, its discontents and local articulations, has served as a common background to these paths of enquiry in the last fifteen years (Clarke 2004, 2008a and b; Harvey 2005; Kalb 2000, 2005; Kalb and Halmai 2011; Nonini 2008; Smith 2008). In some of the work of John and Jean Comaroff, Bruce Kapferer, Susana Narotzky and Gavin Smith, Mike Davis and Slavoj Zizek vibrant overlaps between these institutionally separate fields have been explored (see also, Kalb 2009a and b, 2011).

Some of these globalization-focused lines of enquiry come together powerfully, and in original ways, in Jonathan and Kaysa Friedman's 'anthropology of global systems' (AGS; Friedman and Friedman 2008 a and b), an uncommonly ambitious effort at macro-historical-anthropological theorizing. They picture cycles of economic and political centralization and decentralization throughout human history as capital concentrates in particular places and then moves out of them again when cheap competitors begin to crowd out high-cost established centres. Phases of expansion around a particular core (Athens, Rome, 'the West', the US), they argue, lead to the hegemony of political centres and their elites, and are expressed in the spread of individualist, pragmatic, consumption- and future-oriented modernities detectable throughout human history. Phases of hegemonic decline, on the other hand, lead in their vision to the fragmentation of common instrumentalist identities, the collapse of homogenizing modernisms, and a search for roots in mythic pasts among populations, thus generating quasi-primordial cultural-identity conflicts. In such regressive phases or spaces, according to the Friedmans, hegemonic ruling classes turn themselves into cosmopolitan elites that celebrate multiculturalism but forsake their connection with declining local economies and societies, thereby destroying their own political hegemony together with the cultural hegemony of modernism. The Friedmans summarize these deepening social and cultural antagonisms in the downward phase with their important concept of 'double polarization': polarizations affecting relationships of both class and cultural identity. For contemporary

states in the old declining Western core, crowded out by the BRICS[2] and other cheap mass manufacturers in the global East and South, they predict the transformation of erstwhile Fordist workers into ethnic folks that increasingly resurrect (ethno-religious) neo-nationalisms against both the ethnicized *classes dangereux* of immigrants and surplus populations, on the one side, and rootless cosmopolitanism sponsored by the globalized ruling classes on the other (Friedman 2003; Friedman and Friedman 2008a and b). Clearly, this is a hugely ambitious and pertinent body of work. Importantly, unlike most writing on the left, it expects the globalization of capital to be associated not with a rising leftist counter politics but with a descent into a Tom Wolfe-like 'bonfire of the vanities' within the violent politics of cultural identity.

Here, I want to take up two aspects of the 'Friedman thesis' that are crucial for discussing contemporary challenges to the European or Western state, but which are as yet insufficiently developed in the AGS. First, I am interested in what David Harvey has called the 'state-finance nexus', the 'confluence of state and financial power that confounds the analytic tendency to see state and capital as clearly separable from each other' (Harvey 2010:48). I will explore this in relation to two periods: a historical one and one in the current conjuncture, highlighting basic structures and core mechanisms of state and finance that are relevant for the broad Friedman thesis, as well as the situated *histoires événementielles* in which they are embedded and in which double polarizations become politically expressed. I note throughout that the social struggles that shape the state-finance nexus can only be understood as part of class formations that must be seen as deeply culturally suffused.

Secondly, I will look in more detail at the current making of ethno-national populisms in the European Union/Eurozone in response to neoliberal globalization and developments in the state-finance nexus, including the associated class formations and alliances (see Kalb 2009, 2011; Kalb and Halmai 2011). My intention will be modest: to hold these aspects up for closer observation, open them up, and throw some selective light on their inner structures.

The Friedmans' work is robust on hegemony and identities, but much less specific on the variable historical relationships between capital and the state, and the actual identity projects springing from the political fights around the state-finance nexus. AGS therefore also under-specifies class (see Kalb 2013). In fact, the Friedmans' Weberian notion of capital as 'abstract wealth' points them in the opposite direction, away from the state-capital nexus and away from the class formations structured around it. These are never abstract but

2 The five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

always concrete, demonstrably relational and institutional concatenations, producing a lot of historical huffing and puffing. For the Friedmans, capital can apparently singlehandedly decide why, where, when and how it will move. It either concentrates in a place, creating hegemonic and inclusive modernisms in the centre and the hinterlands, or diffuses again over space, all the time making and destroying hegemonies and determining the ebb and flow of identity politics. Abstract wealth can apparently act of itself and for itself, within its own sphere of calculation and agency. Rather than a social and institutional relation articulated by the state, it is mere pecuniary wealth. There is little overt politics involved and no class struggle is apparently to be expected, only random ethnic violence, like in Martin Scorcese's *Gangs of New York.* The state is insufficiently perceived as a crucial mediation mechanism for capital, one that can either set finance to work locally or help it to flow globally, and which enforces the conditions under which either of this should happen. I claim that the state is even the *conditio sine qua non* for capital formation under capitalism. The absence of relational concreteness reduces, then, the purchase of their vision on contemporary capitalist societies. Indeed, it is no coincidence that they tend to play down the idea of *capitalist* society. Their notion of capital as abstract wealth inhabits more generally all 'commercial civilizations'.

I claim below, as David Harvey has suspected and elaborated all along, that it is precisely the emergence of the *capitalist* state-finance nexus, produced and indeed fought for by a capitalist class in the form of historical 'bourgeois revolution' (see Anderson 1992:105–20; Davidson 2017), which has historically defined capitalism as 'a mode of production'. The capitalist state-finance nexus sets social processes in motion that cannot simply be equated with 'commercial civilizations' in general. It brings social forces and a set of mechanisms into play that require a far more specific grasp, including mechanisms that generate specific identity projects for which the Friedmannian concepts of cultural process are broadly relevant but not necessarily sufficiently precise.

The myths of 1688 and the making of global capitalism

We can gain analytic traction if we return for a moment to the classical debate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and focus on the emergence of the capitalist state-finance nexus. With new historical research in hand, we can demonstrate that capitalism, as distinct from abstract pecuniary capital in commercial civilizations, emerges at the precise historical moment that (over-) accumulated capital within the most advanced mercantile city-state – the United Provinces – takes armed control over a large and potentially strategic territorial-state – England – on behalf of the survival of its own capitalist class.

This moment, in 1688, was later mystified as 'the Glorious Revolution'. After the subjection of England's political centre, the occupiers reformed its core institutions, in particular its state-financing mechanisms and tax-extraction systems, all with an eye on their own protection and expanded reproduction. And after so many failed starts in history, as city-states went down in military competition with territorial states, stagnated (Venice), or financialized themselves with a territorial regime they had no control over (Genova), the new collusion of transnational capital and territorial power finally set 'endless accumulation' in motion. Let us have a closer look at this moment of the birth of capitalism – as distinct from capital as abstract wealth – and take note of the spatial, territorial, social and identity processes emerging in its wake. The argument highlights financialization, state-making, imperialism, class formation and dispossession as (violent) relational mechanisms, rather than abstract wealth, as prime movers.

The precise dynamics underpinning this momentous historical shift have not been well understood. For the classic authors in the debate about the transition from feudalism to capitalism, it has always remained a bit of a black box, in which at some point around 1700 the United Kingdom somehow surpassed the United Provinces in commercial prowess, to be explained in general by her larger resources. Both Wallerstein (1980) and Arrighi (1996) have little more specific to say about it. For Robert Brenner, it is not even significant, because for him the UK's capitalism emerges as an internal phenomenon in its own countryside, driven by agrarian class formation, the enclosure movement and the creation of a landless proletariat (Brenner 1987, 1993). For Brenner 'capitalism in one country' seems a perfect possibility. Whig historians, upon whom most of the Marxist and world-systems analyses have built, have not been less vague. They describe the emergence of a 'political union' in 1688, when the Dutch *Stadholder*, William III, became King of England, supposedly invited by the Whig party and the protestant gentry during their 'glorious revolution' (Ferguson 2004; Pincus 2009; see also Brenner 1993). This is indeed what the classical text, Macaulay's *The History of England* (2006 [1848]), narrates. But 'political union' is a highly un-analytic term suggesting some kind of rosy get together. That sort of 'union' does not exist in the history of states (as the EU-Eurozone is demonstrating before our eyes, despite its 'rosy' rhetoric); certainly not when a container of concentrated capital and maritime fire-power such as the United Provinces, commanding at the time still more than half the worlds' ships and itself ontologically disinterested in territory, is one of the designated partners. The city-state had very specific interests in making a 'union', and these were infinitely better served if their outcome were to be forever represented as a friendly merger on English request.

Recent research suggests that the story about the 'invitation' is in fact one of the most grandiose cases of mystification in modern history, a myth that has continued to anchor the grand narrative of the English state and its glorious revolution until the present day, including all the core liberal concepts springing from it – freedom, liberty, popular sovereignty, parliamentary democracy, civil society, accountability, toleration. However, this invitation was, in crucial respects, not unlike the one sent to the United States of America by the Washington DC-based 'Committee for the Liberation of Iraq' in 2002. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 has always been depicted as a national revolution of an independent Protestant people against a Catholic tyrant, James II, who was destroying their rights and liberties of old; a local uprising helped a bit by the Dutch *Stadholder* on the request of the democratic insurgents. This myth was recently re-narrated with vigour by Pincus (2009).

Research in Dutch archives by Jonathan Israel (1995, 2003), however, has established that the 'glorious revolution' was in reality a full-fledged Dutch military occupation with the official, though secret, intention to make the English 'useful to their friends and allies, and especially to this state' (*Secreete Resolutien*: iv, 230–4, cited in Israel 1995:849). There was indeed substantial internal English support, as emphasized by Pincus. But that support was partly generated by a deliberate Dutch propaganda campaign for the 'protection of English liberties' and partly organized by English dissenters and expats residing in Amsterdam and The Hague (as with the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq in Washington DC). Moreover, local support only began materializing after any doubts about the superiority of William of Orange's fighting power over that of James had subsided. More than an internal rebellion, 1688 was therefore what Israel calls 'the Anglo-Dutch moment': an invasion by one of the largest war fleets that early modern Europe had ever seen – 500 ships and 25,000 hardened and superbly paid mercenaries – requested and financed by the City of Amsterdam and the Dutch States General.

The Burghers of Amsterdam did so with a strategic design in mind that was as audacious as it was desperate. Threatened by the rising military clout of France and its world-empire designs, and with the prospect of a decisive land-based military battle that might not be withstood by the Amsterdam defences, the intention of the leading burghers, normally extremely prudent, was to externalize their staggering territorial protection costs with one surprise seaborne move, and shift the balance of forces in Europe once and for all to their own advantage by enforcing an alliance with an England that would now be commanded by the Dutch military-bureaucratic elite. From late December 1688 onwards, with full control over the centre of London, James II fleeing and an important middle-gentry segment in the provinces willing to collaborate on Dutch terms, William made England responsible,

also financially, for defending Amsterdam and the Dutch cities, while his own fighters would unify the English Isles against the counter revolution led by James II from Ireland and supported by France. This daring plan succeeded, the French military was contained and a 'perpetual Protestant alliance' was forged – which lasted indeed a few decades, though in fact began collapsing almost right away via the inexorable profit-seeking of the perpetual allies.

The pièce de résistance of the Dutch designs was certainly not the crown of James II, but rather the creation of the Bank of England in 1693/4. The Bank, thoroughly modelled on Dutch financial practices, guaranteed Amsterdam-based investors higher fixed rents in English state bonds (8%) than even the Dutch East India Company (VOC) could deliver. It also made the English state accountable for guaranteeing the value of these investments, backing them up with a tax-extraction system imposed by William and featuring the highest tax rates within Europe (except for the United Provinces itself). This was explicitly linked to the strengthening of a parliamentary regime that would demand 'accountability and transparency' (in our current terms) from the monarch and prevent him from defaulting or inflating away the debts of the Bank of England on his own account (as, in contrast, the French king was reputed to do), as later described by the important Dutch Sephardic Jewish financier Isaac de Pinto (2009 [1774]).

Thus was created the first credible alliance between territorial-state making, empire building and globalized capital accumulation since the Roman Republic. The Bank and its wider constitutional, legal and institutional environment was in fact a historically unique accumulation mechanism combined with global capital formation. It would work in tandem with the English state, which would now have the financing mechanisms in place for outcompeting France on the North Atlantic (initially in alliance with the Dutch) and imposing capitalist relationships all over the globe. The Bank facilitated the recycling of Dutch capital into the making of the Atlantic space of flows, creating a spatial division of labour among a 'Commonwealth' of nominally 'free' constituencies connected through the circuits of capital, with London as its centre and entrepôt. After the Anglo-Dutch moment, the enclosure movement in the English countryside, so essential for the Brenner thesis, was legalized and dramatically accelerated and the transition within England now became hegemonic and irreversible.

In other words, the making of the modern English state and the Bank of England, including its further ramifications of imperialism abroad and (agrarian) capitalism at home, was largely the outcome of a military occupation ordered by Amsterdam-based capital, first to save itself, and then to create a larger and secured space for its own operation. Until late in the eighteenth century, the 'financial revolution' (Brewer 1988) that drove British

imperialism forward was primarily financed from Amsterdam. Over this period of a hundred years, the English state debt multiplied more than ten times, while revenue boomed even more. The Anglo-Dutch moment signalled the transition from the pre-capitalist long phase of city-state formation in the interstices of territorial empires to actual modern capitalism as a space-making project of new – capitalist – social and institutional relationships that could be imposed on territories and communities whose reproduction would subsequently become dependent on it. The relational core of that space-making project was composed of three elements: the creation of dependent labour forces (free, bonded or enslaved), 'free' and 'endless' capital circulation, and imperial-military state power focused on enforcing contracts, property rights, debt obligations and the management of unequal exchange. As Harvey (2010) has emphasized, the capitalist-dominated state-finance nexus was its driving engine, and was born between 1688 and 1694. Liberalism, toleration, freedom, markets and contracts were its key domestic notions, undergirding the inclusive and individualist hegemonic modernity discussed by the Friedmans.

Local consequences: the Dutch ur-type

What happened in the old urban cores of The United Provinces when local capital was financialized and sent out to undergird the British Empire and the new spaces of accumulation? After all, Holland was by far the most urbanized landscape in the world, with a good majority of its population already residing in cities and thoroughly dependent on markets. What insights can the eighteenth-century Dutch case generate for the Friedmans' downward phase of collapsing accumulation and hegemony?

While capital was disinvested and new locations were developed for industry abroad, Dutch cities and industries almost immediately began to decline. The most industrialized centres, such as the textile towns of Haarlem and Leiden, ultimately lost more than half their population. The same happened to Zaandam, Europe's first truly heavy-industry district, north of Amsterdam, with a capacity far surpassing Venice's Arsenal, its historic precursor. Rentier wealth, however, kept accumulating, with English and Dutch bonds and equities becoming the prime form of assets by 1750 (Israel 1995:998–1018). Amidst this social polarization, Dutch technology remained unsurpassed for almost three generations more, and the monopolistic 'rich trades' dealing with the East and West Indies kept generating great revenues for their stockholders. It took two to three generations after the decline had set in before unemployment and urban poverty became serious political issues. Pauperization was postponed. This was due to emigration of skilled artisans to

the new spaces of accumulation, and to the continued possibility of the return of the less skilled to the countryside.

But after two generations, inequality and oligopolization led to profound political and cultural stagnation. Protest against oligopolies, parasitic wealth and political closure had finally emerged into the open by the 1770s, partly in conjunction with the new liberal ideological ferment surrounding the American War of Independence. In the late 1780s, now in dialogue with the coming French Revolution, this finally led to an overthrow of established political elites in several cities by the 'Patriots' (Schama 1977). The Patriots, mostly stemming from urban middle classes in the provinces, called for anti-oligarchic and nationalizing liberal reforms. In fact, this echoed the spirit of William of Orange's campaign of 1688, though reinvigorated first by the transatlantic revolutionaries who drove American Independence forward, such as Thomas Paine, and then by the revolutionary French Third Estate, with which they later allied. World-system theorists have pointed out that the successful revolutions in the modern world were always driven by the liberal ideologies from earlier uprisings (Bosswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Wallerstein 2004). This was also the case with the exported liberalism of the Anglo-Dutch moment. After a century of tumultuous entanglements elsewhere, it came back full circle. It had helped to overthrow not only all the state forms against which it had originally been launched (English and French royal absolutism), but also those on behalf of which it had been created (the United Provinces and the American colonies), by prefiguring both American independence and the Batavian Republic (the forerunner of The Netherlands).

All through this period of Dutch decline combined with oligarchization, however, poor artisans and worker/peasants from the hinterlands and the Germanies kept migrating into the contracting but still comparatively agreeable Dutch cities. Despite sustained downward pressure on incomes, urban workers were succeeding, by and large, in defending their basic living standards. They were helped by the general deflation of prices in the eighteenth century, as low-cost commodities arrived from the new overseas production spaces, including potatoes and high-calorie sugar (Israel 1995; Mintz 1985). Urban residence also became cheaper, as real-estate prices went into a deflationary spiral too. Urban standards of living therefore remained higher than in the surrounding 'underdeveloped' areas. Guilds and worker associations, however, were increasingly mobilizing against cheap, unskilled and 'uncivilized' workers from elsewhere, in particular when they happened to be Catholics.

In conclusion, the Dutch case largely corroborates the Friedmans' double-polarization theory in respect to the old declining core. The oligarchization of globally oriented corporate elites did indeed combine with a defensive

popular politics of religious nationalism among urban working classes aimed against new immigrants. However, and not anticipated by the Friedmans, defensive nationalism was later turned to more offensive political use by provincial middle classes as they started the long (and transatlantic) marriage of nationalism and liberalism contra oligarchy, privilege and corruption that was quintessentially expressed in the American and French revolutions. Also, decline did only very gradually affect Dutch banking, multinationals (e.g. Dutch East India Company), technology and oligarchs, whose apogee could be celebrated for another three generations. Significantly, the declining state could continue to finance its debts easily. In fact, it could do so against a lower interest rate than even the British state could command. This was possible because of its large domestic oligarchic capital base, not unlike twenty-first century Japan and probably prefiguring the future of the West as a whole. Finally, while popular living standards were stagnating and perceived to be under continuous threat, there was in fact no real overall collapse. Price deflation of global commodities and local real estate made social reproduction in the old urban core more affordable. Real-estate deflation, however, probably contributed in the longer run to the deepening animosity between provincial middle classes on the one hand, dependent as they were on declining local values, and the urban patriciate on the other, who could reap monopoly rents from property claims in the global economy. This was one of the basic class divisions that ultimately produced the liberal-nationalist overthrow of 'corrupt oligarchies' by the end of the eighteenth century.

This is a scenario not provided for by the Friedmans' framework, one that could become relevant in the currently declining West, which may not escape systematic deflation. While the Friedmans did not anticipate the potentially double character of the primordialist-collectivist identities getting reframed by middle classes for liberal, 'nationalizing' and 'modernizing' purposes against globalized oligarchies, they neither pictured how in the new spaces of production – the Americas, the Atlantic ports, the English countryside – the modern individualist liberalism spread by the current hegemon was gradually radicalized against the rule of capital and against the hegemon itself. The new eighteenth-century liberalism articulated, on the one hand, as the Friedmans would expect, a broad belief in contracts between individuals and a pragmatic consumerism. But it also gave life to antagonistic and more radical, and indeed universalist-collectivist, strands that would come to articulate the claims of dispossessed British peasants (Thompson 2009), uprooted transatlantic worker-travellers and seamen (Linebaugh 2003; Linebaugh and Rediker 2008), American colonists, French revolutionaries and even impoverished Dutch burghers (Schama 1977). Like the collectivist primordialisms that could turn liberal and individualist, the new individualist modernisms could turn

collectivist and radical (see also Kalb 2013). Cosmologies and ideologies were therefore not of one piece, but plastic and malleable, and in fact internally agonistic along lines that reflected the making of new class formations. It is therefore the dynamism of class struggles, both within the new spaces of capitalist expansion as well as within the old cores, including the cultural class struggles within the repertoires of the new modernisms and neo-primordialisms, that remain underdeveloped in the anthropology of global systems (Kalb 2013).

Again, this critical absence can be explained by the Friedmans' Weberian notions of capital and class. A Marxist vision would point to relational mechanisms such as the systematic dispossession that inevitably accompanies capitalist financialized expansions. After all, by definition, capitalist control over the state-finance nexus produces not just new wealth but also new victims, as ordinary producers are dispossessed, crowded out and pushed into markets under terms not of their own choosing, as underlined by Harvey's notion of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2005). This suggests, once more, that we need a better purchase on the concept, the processes and the mechanisms of class in order to better grasp the interlocking relations of state, capital, culture and society within the historicity of globalizing moments (see Carrier and Kalb 2015; Kalb 2015).

Financialization and state capture 1989–2009

In 1798, the Dutch United East India Company, the VOC, was finally dismantled and nationalized by the Patriots. It had devolved into a symbol of oligarchy and corruption. The Dutch now ridiculed the VOC as '*Vereniging Ondergegaan door Corruptie*', 'an association destroyed by corruption'. The Seventeen Lords who had ran the multinational enterprise since its inception, '*De Heeren 17*', had become synonymous with oligarchic closure and rottenness. In an almost analogous contemporary emplotment, Simon Johnson, the former Chief Economist of the IMF, in a book entitled *13 Bankers* (Johnson and Kwak 2010), analyzes the current equivalent of *De Heeren 17*: the small circle of key financiers enjoying oligarchic control over the late-capitalist financial markets centred on Wall Street, including unparalleled private leverage over the state-finance nexus of the US government.

In phases of decline, when capital in the old core is disinvested, made liquid and exported in search for new sources of valorization elsewhere, financial sectors in the old core states inevitably grow in economic and political importance while industrial capital declines, as we have classically seen in the Dutch case. Over time, such financial actors will seek to transform the state-finance nexus from one focused on financing the material expansion of the domestic territory to one that becomes ever more geared to facilitating

the short-term interests of the growing pools of globalized liquid capital (Gowan 1999; Panitch and Konings 2009). This is what has produced financial 'deregulation' in the neoliberal era. Financialization may enhance domestic technological innovation and specialization, and may generate some new growth. But other consequences are less virtuous. Apart from inequality and oligarchization at home, as we have seen in the Anglo-Dutch moment, they also include the use of state power and financial instruments for the making of new proletariats in less developed locations, which then put further downward pressure on the social wage in advanced locations and other peripheral locations alike; the promotion of 'free trade' against existing producer interests; and the management of 'unequal exchange' via the diffusion, proliferation and protection of contractual claims, property rights and debt servicing. This is precisely what neoliberal globalization over the last thirty years, driven by the Washington-Wall Street Complex and the US state, has done. In the course of the process, a network of international institutions and agreements has emerged around WTO, IMF, World Bank, G8 and now G20 meetings that some have called the beginnings of a transnational Western state (Kalb 2005; Shaw 2000), a structure now reaching out to include, in a subordinate position, and 'educate' some of the largest players of the Global East and South (the BRICS).

Neoliberal globalization has thus been the contemporary financialization-cum-space-making analogy to the Anglo-Dutch moment. As in the ur-type, it generated and incorporated many new actors – proletariats, entrepreneurs, capitalists and states – in new locations linked by the expanding circuits of capital. And it refurbished the mythological themes of the original moment: democracy, transparency, self-determination, markets, civil society, individualism, accountability and contracts. It also led to oligarchization in the old core. Johnson's thirteen bankers stand for the creeping capture of the Western state and public interests by oligopolistic finance. Over time, financialization tends to produce state capture by the financial class (Visser and Kalb 2010), *n'importe* the democratization myths under which it operates. *Haute finance*, in the felicitous words of Loyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs, is after all 'doing god's work' – hardly a claim for popular accountability.

If one Googles 'state capture' one will find that the World Bank has reserved the concept exclusively for badly managed economies in the Global South and Central Asia. The concept is meant to explain a lack of social differentiation, economic dynamism, openness and transparency in corrupt countries that are dependent on the export of a single commodity and whose core state-functions have been captured by the actors involved in the dominant sector. The concept was also typically used in the context of the collapse of Communism in 1989–92, where it served as an argument for

fast across-the-board privatization of state assets, lest 'insider interests', read 'Communists entrenched in core industries and ministries', capture the state (see also Woods 2007:11, 104–40).

The disproportionate growth of finance in the West in the last thirty years has produced similar de-differentiations of a prior and more complex social and economic ecology, and has made core states ever more dependent on one single 'crop'. Indeed, Simon Johnson has called them 'banana economies' (Johnson 2009). Any recent study of the 'liberalization' of finance over the last three decades has highlighted the phenomenon of 'regulatory capture' (Kay 2009): big finance was allowed to write its own operating rules under Greenspan's mantra of 'the market knows best'. We also know that a whole line of key personnel in the heart of the US state-finance nexus had its roots and ultimate allegiance in Wall Street, in particular with Goldman Sachs. More than 400 ex-members of the senate currently work as lobbyists for Wall Street on Capitol Hill. The New York Fed, which oversees and micro-regulates Wall Street, was according to insiders effectively ruled by Goldman (Tett 2009). But beyond the somewhat technical notion of 'regulatory capture', it makes historical and analytic sense to talk about state capture by finance *tout court*. Or, as Willem Buiter, a former member of the monetary committee of the Bank of England commented: finance was 'almost a law unto itself' (*Financial Times*, 1 September 2009).

State capture by finance implies, in a sociological sense, that whole publics and institutions outside the financial sector proper have become vitally dependent on its circuits. As we know, many banks are now 'too big and too interconnected to fail'. Total outstanding obligations of banking sectors in Western countries now often exceed yearly GDP, sometimes even up to ten times (Iceland). As a consequence of the growth of a market-based housing sector in the later post-war period, large segments now rely directly and heavily on credit and debt instruments, many of them traded in global financial markets. Pensions tell a similar story. Local communities, and states too, have become increasingly dependent on financialized forms of revenue and planning. All of them depend on large pools of liquid capital and low interest rates (see Turner 2008), underpinning the continued dominance of finance over other public interests.

As the functioning of whole societies has been absorbed in the dynamics of financialization, the sector itself has become ever more oligopolized. Through mergers and takeovers, Western financial corporations have become uniquely concentrated. The IMF sees not more than eleven transnational banks as the 'systemic' pillars of the global system (*Financial Times*, Lex column, 4 June 2011). In the US, only three major Wall Street investment banks are now left. These three are arguably the actual engines of financialized and globalized

capitalism, the ultimate ‘market-makers’ (Augar 2005). This group of three is dominated by just two of them, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley.

Parallel with the increasing oligopolization in investment banking, the growing size of integrated banks, and the increasing chunk of the national economy that is entangled in their webs, their share of total capitalist profits has soared. In the 1970s and early 1980s the US financial sector never earned more than 16 per cent of total profits. By 2004, however, it was claiming over 40 per cent of the profits of corporate America (Johnson 2009). Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan strove for profit levels on their own equity of 20 to 30 per cent while profitability outside the banking sector was frozen at around 7 per cent (Augar 2005). Earnings and bonuses in the financial sector peaked, outgrowing the incomes of any other population segment of Western societies.

At the same time, the financial elite successfully lobbied for minimal taxes. In the City of London, investment banker Nick Ferguson publicly questioned whether it was unfair that he paid less tax than his cleaner (Peston 2008:20). The fierce competition between global cities such as New York, London and Paris assured the expansion of low-tax and no-tax regimes for financial corporations and their specialists, even more so than for industrial corporations, whose actual contributions to the tax bases of states had, notoriously, declined in the last thirty years.

The ratings agencies have been imagined as a bulwark of Hegelian objectivity against speculation and deflation, but they were captured as well. The implosion of the banks in 2008 was caused by the supposedly least risky assets on their balance sheets, the AAA rated ‘super senior risk’ (Tett 2009). While taking on the paraphernalia of public watchdogs, ratings agencies are in fact paid and owned by the very investment banks and investors they do the work for. The rating of escalating numbers of derivative products during the recent financial expansion was immensely lucrative. By 2005 it already counted for half the earnings of Moody’s, for example (Tett 2009:119). Moreover, since the ratings agencies were dealing with just a small coterie of banks, they were very vulnerable to pressure ‘from above’, as they now concede in public hearings (*Financial Times*, 3 June 2010). Tett writes that the investment banks ‘constantly threatened to boycott the agencies if they failed to produce the wished-for ratings’ (ibid.:119). Like the accountancy firms in the fraudulent Enron and Worldcom collapses of the early 2000s, the ratings agencies postured as handmaidens of an imagined ‘objective’ state, but had in fact become part of the spectacle of finance. They were as much gripped by greed as any insider, and fully exploited their position as ‘flex-organizations’ (Wedel 2010) on the blurred boundaries between state/public and private sectors. In August 2008, just a month before the great implosion on Wall Street, in a letter accompanying a commissioned report on the US banking

sector for Hank Paulson, Minister of Finance, Jerry Corrigan, a former New York FED chief now working for an investment bank, wrote that 'elevated financial statesmanship' was needed in the banking industry, but he lamented that 'there appeared to be precious few such bankers left' (Tett 2009:268). Not more than a month later, the absence of such 'elevated financial statesmanship' finally occasioned what one may well call an open effort at state capture by big finance: on three sheets of paper, former Goldman Sachs CEO Hank Paulson told Congress to make 700 billion dollars available at once for Wall Street, to be spent at his discretion and without any democratic deliberation or control. This, after a decades-long period in which there was very little public money available for anything.

State capture and regulatory capture was what made a new feature, the 'shadow banking system', possible in the 2000s. It was only in 2006 that reporters, in particular anthropologist Gillian Tett (see Tett 2009) of the *Financial Times*, started to alert the wider public to the existence of escalating global debts that were literally hidden away in a shadow system. Credit derivatives based on mortgages had been introduced in 2001 and had been booming. These liabilities, however, were immediately shifted from the public balance-sheets of banks into 'off-balance-sheet vehicles', which, by 2008, were hiding some 50 trillion dollars in debt from public scrutiny (close to the entire OECD GDP). These debts went far beyond what could be warranted by the capital bases of the banks; some of them were taking on a hidden leverage of 25 or 30 times their own equity, while their official leverage remained well within the Basle rules of 7 per cent. In a G8 meeting in Washington in April 2008, some months before Lehman Brothers would collapse, state officials from the G8 were interviewing hedge-fund managers, who, as the unregulated part of the global financial system, were supposed to be the ones causing risk, but one of them explained: 'it is not us you should be worrying about – it's the banks! It is the regulated bits of the system you should worry about.' (Tett 2009:190–1). Officials didn't yet understand that venerable banks had been operating a huge cover system that was soon going to blow up, and would then at once be pushed onto the public accounts.

The ticking time bomb was the increase of interest rates, which would inevitably come, and which would then make the roll over of existing debt much more expensive. As it happened, this finally came in response to staggering speculation by the same financial oligarchy in 'futures' contracts' in oil and basic commodities, which was itself partly a 'flight to safety' in the expectation of future trouble in the domestic housing sectors. This new speculation was driving up basic food and commodity prices for all economies in 2007–8, reintroducing inflation in a system that had seen very little of it for well over a decade, and creating the first generalized global concerns since the

1960s about insufficient food supplies and famines. Regulatory capture, too-big-to-fail bankers, dependent middle-class publics, huge debts piled up in a shadow system, and rising basic prices and interest rates cracked the system in 2008.

In an almost exact replay of the US predicament of October 2008, the EU in May 2010 was urged to write out a similar cheque of 750 billion euros, ostensibly to 'stabilize' the euro and 'show solidarity with the Greeks' and other nations on its periphery; in reality, to quote Karl Otto Pöhl, the deeply conservative former President of the German Bundesbank, 'to save the European Banks and the rich Greeks' (*Spiegel International*, 3 June 2010). Captured states were ready to take over and guarantee banking deficits and liabilities. They also shifted, for a short while, into a neo-Keynesian gear in order to pump up the collapsing economies. They were rapidly confronted with rates of state indebtedness that were higher than in the crisis years of the late 1970s that had led to the first wave of neoliberal attacks on the welfare state. Public indebtedness in the West is projected to creep up to some 115 per cent of GDP. The ratings agencies that had failed so readily during the financial crisis promptly started punishing states with lower ratings, and consequently higher interest rates to be paid to finance capital, ushering into a four-year-long period in which politicians elevated the spread in interest rates on the debt of nations as the single key datum to watch beyond trade and budget deficits.

I emphasize again that I'm writing of state capture as a purely sociological fact. It was predictable that in the course of a thirty-year period of financialization, the state-finance nexus of core Western states would increasingly be controlled by the wielders of liquid global capital, and would allow the latter to extend its circuits into new institutional and social arrangements. Such arrangements were at best weakly controlled by countervailing forces in economy and society, because such potential forces had been seriously weakened by the neoliberal solution to the 1970s crises in the first place. Turner (2008) has described how Western states and publics had become addicted to low interest rates and associated steady house-price rises, which compensated for real wage stagnation (see also Harvey 2010; Reich 2010). The housing-finance nexus in countries like the US, the UK, Ireland, Spain, Greece and the Netherlands has consistently added some 1 per cent to economic growth, partly through serving as an extra fund enabling consumption by senior citizens. Without this, relative wage stagnation outside the top incomes could never have been kept off the public agenda.

Indeed, the ostensible contemporary effort of states in fighting back against the financial class and re-regulating the sector is no more than a jumbo exercise in commodity fetishism delegated to the commodity fetishists

themselves. It concentrates solely on the circulation of finance and ignores the flip side of financialization: inequality, oligarchization and the diminution of the democratic power of citizens over the economy, whether in the declining core or the expanding periphery. In the rich countries of the OECD since the mid 1970s, the social wage has consistently declined in relation to the 'capitalist wage'. Thus, in the OECD, while actual mass purchasing power has declined in relative terms, a pool of some 7–10 trillion dollars on a yearly basis (some 20 per cent of OECD GDP) has become available for speculation purposes on behalf of the actual owners of the rich economies. While some 1.5 billion new workers were brought into the circuits of 'the global factory', tripling the global proletariat in the system, downward relative wage pressure has become intense. After 2000, it was in particular China that played a perverse role. The relative income of Chinese labour vis à vis capital has consistently deteriorated, pushing down global wage standards (Fung 2009) even despite recent concerted pressure by the Party for increased wages.

As in the eighteenth-century United Provinces, downward wage pressure did not lead to a collapse of livelihoods in the old core. It did lead to income stagnation and social petrifaction. But cheap credit, often tax deductible, compensated, helped to sustain the myth of endless growth, win-win solutions and ever-rising private wealth in real estate and portfolios. Under globalizing and financializing neoliberalism, the classes that were gaining, or having reasons to hope that they were included in the spoils, were certainly larger than in the eighteenth century. And as in the ur-type, deflation of prices of commodities and mass manufactures actually lowered living costs. It is quite unlikely, however, that middle-class wealth in real estate in the West will be spared deflation indefinitely, and indeed it is already shrinking significantly in some countries. Japan is the example here. It has become obvious by now that global portfolio investments, endorsed by large middle-class constituencies in the West, will not deliver the expected income (King 2010). Moreover, the downward movement of basic commodity prices such as food and energy has already been reversed, in a sharp contrast to eighteenth-century developments. This is little surprise: urbanization in East and South Asia and emerging middle-class wealth in the Global East and Global South produces competitive claims on the world's finite resources. New open spaces for large-scale commercial agriculture, as in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are not to be found anymore, and while Hubbert's peak may be contested (Reyna and Behrends 2008), there is no doubt that energy will be scarce in the near future. In other words, cheap commodities and compensatory housing wealth will reverse their long-term trends, and are beginning to erode purchasing power in the core: commodities up and housing wealth down. As in the classical case of the United Provinces, polarization and oligarchization,

kept from the public agenda until recently, will increasingly be openly exposed. Public indebtedness and austerity will trigger ever sharper contestations about who will be paying which costs.

Finance, sovereignty and 'the people' in the new old Europe

The Friedmans' work inclines towards the epochal. It is strong on the global and trans-historical interrelationships of capital flows, hegemonic cycles, and identity process. As such, it is lucid and enabling. The broad schema of a financialist phase, that poses globalized elites endorsing cosmopolitan ideologies versus a disinvested popular class responding in kind by embracing fantasies of the collectivist nation or ethnic group, is also intuitively relevant for much of contemporary Europe. This continent has seen an inexorable rise of ethno-nationalist politics over the last twenty years, with cultural/class divides roughly along Friedmannian lines (Berezin 2009; Eatwell and Mudde 2009; Gingrich and Banks 2005; Kalb 2009a and b; Kalb and Halmai 2011; Mudde 2007). This happened as the Western state and publics were, unequally but definitely, captured by finance capital. As a consequence, the democratic demos seems to be falling apart into an 'ethnic people' that resurrects the fetish of the organic nation against perceived culturally alien intruders invading from above and from below, and a cosmopolitan elite that feels allegiance to 'humanity' in the abstract rather than to any particular nation. One empirical index of this process of cultural class formation is the steadily declining participation in elections, both local, national and European; that is, except for the moments that ethno-political entrepreneurs sweep up the non-voters for a hike in populist neo-nationalist voting which then pushes the whole political spectrum further to the culturalist right. The non-voters, everywhere in Europe and the West, have potentially become the largest party, and their mobilization can obviate any expert prediction. The UK vote for 'Brexit' was a recent case in point. A non-surprising incident – except for the expert commentariat – within a longer systematic process.

However, the anthropology of global systems needs a firmer empirical hold on the diverse connections between the macro-process in space and the varied territorial outcomes in place. I have suggested that one way to do this is to look at the empirical developments in the state-capital nexus in various nation-states and to substitute precise relational and institutional concepts of capital and class for, respectively, the abstract Weberian idea of capital as wealth and Friedman's somehow culture-focused notion of class (but see Friedman 2015). What is happening to class and identity in the context of the current financial, economic and social crisis in Europe? And what does this suggest in relation to the key claims of the AGS? First, some methodological starting points.

Specific outcomes are influenced by the exact insertion of territories in the global capitalist class system; their histories of state-making, public contention and dominant politico-cultural repertoires; and the exact local/global parameters of class formation, experiences and alliances. Power is the key relational concept that mediates between financializing pressures and situated cultural process. And such relational power is operationalized as class configuration – cumulative and dynamic balances of power between actors connecting capital and labour, which are mediated by the state and the public sphere. The Friedmannian claim of cosmopolitanized elites versus indigenized people should serve less as a scientific conclusion then as an active research agenda, calling for specification, modification, dynamization and contextualization; a call for structured contingency so to speak.

Recall the plasticity of cultural discourses: as we have seen in the classic case of the United Provinces, populist cultural essentialisms – Douglas Holmes (2000) has called them 'integralisms' – can be transformed and 'liberalized' from within as they become appropriated by pro-active middle-class alliances putting rights-based nationalizing claims to the state. The recent 'tea party' movement in the United States, meanwhile, demonstrates that historically libertarian and individualist discourses can also again turn organic, holistic and collectivist as they picture a mythic 'free people' against a state run by big globalized capital. But cosmopolitan liberal individualist outlooks can also be radicalized and collectivized if they are taken up for rights-oriented collective claim-making, as in the democratic revolutions of the late eighteenth to mid twentieth century. The nature of the politics of identity over time is not forever fixed in discourses, but lies in the dynamic class alliances that contest and undergird the nature of the state and the nation, and in their re-appropriation and re-articulation of the historical ideologies of claim-making.

But this does not happen in a historical vacuum. These discourses, struggles and alliances of class have a crucial spatial aspect as well: the national insertion into a specific slot of the global capitalist system, both historically and contemporarily, makes a key difference. Whether a state is core or peripheral makes a difference for its capacities vis à vis global capital, and for its sovereignty – as is so obvious in the ongoing 'Greek crisis'. It also makes a difference for the composition, relations and historical discursive outlooks of its class formations. The specific slot in the world-system is, finally, systematically associated with the question whether a state today is, and perceives itself to be, liberal, postcolonial, post-fascist or post-socialist.

In the Friedmannian framework it is, in particular, the lower middle classes that remain somewhat underdetermined. They are suspended between the cosmopolitanism of the globalized elite and its natural supporters among the higher middle classes on the one hand, and the indigenized popular classes

on the other, both of which push and pull at its edges. The lower middle class and upper working classes are the contested terrain upon which hegemonies of cosmopolitanism versus ethno-indigenism are made.

The 'new old Europe' (Anderson 2009) is a very particular context for these processes of contestation. While the non-transparent and non-democratic top technocratic structures of the Union, already carrying a strong neoliberal imprint, are captured by global and financialized interests (with a European twist), the still nominally sovereign democratic nation-states remain the primary arena for the popular politics of social reproduction and redistribution. The new Europe, at the same time, contains both an old capitalist core that exports large sums of capital, and a large periphery in the south and east that receives huge capital imports of different composition.

The north-western states and the Union itself are ruled by mature capitalist ruling classes. These states and their ruling classes have much more resources at their disposal for bargaining with citizens and labour than the states and elites in the periphery; there is more space for compromise. Citizens of the core states can also, in principle, negotiate directly with national capitalists – even though this facility has dramatically declined in the era of globalization and financialization. At the same time, these states are also likely to be quite solidly captured by core financial actors of variable composition (large global banks and pension funds in UK and Netherlands; insurance conglomerates in Germany; local and cooperative banks in Spain, Italy Germany etc.). Their middle classes have become increasingly integrated in the global circuits managed by such actors (Panitch and Konings 2009), which tends to push the separation line between higher middle-class cosmopolitans and lower middle-class/working-class indigenists downwards. The peripheries, however, lack mature capitalist classes of their own, and they also lack resources. Their citizens bargain not with capital but with government elites that negotiate on their behalf with global capital; elites that can therefore also easily be 'bought' by global capital, which partly explains the corruption-mania in the periphery. Capital, also, and crucially, can choose to shop with another peripheral state if it does not like the bargains on offer, thus enforcing the system-wide logic of social dumping. This is what it means to have a 'dependent capitalism': A strictly circumscribed sovereignty in relation to the global forces of accumulation. It makes politics in places like Greece or Hungary more volatile and spectacular, but also often less efficient, than that of Germany or France.

The classic case of the United Provinces already showed that the politics of emancipation from financialized oligarchy has always featured strong transnational connections. They are part of system-wide cycles and repertoires of contention. The new EU-Eurozone relationships form a hugely contradictory context for this international embedding. On the one hand,

the density of EU-Eurozone contacts and the overlap of political discussions among nation-states assures a certain pressure toward the synchronization of political struggles and agendas, as the Eurozone crisis has underlined. It also assures internationalization of certain domestic political struggles.

The EU-Eurozone structure at the same time, however, ostensibly freezes formal sovereignty, accountability and democratic competition on the national level, and so far prevents the Europeanization of fiscal and social policies. National politicians also continue to make claims vis à vis each other in the Council of Ministers, and within the Euro-group more generally, on the basis of conflicting national interests. The European political structures thereby lock popular politics into the national grid; institutionalizes the very uneven mutual competition of nations before global capital and for influence within the EU; and therefore inevitably feeds the identity politics of the nation – even when we leave out the big issue of immigration for a moment. The EU-Eurozone, in contrast to the EU of old, cannot but magnify the bases for nationalism, including of the ethnic kind.

Ergo: the EU-Eurozone is a deeply contradictory vehicle. It strongly facilitates the internationalization of capital and elites, and simultaneously incarcerates the popular politics of globalization and finance in their national 'homes', which therefore tend to become pretty defensive indeed, even without taking the vexed issue of the politics of immigration into account. By its very structure, the EU-Eurozone must accelerate the Friedmannian trends

Consider two very different but also paradoxically similar cases: Hungary and the Netherlands (note, for reasons of space this can only be an extremely superficial discussion, see Kalb and Halmai 2011 for serious ethnographic exercises on various European settings). I use these two cases because I know them well and because they address key aspects of the Friedman thesis. But I have other reasons too. The current attention to the crisis of the European South, with its mainly leftist mobilizations against local and European capitalist practices, facilitates a certain intellectual laziness, conforming as these mobilizations do to the modernist expectations that rebellions against capital are being waged from within the theatre of the left. For the moment, and for non-surprising reasons, this is so in the Euro-Mediterranean area. The European South confirms my point vis à vis Friedman that a collectivist cosmopolitan response claiming democratic sovereign social rights against financialized globalization, peppered with a good dose of nationalism, remains a distinct possibility – so long as the EU-Eurozone structure does not entirely crush the leftist sovereignty demanded by these mobilizations. But I am more interested in the rise of right-wing, neo-nationalist sensibilities in wider Europe, and suspect that these will be more historically consequential than the left-wing risings in the disempowered South (see Brexit).

So let us get back to Hungary and the Netherlands. The latter country, in fact the historical centre of the capitalist core, the mother of all liberal cosmopolitanisms (of a sort), and since the 1980s a model of the financialization and internationalization of capital, indeed a giant of capital export. The former country, located in the Central European and post-socialist periphery, a historical generator of liberal, organic and fascist nationalisms, and of socialisms as well, and currently among the greatest recipients of Foreign Direct Investment per head in the EU (as percentage of GDP), as well as of portfolio inflows. These very different locations that cross the core-periphery divide (exporter versus importer of capital flows) have both generated neo-nationalist/indigenist political hegemonies in the last twenty years. Amid all their overwhelming differences, they are in a way the European neo-nationalist avant-gardes of the early twenty-first century: Hungary being a model for neo-nationalist processes in the post-socialist periphery; Holland representing a comparable evolution as in other small open countries like Denmark. This similarity of capital-sending and -receiving nations is not expected in the Friedmannian framework.

Rebelling against cosmopolitanism in Central Europe: the Hungarian case

Hungary has long been the poster-child of post-communist transition. In a conversion to capitalism started and controlled by (ex-)socialists, the country privatized more and faster to Western capital than any other Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) country. Proximity to Europe's industrial heartland, a good technological base, skilled workers and low incomes (400 euro per month median in 2008) turned it into one of the most successful export-led successes. Between 1995 and 2005 CEE has been more or less on a par with East Asia in attracting Western foreign direct investment, and much of that came in the form of either new factory complexes or financial and telecom services. These new factory complexes ensured that the Eastern peripheries had much higher export earnings to the core than the Mediterranean 'pleasure peripheries' of the EU. However, coming with long tax-holidays and dependent on Western suppliers, this new manufacturing base failed to fully compensate for the collapse of socialist industry. In the early 1990s more than 1.5 million jobs were destroyed nationwide (in a population of 10 million). The number of active workers plummeted to levels far below Western European averages and never really recovered. Investments were concentrated in the west of the country and around Budapest, and failed to revitalize the east and the south. Roma, concentrated in the east, turned from literate workers into a durably unemployed and heavily discriminated population, now largely dependent on social benefits, informal income and ethnic networks. Early pension schemes

cushioned some of the social effects of the collapse of socialist industry, but put escalating pressures on the finances of the state, which had already started its transition from socialism as the most indebted state of the former 'east bloc' (having been a member of the IMF since 1982).

Hungary implemented its first IMF-imposed austerity program in 1995. Since then, social transfers such as housing, energy or family allowances were steadily singled out for 'reform' and 'targeting'. A proliferation of small informal entrepreneurs, many of them precarious, created a one-sided tax base in which basically only those employed by the state and by transnational capital paid (high) taxes. CEE may have been a preferred destination of globalized capital, but for many of the inhabitants the actual experience of this 'successful transition' was one of creeping dispossession and disenfranchisement, or just low-level stagnation, rather than any crystal-clear social mobility (Kalb 2009a and b). By 2005, many of social historian Eszter Bartha's (2011) lower middle-class/skilled worker interviewees in the boom town of Gyòr, near the Austrian border, complained that building up a life around education and honest work, a family, a home and children had become excessively difficult in comparison to the socialist period (compare Hann 2015; Makovicky 2013).

What made this experience even less palatable, was that the privatization of the economy and the creeping neoliberalization of the state was organized by politicians and entrepreneurs with often demonstrable socialist backgrounds, who had now turned into Blairite social democrats (locally known as 'post-communists'). This had two important consequences for the political scene. First, as elsewhere in CEE, there was no Left remaining to publicly articulate any misgivings about dispossession, as all 'progressive forces' clustered around a narrow political centre, wedding political liberalism to economic neoliberalism – even more so than in the West. This included the 'anti-political' public intellectuals of the erstwhile opposition, who shifted en masse to neoliberalism or the conservative right. The public sphere was thus deprived of counter voices, while the media often actively denounced 'uncivil' protests and were keen to blame the 'losers of transition' for their own failures (Buchowski 2006; Kalb 2009 a and b, 2014; Makovicky 2013). Secondly, in keeping with the myths of post-socialist transition that blame backwardness in relation to Western Europe on socialism rather than on the preceding feudalism, the accumulated private frustrations were increasingly targeted at the post-communists, who were being accused, again as elsewhere in CEE, of robbing the country and erecting a fake capitalism that could only start to somehow resemble 'real capitalism' if these post-communists were finally purged from office (Bartha 2011; Ost 2005; Kalb 2009 a and b, 2011, 2014; Halmai 2010).

By the late 1990s the nationalists of Istvan Csurka got some support in the Hungarian provinces with this sort of rhetoric (see Bartha 2011), but it was only from 2002 onwards that the conservatives of the Fidesz party, unable to win elections on the basis of a middle-class oriented programme like the German CDU, began to respond to popular frustrations (Halmai 2011). Electorally, they had to break into the socialist constituencies of the suburban blocs of the sixties and seventies, whose inhabitants had remained grateful to the socialists for having gained their apartments –which were more or less given to their occupants in the early nineties – and their pensions. Fidesz now became ever more openly nationalist in its rhetoric, offering the 'losers of transition' a caring and deserving nation as the antidote to the perceived transnational loyalties and corruption of the (post-)socialists. Its neo-nationalism, however, increasingly articulated traditional left-wing themes such as misgivings about the privatization of hospitals, reduction of social transfers and corrupt privatization deals, which resonated powerfully with the wider population. Right-wing mobilizations against 'the theft from the nation' ultimately led to months of large demonstrations against the post-socialists before the parliament in the fall of 2006, after the prime minister had admitted he had stolen the elections with lies about Hungary's finances.

These massive mobilizations did not prevent the ruling socialists from once more implementing austerity at the behest of the IMF and the ECB. But they did help to generate a more radical political formation, Jobbik, on the far right of Fidesz and driving it further into radical terrain. Partly tapping from the same constituency and sharing a similar but more biting and racist neo-nationalist repertoire, Jobbik was much more radical then Fidesz in identifying the 'people's needs' – jobs, national employment programmes, workfare for the Roma, enforced schooling for the Roma, protection against finance capital, security – and had a clearer idea of who the enemies were: transnational capital, the EU, liberal governmental elites and the Roma. Human rights and the associated international NGOs were posed against Magyar rights and national sovereignty. The Jobbik underbelly also blurred with a paramilitary formation, the Magyar Garda (now forbidden), which staged scary black-clad demonstrations in gypsy villages and Budapest itself. The fascist flags of the arrow cross of the thirties were now back in the streets of Hungary, supported by a vengeful blogosphere. The country seemed to indulge in a purifying ritual fight with the ghosts of socialists like Bela Kun, Rakosi and Kadar, now presented as all in close alliance with international forces and intent on selling out the nation for selfish gain, just like the contemporary post-socialists. In the elections of 2010 previous non-voters were massively mobilized (about 75 per cent voted versus the usual 55 per cent). Jobbik gained some 17 per cent of the vote while Fidesz won a full majority, producing a 'radical' right-wing populist

government with far greater support than any liberal government in Europe (70 per cent of seats). Thus, Hungary became the *locus classicus* in twenty-first-century Europe of a strong hegemonic bloc of the neo-nationalist Right. National socialism *sensu stricto*.

Global capital and finance played an escalating role in this neo-nationalist pathway in three interlinked ways. First, low corporate taxes (3 per cent on average), installed on behalf of competition for global capital, had kept the lid on state revenues. As a consequence, an effort by the (post-)socialists in the early 2000s to extend universal welfare rights and lift up the Roma from poverty backfired tremendously. Without complementary investments in education, in particular, a regional 'Magyar' mobilization of working citizens with insufficient incomes in de-industrialized north-eastern Hungary was underway to denounce the decline of standards in education as local schools lost the possibility to segregate Roma children into special schools (Szombati 2016). Erstwhile working classes and lower middle classes felt sold out on behalf of the domestic surplus population. This was one of the roots of the rise of Jobbik in the east.

Secondly, after the socialists had tried to placate the wider population with a thirteenth month pay-out per year, and a raise in public salaries and pensions after their narrow victory over Victor Orban in 2002, financial markets punished the socialists for Hungary's rising state debt and began demanding higher interest rates in the mid 2000s, leading to renewed socialist inflicted austerity from 2006 onwards.

Thirdly, in the context of the accession of Hungary to the EU, European banks had provided Hungarian home-owners with substantial low-interest loans in euros and Swiss francs over the boom years of 2002–8. This had, in fact, helped to compensate for the weak collective-bargaining power vis à vis transnational employers and for stagnating median salaries. The state had been entirely complicit in this. This had given Hungarian home-owners – practically the full post-socialist housing stock was privatized to its occupants – a sense of rising consumer wealth and EU-facilitated opportunities. In fact, the flow of loans was materially underwriting the public narratives of a successful transition and 'catch up' with the West; it was the brightest light on the post-socialist horizon. The global financial crisis turned this consumer-credit party into a nightmare: the mainly Austrian banks that were active in Hungary were facing losses on their eastern assets amidst the drying up of liquidity in late 2008/early 2009, and feared that they could be prevented from rolling over local private debts. The drying up of transnationalized credit now abruptly threatened mass private defaults in Hungary and elsewhere in CEE. This fear led to immediate falls in the forint, magnified by global speculation,

and to the rating agencies devaluing Hungarian debt to junk status, which multiplied the fears that local debtors might default en masse.

Austrian financiers, in an operation called 'the Vienna Initiative', now arranged a 25 billion dollar loan to the Hungarian state via the ECB and the IMF, as a buffer for the international banks and the forint. This was a new structure: the Hungarian state had an average debt compared to other EU countries and did not need an IMF loan, let alone one of this magnitude, for its normal financing. It was pushed to take it on because of the disappearance of credit in the international markets and the fears of private defaults by Hungarian clients. The Hungarian state had to cover the risks of the Austrian banks. The loan, however, came with the same neoliberal structural conditionalities for which the IMF had so long been criticized, such as privatizing the hospitals, introducing user fees, welfare retrenchment, substantial cuts in salaries in the public sector and in pensions, the withdrawal of the thirteenth month etc. – notwithstanding public denials by its Director, the French socialist Strauss-Kahn. In the context of the deepening popular distrust of the post-socialist government, there were a lot of rumours around the deal. Some commentators on the right suggested that the austerity measures had been proposed in the secret negotiations with the IMF by the socialist government itself, in order to inflict more pain on the nation.

When the new populist right-wing government was installed in the late spring of 2010, it immediately began punishing both the executives in the finance ministry, suspected of complicity with the deal, and the Austrian banks for the latest round of victimization of the Hungarian nation. The Director of the Hungarian National Bank, a post-socialist technocrat who had a second job as owner of an international business in Cyprus, saw his salary cut from 25 thousand dollars a month to 8 thousand. The ECB and the IMF promptly intervened on behalf of their millionaire by publicly warning that Hungarian politicians should not meddle with the 'independence of the national bank', but unsurprisingly failed to win this fight. Next, the new Fidesz finance minister threatened that Hungary could default on its international debts à la Argentina, which lead, in the context of the Greek crisis, to a serious scare among international financiers. When that explosive option was off the table, the government loudly proclaimed it was going to implement a comparatively high one-off tax on the banking sector, higher than any other country that was trying to make the banks pay for the financial crisis had the courage to (except Belgium, though silently). Fidesz declared that it intended to use the proceeds from this banking tax in creating a national fund to help house-owners prevent foreclosures by buying up the loans from the international banks. Later, it prolonged the bankers' tax and forced international banks to convert their hard-currency loans to forints against a reduced exchange rate

(2014) in exchange for the lifting of the tax (2016). It similarly pushed down the user fees, and therefore the profitability, of the now internationally owned utilities and media. It also refused to take up the second tranche of the IMF loan and rejected further talks with them. All of this, with the stark support of local majorities.

ECB accountants then refused to count Hungary's recently created private pension funds, promoted by the World Bank and managed by international banks, as national savings. As a consequence, the structural state deficit rose substantially and the government was once more pressurized by the EU and the ratings agencies to implement further budget cuts. Fidesz decided at once to re-nationalize the pensions in one big sweep, and thus knock down the deficit and forestall another round of EU-mandated cuts (a measure copied by the Polish Right in 2016). In local elections in the autumn, Fidesz was royally rewarded for its actions on behalf of the nation and could further consolidate its power. This it used to roll back a whole set of liberal checks and balances, including the rules and prerogatives of the Constitutional Court, one of the great liberal achievements of transition. It also threatened the liberal media, which had denounced the rise of the Hungarian right as the return of fascism, with a Fidesz-manned watchdog that would guard on issues of 'dignity' and 'factual correctness', for which the government was again reprimanded by the EU. Meanwhile, local Magyar self-defence organizations were mushrooming, often in the form of 'cultural heritage associations'.

In Hungary, in sum, post-socialist transition under the sign of neo-liberalism, transnationalization, and the financialization of capital, has produced its populist neo-nationalist other, even though this country was massively on the receiving side of the flows. The same has happened in Poland, with the gradual consolidation of a right-wing neo-nationalist regime inspired by Orban's Hungary. The Friedmans, thus, are confirmed, but by the wrong cases.

Third Way flexibility, competitiveness and xenophobia in the Netherlands

The Netherlands, in contrast, was on the sending side. Its financial sector had grown into one of the biggest and most transnationalized in Europe, controlling assets and liabilities well over four times Dutch GDP. Its pension and insurance funds were among the largest players on the European scene and globally. Tax-facilitated mutual funds had expanded hugely in the nineties and 2000s. Dutch real estate had risen 250 per cent or more in value between 1990 and 2005, sponsored by a generous full-tax deductibility of any interest payments on mortgages. The Dutch state had done everything it could to set up a powerful financial industry.

Though Dutch industry took heavy blows in the 70s and 80s, it renewed itself into a smaller but capable and internationally oriented niche sector, some of it pretty high-tech, with strictly managed and modest wage costs (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Dutch multinationals in electronics, consumer products, commodities, petro-chemicals etc. remained strong, as did the highly capitalized agricultural export sector. The export surpluses dwarfed even Germany and China (per capita), producing the most positive trade balance in all of Europe, and making the Netherlands, proportionately speaking, in fact the first paymaster of the European Union.

Economic success was coupled with a strong, almost Foucauldian/Benthammian welfare state. The social security offered by comprehensive benefits had been traded for increased control over their recipients, balancing 'rights and duties' in local parlance. The Dutch state seemed to be able to circulate unemployed workers endlessly into work again. All through the 2000s Dutch unemployment was among the lowest in the EU – part-time employment, in particular but not only of women, was an important aspect of that – and labour-market participation had reached US levels by 2005. By general agreement this was one of the most successful countries of the globalization era, one that was notoriously well managed. The social democratic/neoliberal government that started in 2013 had officially declared the welfare state over: the Netherlands was now a 'participation society'.

The political picture was very different. From the moment, in the late 1980s, that a centre-left government took over from the right and began trying to control the costs of the welfare state, the Netherlands became increasingly politically volatile. In 1991, the government reduced the eligibility and the number of disability benefits. By 1990, a staggering million people was receiving disability benefits: 7 per cent of the population. This was a systematic and silently intended effect of welfare-state-supported economic restructuring, as redundant older personnel were pushed onto disability benefit schemes rather than temporary and strictly audited unemployment benefits. This was better for everyone, for the victims of restructuring as well as the legitimacy of the government and the employers. By 1990, however, the outcome was deemed to be 'economically unsustainable', and it fell to the social democrats to attack their own electoral base. One immediate effect was a sharp and never to be reversed decline in the members of the social democratic party, and an acceleration of the decline in voting-participation. One of the longer-term effects, later reinforced all around, was the spread of culture talk, generated by journalists, welfare bureaucrats, politicians, security forces and research agencies alike.

It started with the first rhetorical attack on disability recipients by the prime minister, proclaiming in a televised speech that 'the Netherlands is sick',

blaming the victims of restructuring for accepting the benefits they had been offered for leaving their jobs without protest. Now, in a massive bureaucratic operation, the mostly older people who had been talked into illness by the state, were again talked, cajoled and therapeutically shepherded into the labour market, precisely at the moment in which jobs started increasing again. Tinkering with the benefit system and other public institutions so as to make them more 'economically sustainable' and at the same time produce productive collective outcomes that boost GDP was from now on perceived as the key element of 'political reform', whether by centre-left or centre-right governments. The rationale was one of containing costs while saving welfare and public services by increasing participation in the labour market, producing jobs (part time or full time), and modernizing the economy via accelerated flexibility combined with wage control. By the end of the 1990s, Dutch productivity per worker, despite the continuous increase of jobs and the preponderance of services (which tend to yield lower productivity outcomes than manufacturing), was among the highest in the world.

Efficiency in the global market had its price, though: by 2005 disability was again surpassing a million. The pool was now increasingly composed of young people with 'mental disabilities'. Such young adults had not been helped by a low-cost, centralized and super-efficient education machine that despite – and because of – its rhetorical centrality for serving the new 'knowledge economy' was measured mainly by its costs and the number of diplomas it was churning out. The compulsion of productivity and competitiveness had its price – albeit one that could of course be tinkered with. These and similar issues became the sources of a creeping discomfort in the nation.

Resources, wealth and incomes were ever more visibly hierarchically distributed, not just in the market sector but also in the public sector and society at large: the flip side of the managerial bonanza. Foreign second-home ownership had boomed (all interest payments deductible from income tax until 2003), the antique-car market multiplied, resorts and yachting for the wealthy were mushrooming near the coast. The Gini coefficient kept creeping upwards, without even expressing housing, capital-market and other wealth gains, which were largely untaxed and non-registered (Wilterdink 1993, 2000). Median wages were kept on a short lease on behalf of competitiveness. Real wages registered the largest discrepancy with actual housing prices of any country of the OECD in the early 2000s. Young households and the lower middle classes were pushed out of the cities and into expanding suburbia, while city centres were transformed on behalf of the professional-managerial classes and their (cultural) consumption. The Netherlands was not at all unique in this development, but the outcomes were crass, certainly as compared to the neighbouring European countries. Poverty was re-discovered by sociologists

in the mid 90s, and they counted close to a million poor people (in particular single mothers and their children, and the elderly). But it failed to impress the political class, and public opinion did not seem to care much. Unions made some noise, but showed no muscle.

Third-way social democracy was a compromise between the welfare managers of Labour and the neoliberal economics demanded by capital and the right, and it was invented in the Netherlands well before Blair and Giddens coined the term for use in Britain and re-exported it to the United States. The welfare state was comprehensively reinvented as a tool to make people 'employable' and circulate them back into flexible-labour markets. Public services were redesigned as market-driven enterprises: continuously audited on key outputs and the efficient use of taxpayers' money, in ways the Harvard Business School would be proud of (Head 2011). In the early 90s in the Netherlands, third-way social democrats, for the first time in history, started seeking pacts with the neoliberals of the VVD party. This was a 'culturally conservative' club with a strong lobby from the Dutch employers' organization and close personal links with the security establishment. That latter complexion had major repercussions for the biases of political discourse in the nation, which now shifted wholesale from rights to duties, and then to security. The upshot was one of the fastest increases of all countries in the prison population, as Wacquant (2012) noted.

Immigrants were hit hard in the decade-long crisis (1980–90). Unemployment and the sharpening competition for jobs had crowded them out more than people of Dutch origin. The timing of the allowing of 'family re-constitution' for immigrant men, who brought their wives and children to Europe, did not help either. In the course of the 90s, spatial polarizations between gentrifying inner and ex-urban spaces on the one side, and the older working-class neighbourhoods on the other, led to sharp social segregation. Poorer families were now increasingly of immigrant origin, and heavily concentrated in some inner-city districts. Unemployed immigrant youth and school dropouts were increasingly labelled as a 'social problem' and later as a 'security risk'. The outcome of this confluence of political discourses was 'culture talk'. It cemented and expressed the alliance between the neoliberals and labour and transformed immigrant youths into a 'cultural problem'. Publicist Paul Scheffer's (2000) essay 'the multicultural drama', published in the highbrow *NRC Handelsblad* and subsequently discussed in a session of Parliament, signalled that the culture discourse had become fully hegemonic (Ghorashi 2003, 2010). It argued that multiculturalism was stuck in soft illusions, and that cultural background must be blamed for the economic failure of immigrants in the Netherlands. Social-policy buzzwords such as inclusion and integration were now rapidly swallowed by an impatient

call for assimilation. World developments since 11 September 2001 and the consequent 'War on Terror' cascaded into this national discussion. The Netherlands was immediately volunteered as the most ardent European supporter of US imperial adventures, magnifying the ethno-populist pulse of culture talk. The Dutch seemed in a veritable culture war now: Dutch liberalism recaptured for a moment its bellicose origins in the seventeenth century, fighting Muslim zealots, repressors of women, homophobes, in the Dutch polder as well as in the Hindu Kush. And, as with football matches of the national team – becoming ever more popular these years, and more openly wrapped in nationalism; the royal House of Orange also became much more warmly celebrated – they were supposed to win.

It was Pim Fortuin who first discovered the full electoral possibilities of the ensuing mood. Playing the xenophobic card allowed him to mobilize the largest potential-voter segment in the Netherlands: the non-voters. It could have brought him an outright election victory out of the blue had he not been shot. Public intellectuals of the second rank now took over the torch: Hirsi Ali and Van Gogh began a mediatized anti-Islam spectacle, before the latter was murdered by a perfectly integrated young Muslim, and the former had to flee under security to the US (see Buruma 2006; Ghorashi 2003). The new VVD minister of social affairs, a former provincial prison director, now ran her own political movement, 'Proud of the Netherlands'. In this context of culture war, the highbrow *NRC* newspaper found it acceptable to headline that 'sexual violence was caused by cultural background – scientifically proven'. And the governmental research agency with the authoritative name the Sociaal-Cultureel Plan Bureau (SCPB) pleased its paymasters by constructing a scientific 'modernity index' that systematically denied Muslim immigrants any 'coevalness' (Fabian 1983) with authochtonous Dutch, who were of course paragons of modern individualism.

Culture talk however did not only energize a xenophobic wave. It was also very much about the Dutch themselves, who were becoming increasingly annoyed with each other. A zero-tolerance atmosphere was spreading, fuelled by a frantic, irreverent, expressly blunt blogosphere. And, as an antidote, Dutch schools and parents were discovering ever more 'super intelligent' Dutch children, who were of course neglected by the bureaucracies and the schools but intensely deserving of official support.

After the bloody episode of Fortuin and Van Goch, Dutch prudent voters, shocked, put their foot on the brake and supported the ultimate non-politician with his world-estranged Harry Potter looks, Jan Peter Balkenende of the Christian Democrats. Culture talk and regular gaffes, however, kept flourishing and were further institutionalized. It was the provincial maverick Geert Wilders who would pick up on the attack on Muslims started by

Fortuin, breaking away from the VVD party and launching his own Partij van de Vrijheid ('Freedom Party') (PVV) in 2005. He addressed the same dispossessed white working-class non-voters in the suburban de-industrialized zones of the country: Limburg, Helmond, West Brabant, around Rotterdam, in The Hague, and Almere. Living under permanent security and sleeping night after night in a different place, he would keep his game going with such provocative proposals as a 'head garbage tax' on headscarves ('the polluter pays' had the whole parliament laughing in good Dutch mode), a plan to forbid the Koran, enforced repatriation and other ideas derived from the Islamo-fascism narrative sponsored by US-Israeli conservatives with whom he became closely embroiled.

In 2010, in the same weeks that Jobbik and Fidesz were jumping to victory in Hungary, Wilders became the biggest winner in a Dutch election with the most rightist outcome since 1945, with his PVV gaining over 15 per cent of the vote. The neoliberal VVD had always endorsed culture talk, nationalism and anti-immigration policies, and had spread the securitization discourse. But now that Wilders was taking the lead on those scores, the party cleverly specialized on the one claim that could make it the largest middle-class formation for the first time in its existence, ending the long period of Christian Democratic dominance: the future security and continued fiscal protection of homeowners, a distinctly 'classist' and 'coloured' topic of course. Together, the VVD of the homeowners and Wilders' neo-nationalist populists, could command a potentially strong historic bloc: the 'white' beneficiaries as well as the victims of financialization and neoliberalization brought together in one 'people's front': Against the 'highbrow' 1970s style multiculturalist, social-democratic 'elite' and its outdated language of rights, on the one hand, and the unassimilated, at best only half-modern Muslim immigrants (and their primitive brethren in the Hindu Kush) on the other.

With the costs of the financial crisis shifted to the public budget (ABN Amro had to be nationalized and 'saved'; ING needed 25 billion etc.), and public debt subsequently hitting the heights of the 1980s again – the Netherlands had been one of the few nations to actually reduce its public debt substantially between 1990 and 2008, with a few of the social consequences described above – the fight about the 'reform' of the welfare state was now getting into a new phase. In response to the credit crunch on Wall Street and then the Euro crisis, all Dutch political parties had immediately demanded austerity. Politicians and technocrats had drawn up the longest lists (in relation to GDP) of budget cuts of any state in north-western Europe, so as to compete successfully for the favours of global capital (and outcompete other European states on the interest-rate front). Technocrats of the Dutch National Bank, however, had over the years been pushing for a controlled deflation of the serious

housing bubble, and had presented the gradual reduction of tax facilities for homeowners as an overriding political necessity; it was not 'economically sustainable'. With austerity coming, this proposal was now endorsed by the social democrats and by some Christian democrats, who saw it as a chance to deflect the coming budget cuts away from the welfare services they together had built, with approval from the Dutch Central Bank and the top cadre of bureaucrats. With their stance for a continuation of public welfare against the welfare for homeowners, the old ruling parties of the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats became the great losers of the election. A decisive segment of Dutch voters insisted on state protection for their inflated real-estate wealth – security – and was ready to accept severe cuts in education, culture and welfare, as well as further xenophobic whipping-up of Dutch society, in return. They also voted, unsurprisingly, against a 'Europe of social transfers' to the 'mismanaged, corrupt and profligate periphery'.

Conclusion

The Eurozone-EU is a veritable theatre of 'double polarization'. The evidence of the last twenty years broadly affirms the Friedmannian thesis, in particular in the north-western core and the post-socialist east – though the Euro-Med area is a strong reminder of the ongoing possibilities of left-wing liberal collectivisms to emerge on which Friedman has largely remained silent. More pertinent for this chapter: Friedman's Anthropology of Global Systems does not expect Central and Eastern Europe to be an affirmative case. CEE is a major recipient of financial inflows, which have produced real re-industrialization in the region, as well as considerable economic growth. AGS fails to anticipate that economic growth, particularly in dependent capitalisms, comes with policies of dispossession and disenfranchisement centrally driven by a state-finance nexus that is largely dominated by transnational capital. This nexus works through comprador bourgeoisies and governmental classes in the capital city and generates unforgiving inequalities and unevenness. In particular, it sets both a political-economic competition and a ferocious cultural rivalry in motion between downwardly mobile working and middle classes in the provinces and domestic surplus populations such as the Roma. Ethno-nationalism in post-socialist Europe receives some of its core impulses from this populist configuration, ushering in, in the Hungarian case, the transformation of a liberal constitution into a workfare state that is geared to sponsoring working 'Magyars' and a 'Magyar' national bourgeoisie. The rise of ethno-nationalism in CEE has now produced two states, Hungary and Poland (and in a way Slovakia), that are ready to push out transnational capital. These states seek to regain sovereignty over the state-finance nexus, as well as over the organization and possession of key public services such as banking and

utilities. Their governments attack liberal actors at home, and confront the EU, as the Visegrad bloc, on 'liberal values'. The EU is not only fracturing along north-south lines within the Eurozone, but also between east and west outside it. Brexit will only magnify the force of those trends.

The AGS does anticipate the Dutch case. Dutch ethno-nationalism, however, fails to picture its own transnationalized financial elite as one of its vital threats, as the AGS would suggest. Contemporary Dutch nationalism, emerging within one of the most financialized nation-states in the West, and coming, as in Hungary, from the provinces in order to conquer the urban and cosmopolitan heart of the Dutch state, imagines itself as a frontal attack on a leftist multicultural urbane elite 'of the sixties' and its rights discourse. It threatens its immigrants with assimilation or deportation, but seems not ready, at least rhetorically, to fight finance and its associated inequalities, oligarchy and neoliberal managerialism. Efforts in that direction were systematically stillborn. Rather, it fights on behalf of finance: huge and uncontested state transfers to save the Dutch banks and no discussion of bank taxes (a temporary cap on salaries and bonuses, though). State capture by finance seems affirmed. Its anger is displaced onto an urban cultural and governmental elite that over the years had allowed neoliberal disenfranchisements to happen while 'protecting' the cultural rights of immigrants.

Historical discourses and identities are neither fixed nor static, and will be (re)developed in the context and the course of concrete historical struggles. Liberal rights-based individualism is considered a national heritage of the Dutch. But in the present context it is re-signified as a Dutch organic identity, denied to anyone else, in particular non-EU immigrants but also many of its neighbours in Europe. Hungarian historically organic notions of the nation are predictably deployed to produce internal others, the Roma, and attack them as well as their liberal protectors, but they are also redeployed as a civil-legal tool to make claims for jobs and middle-class welfare, and against international financial predators. The explanation of such paradoxical and plastic outcomes, as I have emphasized, lies in the specificities of ongoing local/global class formation processes and in the fights around the state-finance nexus that are either not really anticipated in AGS or weakly conceptualized.

Former labour voters or labour non-voters in the provincial towns of northern England, the Midlands and the eastern English coast have embraced Brexit and have contributed decisively to Britain's break away from the European Union. Northern French working-class towns, meanwhile, are abandoning the Socialist and Communist parties and endorsing the restyled Front National of Marine Le Pen. The white working-class heartland of the US is dumping the Democrats and has supported billionaire Donald Trump's bid for the presidency. The Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and

the Nordic countries are all now producing hegemonies that align a populist neoliberalism with xenophobia, crucially endorsed by white disenfranchised working classes, and electorally energized by immigration scares and security panics. Central and Eastern Europe is setting up the Visegrad Bloc as a second geopolitical and geocultural division within the EU, powerfully propelled by neo-nationalist electorates in the stagnant east of the East – after the southern Eurozone periphery moved (partly) to the left. The scene is dynamic, scary and on the verge of destroying long-accepted liberal and expert certainties. The AGS uniquely brought class and cultural process closely together on a macro level and has been almost clairvoyant in picturing these key processes. I have pointed to further methodological and conceptual advances that can help us analyse better the processes before our very eyes. Now that the experts, the commentariat, and the political classes are at the end of their wits, anthropology can, almost quietly, continue with its business-as-usual and 'fail even better'.

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CHAPTER 2

State formation, territorialization and the challenge of movement

Hege Toje

Springtime 2006: a fourteen-year-old girl living in a *stanitsa*[1] in the southern Russian region Krasnodar faced problems when she was trying to obtain her first internal passport. Representatives of the family went from office to office, trying to get the paperwork sorted out. This series of events was not extraordinary; rather, it was typical of the bureaucratic hassle most people had to go through whenever they entered the economy of state documents.[2] It was, however, this young girl's passport trouble that spurred me into thinking about why this document was so important, what kind of regulatory system it represented, and its historical grounding. In Russia, there is a distinction between the internal passport (which all adult citizens must have) and the *zagran* passport, which allows you to cross international borders (and that only a few people have). The internal passport includes personal information on 'facts' that are documented and certified by the state bureaucracy: the date and year of birth, registered residence, marital status (and name of spouse), number of children and their year of birth, military-service status (for men) and social-security status (invalid, war veteran, pensioner, for example).[3] A passport is required as an identity document for job applications, for access to health services, and for taking public examinations, among other things. In

1 The term *stanitsa* refers to a rural Cossack settlement, and before the revolution such settlements had special rights in terms of land ownership and the disposition of land and natural resources, and in terms of self-administration.

2 The details of the passport trouble will be discussed later in this chapter.

3 Formerly, ethnicity was part of passport information, but this has now been removed.

other words, the document reflects the state's monitoring and regulation of specific flows of mobility.

The use of identity documents has long historical roots. In the 1620s documents were used by the Muscovite state apparatus to distinguish between legitimate travel and unauthorized movement. In fact, Russia advanced notions of territorial sovereignty and border regimes long before most European states began to actively establish and patrol their borders (Boeck 2009:9). In addition, other central policies revolved around gaining control over population movement. The 1694 law on serfdom was introduced as a means to control migration, and to tie peasants to specific residences by restricting their right to move outside their villages without authorization – a law that was not abolished until 1861. Later, the Soviet state operated with 'one of the strictest internal passport regimes on record' (Matthews 1993:i). The collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s similarly restricted peasant movement, as authorization was required from collective farms to leave the villages. Looking at state practices of the different historical periods in Russian history, the pervasiveness of various forms of regulation and control over movement is quite striking. The problem of regulating movement emerges as a historical issue, beyond ordinary state concerns. In this chapter, movement will be analyzed as a *key object of regulation* 'upon which management relies'; it 'depend[s] on the generation of expert knowledge about those objects, and on a body of experts who can monitor the behavior of those objects on the basis of the knowledge thus generated' (Nugent 2007:199). Furthermore, movement as a key object of regulation has directed and shaped the central trajectories of Russian state formations, and this may be seen a kind of *longue durée* in Russian state practices. Why did mobility emerge as a key object of regulation, even for the sixteenth-century Muscovite state? Partly, it was an effect of the challenges posed by mobile warriors, raiders and migrants, exacerbated by the geographic features of a vast flat landscape with few natural borders. Partly, it became intrinsic to the ways that different Russian state formations developed state-building strategies that revolved around systematic restrictions (and management) of population movement, resettlement, displacement and deportation (the vast territory also facilitates these forms of regulatory politics).

The aim of this chapter is to explore the dynamic relationship between movement and state formation as it unfolds in three distinct cases linked to different times and places across the Russian territory: the passport trouble mentioned above, the Cossacks' role in imperial state formation, and the Soviet Gulag camps and the *vory-v-zakone* (the brotherhood of thieves). These empirical cases stem from different historical periods, and serve as foci from which to explore the various techniques, capabilities and dynamics

taking place at the interface between the strategic attempts of various state formations to appropriate, direct and control population movement, and the actual effects[4] of such attempts.[5] The control over movement is attempted by the construction of specific forms of 'mobility systems', that is, systems that enable and channel the movement of people, ideas and things (see Urry 2007:12–16). 'Movement' is here used in a broad sense, including bodily capacities and geographical movement, the circulation of persons and objects (material/immaterial), and movement between social and economic positions. A focus on the politicization of movement in a wide sense has several advantages. First, a broad conceptualization of movement incorporates both social and geographical dimensions of mobility, which are often interconnected processes. Secondly, by conceptualizing movement, on the one hand, as a fundamental part of human agency, and, on the other, as an appropriable human capacity, it enables us to address processes such as flight, migration, military service, education, localization (forced/induced) and displacement through the same analytical lens. Thirdly, basic state policies aimed at governing social and geographical mobility (e.g., through education, military service, registration of work and residence) have the effect of shaping identities and identity transitions (e.g., childhood–adulthood). Finally, the focus on the circulation of objects and persons allows us to cut

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4 My use of the concept of 'effect' echoes the perspective of Trouillot (2001), who proposes an alternative way of studying state formation through a focus on state effects. Trouillot's approach represents an attempt to bypass the ideological presumptions that have shaped former studies of state power, by decentralizing and detaching the notion of state effect from the state apparatus. By using the concept of 'effect' he separates actual dynamics from political intentions. My uneasiness with his argument stems from the fact that it hinges on predefined state effects, modelled on Western liberal democracies. Trouillot is in this sense producing a new bias. Instead, we need to explore varieties of state formation, that is, seeing and identifying state formation as unfolding and being contested historically. At the same time, we need a definition of the state that helps us distinguish it from other power formations. In this sense, I find Kapferer and Bertelsens's (2009) perspective useful because it focuses on the totalizing ambition, instead of predefining its content, and thus opens up a perspective that allows for the empirical discovery of state effects. Also, the pre-defined state effects of Trouillot leave little room for the ways that political subjects are integral in producing, as well as challenging, state processes, which I believe is a central component of the variations of state forms that we may observe around the globe.

5 The material on which the analysis is based also differs, ranging from empirical events (the passport trouble) to secondary historical literature (Cossacks and Gulag camps).

across processes that are often thought of as belonging to either the realm of state or the realm of economy. This approach is inspired by the work of scholars such as Bruno Latour (2005) and John Urry (2007), in their attempts to reconceptualize 'the social' away from metaphors of structure, stasis and order, by proposing a focus on the tracing of connections and the dynamics of associations (Latour), and by analyzing movement and mobility, and their ordering (Urry).

Mobilities and state formation

James Scott writes in the introduction to *Seeing like a State* that his interest in the state grew out of the question of why it 'always seemed to be the enemy of people who move around' (1998:1). This statement touches upon a vital dimension of state formation. Scott was referring to nomads, homeless people, refugees and Gypsies – people, who are either fundamentally mobile in their livelihoods or who have become mobile out of necessity. He discovers that the state efforts to govern and civilize the perceived disorderliness of mobile livelihoods and lifestyles are not unique, but rather highlight the general working of state processes as directed toward the placement of people, including forced sedentarization. But what exactly makes mobile livelihoods challenging to power formations such as the state? Mobility does not, of course, pertain to nomads and refugees alone; it is a fundamental capacity of human beings. Movement is associated with life itself, and the capacity for production and reproduction. In contrast, immobility is often associated with old age, disability and death.[6] The philosopher Edward S. Casey (1993) argues that our fundamental capacity for mobility makes us depend on 'territoriality' as a means of maintaining the stability and security of a home-place or home-region. One way to create 'home-places' involves the creation of spatial delineations by means of building or cultivation. The building of shelters or houses, the cultivation of gardens and fields, or the establishment of nomadic trekking routes, and the erecting of tents in the same formation at shifting locations – these are all ways that such home-places are made.

Place-making thus often entails the establishment of boundaries or various forms of delineation in material, social and symbolic senses. In a discussion on the multiple nature of boundaries, Fredrik Barth (2000) proposes three levels of abstraction related to the English term 'boundary.' First, a boundary

6 Death represents immobility in a physical sense, but this does not, of course, imply that dead bodies are not moved; on the contrary, movement of dead bodies is central in both a ritual and a political sense (see, for example, Kwon 2006; Verdery 1999). Nor does this claim deny the mobility and potency of spirit worlds into which the dead may or may not be culturally incorporated.

may refer to territorial divisions; secondly, to social divisions; and thirdly, to cognitive divisions between categories that depend on the drawing of a boundary. Inspired by the cognitive theory of Lakoff, Barth stresses the need for anthropologists to study 'the natives' ways of constructing boundaries, instead of imposing preconceived analytical concepts that also carry specific cultural genealogies. The social and cultural processes of boundary-making (or their absence) require scholarly attention. What about the issues of power in the formation of such cognitive categories and boundaries that Barth urges us to explore? Lakoff's cognitive theory (2008) stresses human perceptual resources as fundamental in the formation of cognitive categories, but this seems to lack a perspective of power with regard to how human experiences are shaped. If one follows the argument of Pierre Bourdieu (1999:53), who claims that 'one of the major powers of the state is to produce and impose … categories of thought that we spontaneously apply to all things of the social world …', the 'native's point of view' becomes a far more complex matter. The majority of peoples across the world have become increasingly familiar with different power formations (such as the UN, NATO, states, global religious movements and corporate firms), and are not left unaffected by these encounters. There is not merely a need for a cognitive theory, as Barth claims; we also need to have theories of power when analyzing processes of boundary-making, and state formation should be considered as a potential influence.

Inspired by the philosophy of Deleuze and Guatteri, Kapferer and Bertelsen (2009:3) conceptualize state dynamics 'to be … oriented to achieving an exclusive and overarching determining potency in the fields of social relations in which it is situated and which state or state-related practice attempts to define'. State dynamics are thus characterized by a totalizing orientation; they co-exist with and are counteracted by the dynamics of the war machine, and both dynamics are, the authors contend, present in most social processes. State dynamics denote a dynamic structure of power, a social assemblage where boundaries are clearly defined, with centred hierarchical systems striving toward the establishment of order. The war machine is a dynamic that is both external and hostile to the state. Its modus operandi is the rhizome, a root structure lacking an identifiable beginning – an anti-centralized and non-hierarchical dynamic structure that lacks unity. By suggesting a focus on state dynamics (and the war machine) Kapferer and Bertelsen analytically unhook capabilities or orientations that lie at the core of more conventional understandings of the state as a hierarchical structure imposing some kind of order. This enables explorations of state dynamics as integral to, for instance, other power formations operating in the field of social relations, such as commercial companies, transnational organizations

or mafia networks.[7] Their perspective further develops central leads in the growing academic discourse on the anthropology of the state (see for instance Mitchell 1999; Trouillot 2001). Common to these new perspectives is that they see the ordering processes of 'the state' as fundamentally embedded in social relations. As indicated above, the 'totalizing orientation' stands out as a defining feature of Kapferer and Bertelsen's state dynamics. This is a broad conceptualization that calls for further specification, as totalizing orientations necessarily take different forms and extensions, and vary by the degree to which they exercise control and influence in the socio-cultural field. Kapferer and Bertelsen make this specification, to some extent, by invoking the concept of 'territorialization', which they isolate as one characteristic technique of state processes. 'Territorialization,' they write, 'is not merely geographical, but the bounding and controlling of regions or spaces of interests.' (2009:3). Definition and differentiation of socio-economic life, as well as control over subjectivities and activities of production, are listed as central to processes of territorialization. It is such processes of bounding and regulation, and their counteractions, that constitute the analytical core of this chapter.

Building on the notion of territorialization, state processes may be seen as fundamentally revolving around establishing, reworking and reproducing authoritative boundaries on all levels – socio-cultural, economic, political, cognitive and territorial – by a variety of political means. One effect of such boundary-making is what is commonly referred to as localization or placement of political subjects, that is, tying political subjects to fixed identity categories and places (see, for example, Scott 1998; Verdery 1996).[8] This analytical metaphor seems to indicate that state processes entail the production of static orders, by turning dynamic heterogeneity into fixed categories, hierarchies and places. Such boundaries and distinctions are, however, not only established to block unwanted and disordered flows, and to distinguish between who belongs and who does not; they are also established to produce patterned and coordinated movement. Take, for instance, a state border, which reflects both the structures and symbols of state sovereignty (Donnan

7 There are similarities in the way contemporary companies and what is conventionally thought of as 'the state' (see also Kapferer 2005 argument concerning companies that take on a state-like dynamic). The fundamental difference lies in the scale of ambition, where state formations are directed toward the gaining of an overarching definitional and regulational power over the social realm.

8 Trouillot (2001) conceptualizes this in his proposed 'state-effects', in which isolation, identification and the legibility effects relate to different levels of 'localization' of people by establishing and governing through fixed categories.

and Wilson 1999).[9] Fences or walls may mark the border. In addition, there are several controlled passage points, with border guards and customs, to check people, passports and transported goods. The people who pass across the border will stand in line, waiting to be channelled through a set of procedures (document checking, receiving required stamps, body searches) before they are allowed to proceed or are turned away. The border is established to block movement in order to gain control over people's passage across it, not to stop them entirely. As such, it may be seen as a regulatory system of mobility across state-defined boundaries. The bureaucratic, legal and political processes of boundary making that state processes entail can be viewed as representing multiple attempts to order, shape and channel flows of people, as well as material and immaterial objects; these are flows that can be monitored, and from which resources can be extracted.

Let us return briefly to James Scott's observation of the close-to-universal hostility of the state towards people who move around. As we have seen above, the problem of mobile livelihoods in terms of state formation does not lie in that mobility itself. Rather, it is related to their challenge to social, political or legal orders, as these mobile livelihoods cut across territorial, legal and social boundaries that are managed and guaranteed by 'the state'. They are perceived as 'disordered' precisely because they do not follow the paths of flows that are defined, coded and managed by the variety of state institutions. Movement is not only affected by government; it is also shaped by the natural conditions of the landscape or of the sea. Some landscapes make establishment of rule more difficult than others, for example high mountains, or close-to-impenetrable jungle (see also Scott 2009). The Eurasian steppes posed a different set of difficulties.

The problem of territory in Russian state formation and state imaginaries

A landscape's topology and ecological properties, as well as human mobilities and livelihoods, are central elements in processes of geographical bounding (the more conventional definition of territorialization). Russia is commonly

9 In Donnan and Wilson's (1999:15–16) definition of borders, three elements are significant: the juridical borderline, which separates and joins states; the agents and institutions of the state found at the border, interlinked with other institutions elsewhere in the state territory; and the frontiers, acting as territorial zones that extend and cut across the state-invoked border.

associated with its territorial size. Today, it comprises eleven time zones,[10] with climates that range from arctic to subtropical, making it the largest nation-state in the world in terms of territorial extension. A large part of this territory is shaped by the steppe, a horizontal belt of flat grasslands stretching from Mongolia to Hungary. The climate of the steppe is characterized by hot summers and cold winters. In its flatness, and with few natural borders, it has served as a perfect path for various mobilities. Nomads, traders, warriors and bandits have all traversed and used the steppe's inherent potential for movement. It formed a natural highway between Asia and Europe that was dominated by nomads from the first millennium BC until the eighteenth century. At different times in this period the steppe harboured several nomadic state formations, the most prominent being the Mongolian empire. Before the establishment of more resilient state formations, the steppe formed a predatory environment, where warfare was an integral part of nomadic existence. The steppes produced military effectiveness and individual toughness, and it enabled unprecedented mobility (O'Rourke 2007:17). The steppes were gradually incorporated into the Russian state formation from the fifteenth century onwards, and this territory forms central ecological, economic and political conditions for processes of territorialization. Moreover, the territory's positioning between Europe and Asia, which Ferdinand Braudel (1994:528) has described as an enormous frontier zone between Asia and Europe, has formed both historical trajectories and state imaginaries. Russia has been seen as reconciling contradictory cultural influences of Western civilization and Eastern barbarism. The vastness of the territory and its cultural heterogeneity also lie at the core of Russian national imaginaries:

> Beginning in the times of Peter the Great, two perspectives have competed and clashed in Russian consciousness. How are we to understand our endless geographical spaces? Were they a blessing, or were they a curse? A burden beyond our capabilities that oppressed our nation and sucked out strengths that could have worked to build civilization, social well-being and comfortable European forms of life?
>
> (Kuniaev 1984:5)

10 In Russia, currently, there are political debates about decreasing the number of time zones in order to increase economic efficiency, which attest to the ways that state processes fuelled by economic and political concerns may redefine fundamental structural categories, such as time (see 'Russian president Dmitry Medvedev wants to cut 11 time zones', *Guardian*, 12 November 2009).

These words exemplify how geographical extension and cultural diversity have become themes in intellectual debates about the Russian national past and future. They reveal a fundamental ambivalence towards the vast territory that characterized the late Russian empire and the Soviet Union, as well as contemporary Russia. Territorial size is simultaneously considered a resource in terms of economic and political power, and, at the same time, this vast territory and cultural diversity constitute a drawback if unity cannot be attained. Moreover, these tensions produced by the vast territory are considered to be a defining feature of Russian nation- and statehood. Kuniaev's statement echoes a recurrent discussion I have with one of my friends, Yurii, a descendant of Don Cossacks Old Believers[11] in the southern Russian region of Krasnodar. Now in his early forties, he has lived the past twenty years or so in the Zakubanskaya *stanitsa*,[12] where I have been doing fieldwork on and off for the past 15 years. As a practising Orthodox Christian, and as a person with philosophical inclinations, he often describes post-Soviet reality in terms of its fragmentation. The 'dissolution' does not merely refer to the splitting up and reconfiguration of the federation; it refers to a perceived fragmentation of morality and social norms expressed through a lack of interpersonal trust and respect outside close networks of family and friends. This description is partly informed by his post-Soviet experience of operating in the lower sections of business and trade, ranging from non-registered taxi driving to trading in agricultural produce. Yurii considers the vastness of the Russian territory and its cultural diversity as posing a fundamental challenge to national unity.[13] He believes that such unity can only be achieved through an all-embracing ideological framework, an idea that is also prevalent in Russian political debates (see, for example, Urban 1998). Socialism provided such a framework in the past, and in his view the future national framework should be Orthodox Christianity – a view actively propagated by the Orthodox Church itself (see Trepanier 2007). The problem of unity thus emerges as a central concern in national imaginaries, produced by both territorial vastness and the imperial heritage.

Seen from the perspective of state builders, movement is another problem produced by the natural properties and extension of the territory. Mobility, facilitated by the steppes, produced the special challenges of external attack

11 Don Cossacks formed autonomous militaristic farmer communities settled along the River Don. They became incorporated with other Cossack communities as a special military stratum in tsarist Russia in the seventeenth century.

12 Original names of settlements and people have been changed.

13 Caroline Humphrey (2001) has also noted the centrality of the notion of unity in Russian politics.

and the flight of political subjects across borders, as well as the challenge of establishing regulatory and controlling systems that could cope with large distances. These were all key issues for Tsarist (after territorial expansion began in the sixteenth century), Soviet and Russian state formations. The natural properties of the landscape and territorial extension thus contribute towards making human mobility a central concern, both culturally and politically.

The challenge of retaining a vast territory under state control, and the criminal potential arising from mobility, are central themes in one of the famous works of Russian (or Ukrainian[14]) literature, *Dead Souls*, written by Nikolai Gogol (1996) in 1842. The protagonist in the novel is Chichikov, a trader and con man, who travels between provincial towns, buying the names of dead serfs from landowners before state bureaucrats record their deaths. Taking advantage of the temporal gap between the death and its bureaucratic registration, and the updating of population overviews, he amasses a fictitious fortune. By extracting objects of non-value from the landlords, he transforms the names of dead souls into a resource that can be converted to hard cash. The souls (*dushi*) of the landowner were considered property under the system of serfdom, and could as easily be mortgaged in banks as material property. The provincial towns, placed at the margin of the Russian empire, were in Gogol's time known for having an ineffective apparatus of control and government.[15] The landowners that the protagonist seeks out are located at a distance from the town. Inadequate roads into the districts made travel there an infrequent occurrence, both for landowners in reporting their affairs, and for bureaucratic checks; meanwhile, frequent epidemics of disease, deadly fevers and smallpox raised the death toll, and increased the 'resource' of dead souls. Gogol's work, from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, reveals a fundamental territorial challenge for the Russian empire; its less-controlled and less-governed peripheries left both state and capital vulnerable to mobile rule breakers.

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14 In recent years Ukrainians have challenged the appropriation of Nikolai Gogol into the Russian literary canon, as he was born in Ukraine, even though he lived and worked most of his life in St Petersburg.

15 The fact that margins of empires and states have been considered as zones of less effective control and government is not something that pertains to Russian state formations alone (see, for example, Das and Poole 2004). I would claim, however, that the large territory makes this an even more urgent problem for the central authorities in Russia, as it is perceived as a source of constant threat of political fragmentation, and a challenge to the reproduction of political order, which also contributes to making unity a central issue in Russian politics.

State formations and movement as a key object of regulation

Various political and bureaucratic techniques have been introduced in different historical state formations on the Eurasian steppes to attempt to control movement politically perceived as undesired and disruptive. In the Soviet era, the system of internal passports and *propiska* (registration of residence) was established in an attempt to regulate rural-urban migration through state allocation of housing and work (Buckley 1995; Matthews 1993). As we will see later, this still operates in contemporary Russia. Such systems represent attempts to control and regulate movement. Other state policies that can be conceived in similar terms are state-initiated migration as a vital part of Russian colonial expansion, the use of exile and imprisonment in geographically remote areas in Tsarist and Soviet Russia, the Soviet system of *putevka* (a document that certified travel and stays related to work or holidays at designated places, financed through the state budget), or the practice of obligatory work after the end of formal education (*razpredelenie*). The following empirical argument provides historical and contemporary snapshots, probing a variety of dynamics and formations that come into being as unanticipated effects of political attempts to regulate, control, block and force movement. The snapshot metaphor is deliberately invoked to underline the explorative and somehow fragmented approach taken here. It acknowledges that the totality of 'the state' is itself a construct as a singular, all-embracing and totalizing idea, and thus its dynamics cannot be studied as a whole. It follows the lead of important work on the anthropology of the state (see Auyero *et al.* 2016; Das and Poole 2004; Fallers 2017; Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009; Krohn-Hansen and Nustad 2005; Reeves *et.al.* 2014; Mitchell 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Stepputat and Hansen 2001; Trouillot 2001), which focuses on state formations as products of complex historical and cultural processes that reach beyond national borders. This body of work treats state processes as complex in their institutional manifestation, practices and experiences, and traces how the state is materially realized and becomes embedded in everyday practices (see Kapferer 2005:viii). The processes accounted for in the present work stem from different historical periods, and therefore reflect varying state formations in terms of power base, ideology, territory and capabilities. This argument is not an evolutionary one in terms of state formation, nor is it an attempt to trace a coherent trajectory or create a unified history of Russian state formation. There are many histories and multiple dynamics to the various power formations across this territory. The stance taken here is that state formation is a continuous process with no definite beginning or end: it is always in flux. Nevertheless, there is a need for some general and loosely defined categorization of the state formations I deal with here, which are most readily understood as based on varying

ideological orientations and political foundations, while constantly bearing in mind that these are far from static and easily delineated entities. This work will distinguish among processes related to contemporary Russian, Soviet and tsarist state formations, which are founded on different ideologies of autocracy and tsarism, socialism and democracy. They differ also in terms of state capacity, with the Soviet state formation exercising by far the most intrusive form of rule. They are also interlinked by (but are not identical in terms of) territory and groups of political subjects. Moreover, they share the challenge of movement and the vastness of territory, which becomes a central concern for state formation both politically and culturally. These examples reveal how challenges to the state are not just external threats, but also derive from unanticipated effects of state formation. State processes produce their own challenges, as political attempts at population control are manipulated, actively resisted and evaded. Instead of seeing these as comprising a series of failed attempts at state-making, they should be regarded as an inseparable aspect of state processes and practices, and as integral to their formation.

Passport trouble

The passport system in Russia is usually traced back to the seventeenth century and the reforms of Peter the Great, which were intended to ensure recruitment to a modernized army, organize personal taxation and suppress lawlessness (Matthews 1993). As we have seen, however, strict control over movement has longer historical roots than this would suggest. The Soviet system of internal passports was established to curb the waves of rural-urban migration that took place as an effect of the wholesale collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s, and internal passports continue to have a self-evident importance for Russian citizens in the present time. Most people carry their passports on them when they move outside their homes. Moreover, the passport is the most important sign of Russian citizenship, and receiving one's first passport marks a transition from childhood into young adulthood. As mentioned earlier, the passport contains a variety of biographical information, among these the registration of residence. In contemporary legal terms this is called *registratsiia po mestu zhitel'stva*. Most people, however, still use the Soviet category for the registration of residence, the *propiska*, and I will adopt this term in the following discussion. Despite the fact that the 1993 law establishes the right of free movement,[16] residence is still included in the passport alongside other biographical data. Also, the

16 Law of the Russian Federation from 25 June 1993, № 5242-1, *The right of the citizens of the Russian Federation to free movement, to the free choice of residence and stay within the Russian Federal territory.*

propiska system continues to operate in practice in Russia. This takes place in the form of state instructions distributed to various state-run institutions, for example police offices, schools and hospitals. The instructions function as service directives that in effect re-invoke the old *propiska* system. Residence registration is therefore still required to gain access to various public spheres and services, such as education, health care and work.[17] As we shall see below, the registration of residence is central to the purpose of the passport.

The detail of the personal information as it appears in internal passports is an indication of the state's capacity not only to record and monitor the population, but also to extract and channel productive capacities through education, work and military service. It manifests a number of state-produced boundaries linked to citizenship, age and social categories. The following text is a condensed description of a process that lasted over several months in 2006.

> Springtime 2006: it is time for Anya to acquire her first passport. In order to get a passport, her registration of residence, the *propiska*, needs renewal. From birth, Anya has been registered at her grandparents' house. The house where she lives today with her family is not officially registered as 'living quarters', and cannot be used as an address for the *propiska*. The house, which has two rooms (a kitchen and a living room/bedroom) and an attic for storage, was built at the end of the 1990s by her father. At the time he was earning good money in the informal economy as a craftsman. However, health problems put a stop to the physically strenuous labour, and cut off his access to decent earnings. All plans to expand the house and the formal registration of residence were put on hold. In order to get the house officially approved, the registration process requires a large sum of money – about 15,000 roubles,[18] – and her parents have not made it a priority to get the house through this official registration process. All members of the household are therefore registered at a grandparent's apartment. The grandfather died a couple of years ago, and the grandmother is not officially registered as the owner. In 1978 this apartment was allocated to the family by the state company they worked for. In the privatization turmoil

17 This indicates a dynamic of new laws in Russia where the bureaucratic practice of the old *propiska* system simply continues to be enforced despite a changed legal framework. Furthermore, a fast reconfiguration of the legal landscape through the extensive production of new laws and regulations inevitably produces rule-breaking. This is, in turn, used by the law-enforcement units to extract payment from the rule-breaker through fines and bribes.

18 This equates to about two months wages, given the household's total income.

> of the 1990s, the apartment was transferred to them as private property, free of charge. The grandfather was formally registered as the owner; the grandmother has not gone through the legal process of transferring the property to her name. In order to get a passport Anya needs to be reregistered at her grandmother's address. The problem is that only the officially registered owner has the right to permanently register members at the address. The registration office will only agree to give Anya a temporary registration, which will need renewal every third month. Going through this tedious and time-consuming bureaucratic procedure, which demands that they travel to the municipal centre every third month, is a potential nightmare for the parents (who need to be present because she is underage), Anya and her grandmother. It is also urgent for Anya to get her first passport, which she needs to be able to take her final examinations at school. The passport raises several problematic issues for the extended family, related to the registration of property. The parents did not see any possibility that they would be able, financially, to put their house through the registration process, and the grandmother did not have the money to spare for the legal procedure to transfer the house into her name. In the end, the grandmother found the money, and used her enforced and unpaid vacation to travel to the municipal centre. In the process she learned that the apartment was not properly privatized, as it has only been registered in the settlement at the local registry, and not at the municipal centre. She finally got all the paperwork done, and Anya received her first passport.

This narrative tells us several things. It demonstrates the interconnectedness of what appear to be separate bureaucratic processes, located in different administrative departments and offices. As such, it speaks against propositions in works on the anthropology of the state that tend to stress the fragmentariness of state practices (e.g. Navaro-Yashin 2002; Trouillot 2001). The passport materializes a nexus of regulatory control linking registration of property, residence and citizenship. The *propiska* is central to getting a passport, and the *propiska* can only be obtained through the consent of the registered property owner. The passport becomes in this way a means of controlling movement, registering movement, localizing people, fixing identity categories and channelling political subjects through publicly defined spheres. The event also demonstrates the fine line between citizens and non-citizens, between insiders who have access to public services, and can take part in various activities, and those who are excluded. As such, the system does not only restrict, monitor and control people's whereabouts, it also produces societal margins of homelessness, of people without *propiska*, who are disqualified from taking part (Humphrey 2001; Matthews 1993). Without a *propiska*, access

to public services, like health care, education and work, will, in the worst cases be blocked, and at best restricted. A young girl in the settlement was working in one of the local kindergartens, despite the fact that she was registered in another region, which disqualified her from taking a local job. Her ability to work rested on benign rule-breaking by her superior. She was engaged to a local man, but his parents would not agree to give her a *propiska* at their address, since such a registration would give her certain rights if the house was sold. The consent of the property owner to register residence therefore requires either that citizens have relatives or others who are able and willing to register them, or that they own their own house. Without these assets people are placed at the margins of Russian society. As with any imposed boundary such as this, the *propiska* system was and is open to manipulation. In the Soviet era, marriage was used strategically to obtain residence registration in affluent cities like Moscow, which contributed to increasing levels of divorce (Matthews 1993). Today, the *propiska* sometimes serves as an obstacle to selling apartments and houses, as no one will buy a house with registered residents at the address, even if they do not physically reside there. The *propiska* is then used as a lever for the registered resident to get paid by the owner to deregister. From their perspective, this is not extortion, though it may sometimes seem so to the owner, as the *propiska* is regarded as a valuable and necessary resource that can be exchanged or traded.

Documents such as the passport are central to modern bureaucracy (Weber 1978:957), and as Laura Ann Stoler (2002) argues in relation to colonial archives, such documents constitute central sites of state processes. Passports serve as material manifestations of citizenship, and define categories deemed important by the state. In Russia, the system of documents operates as a power grid, imposing requirements and sanctions that, in a moment (that can rarely be foreseen), may be dissolved or evaded by informal payments or use of personal networks. The passport brings with it a broad regulatory system, which operates through, and defines, a variety of boundaries at which individual movement is governed and monitored through geographical localization, and via a tracking of social mobility by established political and bureaucratic categories. The passport event described above shows how state practices and requirements are socially mediated, and how the state mapping of residence, curiously, far from reflects the territory. In fact, the territory is not really the point: the requirements of the state are the issue here, and as such they constitute a reality of and for the state. The issue is not whether the girl actually lives with her grandmother – the point is that she is required to be registered *somewhere*, in order to be included in the sovereign space. This resembles what James Scott (1998) in a different context calls 'the miniaturization of order' – a kind of construction of order which may replace

the real thing. He uses this concept in relation to Soviet dramas, when dealing with their reconstruction of the Russian revolution as ordered and 'rational', which is far from the anarchy that actually reigned over society during this period: 'A facade or a small easily managed zone of order and conformity may come to be an end in itself; the representation may usurp the reality.' (Scott 1998:196). The nitty-grittiness of bureaucratic procedures constitute managed zones of order in a similar fashion; something which, according to a logic of state expansion, has a tendency to become an end in itself. If not usurping reality, such processes of expansion through a miniaturization of order, to paraphrase Scott, creates a reality of its own.[19] The passport system represents an example of how the contemporary Russian state formation operates a complex system of regulatory control of social and geographic mobilities. The passport materializes, and operates along, multiple boundaries of bureaucratic categories. The system aims to monitor and channel individual movement into public institutions and services provided by the state. This ambition constitutes a centrepiece of various Russian state formations at different historical moments. We will now redirect our focus from the passport event of 2006 in the Krasnodar region, to a time when this region had not yet been defined and bounded, but was part of the non-state territories occupied by various groups and tribes. This historical example is taken from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which marked the beginning of the establishment of a territorial state centred in Moscow.

Becoming a territorial state – producing borders and boundaries

In 1480, after the end of the Mongolian empire's control over the territories that today belong to Russia, the Grand Duchy of Muscovy rose to power. From the middle of the fifteenth century the economy grew, and territorial expansion began. Over the next hundred years the population multiplied, agriculture prospered, internal trade and the use of money increased, and the Muscovy state territory increased to six times its original size (Anderson 1979:328). This growth was propelled by trade with Europe and Byzantium, where the import of goods, military technology and human capital contributed to internal economic growth and territorial expansion for the Muscovy state (Braudel 1994). With this general situation as a backdrop, the focus here will be on a specific dynamic of state formation in relation to movement at the frontier of the gradually expanding state. In the sixteenth century nomadic raids posed

19 Scott remarks on a similar façade effect of the high-modernist dream of the collective farm, with a technical and organizational modern outlook, but which did not generate agricultural produce effectively; that is, it looks highly productive, but it is not (Scott 1998).

a serious threat to the existence of the Muscovy state. In addition to the destructive looting of property, the most valuable resource sought during the raids was people, who were then taken to the Black Sea ports and channelled into the slave trade, supplying the slave markets of the Ottoman Empire. During one invasion in 1521, an army from the Crimean khanate attacked the provinces of Moscow, Nizhnyi Novgorod, Vladimir, Kolomna and Riazan, and took captive between 300,000 and 400,000 people (Derluguian 1997:95). In an attempt to block such destructive raids, in the late 1400s the Muscovite rulers initiated the building of a long cordon along the Oka River, south of Moscow, which was developed in the 1500s as a defensive line, running south for about 600 miles through a string of fortified towns connected by felled trees, ditches and rivers (Sunderland 2004:24). The establishment of these defences can be seen as a step toward establishing border control and territorial sovereignty. Such embryonic territorialization also became a part of a military expansionist strategy of simply moving the defence line into new territory, and in this way they were able to 'gather the lands', as the imperial ambition was expressed (Kappeler 2001). A concern with fleeing peasants was emerging in the same period, and a decree in 1497, issued by Ivan III, restricted peasant movement through Muscovy to two weeks a year – a first step toward enserfment of the Russian peasantry (Anderson 1979:329). The enserfment took place over two centuries later, in 1649, and came about as a response to the problem of peasants fleeing across the borders in the east toward Siberia and south toward Don. It was established to secure agricultural labor for the Muscovy military (Hellie 1994). Territorialization, therefore, was intimately linked to the ability to block undesired movement in the forms of nomadic raiding and fleeing peasants. The defensive lines demanded military personnel, as well as a civilian population of traders and peasants to supply food and equipment to this border population. But the steppelands made the borders difficult to defend, and for the border population the danger was continuous, and few volunteered to live there. The borders typically drew in unsuccessful landowners, adventurers, fugitives and criminals, which produced a social, cultural and ethnic heterogeneity at the frontiers (O'Rourke 2007).

The production of state challenges – dynamics of violence and fragmentation

This strategic securing of the borders created a dynamic between processes of territorialization and migration, in which the need for increased economic revenue to finance military operations of territorial expansion and defence resulted in new forms of repressive control of movement, which again produced increased flight across the borders into no man's land. The group known as Cossacks (*kazaki*) was a social formation that came into being as

an effect of these processes. After the Mongolian Empire dissolved, multi-ethnic male groups were formed on the steppe frontiers.[20] They survived by hunting, trading, looting and acting as mercenaries.[21] Their livelihood was originally nomadic in form; their political organization was egalitarian oriented and 'democratic', as they elected their leaders, who were replaced on a regular basis. The combination of open steppes, oppressive social systems and constant warfare helped shape these groups of free men with highly developed military skills (O'Rourke 2007). As a social formation, it is comparable to Pierre Clastres's (1982) observations of Guayani Indians in Paraguay, who were similarly organized as dispersed and highly mobile societies of warrior groups, where permanent warfare and constant elections produced a society that worked against the development of hierarchical structures of a state kind. The original Cossack groupings resembled this kind of formation, combined with a strong ideology of freedom at both individual and group levels. What shaped these groups was quite clearly a 'society against the state logic' à la Clastres. The political and ecological conditions of the steppe also contributed to the initial establishment of small, mobile groups of men. This was the only way to survive and successfully extract the rich resources of fish and game in a context of mobile and competing nomadic warrior groups. In the case of the Cossacks, these smaller groups fused over time into larger communities, a process that was enabled by two important changes. Firstly, the collapse of the Kipchak khanate in the sixteenth century provided a territorial opportunity, in terms of producing larger and more permanent political formations of Cossack groups along the Don and the Dnieper rivers, which provided some natural protection from attacks. Secondly, it was in the interests of the Moscow and Polish/Lithuanian states to tap into the obvious military resources of these groups, which were formed by an environment of constant warfare, as well as to draw on their knowledge that enabled survival on the steppes. For these states it was more efficient to deal with the larger Cossack communities than with smaller units, and they allowed and endorsed their establishment by trying to close contracts with them collectively, and by financing their

20 In Russian, the Cossack category is *kazak*, which stems from the Turkish word *qazaq*, a concept that originates with Arabic cultures and originally meant freebooter or nomadic soldier (Longworth 1969:344). The concept indicates that the Cossacks were not purely Slavic or Russian, which is what is commonly assumed, but were also fundamentally shaped by other influences (see also O'Rourke 2007).

21 The Crimean khanate similarly used the Nogai nomads as cavalry and military resource in attacks and raids against the neighbouring Slavic lands (Williams 1998).

existence through a variety of subsidies (Boeck 2009; O'Rourke 2007). As the Moscow-based state increased their repressive policies, many chose to flee across the borders to seek a better life on the steppes. These people were incorporated into the Cossack communities, which gradually gave up their mobile livelihoods, settled and began farming.[22] The Slavic component in these communities increased and became dominant as a result of the political subjects who fled from punishment, oppressive landowners and religious persecution (for example, the old believers, a religious protest movement, were formed as a response to Patriarch Nikons' reforms in 1649). As the border expanded, a fear of depopulating the original areas around Moscow arose among the ruling elite. The wish to reincorporate fleeing subjects, together with imperial ambitions, motivated territorial expansion (Sunderland 2004). From the sixteenth century, the Cossacks were slowly incorporated as a specific military stratum in the Russian empire, serving as border guards and being mobilized as cavalry during warfare. The contract between the Cossacks and the Russian state was based on an exchange of military manpower in the form of extended military service in return for privileged access and the right to land, and hunting and fishing grounds. It included tax redemption, combined with special rights of autonomy and self-rule. This autonomy was slowly taken away from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, in a piece-meal fashion, and was replaced with state-imposed justice and state-appointed political leaders.[23] This mode of appropriation through the granting of privileges implied an acknowledgement of Moscow's sovereignty over the Cossack territories, as a generous gift of the sovereign in return for the desired military manpower. In the nineteenth century, the Cossacks went from being 'outsiders' to being identified as a symbolic core of Russian national mythology, being ascribed the very essence of Russianness (see also

22 Similar circumstances in colonial America (with a large slave population, an extended frontier and warlike indigenous peoples) did not produce groups such as the Cossacks. One reason for this may have been that the slave owners and authorities offered bounties for runaway slaves (O'Rourke 2007); another likely reason is that colonial America had more efficient control apparatus along their peripheries than the Russian state had in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

23 The local ataman (Cossack leader) was still elected, but the leader of the Cossack host (army) was now appointed by the state.

Toje 2006).[24] The description of the processes undergone here is, of course, both simplified and generalized, and does not do justice to the complexity of the Cossack phenomenon. I therefore hasten to add that each of the Cossack groups have their own distinctive historical trajectory, and sedentarization and the adaption to farming practices took place at different moments for different groups, as did the closing of contracts with various states. My aim here is merely to point out a general dynamic to illuminate the strategy of appropriation and incorporation as a part of territorialization processes. The Cossacks with their freedom-loving ethos were, however, not submissive subjects, and there are Cossacks behind significant revolts in Russian history. Cossacks also chose to evade state attempts at regulation and appropriation by fleeing into territories further beyond state control; some groups chose even to emigrate from Russia to Turkey when there was no longer a non-state space available to establish their own way of life.

The transformation of Cossack society over time may be expressed in general terms as a process in which the state's field of power appropriates communities of mobile Cossack warriors, who themselves come into being as unanticipated effects of state efforts to consolidate territorial and economic power. As a society against the state, the Cossack communities challenged state orders, by living as free men who refused stable submission to authorities other than their own, and whose communities made flight an option by incorporating refugees as Cossacks. By incorporating Cossacks as a stratum within the Tsarist state, the mobility and military capabilities of these warriors was put to strategic use in conquering and colonizing new territories. The process resonates with Deleuze and Guatteri's (1986) perspective on the war machine and the state, in which the state denotes a dynamic structure of power – a social assemblage where boundaries are clearly defined and with centred hierarchical systems striving toward the establishment of order. The war machine is a dynamic both external and hostile to the state. Nomads are used as exemplification of the rhizome, the anti-centralised dynamic structure that gives the war machine its distinctive force. In the case analyzed above, the Cossacks may be conceived of in similar terms. The establishment of territorial borders, alongside the codification of spaces

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24 The Cossacks were seen as uniting the two contradictory forces central to Russian self-perceptions in the nineteenth century – Asia and Europe, civilization and barbarism (see, for example, Bassin 1993; Kornblatt 1992). Cossacks were considered to be loyal to the tsar (the last Russian tsar had Cossack guards to protect the royal family) and were Orthodox Christians, but they were simultaneously situated at Russia's territorial margins and resembled nomads or mountain warriors in clothing, military technique and manners.

and social positions, represents a typical attempt to delineate, define and encode spaces of interest by the state, which finally incorporates the nomadic elements into its permanent structure, as a force to be released when needed. So where is the argument about movement and state formation in this? The attempts to control, regulate and block movement produced effects of flight. Another effect was the formation of Cossack communities outside state borders, which was enabled by the largely ungoverned steppes, the political ambitions of Muscovy and the competitive relations between khanates, states and empires, as well as nomadic groups. Imperial ambitions, combined with the desire to reincorporate fleeing subjects, spurred territorial expansion of the Russian state. As the defence line and territory was extended, the need to defend borders and territory grew, and one of the political strategies was to incorporate the militaristic communities of Cossacks, which subsequently served as mobile military units for the empire. This process was characterized by an increasing need to control and block movement, as well as the gradual development and refinement of political means to extract and channel movement in the form of military resources. Processes that counter, shape and fuel these state processes include the phenomena of fleeing political subjects, the threat of nomadic raids, and explicit protest in the shape of social uprisings and riots. A similar dynamic regarding population control and movement existed in a radically different context in the Soviet Gulag system.

***Vory-v-zakone* in the Gulag system, violence and (dis)order**

Exile as punishment can be traced back to forced labour camps in Siberia in seventeenth-century Russia, a practice that was expanded and developed over the tsarist period until the time of the revolution. Here, dislocation is conceptualized as forced movement, and spatial confinement is ordered and managed by the state. The vast territory of Soviet Russia (as was also the case for its tsarist predecessor) enabled the combination of systematic dislocation and imprisonment to become a dominant form of punishment of criminal and political action. The transporting of people away from their homes to be placed in forced-labour camps implies migratory movement; however, it was enacted in a radically different framework from that of voluntary migration, even though the geographical outcome was similar. The labour camps were constructed not only as a way to punish, but also to control and extract the productive capacities of the prisoners. Together, dislocation, imprisonment and forced labour constitute an extreme system of movement control and management.

The infamous Gulag system was established in 1918, and was significantly expanded from 1929 under Stalin, when forced labour was used systematically to speed up industrialization, and to extract natural resources in the north.

The network spread throughout the Soviet Union, and was found in a variety of forms: labour camps, punishment camps, criminal and political camps, women's camps, and children's camps. The fact that a small and isolated settlement not far from where I conducted fieldwork used to be a women's camp belonging to the Gulag network attests to the 'everywhere-ness' of the system. The Gulag system was far more extensive than its conventional association with Siberia would suggest. The deployment of Gulag camps reached a peak in the 1950s, when 2.5 million people were imprisoned. Between 1929 and the time of Stalin's death in 1953, it is estimated that eighteen million people passed through the system. Even though a large number of camps were dismantled after Stalin's death, they continued to be used until the dissolving of the Soviet Union. The practice of exiling dangerous, criminal and oppositional elements does not, of course, pertain to Russian state formation alone; it is found in many varieties at different times and places – the Guantanamo camp springs to mind, for example. What made the Gulag system special were its dimensions in terms of the number of camps and prisoners, its geographical extension and its being integral to the systematic use of forced labour in driving modernization and industrialization. Anne Appelbaum (2004) notes that not only did the camp system play a central role in the Soviet economy, it was also a distinct social formation, with its own laws, practices, morality, language and literature. Even so, she argues, the Gulag also reflected tendencies and practices of wider Soviet society. For the prisoners of Stalin's Gulags, the outside was not considered a domain of freedom, but rather was called the 'large prison zone'; while the Gulag itself was referred to as the 'small prison zone' (Appelbaum 2004:xxvi). Life inside the camps was a struggle for survival in the context of strenuous physical labour, hunger, illness, brutality and violence from other convicts. The Gulag system marked the people who survived it, and former prisoners sometimes said that they could spot an ex-convict on the street 'by the look in their eyes' (Appelbaum 2004:xiv). In the camps there was a clear social divide between political and professional criminals. The criminals of the camps were organized in hierarchies of castes, in which the *vory-v-zakone* fraternity formed an elite group. *Vory-v-zakone* has been translated as thieves-with-a-code-of-honour (Varese 2001), but it literately means 'thieves within the law,' which indicates that this group had their own laws according to which the members were judged and punished. They share some key features with the Cossacks, in that they came together as a society against the state, with similarities in their non-submissive ethos and egalitarianism. However, this fraternity was formed at a different kind of margin than the steppe frontier, in a kind of *homo sacer* position in the Gulag camps, where one could be killed without repercussion, though not sacrificed

(Agamben 1998).[25] In contrast to Agamben's representation of 'bare life' in German concentration camps, this formation possessed a further dimension in terms of the potential for action, and the production of challenges, that those in a more victimized and unprotected position in Agamben's analysis lacked (even though there were plenty of similar victims in the Gulag system). The fraternity was built on criminal-group structures established prior to the revolution, though these were transformed and greatly extended in the Gulag camps.

Membership of the fraternity was restricted, and the recommendation of two members was required to join this criminal elite. It was an exclusively male community, in which women were not allowed to participate and in which loyalty to the brotherhood came before any other relationship. Being a *vor* implied submission to a strict code of behaviour. One had to refrain from any officially recognized labour, and survive only by criminal activity. Further, the code demanded that there should be no cooperation with any representative of the state. Compared to the Cossacks, who as mercenaries of both the Ottoman and Russian empires had a more pragmatic attitude, this fraternity of thieves was more uncompromising stand in their relationship with the state. A *vor* should never enter the army or be a witness in court, as the thieves did not acknowledge Soviet law. A *vor* must be honest towards, and never challenge the authority of, other members, and should avoid internal conflict within the group. He was also obliged to share everything he possessed with his fellow thieves. The fraternity survived economically by demanding a share of food, cigarettes and other scarce resources from other inmates, and by contributions from outside the prison camps that were used as a communal fund (*obshchak*) (Varese 2001:125–7). These *vory* lived a large part of their lives in prison camps, and their belonging to the fraternity provided protection within that community, although its laws kept them at the margins or outside vital Soviet institutions. Their criminal activity was mainly linked to extortion, stealing and card games. The *vor* fraternity was a product of prison culture, indeed one could not become a *vor* without having gained considerable experience in prison camps; but their network also helped them to survive and coordinate criminal activity outside the camps. They operated their own courts, with their own laws. As such, the *vor* may be seen as a sovereign formation, paradoxically existing within the most restricted control zones of the Soviet empire. If the authorities tried to protect prisoners by sending them away to different camps, then death sentences would be carried

25 Essentially this means a position devoid of value, placed outside the societal order. The fact that homer sacer could not be sacrificed, illustrates this, as sacrifice is dependent on a life of value in order to be a meaningful act.

out in them without question by members of the fraternity. Paradoxically, the Gulag system with its networks of camps allowed the fraternity to spread across the territory, and it acquired a national dimension. Inter-Gulag transfers helped to circulate vital information about new members, sentences and rule breaking, as well as disseminating and coordinating rituals for the initiation of new members and punishment. In spite of their anti-state positioning, *vory* served certain political interests of the state, as they victimized and robbed fellow inmates, especially political prisoners. Frederico Varese (2001) states that this almost certainly took place with the tactic acceptance and support of the prison authorities. In this sense, the penal codes and categories of the state served as a basis for the formations of groups such as *vory*.[26]

Systematic displacement as part of legal punishment was not merely a way to deal with convicts. Stalin's exiling of entire ethnic groups can be seen in similar terms, as a distinctive form of population politics enabled by an enormous territory and abundance of land, which rendered possible dislocation on a massive scale. By transporting prisoners across the territory, the labour force was channelled off into Gulag camps that worked to exploit natural resources to the benefit of the state economy. An unforeseen effect of the Gulag, as we have seen, was the formation of a national *vory-v-zakone* network. Formed as a society against the state, the group survived and expanded by preying on fellow prisoners. Paradoxically, their particular dislike for political prisoners coincided with state interests, and their violent treatment and bullying of these prisoners served as additional punishment, victimization and marginalization within the camps – a fact that possibly

26 In the late 1940s, a campaign against organized crime was launched, and the prison authorities relied on former soldiers imprisoned after the Second World War to fight the *vory-v-zakone*. The violent campaign almost annihilated the criminal network. Some of the thieves did, however, survive, and the network blossomed again from the 1960s onwards. Interestingly, Kharkhordin (1999:305) notes that the honour code for the members of *vory-v-zakone* had by the mid-1960s expanded to the model for the unwritten 'prison law' that still operates in Russian prisons. He argues that this came about as an effect of the harshening of prison policies in the 1960s, which coincided with the Krushchevian strategy aimed at creating collectives (*kollektiv*) in all sectors of the society. Characteristic for the organization of the *kollektiv*, Kharkhordin argues, was the communist aim that united the group and its regulation through peer-surveillance. The collectives organized by prison authorities were established by violent means as a network of constant informers. This system spurred the creation of a wider community of inmates that resisted the prison authorities, and who adopted the *vory-v-zakone* organizational structure and code of honour.

enabled the formation of this criminal network. The *vory* placed themselves outside the Soviet system by evading state-organized labour and military service, and developed their own system of justice. Their existence was, however, contingent on Soviet order – on the basis of which it thrived. As an anti-product of the Soviet system, the fraternity was reshaped and redefined during the Gorbachev period. Membership was more easily achieved, and the number of thieves grew. In the post-Soviet period the *vory* encountered competition from other criminal networks, and lost some of its significance. Its existence and activities became well known outside the camp system and, to this day, people I know well will automatically lower their voices if mentioning the *vory-v-zakone*. In talking about this shadowy criminal organization, which tends to evoke a mixture of respect (in their defiance of the Soviet system) and disapproval (of their ruthless methods), one is let in on one of the secrets of Soviet society.

Concluding remarks

The three snapshots examined in this chapter are taken from different state formations on the Russian territory, each of which is related to specific state dynamics taking place at different times and places in relation to various political and legal subjects. These cases may be analyzed through the same lens by focusing on mobility and movement, and the multiple ways attempts are made to control, monitor, manage, extract, force, induce and channel it. The means to effectively curb disordered movement and govern human mobility varies with the ideological ambitions and capacity of the state formations dealt with here. They nevertheless share some of the challenges and resources related to a vast territory (and a flat landscape, which was especially important in early state dynamics). I have argued that these different state formations share a preoccupation with movement, and suggest that this, as a key object of regulation, may be seen as a golden thread running through different Russian state formations. Instead of placing emphasis on the production of static orders by means of categories, I have focused on how mobilities are attempted and shaped into patterned flows through the establishment of various forms of boundaries. The cases analyzed here also reveal how state-formation processes are fundamentally embedded in socio-cultural processes; on the other hand, such processes produce their own challenges. We see from these cases that multiple forms of violence integral to the establishment of state order ultimately become a source of its fragmentation through the production of margins and competing social visions. In this chapter, then, state practices have been conceptualized as fundamentally revolving around establishing, reworking and reproducing authoritative boundaries on all levels via a variety of political and bureaucratic

means. Central to these processes are the construction of mobility systems, examples of which include the passport, the border established by fifteenth-century Muscovy, the incorporation of Cossacks as a military estate, and the network of Gulag camps. The passport system was construed to regulate productive flows related to work and residence; the borders to block and regulate movement across the geographical limits of the state; the Cossack contracts to mobilize a military capacity; the Gulag network to order flows of prisoners for the purpose of punishment and economic benefits. The creation of mobility systems is central to state processes on an overall level, as part of a totalizing orientation. What makes this specific to the various Russian state formations are the forms these systems take, the dynamics realized in social practice, and the challenges that arise as a response to such systems. The pervasiveness of such political measures creates a link between the autocratic tsarist state formation in the fifteenth century, the creation of a high-modernist Soviet state and contemporary Russia. In the past five years the key concern to regulate movement has been exhibited in an increased political focus on the control of flows of goods and people onto the Russian territory; the state branding of NGOs with international sources of financing as 'foreign agents'; and an increased frequency of denied visas for foreigners, as well as restrictions on the import of food products. It can be seen that the politics of movement, in combination with a political and legal framework developed at different historical moments to gain control over mobility, have shaped, and continue to shape, the trajectory of Russian state processes.

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CHAPTER 3

The state? What state?

State, confessionalism and civil society in Lebanon

Anh Nga Longva

Introduction

The Republic of Lebanon has been an object of sustained scholarly attention since its creation in 1943 following the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. Over the years, experts have debated on the nature of the Lebanese state. Some have seen in it promising democratic features and the term 'consociational democracy' (Lijphart 1969) was tentatively used in the 1960s. But as Lebanon descended into a brutal civil war in the following decades (1975–90) there was no longer talk of democracy, consociational or otherwise; the Lebanese state was now described as 'paralyzed', 'fractured', 'weak'. At the height of the civil war, analysts spoke of 'state collapse' and 'breakdown'. The civil war ended nearly 30 years ago, Lebanon has been on a difficult recovery path since, but the label 'weak' still sticks to its state. The cause for this weakness, it is widely agreed, is confessionalism.

A state is confessional when its relationship to its citizens is mediated through their religious community, or 'confession'.[1] Lebanese citizenship presupposes membership in one of the seventeen recognized religious communities. These citizens exercise their political rights of participation and representation, and their most fundamental civil rights (to marry, to receive an education, and so on) only as certain kinds of citizens, e.g. Sunni, Shi`i, Maronite, Druze etc. It could be claimed that, so far as domestic

1 As a result of French influence, 'confession' is commonly used in Lebanon in the sense of sect or religious community. Hence confessionalism is also commonly spoken of as sectarianism. In this text 'confession' and 'religious community' are used interchangeably.

affairs are concerned, 'the Lebanese citizen' or 'the citizen' *tout court* is an abstraction; what exists in reality are citizens appended with religious adjectives. Many states feature practices with various degrees of resemblance to this 'confessionalism', but no others are referred to in this way. This is first of all because such groups are usually differentiated in terms of language, race or culture ('ethnicity'), not only in terms of religion, as in Lebanon. Furthermore, confessionalism in Lebanon is not a practice based on unlawful discrimination or favouritism. On the contrary, the distinctions are stipulated in the constitution. Through confessionalism the Lebanese state officially shows its recognition of, and respect for, religious diversity by granting these communities the right to participate *qua* communities in the political life of the country on the basis of proportional representation.

Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648,[2] the ideal-typical model of the modern state has been the national state that emphasizes, even imposes, cultural unity and homogeneity, and frowns upon divergence and diversity. Together with this ideal-type we find the axiomatic expectation that the state '*should* provide the predominant (if not exclusive) set of 'rules of the game' in each society' (Migdal 1988:14, orig. emphasis). The Lebanese state fails to meet both expectations. Confessionalism, by definition, highlights differences, reinforces religious boundaries and defeats every attempt at building an overarching nationalism in its fostering of a series of sub-nationalisms. Besides, in a confessional state, the religious communities, not the state, are the key structuring element of social life.

To understand the persistence of the confessional state in Lebanon we need to understand the relationship between the Lebanese state and society. This cannot be done through an analysis that starts from theories on the ideal-typical state that are based on European experience and infused with Enlightenment values, in particular individualism. What we need is a theoretical perspective which resonates with Lebanon's historical experience and the cultural logic of its state system. In the following, I will therefore draw on theoretical traditions within anthropology and political philosophy that give primacy to the community or the group; I refer especially to theories by

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2 Signed in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia put an end to the European wars of religion between Catholics and Protestants, also known as the Thirty Years' War. The Peace of Westphalia established the principle of state sovereignty and the norm of non-interference in another state's domestic affairs. The Westphalian principles are central to international law and to the prevailing world order, but with the rise of globalization and inter-dependence, their political and moral justification is being increasingly questioned.

Herder, Durkheim seen through Dumont, and the American communitarian philosophers.

Individualism/liberalism versus holism/communitarianism

The opposition between the individual and the group is part of a wider set of dichotomies that was most clearly articulated in the critiques of the Enlightenment by the German Romanticists. It was in 1774, at the height of the French and English Enlightenment, that Herder published his frontal attack against the relentless pursuit of universal reason advocated by the *philosophes*. Herder extolled the things that reason looks down upon – emotions, family relations – and saw them as the values which 'move mankind the most [and] speak to the human heart' (Herder 2004: xxv). Of primary relevance to our discussion here, amongst Herder's many intellectual contributions, is his historicism: for him, each historical period has its own 'mentality' (*Geist*), its own set of concepts, beliefs and perceptions. And just as each period has its own *Geist*, so does each nation (*Volk*). From this arose the theory of culture and cultural diversity that, thanks to Boas, was to play a central part in cultural anthropology. To the *philosophes*' universalism, Herder opposes particularism and its methodological counterpart, relativism. His views on the relationship between the individual and the group are stated indirectly through his doctrine that linguistic meaning is fundamentally social. This has generally been interpreted as a claim that the self is socially constituted.

When Durkheim, in the late nineteenth century, set about creating the new discipline of sociology, the difference between the individual and the group was the guiding concern of his project. His work can be read as an exploration of 'ways to express the normative relation between the private and the public that would avoid the tendency to reduce it to these two contrary positions' (Cladis 1992:1). Among anthropologists, it was Louis Dumont who, following in Durkheim's footsteps, explored most thoroughly the difference between the 'French' and the 'German' ideologies. He viewed the transition from tradition to modernity as the result of the 'individualist revolution', i.e. 'a displacement of the main value stress from society as a whole (holism) to the human individual taken as an embodiment of humanity at large (individualism)' (Dumont 1970:32). Whereas individualism entails universalism, holism entails particularism. A Frenchman, claims Dumont, believes he is 'a man by nature, and a Frenchman by accident', whereas a German believes he 'essentially [is] a German, and [he is] a man through [his] being a German' (Dumont 1986:25). The historical origin of individualism is commonly placed in fifteenth-century Renaissance Italy, and it was in this milieu that the humanist philosopher Pico della Mirandola wrote his famous passage depicting God's intention to make man an autonomous and rational

individual, a so-called 'sovereign artificer'. Goodin calls this the 'founding fiction of the modern social world', and one that is the central pillar of the Enlightenment worldview (1998:531). In the same vein, Dumont describes individualism as 'a utopian theory sheltered against any contact with actual social life' (1986:25). Nonetheless, Dumont acknowledges the strength of philosophical individualism. As the travelling companion of modernity, its penetration into traditional societies is irresistible. In these societies, individualism is neither rejected offhand nor embraced uncritically; rather, the ideology's values are transferred from the level of the human individuals to the level of individual 'cultures' or 'peoples'. Thus Herder, while protesting against 'the flat rationalism of the Enlightenment', argued that all cultures are of equal value, and therefore have an equal right to exist and be respected. Equality being, obviously, an Enlightenment notion, the difference between Herder and the Enlightenment philosophers is in his applying it to national and cultural groups while they applied it to individuals (Dumont 1986:29).

Within contemporary American political philosophy, liberalism is the direct heir of the Enlightenment, especially with regard to its tenets on individualism and universalism. Liberals espouse the thesis of the sovereign artificer, and have made it a pillar of mainstream Western moral and political thought (Goodin 1998). The problem with this vision, according to communitarians, is its propensity to conceive of the individual as an absolutely autonomous being. Communitarian critiques of liberalism have been a recurrent feature throughout twentieth-century political philosophy. On the one side of the argument, we have the liberals who argue for the inalienability of individuals' rights against groups' interests, claiming that this is a prerequisite for the smooth functioning of a democratic society in which there is a plurality of views regarding aims, interests and beliefs. Such a society is best governed by principles that do not favour any particular conception of the good, as this would infringe upon the individual's autonomy of choice. Government is thus about justice and fairness, not about whether the views which inform government policies are true or false (Rawls 1999). On the other side, we have the communitarians who object to the notion of human actors as independent selves, whose identity is 'unencumbered' by aims and attachments. According to the communitarians, we are who we are in terms of our constitutive attachments – members in a certain family, community or nation, bearers of a certain history that 'draws [us] closer to some and more distant from others [and] makes some aims more appropriate, others less so' (Sandel 1998:179). Being 'encumbered selves' is what makes us self-interpreting, self-knowing beings, in other words, true agents (ibid.). Communitarians are in this sense direct descendents of the Romanticist philosophy.

Having briefly reviewed the main differences between individualism/liberalism and holism/communitarianism in their anthropological and political philosophy contexts, I will now introduce the Lebanese state project and the practice of confessionalism.

The Lebanese state: a hybrid project

The state of Lebanon owes its existence to France, which assumed the mandate of Syria in 1920 in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. To counter the Syrians' will for independence, the French partitioned Syria into six minority states, the largest and most viable of which was the Republic of Lebanon, built around predominantly Christian Mount Lebanon. Of the initial six, only the Lebanese state survived, because France, whose strategic interests included the systematic weakening of Syria, decided to append to Mount Lebanon two of the Syrian richest regions: the coastal area with the port cities of Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon, and the fertile Beqa`a valley. Being in majority Sunni Muslim, the inhabitants of these regions, especially those in the Tripoli area, resented being arbitrarily divorced from their Syrian homeland and were strongly opposed to an independent Lebanon (Harris 2012). According to the French mandatory, Lebanon was to be a country where all religions would enjoy perfect equality, and where the Christians would be their own masters, freed from centuries of Muslim political and social domination. The Maronites, the largest Christian community concentrated in Mount Lebanon, lobbied intensely for the creation of the state of Lebanon at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. Originally, they only sought the independence of Mount Lebanon (*'Le Petit Liban'*), a region the Maronites shared with two heterodox Muslim communities, the Druzes and the Shi`a, but in which they were in majority. From 1861 to 1915 Mount Lebanon had enjoyed the status of an autonomous Ottoman province (*mutasarrifiya*). The experience with the *mutasarrifiya* taught the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon valuable lessons in self-rule and peaceful sectarian cooperation (Akarli 1993). On this basis, the Maronites felt the province was ready for independence after First World War, though some pragmatists feared that a state consisting solely of Mount Lebanon would not be economically viable. Independent modern statehood, they argued, required a larger territory and more diversified resources. In this 'Greater Lebanon' (*'Le Grand Liban'*), however, the Maronites would no longer be the majority group, and would have to share power with Muslims and other non-Christians. In 1920, France opted for the creation of Greater Lebanon 'to satisfy the Maronites, secure French domination over the area and isolate Damascus' (Zamir 2000:5).

The Republic of Lebanon, with its extended boundaries and enlarged population, was a multi-religious, plural state. It consisted of Sunnis, Shi'a,

Druzes, Jews, and Christians belonging to more than a dozen churches, the largest being the Maronite church. As a society, Lebanon had been moulded by Ottoman state structures and practices for four centuries. Most outstanding among these was the *millet* system, whereby religious communities (*millet*) were free to organize their religious and cultural lives according to their own religious laws and cultural norms, so long as they paid taxes to the sultan and acted as his docile subjects. As a result of this practice, the communities were fiercely jealous of their autonomy, not only in relation to the state but also in relation to each other.

The charter of the mandate of Syria forbid the mandatory from interfering in the running of the religious communities, whose immunities were explicitly guaranteed (Rabbath 1986:99). The mandatory's task, assigned by the League of Nations, was to write a constitution and build a whole new state apparatus for the mandated territories. The challenge for France was to create a constitution that allied the spirit of civic equality and liberty with a guarantee of the religious communities' autonomy. The result was the Constitution of 1926, a combination of the *millet* system (with the critical difference that the Sunni Muslims' role as state-power holders was now taken over by the Maronites) and the principle of equality, not only between individuals but also between the religious communities. In other words, the Lebanese state project was a highly unusual attempt to marry the spirit of the Enlightenment and the teachings of Herder.

Confessionalism (*ta'ifiyya*) or how to square a circle

References to the rights of, and equality between, the religious communities are found in only 2 of the 102 articles in the 1926 Constitution. Article 9 which is about freedom of conscience, declares that

> The state … shall respect all religions and creeds and guarantees, under its protection, the free exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever religious sect they belong, is respected.

Article 10 goes into more details and states that

> … there shall be no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction.

The rest of the constitution is formulated in a strictly secular language centred on individual rights. Articles 9 and 10 were among the Constitution's fundamental provisions and have remained unchanged since 1926. While the majority of the population may not be familiar with the constitutional text, the principles enunciated in these two articles are an integral part of Lebanon's self-definition. They are the legal and moral prism through which most Lebanese perceive, comprehend, and justify the pervasive influence of the religious communities over Lebanese society and politics. The tension between Christians and Muslims remained throughout the mandate, but it was kept under control by the French authorities. It was as part of the attempt to placate the reluctant Muslims and convince them to participate in the Lebanese state project after independence in 1943 that confessionalism began to penetrate the state system.

Confessionalism, or *ta'ifiyya*,[3] thus became a defining feature of Lebanon, a state founded for the Christians and run single-handedly by France during its formative years (Rabbath 1986). This is a paradox, as confessionalism was originally a Muslim institution, embodying the combined legacy of the *dhimma* and Ottoman *millet* systems.[4] But whereas we find in these systems one ruling community (the Muslims) and several minority communities (the non-Muslims), this is no longer the case. In present-day Lebanon, as a result of the equality between all religions, the continued existence of the republic of Lebanon is predicated on consensus and power sharing. It is also predicated on a stable demographic balance. A population census was carried out in 1932, according to which the Christians were in slight majority.[5] This fact was used by the mandatory to grant the Christians a higher rate of representation in parliament than the Muslims (6 against 5). This 1932 census was the last to be taken, with the general agreement that an assumption (no matter how

3 From *ta'ifa* (pl. *tawa'if*), nowadays the preferred term for 'community' instead of *milla*.

4 *Dhimma* was the arrangement whereby Jews and Christians living in pre-modern Muslim states were granted protection by the Muslim ruler in exchange for acknowledgement of the Muslims' political, legal and social superiority. *Millet* derives from the practice of *dhimma*. While the subjects of the *dhimma* were the Christians and the Jews, the *millet* system covered all the officially recognized religious communities. But as in the *dhimma*, the Muslims enjoyed a higher status than the other *millets*.

5 This assertion was strongly disputed by the Muslims at the time. They also claimed that the French mandatory deliberately resettled the Armenian refugees from Turkey on Lebanese territory rather than in Syria in order to raise the proportion of the Christians prior to the census (van den Boogert 2015).

incorrect) of quasi-equilibrium between Christians and Muslims is the best way to keep the peace in Lebanon.

There are in all seventeen officially recognized religious communities. The dividing lines run between different branches of Islam (Sunni, Shi`i and Druze) and Christianity (Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant). One speaks of Lebanese diversity and pluralism, despite the narrow range of cultural and doctrinal variations, because confessional identities have a significance that goes well beyond questions of faith and spirituality. Over the years they have taken on an ethnic character (through in-group marriages) and a unique political character (because political affiliation nearly always corresponds to confessional affiliation, the confessions are quasi-political parties). In the Lebanese context, therefore, the term *ta'ifa* refers to these religious-cum-ethnic-cum-political communities that compete among themselves for resources, power and representation.

The confessionalization of daily life

Confessionalism is simultaneously a classificatory system, social structure, ideology and mode of perception of self and others. The presence of the religious communities is felt in every aspect of daily life, whereas encounters with the state are only sporadic. Basic social services, in particular education and healthcare, are mostly in the hands of the confessions, which own the majority of schools and hospitals. According to the World Health Organization 90 per cent of health-service delivery in Lebanon is provided by the private sector, and most of this via the religious communities. The majority of the Lebanese are reticent to resort to state-run health services, first and foremost because of their alleged lower quality, but also because if they need to be hospitalized, most prefer to be cared for by people with whom they feel some cultural and religious affinity. We find a similar pattern of organization and practice in the field of education. As mentioned earlier, the right of each confession to have its own schools is guaranteed by the constitution. Lebanon has, in addition, a plethora of confessional universities, many of them Christian, with the two oldest dating back to the nineteenth century. Lebanese parents do their utmost to send their children to fee-paying private schools. State schools, though free, are always a last resort, though they are not shunned to the same extent as state hospitals.

The state bureaucracy is also confessionalized. All public functions, from the highest level to the lowest, are distributed along religious lines. According to an unwritten tradition, the so-called National Pact of 1943, the President of the Republic is always a Maronite; the Prime Minister, a Sunni; and the Speaker of Parliament, a Shi`i. The same principle of confessional quotas is

reproduced throughout the entire state bureaucracy, although positions and turfs can, and do, shift hands between the communities at the lower level.

In many Middle Eastern countries the 'modernization' of state rule takes place through the replacement of the rulers' traditional dependence on tribal support with dependence on the army, as happened in Iran with the emergence of the Pahlavi dynasty (Cronin 1997). In Lebanon there has been no possibility of the army playing such a role, because, as with all other state institutions, it was, at least until recently, confessionally organized. The guiding principle in recruitment and promotion was confessional balance rather than competence.

Nor can the Lebanese state rely on the economy to control the society. Unlike the Gulf states or Iran, the Lebanon does not have a rentier economy which guarantees its independence from the society (Beblawi 1987); nor can it resort to cooptative policies, for instance a generous welfare system, to induce the citizens to switch allegiance in its favour.

Not surprisingly, Lebanon's geography is also deeply confessionalized. Wherever Lebanese families settle down, the land on which they live takes on their confessional identity. Space is confessionally demarcated through the presence of community schools, hospitals and places of worship, and through the naming of streets, squares, public monuments and so forth. In mixed urban areas, people belonging to the same community tend to gather in the same neighbourhoods and streets. Some areas are more mixed than others, but, as a rule, it is possible for Lebanese people to spend most of their life within the geographic boundaries and social fold of their community without having to deal extensively with people from other confessions.

The confessionalization of geographic space means that people's place of origin, in particular their natal village, is critically important in the definition of their social identity. In the context of Lebanon, 'their natal village' (*masqat ra'is*) refers not to the individual's own place of birth, but that of his or her father and forefathers. Thus, a person can be born in Beirut but be registered in, say, a village in Mount Lebanon, if this is where his or her father originates from. While a person may have lived all their life in a city, it is only in their natal village that they can cast a vote during a parliamentary election, and only for candidates who represent that specific region. A woman's ties to her natal village, however, are not granted the same importance as a man's, as upon marriage she is automatically registered as originating from her husband's natal village.

It is in times of tension and conflict that the confessional character of the regions asserts itself most clearly, as the local majority communities take over the functions and prerogatives of the state. For instance, during the civil war, East Beirut, a Christian area, cut itself loose from the state. Its day-to-day running was taken over by the Lebanese Forces, the most powerful Christian

militia. Likewise, the state is currently only minimally involved in the day-to-day administration of the southern suburbs of Beirut, a Shi´ite territory controlled by the Hizbollah. So is most of southern Lebanon.[6] Confessionalization also characterizes the many post-conflict reconstructions, with the majority being funded by private donors who belong to the community the affected area is identified with.

Finally, the confessional appropriation of space also takes place in the literal sense: as corporate groups, all the religious communities own properties in their regions. These are *waqf*, properties used for religious and philanthropic purposes; they cannot be confiscated or taxed by the state.

Just as there are very few areas of Lebanon that are not identified with a confession, there are also very few aspects of the citizens' lives which escape their community's scrutiny. The religious authorities have the monopoly of regulation over all matters pertaining to an individual's personal status. Marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption and questions related to new reproductive technologies are regulated exclusively by religious decisions; conflicts are sorted out in ecclesiastic tribunals for Christians and shari`a courts for Muslims. There is no institution of civil marriage in Lebanon, making it necessary for marriages between Muslims and Christians to be performed abroad unless one of the spouses converts to the other's religion.

Efforts to introduce civil marriage as an option in personal status law have been made three times since the 1950s. Each time they were met with unanimous opposition from the religious leaders and mild indifference from the general public. In 2008 parliament approved the optional removal of religious affiliation from the citizens' identity documents. This historic step was not entirely successful, however, because it did not take long for people to realize that a Lebanese without religious affiliation is also a Lebanese without basic social and personal status rights, including the right to apply for jobs in the confessional public sector. What the right to remove religious affiliation from ID documents has done, meanwhile, is to revive the question of optional civil marriage on the Lebanese soil. Over the past few years the media have reported a trickle of inter-denominational marriages in Lebanon itself, but it is difficult to envisage that this practice will gain momentum as long as matters

6 Although peace came to Lebanon in 1990, the war went on for ten more years in the south. The region, which has always been home to the Shi`a, had been occupied by Israel since 1982. It was Hezbollah, not the Lebanese Army, that stood behind the armed struggle which resulted in the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000. This explains why Hezbollah's control of the south is viewed by most Lebanese as legitimate.

of personal status are not comprehensively reviewed and confessionalism entirely discarded.

That the confessionally demarcated areas can, in times of crisis, so effortlessly turn into autonomous mini-states, becoming for all practical purposes states-within-the-state, testifies to the effectiveness of the organizational apparatus put in place by the *tawa'if*. This has not only withstood the many violent conflicts in Lebanon's history, it has emerged stronger. Unlike the state, the communities seem to perform best under duress, providing their members with prompt and efficient assistance. Given the stream of recurring conflicts that have had a paralyzing effect on the state, it is hardly surprising that the Lebanese perceive the role of their religious communities more clearly and more positively than that of the state.

This brief description of the practice of confessionalism may give the impression that the religious communities are united social bodies. In fact, the religious communities in Lebanon are internally divided by a series of cleavages. The largest among them are divided by mutually hostile factions led by wealthy and powerful families that compete among themselves for clients and supporters. The *tawa'if* are based on a patrimonial structure and ideology whereby the leader is not a *primus inter pares*, but is rather a charismatic ruler who controls a complex network of personal client-type relations. This is a structure in which there is little room for collaboration between rivals, and where hostilities are not only a matter between two individuals but involve all those attached to them. Male charisma is a key pillar of confessional patrimonialism, and also the main reason why Lebanese women are conspicuously absent from both politics and business. Moreover, the fact that positions in the state are allocated on the basis of confessional quotas and not individual competence, means that the fiercest competitions take place within rather than between communities. Hence the *tawa'if* are often the loci of bitter rivalries and enmities: the fiercest battles during the war were not between Christians and Muslims (although these were fierce enough) but between branches of communities.[7] Tensions are also common between secular and religious leaderships. In the original *millet* system, communal autonomy meant that both religious and lay leaders played crucial roles as representatives of their community before the Ottoman authorities. They were held responsible for the payment of taxes, the distribution of justice and the keeping of the peace within the community. Under the present-day confessional system, the religious leader's responsibilities are vastly reduced,

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7 Two examples are the violent confrontations between Amal and Hizbollah, both Shi`i, in the late 1980s, and the bloody war between the Lebanese Forces and the Aounists, both Maronite, in 1990.

though he remains the most respected spokesman of his community. But the task of defending and promoting the interests of the *ta'ifa* still belongs to the lay leaders, now clothed as politicians. While the division of labour is clear in most cases, it is not so among the Maronites, whose patriarch is still looked upon by many as a political as well as spiritual leader. Hence a certain amount of tension exists between some Maronite politicians and the patriarchate, though there are no examples of politicians actually breaking away from their church leader. In the case of the Shi`a, who under the Ottoman were not recognized as a *milla* due to their being Muslims, the reverse has taken place: the rise of the Shi`a from an underdog community to one which successfully challenges the traditional Maronite and Sunni hegemony was achieved thanks to the initiative of the religious leaders, first the imam Musa Sadr then the leaders of Hezbollah; hence their firm control over the political and social leadership in the Shi`i community today, at the expense of the lay leaders.[8] Finally, the *tawa'if* are also divided in terms of class: disparities in income and education have a vast impact on people's worldviews and choices even if they belong to the same faith. There are striking commonalities between the elites of all the communities. Over the years, children of the upper class-families have attended the same expensive non-confessional private schools; likewise, many children from rich Muslim families have graduated from exclusive Christian schools. The result is a class of people who have no difficulties interacting with each other, though such interactions do not render the confessional boundaries more porous. Bonds created by class interests and habits always tend in the end to be weaker than those based on religion, because the latter coincide with kinship bonds.

Most Lebanese have an ambiguous attitude towards confessionalism: on the one hand they view it as the major source of their predicament. Not only ordinary citizens and intellectuals, but also politicians, arguably the clearest beneficiaries of the system, express the wish to rid themselves of it. The Taif Agreement, which put an end to the civil war and was signed in October 1989 in the town of Taif, Saudi Arabia, makes an explicit call for its

8 The non-religious Amal party led by Nabih Beri, a lawyer who has held the position of Speaker of the Parliament since the end of the war, is sometimes construed as a challenge to Hizbollah. But few believe Amal represents a genuine alternative to Hizbollah.

eradication, which was formalized in the 1991 Constitution.[9] But at the same time, both private and public persons in Lebanon seem unable to let go of confessionalism or agree on an alternative. In principle, everyone supports an open system of universal rights, but when it comes down to practicalities, my informants say that they do not wish to live in a state that treats them 'as numbers'. Western democracy may be good, they say, but it is too impersonal.

Weak state, strong civil society

In discussions on strong versus weak states, the Middle East is often used as an illustration of the former. State strength can be interpreted positively or negatively. It is generally agreed that Middle Eastern states are strong in the negative, authoritarian, sense (Bellin 2004). Most Arab states are, in the words of Ayubi, 'so opposed to society that [they] can only deal with it via coercion and raw force'. They are strong in the sense that they subjugate society, not because they 'work with and through [its] centres of power' (Ayubi 1995:449–50). Ayubi prefers to describe the Arab states as hard, violent or fierce, rather than as strong. In this region of fierce states, Lebanon stands out as an exception. It, by all accounts, has a weak state, whose sovereignty, both internal and external, has been repeatedly and successfully challenged by various actors. If we accept Ayubi's definition of the strong state in the Middle East as anti-society, an interesting question arises regarding the nature of the relationship between state and society in Lebanon. Obviously, the Lebanese state's weakness is not due to its ignoring, let alone subjugating, society. On the contrary, all evidence indicates that the Lebanese state is weak because it is overrun by an unusually strong civil society.

My use of the term civil society in this context will be met by some raised eyebrows. Its usage has varied significantly over time. According to the definition prevailing in the 1980s and 90s, and which is still quite dominant today, civil society is voluntary (membership is contractual), secular (members make use of critical rationality), liberal (tolerant and non-authoritarian), and anti-state. It deals with matters related to the public, though not state-

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9 Article 95b of the 1991 Constitution states the following: 'The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the judiciary, in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies is to be cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; it shall be replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and their equivalents are exempt from this rule, and the posts must be distributed equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence.'

dominated, sphere. Its aim is to promote the fundamental liberties, especially freedom of thought, speech and association, all prerequisites of democracy. Several critical scholars have called this definition utopian and contended that, in so far as it has roots in reality, it is based mostly if not wholly on the European, especially Eastern European, historical experience (Hann and Dunn 1996). When applied to the Middle East this Eurocentric definition is problematic because the kind of civil society it describes is weak or even absent there, which would seem to confirm the exceptionalism thesis held by some prominent social theorists (e.g. Gellner 1991; Weber 1978) with regard to the region. But civil society need not be patterned according to the Eastern European experience and the events that ended the Cold War. In his social philosophy, Hegel (in Bratton 1989) views civil society as the institution that mediates between the family and the state. Elaborating on this, Bryan Turner gives a cogent description of civil society by placing it in the context of despotism. He visualized despotism as a landscape where 'the individual is fully exposed to the gaze of the despotic ruler', on account of the absence of 'social groups or institutions behind which the ruled may hide [from the ruler's gaze]' (1994:23). Turner defines civil society as 'a prolific network of institutions – church, family, club, guild, association and community – [which] lies between the state and the individual, and which simultaneously connects the individual to authority and protects the individual from total political control' (ibid.).

If we take Turner's definition as the point of departure and stop focusing on secularity and liberalism as absolute conditions, the discussion on civil society in the Middle East takes a different turn. Indeed, there has been a growing willingness among Middle East scholars to expand the definition of civil society. Al-Sayyid (1995), for instance, suggests that civil society could be understood as composed of institutions – whether economic, cultural or religious – that are not subject to a single uniform regime imposed by public authorities. Yet Al-Sayyid, and many scholars with him, still find it too radical to accept groups based on primordial ties, understood as ties deriving from membership in a family, a tribe, a confession, as part of civil society.

It is generally assumed that civil society is a prerequisite of democracy. While Lebanon was a favourite empirical reference in pre-1975 Third World democracy studies, its absence is noticeable in works on civil society in the Middle East.[10] Admittedly, Western-type associations and unions, while

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10 An example is the two-volume collection *Civil Society in the Middle Ea*st (Norton 1995, 1996). This classic work includes case studies from almost all the countries in the Middle East and North Africa. But Lebanon, while mentioned here and there, is omitted from any in-depth study.

numerous, have little impact in Lebanon. But to conclude from this that Lebanon has no civil society would be a serious mistake. My contention is that there is a strong civil society that has been active over a long period, not least during the war. But this civil society fails to be taken into consideration because it consists of religious communities. Not only is membership in these communities ascribed, they also embody values radically opposed to those of the Enlightenment, not least secularism and individualism. Moreover, they are seen as the source of the many evils that have befallen Lebanon.

Confessionalism was undeniably one cause of the civil war, and is still behind many ongoing tensions and conflicts. But we need to differentiate between political confessionalism and religious communities. The former can easily be used by some leaders as a weapon to stoke communal hostilities. But the members in the *tawa'if* do not always stand united behind these leaders; more importantly, these associations were not created to fight against others, and, unlike militant organizations, they are neither actual nor potential purveyors of hatred. By their existence, the *tawa'if* foster religious differentiation, hence social separation, and they are admittedly jealous of their autonomy, but their religious leaders neither preach nor condone aggression and violence. While the political leaders and their militias waged war in the 1970s and 1980s, the religious communities themselves played a critical role in providing assistance and a sense of normalcy to the battered population when the fighting was at its worse. One example suffices: throughout the war, in most neighbourhoods of the divided capital of Beirut the confessional schools were kept open and running a few hours every day so that the children could continue their education. With surprisingly few exceptions, during the sixteen years of war, Lebanese youths studied, sat exams and graduated from schools. The reasons this was possible are various and complex, but one factor is that the confessional schools were protected by the local militias who identified with them, unlike the 'alien' state schools, which were the first to close down for lack of protection; another lies in the personal involvement and motivation of the staff, for whom the confessional schools also happened to be their own children's schools. The same is true for hospitals, orphanages and all other confessionally run institutions. Because the local people, whether workers, employers, housewives or militiamen, had a stake in these institutions and felt directly concerned, they willingly mobilized for their defence and upkeep. This is also true during peace time. Herein lies the main reason for the communities' strength: personal identification and a sense of sharing a common fate nurture the kind of public spiritedness and participatory politics that characterizes vibrant civil societies, and whose absence in several contemporary societies has been deplored by civil-society theorists.

The traditional civil society

A study of civil society that makes room for the role of the religious communities, in all its ambivalence, will help us better understand the enduring importance of such communities and the functioning of Lebanese society as a whole. It can also help us understand why Lebanon, with all its weaknesses, still captures the imagination of many men and women in the Middle East. On the one hand, it is widely agreed that the Lebanese state is weak ('what state?' is the cynical reaction when the topic comes up in the conversation), plagued by confessionalism, unstable and prone to conflict. On the other hand, there is an unarticulated feeling that despite all the problems associated with confessionalism, there is something unique and compelling in the Lebanese state project. What really distinguishes Lebanon from other Arab states is that, through confessionalism, it is preserving certain values that are central to the Middle East as a cultural and historical region, but which are often rejected by reformers and the elite as anti-modern. As Harik (1994:47) put it,

> in most Arab countries, traditional solidarities constitute the most common social bonds, whether tribal, ethnic, communal, religious, or kinship-based. Yet Arab intellectuals – the biggest promoters of civil society – generally loathe traditional loyalties and attitudes, and offer a vision with no place for associations based on primordial ties. To these intellectuals, only modern associations with voluntary memberships are acceptable.

The uniqueness of the Lebanese state project lies precisely in that it openly and unapologetically recognizes the importance of associations based on primordial ties, while at the same time subscribing to Western ideas, among them the Herderian principle of equality between these communities. Lebanese civil society is 'civil' not in the narrow but in the wide sense; it includes not only Western-type non-governmental organizations, but also primordial associations with deep local roots, such as families, kin groups and religious communities. According to Harik, considerations of civil society that do not take account of traditional associations do not help promote democracy, as civil society 'is supposed to act as an intermediary between the individual and national leaders, and in doing so also supposed to serve as a check on the power that those leaders can wield' (ibid.). In Lebanon few 'modern' civil associations have ever been able to have this kind of effect on the nation's leaders. Lebanon is known in the Middle East for its free media, and Beirut has been the region's cultural and intellectual hub since the early twentieth century. Yet neither the media nor the intellectuals have succeeded in persuading the politicians to serve the state interests rather than those of

their communities; that the media themselves are confessionally owned is part of the explanation.[11] Likewise, although there have been vibrant professional associations and trade unions since the 1950s, these organizations have had a fairly limited impact on the Lebanese political system, which has remained remarkably static since 1943. The Lebanese marched and demonstrated before, during and after the war, for a variety of causes, but such civic mobilizations seldom elicited a response from the state, let alone goaded it into undertaking reforms.[12] The only concrete and meaningful change to the confessional system since 1926 was brought about by the Taif Agreement and consisted in a fairer distribution of power between Christians and Muslims (both now have equal representation in parliament, and the power of the Sunni prime minister is reinforced in relation to that of the Maronite president). The Taif Agreement was the result of cooperation between a handful of Lebanese politicians and the Saudi and Syrian leaders, rather than deriving from any popular demands through civil society. The religious communities are the only civil formations that have a genuine impact on the Lebanese political leaders, who owe their positions in the system to their membership in these communities. Whether they are the Maronite president of the republic, the Sunni prime minister or the Shi`i speaker of parliament, these men would not have gained their positions unless they enjoyed the public support of the secular elite and the religious leaders of their communities. Once in place, the successful candidates are expected to show their appreciation by acting, first, as guardians of their communities' interests, and only then as servants of the Lebanese state. This means that the confessions are involved in the running of the state in a way that ordinary civil associations are not. In other words, every domestic policy, especially if related to education and personal status, is adopted with the implicit or explicit approval of the communities to which the politicians and their allies belong.

Through confessionalism 'traditional' civil society, as opposed to Western-style civil society, penetrates the state and shapes it from within. This erodes the boundaries between state and civil society, but not in favour of the state.

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11 Except for the state-owned Télé Liban, the major Lebanese television channels are privately owned by political parties and are identified with a specific religious community. The same applies for the printed press and radio stations.

12 The sudden withdrawal of Syrian armies from Lebanon in 2005 is viewed by some Lebanese and Western media as a result of the so-called Cedar Revolution, a movement responsible for anti-Syrian mass demonstrations in March 2005. While the 'revolution' was a remarkable popular mobilization, a more likely explanation for Syria's withdrawal was international pressure on the Al Assad regime to abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1559.

The classic view of civil society being by definition anti-state posits a clear separation between the two, and presupposes that power lies with the state. But this is not the case in Lebanon. The *tawa'if* have captured the state and shape it from within, so that the state has lost its autonomy and become, to a certain extent, part of, or subsumed under, the religious communities. A change in the nature of the system can only be carried out with the accord of these communities. If the state system has remained static over the years, it is because the status quo serves the religious communities' interests. The Lebanese state is weak by design, not by accident, and this weakness is an expression of the will of traditional civil society.

'The tyranny of cousins'

The conventional Arabic translation of civil society is *mujtama`a madani*. *Madani* derives from *madina*, Arabic for town or city, following civil's derivation from *civitas*, the Latin for city. And just as civil is the root-word for civilization, and has therefore strong connotations with civility and refinement, *madani* means urban, civilized, in addition to civil. It also means secular, making *mujta`a madani* a faithful translation of the usual definition of civil society. Some Arab scholars have suggested another way to refer to civil society: *mujtama`a ahli* (see Al-Sayyid1995). *Ahl* means kin, family; so *mujtama`a ahli* is literally, 'kin society'. The major difference between *mujtama`a madani* and *mujtama`a ahli* is that membership in the former is voluntary, whereas in the latter it is, in general, ascribed. Free choice is crucial, as it implies and inspires the use of critical reason, something its absence most likely inhibits. In most civil-society theories, emphasis is put on 'choosing those with whom one wants to associate and choosing the terms on which associations are formed' (Fine 1997:19). On this account, it is understandable that many analysts are reluctant to view kin groups and religious communities as part of civil society. But there are degrees of free choice. Ascription does not necessarily entail blind and wholehearted support for the group into which one is born; it can entail anything from active support, to indifference, to passive resistance and active opposition. Instead of differentiating between the presence and absence of free choice, and making this a defining characteristic of civil society, we should differentiate between actors who actively use their membership in a confession to mobilize for civil action and those who do not. Only the former are part of *mujtama`a ahli*.

The question of how this type of civil society – anti-secular, anti-individualist and patrimonial – is to be assessed normatively, and how it compares with its 'utopian' counterpart, lies, strictly speaking, beyond the

concern of this study.[13] Part of the question can, however, be addressed by pointing up some of the dilemmas inherent to this model in Lebanon. Ascribed membership in the *tawa'if* means that people are born into a ready-made social universe, complete with its networks, values, rules and hierarchies. While the parameters of social life are always pre-established, the degree to which the individual is expected to endorse them is higher in a confessionally organized society. It is not only, or not so much, that the individual is left with little free choice and a narrow margin of action, but there is a lack of incentives for actors to make use of this freedom to choose. Beneath the open, easy-going flow of interaction that characterizes social life in Lebanon, lies a mild absence of curiosity with regard to the Other, who lives beyond one's own confessional boundaries. This attitude, which is not altogether negative, as a degree of indifference is a necessary ingredient in the tolerance of plural societies, implies that people find what it takes to satisfy their social needs within their communities. One grows up, goes to school, socializes, marries and, often, works among one's own people. Of course, we do observe movements across confessional boundaries: there are occasional friendship relationships and business associations, as well as mixed marriages that sometimes involve religious conversions. But upon close scrutiny, cross-confessional relations tend to be superficial or transient, and most mixed marriages take place between the various branches of Christianity or between Sunnis and Shi`a, seldom between Christians and Muslims. While not forbidden, the complications in the personal status law raised by Islamo-Christian marriages,[14] combined with frequent negative reactions in the couple's immediate social circles can be seen as normative limitations to the individual's right of exit from the group. The same is true for religious conversions. As a Maronite friend once remarked: 'Even if I become an atheist, I will still be seen as a Maronite atheist, not just an atheist.' Such movements exist, but they confirm rather than challenge the confessional logic.

Traditional civil society is encompassing in an enticing way, and offers not only the drive to undertake collective action when needed but also a rewarding sense of security and psychological comfort. All the Lebanese I know have rebelled against confessionalism at one time or other in their lives, and they sometimes complain that the confessional embrace is suffocating. But, as they criticize it, they also appreciate the social and emotional advantages which

13 For an interesting discussion on non-liberal civil society, see Chambers and Kopstein 2001.

14 For instance Islam allows Muslim men to marry Christian and Jewish women, but forbids Muslim women to marry Christian men unless they convert to Islam. There are also legal differences regarding inheritance and divorce.

the ascribed, hence unquestioned, membership in a recognized community imparts. This may be the reason why the wish to break free from the suffocating embrace of the *tawa'if*, although genuine, is not powerful enough to make the prospect of standing on one's own, disempowered and stripped of all confessional identity markers, worthwhile.

In *Conditions of Liberty* (1994), Gellner has a quote by Fustel de Coulanges, according to which man in traditional societies has the choice between being subjected to the 'tyranny of kings' or to 'the tyranny of cousins'. By 'traditional societies', the author of *La Cité Antique* meant something quite different from today's Lebanon; but because in Lebanon strong religious communities automatically means a weak state and vice versa, Fustel's remark may well apply. The astonishing resilience of confessionalism is a signal that most Lebanese prefer the tyranny they know well – that of cousins – to the tyranny they suspect a strong or fierce state would entail – that of kings.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that the study of the state-society relationship in Lebanon leads to two conclusions. Firstly, that as associations capable of organizing themselves with a certain degree of independence from state intervention, the religious communities in Lebanon fulfil the definition of civil society. This definition does not make any a priori normative assumptions about the nature of the associations in question, nor does it postulate free choice as an absolute requirement. Secondly, that not only does Lebanese civil society retain its independence vis-à-vis the state, it also penetrates the state and shapes it from within. In the confrontation between state and civil society, it is the latter which comes out the strongest; it is also civil society which dictates the 'rules of the game' (Migdal 1988) – at least those which concern its own autonomy.

This chapter opened with references to the opposition between the individualism of the Enlightenment and the holism of the Romanticist philosophy. Over the years, the old individualism-holism dichotomy has been confronted with diverse empirical situations. By contrast, the debate between liberalism and communitarianism, conducted by political philosophers in the 1980s and 90s, has taken place with few references to real-life situations. Where such contextualizations do occur, the examples are almost always drawn from Western societies, more often than not, the United States. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of communitarianism, which is no longer a dominant ideology anywhere in the West. On the whole, the strengths and weaknesses of liberalism and communitarianism tend to be discussed as abstract ideas, detached from the impact they have on people's lives. Yet a cursory look at polities beyond Europe and north America provides a wealth of data about

the dilemmas populations are confronted with as a result of the tug of war between the need for a state built on universalism and individualism, and the need for a society one feels is one's own, and from which one derives social meaning and psychological comfort (Geertz 1963). Lebanon, with its hybrid-state project, can teach both liberals and communitarians a rich lesson in such dilemmas.

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CHAPTER 4

'Yogya Inc.'

Transformed kingship in decentralizing Indonesia

ELDAR BRÅTEN

State decentralization is an important element in neoliberal reform (see e.g. Hadiz 2010; Lobao *et al.* 2009; Mohan and Stokke 2008). Devolution of power to local levels is intended to reduce state inefficiency and spur entrepreneurship and market expansion. It thus partakes in the wider neoliberal ambition to shift the balance between state and market. While decentralization policies per se do not necessarily diminish state control, only shifting power from central to local levels or from centre to peripheries, they often work in tandem with other means of neoliberal transformation – like privatization and deregulation – to undermine state supremacy. In the neoliberal perspective, this rolling back of the central state is moreover intimately tied to conceptions of 'good governance' (Taylor 2004). Either by design or implication, neoliberal restructuring is often assumed to enhance basic democratic principles like accountability, transparency and the rule of law.

It would be fallacious, however, to mistake this ideological coupling of decentralization and democratization for an analytical proposition. Beyond the programmatic emphasis on 'good governance', which, incidentally, is a rallying point also for opponents of neoliberalism (Hadiz 2010:6–10; Mohan and Stokke 2000), we know fairly little about the socio-political reconfigurations that follow in the wake of decentralization praxis. And we know even less about the topic focused upon in this chapter: how transformations are embedded in local conceptions about power and the political, that is how decentralization articulates with various sources of legitimacy in the local setting. As several critics have pointed out, rather than achieve democratization, state decentralization may create new arenas of contestation that provide local power-holders with means to increase their economic and political power

(e.g. Bünte 2009; Hadiz 2010). While the curtailing of centralized power may significantly recharge local politics and in a sense bring power 'closer to people', it would be analytically unproductive to assume an a priori intrinsic relationship between political devolution and democracy or egalitarianism, or indeed any political system. In line with the general argument of this volume, I argue that state challenges and transformations need to be understood in their empirical complexity, as processes embedded in specific and diverse socio-historical contexts. Although state decentralization may take the appearance of a general and global phenomenon due to relatively uniform policy ambitions worldwide, decentralization as praxis is always a matter of articulations with pre-existing social realities that are to some extent external to the policy level. The socio-political effects of decentralization policies thus need to be researched rather than presumed.

This chapter focuses on a country that is highly regarded for its recent achievements of political reform. Most strikingly, the *reformasi* movement that put an end to Suharto's 32-year-long autocratic rule in 1998 managed to turn Indonesia into a formal democracy.[1] There is now relative freedom of speech and association, and a plethora of political parties run for parliamentary elections at national, provincial and district levels. Simultaneously, from 1999 onwards, the country embarked on a rapid and ambitious decentralization programme, significantly repowering the district level of the state – the administrative units of kotamadya (municipalities) and kabupaten (rural districts). Moreover, taking into consideration the size of Indonesia's territory and population and the enormous cultural diversity that is enclosed within its borders, the country is a particularly intriguing site for the study of socio-political articulations of state decentralization. Several recent studies of the incipient effects of decentralization all over Indonesia underscore my point about complex interactions among policies and social realities (e.g. Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Bräuchler 2015, 2017; Bünte 2009; Davidson and Henley 2007; Dewi 2015; Erb et al. 2005; Hadiz 2010; Hill 2014; Holtzappel and Ramstedt 2009; Ito 2011; Kingsbury and Aveling 2003; Nordholt and van Klinken 2007; Tyson 2010; Vel 2008; Vel and Bedner 2015; Von Benda-Beckman and Von Benda-Beckman 2013).

1 However, critics question the extent to which Indonesia has become a 'real' or 'substantial' democracy (Bünte and Ufen 2009). It is debatable whether political elites at various levels actually represent the interests of their electorates (Törnquist 2006; Ito 2011), corruption by way of patronage pervades the state (Schütte 2009), and reformasi did not significantly alter the concord between conglomerate capital and political elites (Aspinall 2005:5; Robison and Hadiz 2004).

More specifically, the chapter traces developments in an Indonesian province – Yogyakarta[2] in Java – that utilizes the new opportunities of decentralized authority to claim extraordinary legal status within the state. Contrary to the general thrust of *reformasi* and democratization, the sultan of Yogyakarta has defended his hereditary claim to the highest office in the province, the governorship, and has sought legal codification of his royal prerogative, challenging a core principle of the post-Suharto state. The case thus illustrates how local kings may utilize a decentralized and formally democratic order to assert their power. My analysis attempts to discern aspects of the local socio-cultural context that make this assertion possible, in particular I try to account for the discourses that legitimize and mobilize popular support behind the claim to non-democratic recruitment to the governorship. Paradoxically, a local democratic vote on the matter would most likely result in a clear majority for the non-democratic model. These discourses frame but are also to some extent refashioned by the sultan's personal performance as king and politician. Kingship is not a static given, but has to be renegotiated in the context of wider national and transnational forces, especially when, as is the case, the sultan also has political ambitions outside of Yogyakarta. I will argue that the sultan's engagement of the wider *reformasi* context creates a series of paradoxes that affect not only his political strength but also the content of kingship as such. The case thus throws light on relations between central and local-state authority in Indonesia and state-society relations more generally, not least on the way cultural content – local cosmology – is implicated in, and affects, the course of decentralization praxis.

Indonesian decentralization

Under Suharto's autocratic rule (1966–98) Indonesia grew into a rather centralistic state. Most of the revenues generated in the peripheries were disposed of in Jakarta, and the major political decisions were taken by the Suharto family and its cronies. Through regional military commands, regional-level state offices (*kanwil*) and an elaborate system of patronage at all levels of society, the central state penetrated deep into people's everyday life. Although economic resources were redistributed through a huge array of development programmes and the general welfare situation improved for the larger part of the population, Suharto's centralized regime (called New Order) generated a resentment that was impossible to contain when the Asian

2 The special province of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta* – DIY) consists of four rural districts (*kabupaten*) and one municipality (*kotamadya*) – the city of Yogyakarta. Both the city and the province are often referred to with the shorter term Yogya, or alternative spellings of this abbreviation, like Jogja, Jogya or Yogja.

financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997. The widespread dissatisfaction with the regime's practices of *korupsi*, *kolusi*, *nepotisme* (KKN) came into the open, and after mass mobilization and withdrawal of support from major elite partners in the early months of 1998, Suharto had no other option than to step down (on 21 May).

Although almost two decades later it is apparent that *reformasi* was no real threat to the Jakarta elite – central players under Suharto still retain core positions in politics and the economy – the regime change did usher in a series of institutional reforms. Surprisingly, Indonesia finally let East Timor have its freedom and, as mentioned, new legislation during the interim regime of former Vice President Habibie 1998–9 established a democratic state order and initiated a grand decentralization programme. High on the agenda in this period of transition was the status of regions: the question of their control over revenues and the threat from active or reactivated separatist sentiments and movements. Like many foreign observers (e.g. Kingsbury and Aveling 2003), politicians in Jakarta also seemed to fear a disintegration of the country, a *balkanisasi*, and various models of state restructuring were discussed to pre-empt this development. The most extreme proposition was to consider a federal state, but most politicians held that active decentralization within the unitary state would be a sufficient countermeasure. This situation also goes a long way to explain the lack of resistance against the decentralization measures that were part of IMF's rescue package for the Indonesian economy.

Based in the new legislation,[3] local levels of the state now obtained considerable economic and political power, and, concomitantly, we saw reconfigurations of administrative units all over the country due to the resurgence of local identities. This process is called *pemekaran* in Indonesian – 'expansion' or 'blossoming': ethnic, religious and other idioms are evoked to justify economic and political claims (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Nordholt and van Klinken 2007). Of special relevance for my discussion here is the general revival of kingship, a political form that is often seen as a counterpoint to the modern state, and adverse to democracy. In Indonesian intellectual discourse, the present 'return of the sultans' (van Klinken 2007) is often construed as a threat from the past – the re-emergence of a 'feudal', 'undemocratic' or 'backward' political force, directly opposed to the ideals of the modern, rational and now formally democratic Indonesian state (Rozaki and Hariyanto 2003; Nugroho 2002).

The radical 1999 legislation transferred power to districts while dismantling the hierarchical order of the state, thus bypassing the potentially powerful

3 The relevant legislation are Laws No. 22/1999, 25/1999, 32/2004, 33/2004, 28/2009 and 23/2014.

provincial level. Districts were construed as autonomous, equally ranked state units, with provincial bureaucracy and governors in the function as facilitators of cooperation among districts. However, parts of the national elite resented the profundity of the process, and when Megawati Sukarnoputri took office as president in 2001, Jakarta sought to 'adjust' developments. This lead to new legislation in 2004 that while retaining the basic intention of power devolution reinstated a hierarchical state structure (Bünte 2009:111–12). Provinces were re-inscribed as an administrative level above districts, and re-empowered. Later legislation has also been aimed at a degree of re-centralization, but the new context of decentralization no doubt provides much greater leeway for provinces and their governors than under the highly centralized rule of Suharto.

However, as democratization follows decentralization, governors are henceforth to be voted into office. For the Yogyakarta sultan to retain unchallenged, permanent control over governorship, then, the province has to acquire special legal status, so-called *keistimewaan*.[4] Due to the important role of Yogyakarta in national history (see below), Sri Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (the present sultan's father) acquired rights to the office after independence, and the recent struggle for *keistimewaan* has aimed at a formal codification of this royal prerogative under the present decentralized state order. A majority of local politicians has supported the claim, and in 2003 the provincial parliament submitted a request to the central government to acknowledge enduring, non-democratic Hamengku Buwono control over the governorship. It was also suggested that the sultan should obtain legal immunity as part of *keistimewaan* status,[5] and certain economic privileges. Losing control over the local state means economic assets traditionally associated with the court could become nationalized, and the sultan might thus be in a weaker position to negotiate funding for court functions – buildings, staff, arts, rituals etc., leading to the likelihood of his role as king also being undermined.

4 *Keistimewaan* is a noun construction based on the core word *istimewa*, meaning 'special'. A proximate English translation would be 'specialness'. Apart from Yogyakarta, three other provinces in Indonesia are recognized as 'special' – the capital city of Jakarta, and the 'troubled' provinces of Aceh and West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya). Bali has also been struggling to obtain *keistimewaan* status (Picard 2005).

5 Several drafts for legislation were discussed. Apart from the proposition submitted by the provincial parliament in 2003, the central government also requested a team of scholars at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta formulate a model that might be seen as a political compromise. Furthermore, the national parliament worked out their own proposals.

This chapter traces developments during the prolonged tug-of-war between Jakarta and Yogyakarta that followed the formal request for *keistimewaan*. The regional parliament 'voted not to vote' (Woodward 2011:8) and reinstalled the sultan as governor in 2003. This postponement of the problem was accepted by Jakarta, and, officially, the case should have been decided by October 2008 when the governorship period expired. However, the central government did not reach any conclusion, and Jakarta instead extended Hamengku Buwono's term, pending a solution, first to October 2011, then with another year. Finally, in 2012, the issue was resolved as the national parliament granted Yogyakarta special status within the nation. Although the formal codification of *keistimewaan* settled the immediate legal quandaries, the new legislation remains unclear on certain critical points concerning the status of kingship (see below).

In a true democratic order, peoples' ideas and values impinge directly on the form and content of politics, and we encounter an interesting paradox when, as seems to be the case in Yogyakarta, a majority of the population support a non-democratic state order. In the following I will thus try to bring out the logics of the discourses on special legal status. What are the justifications for the claim to *keistimewaan* and how does the sultan as king-cum-governor position himself relative to these discourses? How does he legitimize his royal claims on the governorship, in the context of a decentralizing, democratizing, modern state? And how is kingship affected by its articulation with state structures?

The Jakarta-Yogyakarta nexus

The most explicit claim to special status draws on Yogyakarta's history, as late Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was instrumental in the establishment of Indonesia (e.g. Monfries 2008, 2015). Yogyakarta was regarded as the most independent principality under colonial rule, and could perhaps have founded its own state, but the sultan chose to join forces with the nationalist movement.[6] During the freedom struggle against the Dutch after the Japanese surrender in 1945, he invited the nationalist leader Sukarno and his government to Yogyakarta and turned the city into the capital of the yet-to-be-formed nation-state, housing the cabinet in his palace, and establishing the precursors to an Indonesian university on royal grounds (Ricklefs 1981:200–21). Yogyakarta was later surrendered during military confrontations with the Dutch, but on 1 March 1949 a guerrilla force under Lieutenant Colonel Suharto – later president – managed to retake the city for six hours. Suharto later turned this

6 At one stage the Dutch offered to make the sultan the king of Java (Ricklefs 1981:219; Selo Soemardjan 1989:116).

achievement into a constitutive event of the nation, and a heroic justification for his own rule. Although the precise contribution of Suharto during the events is unclear and contested, this in not entirely a case of contrived history writing; the fighting in Yogyakarta helped sway international opinion behind Indonesian demands (Ricklefs 1981:218–21), and later in the year the country achieved independence. The space of Yogyakarta is thus central to the birth of Indonesia, and its monarchs are inscribed in the nation in a foundational sense: without Yogyakarta and the Hamengku Buwonos, there would be no Indonesia. At least this is the view propounded by local narratives.[7]

Yogyakarta, thus, resonates with the nation in a cosmological interpretation; Yogya[8] is a metonym for Indonesia. This is quite explicit in some popular discourse that construes the court city as indexical of the nation – it is seen as the *kota barometer* – the 'barometer city', especially as regards political developments. Peace, order and security (*tentrem*, *tata*, *aman*) in Yogyakarta are taken to reflect a national leadership in control. During Suharto's rule, Yogyanese would often point out that in contrast to the rest of the country the province was amazingly quiet and peaceful. Conversely, chaos in Yogyakarta would be evidence of political collapse in Jakarta. These barometer narratives conceal, however, a deeper and more complex rendering of the indexical correspondence between part and whole. In more subdued popular discourse, the part – 'Yogya' – may take precedence over the whole. The intimate correspondence between Yogyakarta and the nation implies that local conditions are not only reflective, but predictive of developments in Jakarta. People on the move in Yogyakarta forebode political change on the national scene.

In an even more forceful version, this logic is imbued with a degree of causality so that the part can be operated on to affect the whole. In this rendering, Yogyakarta secures national leadership by way of its own stability, and the sultan's moves and dispositions on the local scene thus have import far beyond the borders of the province itself (see Woodward 2003, 2011:3, 253–4). The ultimate implication of this inverse logic is that the sultan is in fact the guarantor of the nation, a figure that safeguards Indonesia from behind the scenes. This notion of a double space in power is reflected in and probably

7 Post-Suharto discourse on these events is highly critical of Suharto's contribution to the military-cum-political victory (Nordholt *et al.* 2008:18; Ahimsa-Putra 2001). Local discourse rather emphasizes the importance of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, who was minister of security in the revolutionary cabinet at the time.

8 In the following I use the official term Yogyakarta to denote the territory and the administrative unit of province, while the popular abbreviation Yogya is used in reference to the mythical construction in focus of my analysis.

inspired by the basic perceptive structure of the Javanese shadow play, *wayang kulit.* The appearances on the shadow screen indicate, while concealing, a *dhalang* – a shadow puppeteer – who has power to construct reality. While appearances seem to attain their own reality in immediate perception, when a clever puppeteer – or politician – manages to make his presence invisible in conjuring up reality, there is always a deeper dynamics of power (Keeler 1987). Similarly, overt manifestations of political power are often surrounded by a degree of doubt and suspicion, as even official holders of power may turn out to be '*dhalanged*' in a deeper analysis (Bubandt 2009; Keeler 1987:200–1). Popular discourse is rife with allusions to shadow puppeteers in Indonesian politics, and some Yogyanese are inclined to place their royal family at the centre of hidden power, especially the late Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX.

Explanations are often couched in a vocabulary of mystical power, *kasekten*, for example, in stories about how Hamengku Buwono IX provided Suharto with his most powerful dagger (*keris*) while retaining its real magical powers; or how the president meditated at the graves of Javanese monarchs in order to get spiritual guidance in critical national matters. The events surrounding the fall of Suharto in 1998 had similar cosmological overtones. Sultan Hamengku Buwono X then intervened in the popular uprising at the local scene in order to keep Yogyakarta peaceful throughout the turbulence (see below). In the inverse logic of cosmic causality, he thus ensured Indonesia's orderly transition to democracy (see Dwiyanto 2009:537–44). In a sense, he seized the historical moment to keep the micro-cosmos of Yogyakarta in balance, thereby altering the course of national politics.

Far from all Yogyanese submit to these views, but there are also other ways to imbue Yogyakarta with centrality. A more secular view holds that as the prime educational centre in Indonesia, Yogyakarta is a barometer in the sense that it embodies a miniature of the country in terms of cultural and social variation (see Awang 2002:24; Wahyukismoyo 2008:115–17). In another version, the province is seen to attract the cultural elite and thus be a space for innovations and new ideas – in education and research, but also in the arts, philosophy and culture more generally. Yogyakarta is thus regarded as highly formative of the nation through the drives of its upper-middle class.

Whatever perspective locals place on the centrality of the province, it is hard to deny that the sultan in 1998 attempted to reinforce the historical role of Yogyakarta in the nation. The fall of Suharto provided him with a golden opportunity to 'seize the moment' and re-establish the constitutive link between Yogya and the nation. This was the first real occasion to prove his powers as king, i.e. as kingmaker or *dhalang*. Apart from all the mystical notions that surrounded his father's rule, Hamengku Buwono IX was also demonstrably a skilled this-worldly politician. While building a supreme

reputation as king in Yogyakarta, he was also a major player in national politics. He held central positions under Sukarno, and during Suharto's rule he was first Minister of Economics, Finance and Industry (1966–73), then vice president of Indonesia (1973–8). Although the relation between Suharto and the sultan soured – it is generally assumed that Hamengku Buwono IX withdrew as vice president in protest against Suharto's excesses (Ahimsa-Putra 2001; Wahyukismoyo 2008:51–2) – he remained a tremendous symbolic figure of power, no doubt partly due to his mild opposition against Suharto.

When Hamengku Buwono X ascended the throne in 1989 after his father's death, he shouldered an immense legacy in terms of both spiritual and political prowess. Jakarta now sought to obviate Hamengku Buwono privileges by elevating the incumbent vice-governor, a prince from the other major aristocratic line in Yogyakarta, the Pakualam, to the governorship of Yogyakarta. Moreover, it is important to note that the sultan's popular support is not guaranteed by royal descent itself. To evoke Weber's ideal types (Weber *et al.* 1978:212–301), the traditional authority of kingship is not sufficient to rally support behind a particular sultan; he also has to prove himself in terms of charismatic feats. During my fieldwork in the early 1990s, locals discussed whether the new sultan actually possessed spiritual power (*kasekten*) or not, and/or whether he had the necessary personal stamina to become a real king. Many apparently viewed him as a rather anonymous figure compared to his popular and charismatic father.[9] There were also misgivings about his personal lifestyle (see Darmawan 2010:87–98; Hughes-Freeland 2007:188; Schlehe 1996:407), and, as will be discussed below, many strongly disagreed with his particular projection of kingship.

However, on 20 May 1998, a decade into his reign as king and one day prior to Suharto's resignation, the sultan proclaimed to an alleged audience of one million people, a third of the population of the province, that he supported the uprising against the president. Explicitly invoking the role of Yogya in the nation – 'there is a call of history' (*adalah panggilan sejarah*)[10] – he, together with the incumbent governor, Pakualam VIII, issued a declaration (*maklumat*) that called on the people and the army to support the reform movement and, by implication, to bring down Suharto. The occasion reiterated symbolic meanings of the constitutive events of the national revolution (Woodward 2003, 2011:257). The Yogyakarta king again addressed the central power, the

9 At the death of Hamengku Buwono IX, 150.000 people paid their last respects during his sixteen hours of lying in state (Vatikotis 1998:99), and a staggering three million are said to have attended the funeral (Vatikotis 2008:62).

10 'Sultan HB X Ajak Rakyat Dukung Reformasi', *Kompas Online*, 21 May 1998: www.seasite.niu.edu/indonesian/Reformasi/Chronicle/Kompas/May21/sult01.htm.

premises of national order that had now grown indistinguishable from the person of Suharto. Once more, Yogyakarta sought to alter national history, this time by putting an end to Suharto's New Order regime. Secondly, the sultan here rose as king. Taking leadership while gaining the support of Governor Pakualam VIII, he inverted local powers, so that kingship again encompassed governorship. His kingly status was also emphasized in commentary: 'I am not a politician who needs to negotiate; my capacity is as a moral force'.[11] In addition, by reading aloud the highly formal declaration, the sultan sought to officiate a new foundation, in resemblance to the way the nation was created through the issuing of The Proclamation of Independence in 1945, and the way Suharto initiated his rule with the infamous Supersemar of 1966, a formal declaration (the authenticity of which is disputed) in which Sukarno transferred powers to Suharto. There are resonances in the sultan's declaration of what is called *sabda* in Javanese: efficacious speech rooted in cosmic power. Finally and profoundly, the sultan evoked a constitutive power beyond both Suharto and the nation, namely the people – *rakyat*. In both the declaration itself and in the speech that preceded it, the sultan was quite explicit on the point that power ultimately originates with *rakyat*, and being uttered in front of the huge audience that cheered his speech, the immediate experiential reference point for *rakyat* was the people of Yogyakarta. In other words, the occasion itself was a manifestation that the people of Yogyakarta moved (*bergerak*), i.e. in terms of the inverse holographic logics discussed above, that the part occasioned the orderly transition of the whole.[12]

Although by mid May it was probably clear to the major actors that Suharto's days were numbered, so that opposing the president entailed no great risks, the sultan no doubt strengthened his standing in the eyes of Yogyanese by coming out so forcefully against the central regime. Many saw it as a kingly act, a move to re-establish the proper role of Yogya in the nation. When later in the year Pakualam VIII passed away, the provincial parliament ensured that the governorship passed back to the Hamengku Buwono line, and when his first five-year term elapsed in 2003, the assembly re-appointed the sultan for another term.

While the sultan during these years mainly concentrated on local politics and the struggle to attain special status for the province, he also pondered his national role. He was one of four signatories of the Ciganjur Declaration in November 1998 that called for deeper political reforms. Together with

11 Ibid.

12 Appropriately, the car that the sultan drove on this occasion, and the batik shirt he wore, have already been 'sacralized' by way of becoming exhibits in the Kraton museum (Hatley 2008:219).

two coming presidents (Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid) and the powerful chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (Amien Rais) he thus inscribed himself in the forefront of the *reformasi* movement at the national level. In 1999 he was nominated as presidential candidate by one of the Islamic parties, but declined the offer, and in 2004 he was on the list of potential presidential candidates in the Golkar party, though he was never nominated.[13] However, in 2007 the sultan signalled that he was now ready to lead the nation, and in October 2008, he officially declared himself a presidential contender. While on former occasions the initiative seems to have come from political parties, in 2008 he stepped forward on his own account. Having no formal backing, he ran on personal qualities, apparently hoping for party endorsement if he emerged as a real contender.

As will be clear below, this proved to be a costly decision. However, had he succeeded, Yogyakarta's historical, constitutive role in the nation would have reached a new stage. The cosmic correspondence between Yogya and Indonesia would have been turned on its head, making the ground of royalty emerge as, literally, the figure of the state. For the first time in the modern nation's history, kingship would have eclipsed central power; the *dhalang* would have stepped forward as president, so to speak.[14] This adds complexity to our analysis of centre-periphery articulations under processes of decentralization. Although the sultan in the end failed to conquer the nation, his attempt evoked the potentiality that the central order may be overcome by local ones. My discussion below will, however, concentrate on the local effects of the sultan's presidential campaign, as the implications seemed to work both ways: engaging the central order, i.e. democratically contesting the national presidency, seemed to undermine the sultan's standing as local king.

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13 During Suharto's regime, all political parties were fused into three highly dependent organizations, two of which were refashioned as quasi-parties (thus symbolically representing the 'opposition'), while the third – GOLKAR – was rendered a 'functional group' rather than a political party. It was thus, in a sense, a transcendent organization, representing the state rather than politics, and GOLKAR was engineered to win around two thirds of the votes in national elections. GOLKAR survived Suharto and is still a major political force, and the sultan has for a long time been a member of, and had central positions in, the party.

14 A deeper analysis along these lines would have to take into account the fact that the central state, especially under Suharto's patrimonial rule, also attained sultan-like characteristics (Aspinall 2005; Pemberton 1994).

Divine kingship

I have already suggested that a concept of spiritual power (*kasekten*) informs the way many locals assess their royals. This notion points to a second general source of legitimacy in the context of Yogyakarta, rooted in conceptions of divine kingship (Anderson 1972; Geertz 1980; Tambiah 1985:252–86). Although it is impossible to uphold any credible notion that Yogya is the centre of the world, locals do maintain ritual practices that have clear cosmic overtones. The landscape of Yogyakarta is taken to be infused with spiritual power, and the ritual engagement of this power, in the form of a large variety of mystical or magical practices, is intimately related to the way *kraton*, the palace, is inscribed in the local cosmology (Bråten 1995; de Jong and Twikromo 2017; Hughes-Freeland 1991, 2007, 2008; Schlehe 1996, 2006, 2010; Woodward 1989, 2003).

The royal name Hamengku Buwono translates as 'he who holds the world in his lap' (Hughes-Freeland 2008:113) or he who 'cradles the world' (Hughes-Freeland 2007:188). Moreover, Yogyakarta originated as a court city, an 'exemplary centre' (Geertz 1980; Errington 1989), in 1755, when a rebellious prince from the court of nearby Surakarta established his own court in this sparsely populated area. As a court city, Yogyakarta's basic architectural design reflects a core principle of divine kingship: the sultan's mediating role between micro- and macro-cosmos (*jagad alit, jagad ageng*).[15] In Yogyakarta this mediating role takes a manifest form in a geographical axis, running north-south through the city,[16] with an immense spiritual power at each pole and the mediating *kraton* in the middle (De Giosa 2011; de Jong and Twikromo 2017; Hennings 2007). About 30 kilometres north of the palace is one of the most active volcanoes in the world, Mount Merapi; at approximately the same distance to the south one finds the beach of Parangkusumo, which is the entry point to the ocean domain of the ferocious spirit Queen Nyai Loro Kidul. The queen is in the habit of consuming anyone foolish enough to enter her waters, and she may cause earthquakes and throw up tsunamis.

The mystical meanings and magical powers embedded in this sacred geography are an everyday concern for many people in Yogyakarta. Although Islamization and the emergence of more modernist attitudes in parts of the local elite challenge and, to some extent, erode these views – as we shall see, the sultan is instrumental in this process – a large portion of the population

15 There are opposing views on the cultural basis of this construction – most authors see continuities with Hindu-Buddhist conceptions of kingship, while Woodward (1989, 2011) argues that the cosmology is at base Sufi. However, all would underline the centrality of the king/*kraton* in local conceptions.

16 There is also a spiritually less significant east-west axis.

in Yogyakarta still embraces the cosmology at some level of existential depth (see Bråten 1995; Daniels 2009:29; de Jong and Twikromo 2017; Schlehe 1998, 2010). In terms of religious practice, the tradition, generally labelled *kejawen*, is reproduced through the circulation of narratives about supernatural landscapes and through collective and individual offerings to spirit powers and royal graves all around the province. The overall perspective is that veneration is necessary in order to keep Yogyakarta safe. The Yogyakarta *kraton* itself relates to the powers in a similar way, through ritual offerings at the volcano and the beach, but also more directly in that the sultan in person is supposed to be the spirit queen's consort (Hughes-Freeland 2008:145–6; Resink 1997). It is through this conjugal relation that the spirit queen guarantees the safety of Yogyakarta by keeping the volcano of Merapi in check. There is a sacred spot on Parangkusumo beach where the first sultan, the founder of the Mataram kingdom, allegedly met the spirit queen. Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX confirmed on occasion that he saw Nyai Loro Kidul, something that attested to his spiritual powers in the eyes of many Yoganese.[17]

But these cosmic connotations of kingship are absent from public discourse on *keistimewaan*. There are no open claims that the Hamengku Buwonos have supernatural rights to the governorship. The cosmic or spiritual dimension of Yogya is rather a subtext, a resonating ground for the sultan's many statements and actions. Importantly, Hamengku Buwono X himself seems to encourage this distancing of the cosmic. In the public domain, he largely undermines popular spiritual interpretations of events.[18] He thus seems eager to disconnect kingship and state in this particular respect, projecting governorship as a modern, rational, technocratic undertaking, something clearly distinguishable from the *kejawen* tradition out of which his kingdom has emerged. He construes the local state entirely in non-spiritual terms, and the important question is what implications this rendering, by way of his double identity as king-cum-governor, may have for the content of contemporary kingship. Before discussing this important transformation, it is, however, necessary to account for some implications of the sultan's national ambitions.

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17 The sultan may have been uncomfortable with the sexual connotations of the concord, however; apparently he tried to reframe the goddess as a grandmother rather than a wife or mistress (Hughes-Freeland 2008:148; Wessing 1997:339).

18 In the early 1990s people in Yogyakarta related an event during the ritual of the circumambulation of the palace in which Nyai Loro Kidul appeared next to the Sultan in his carriage. In commentary Hamengku Buwono X did not directly deny this interpretation (Hughes-Freeland 1991:149-50), but later in his rule he has rather consistently framed Nyai Loro Kidul as belief, rather than reality.

King or president?

Taking kingship as the frame, the two sources of legitimacy discussed above – heroic history and spiritual legacy – underpin the sultan's claim to control over his royal territory. In the context of the local state and vis-à-vis Jakarta, they serve to mobilize popular support behind the demand that the province be recognized as a unique entity within the modern state. The claim to a special history is articulated explicitly to justify *keistimewaan*, while allusions to divine kingship remain a resonating ground that justifies the king's special privilege in the eyes of many of his subjects. When, however, the sultan is not content as king/governor of Yogya but decides to contest the nation itself, the context of legitimacy shifts dramatically. On the one hand, he must submit to the premises of national politics and thus engage quite different sources of legitimacy; the 'logic of Yogya' has little or no purchase relative to the wider national audience. On the other hand, he cannot entirely escape from his kingship. His local sources of legitimacy spill over into, and are evoked in, the wider context of national politics, sometimes in rather embarrassing ways. And the osmosis seems to work in both directions, as his decision to contest the presidency also frames his moves on the local scene; he is manifestly the kind of king that is willing to transcend, some would say sacrifice, Yogya for the sake of personal ambitions (*pamrih*). The sultan thus creates a new and profound paradox for himself: in his struggle to become president of the modern, democratic state, he cannot escape the fact that he is a king; simultaneously, the attempt to conquer the nation will forever colour his kingship.

It is important to appreciate that the sultan attempts to negotiate a paradoxical situation that has no easy resolution. The two fields of contestation – Yogyakarta and Indonesia – will always impact each other; the sultan simply cannot escape his double identity of being both king and politician.[19] He may, however, choose to play up or down either identity

19 As noted, his father also negotiated this divide, with considerable success. The difference is that many of the challenges discussed in this chapter were subdued or invisible during Suharto's autocratic rule. Significantly, politics was largely an internal and elite affair, allowing a rather 'king-like' form of rule in which Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX apparently attained high positions by way of his moral standing, i.e., by being asked to (continue to) serve the nation. The contemporary style of politics, on the other hand, discloses personal ambition and almost immediately evokes issues of KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism). As I suggest below, claims to moral supremacy are thus easily reframed as political rhetoric. This, I argue, also has significant effects on the moral authority of kingship in the local context.

relative to different arenas and audiences, and it is in this performance we may discern his personal prowess, his ability to create bridges and convince – build legitimacy – across profound contradictions. It is also here we may discern tendencies to reconstruct his constitutive identities, not least his role as king. Although this is not the place for a full analysis of his presidential campaign, the way the sultan framed his presidential ambition is illustrative of how he simultaneously creates and attempts to resolve his double identity.

The campaign entailed an interesting and simultaneous emphasis on and distancing from kingship. Most astonishingly, the sultan suddenly decided to give up his claim on the governorship! In his birthday speech of April 2007, he shocked many Yogyanese by declaring that he did not seek another term after 2008, in effect conveying that he was willing to concede the royal privilege over the local state. Although he announced his ambition to contest the presidency much later, it is apparent that he already contemplated the campaign and that he sought to distance himself from this aspect of kingship in order to improve his chances in the national contest. The explicit reason for giving up the governorship was couched in the rhetoric of the *reformasi* movement – as a need to adapt to the new democratic times.[20] The statement left the local advocates of *keistimewaan* in an odd situation – struggling to retain a royal prerogative that the local king himself did not defend! Whatever tactical reasons the sultan may have had, he seemed to tie himself to the decision by issuing an official declaration on the matter, again with overtones of efficacious speech,[21] and by repeating his stance on several subsequent occasions before and during the presidential campaign. Thereafter, the struggle for *keistimewaan* was in a sense fought by proxies – the provincial parliament, local media and popular movements continued to argue for legal status that *de jure* entailed royal control over the governorship.

While thus apparently assuming a *reformasi* stance with respect to the core contention in Yogyakarta (of *keistimewaan*), there were distinctly royal overtones in his official announcement of October 2008 to contest the nation. The announcement was made in Yogyakarta, not Jakarta. The sultan launched his candidacy through the institution of *pesowanan ageng*, a 'grand visitation' between a king and his people. He spoke from *alun-alun*, the public field in front of his palace. The other sultans of Indonesia arrived in Yogyakarta for the event, and he launched the candidacy with the words: 'I am ready to fulfil

20 See, for instance, the interview with Sultan Hamengku Buwono X in the talkshow Kick Andy (*Empat mata: Blak-blakan dengan Sultan*) at METROTV (available on YouTube).

21 In fact, the sultan himself explicated his statement in such terms: 'The *sabda* of a sage-king asserts that what has been uttered cannot be changed.' (Zainal 2007:9).

the calls of *Ibu pertiwi*.' *Ibu pertiwi* is a polysemic Sanskrit term; in nationalist discourse it is often translated as 'mother country' – Indonesia, but a deeper sense is 'Mother Earth', and in the Javanese cosmological context of exemplary centres, it may connote an even broader or deeper reality. Whatever interpretive depth one accords to the word, the sultan apparently forwarded himself on the basis of a higher moral authority that called on him to put the nation back on its right footing. He adopted the word *restorasi* (restoration) to denote this salvaging of the nation, and his campaign was rife with references to *pengabdian* – 'service', 'devotion' – and, again, *rakyat*, the people. In an interesting rhetorical inversion of royal hierarchy,[22] he underlined the king's duty to serve his subjects, 'heed people's inner hearts' (*hati nurani rakyat*), and to act on their behalf: 'I cannot any longer stand to watch people's suffering!'[23] The kingly intervention on behalf of *rakyat* had a clear provocation, *reformasi* government. His unusually explicit critique was directed at the failures of the reform movement: 'After 10 years of *reformasi*, there has been no fundamental change leading to national progress, prosperity and accountable government.'

Apparently, the presidential campaign entailed a paradoxical shift in the relation between kingship and state: It seems that the sultan sought to project the moral authority of kingship onto the national arena, while in fact dismantling the substance of kingship in his traditional domain. He willingly gave up royal prerogatives locally in order to emerge as a moral force nationally, a profound democrat. In the end, however, the presidential campaign was a huge failure. The sultan did not manage to secure institutional backing from any of the larger political parties, and his personal charisma had little purchase on the national scene. In the national media there were frequent allusions to his anti-democratic or 'feudal' origin; and as a kind of primordial figure of Java, he also evoked the fact of Javanese domination in Indonesia, which is much resented in many regions. In addition, he was criticized for the lack of a substantial political programme beyond his heavily moralistic rhetoric. At best, the sultan was judged as a 'dark horse' (*kuda hitam*) who

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22 This inversion seems to have been a rhetorical foundation for his rule from the beginning, as in his accession speech in 1989 he emphasized the role of *kraton* as a 'throne for the people', *tahta untuk rakyat* (Hughes-Freeland 1991:144). This is not a novel discursive figure, however; his father also emphasized the serving role of a king, and the construction has precedents in the mystical notion of union between king and subjects (*menunggaling kawula gusti*) (Woodward 2011:24-25). The notion of *rakyat* also underpinned both the independence struggle and the formation of the nation (Woodward 2011:164-5).

23 See recording of speech by the TV station SCTV: *Barometer: Dari Raja Jawa ke Indonesia RI*, 28 October 2008 (available on YouTube).

could emerge if the national elite did not manage to sort out their internal differences. In the end, the incumbent president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was re-elected with a clear margin; the sultan did not even make it to the ballot paper for the election.

Turning from the national scene to the sultan's local performance, we can follow the deepening of the split between kingship and state. While the sultan seemed to evoke aspects of kingship in the national contest, he only reluctantly played on this role in the local context. As mentioned, in many ways the sultan acts in a rather un-kingly fashion in his public appearances in Yogyakarta. Local critics could cite a long list of 'deviances' (see Darmawan 2010:87–98). Most notably, he seems troubled by the strong spiritual connotations of *kraton* practices. Under pressure, the sultan tends to distance himself from beliefs in spiritual powers altogether, as if the elaborate palace rituals that signify his rule have lost their sense. He consistently reframes such practices as 'symbols', 'expressions' or even 'myths'[24] (*simbol*, *lambang*, *mitos*), thus downplaying their efficacious potential. During the presidential campaign he implied that people are too easily deceived by sensational representations of supernatural kingship ('people see too many movies'), adding that 'I am not living in a Cinderella world!'[25] Paradoxically, the sultan himself thus seemed to spearhead a disenchantment of his own kingdom, distancing himself from a major source of local legitimacy.

Moreover, the sultan is also monogamous and defends this position ideologically – there should be no other sexual relations, spiritual or otherwise, than with one wife. Apart from evading any implications of liaisons with the spirit queen, he thus also challenges Javanese conceptions of power in which virility and political prowess are intimately connected (Anderson 1972; Wessing 1997:331). He has also not 'managed' to produce male offspring; this is also seen as a 'deviation', or perhaps spiritual weakness, by some Yogyanese. Furthermore, the sultan has shifted the traditional balance between Islam and Javanese kingship by going on the Islamic pilgrimage. Interestingly, he inscribes Islam rather than Javanese religious conceptions (*kejawen*) into the mythology of major political moves. While Indonesian political leaders are known to visit the graves of Javanese monarchs and other spiritual forces prior to important decisions, the sultan rather spent time in a mosque

24 See, for instance, the speech quoted in Dwiyanto 2009:595-605.

25 Interview in the talk show Kick Andy (*Empat mata: Blak-blakan dengan Sultan*) at METROTV (available on YouTube).

while struggling with the question of whether to give up his governorship.[26] Moreover, the sultan is active in business. So was his father, but Hamengku Buwono X is framing business in a rather problematic way that I will return to below. In sum, the sultan does not act in very kingly ways in the local scene; in his everyday public appearance he rather stresses core tenets of the modern state: rationality, bureaucratic procedures, legal authority and, not least, economic development. He is constantly on the move, officiating state-initiated development projects.

This framing of kingship is not taken lightly by some groups in Yogyakarta; new mystical movements have emerged, there are revivals of magical rituals, the sultan is openly criticized for failing to preserve the spiritual heritage of Yogya, and occasionally there are moments of open resistance. One especially noteworthy case took place in 2006, when a subordinate palace official – the ritual caretaker of the Merapi volcano, *mbah* Marijan – opposed government attempts to evacuate the local population prior to an eruption. Marijan alleged he had spiritual contacts with the mountain and advised people to remain at home, as there was no real danger. Merapi would warn him if and when an eruption was coming. This irritated not only the sultan, but also the national state in the form of official geologists, and even the president, who urged people to leave. This open opposition against the sultan from a subordinate, who had his way (people largely stayed), coupled with the severe earthquake that hit Yogyakarta in the midst of this struggle, killing *c*.6.000 people and destroying parts of the *kraton* itself, spoke volumes to locals with a cosmic bent (see Schlehe 2006, 2010).

So, although the presidential campaign represented a new stage in the sultan's alienation from Yogya, it continued a more general tendency to redefine local kingship. The 2008 announcement was the final manifestation that the sultan was willing to risk Yogyakarta for his personal ambitions on the national scene. The event coincided with the end of his official term as governor, and some hoped the sultan would use the occasion to underline the demand for *keistimewaan*. Instead, he drew on the authority of the 'grand visitation' to launch himself as a presidential candidate, thus in effect abandoning his claim on the governorship. Some locals apparently saw this as a misuse of Yogya. But the campaign did not only transgress on the

26 Interview with Sultan Hamengku Buwono X in the talkshow Kick Andy (*Empat mata: Blak-blakan dengan Sultan*) at METROTV (available on YouTube). His move against Suharto a decade earlier was, however, preceded by a period of fasting (*puasa*) and meditation (*semedi*) in which he, entirely according to *kejawen* logic, obtained a vision that indicated the coming events (Wahyukismoyo 2008:44-5).

identity of Yogya; in a deeper Javanese rendering, it can be argued that the person of the king was himself being compromised. In the logics of divine power, a king is more powerful the less he is visible (Anderson 1972; see also Bråten 1995). The more public and assertive he is, the weaker is his power; true kings rule silently and invisibly from behind the scenes. In this logic, the expression of open ambition (*pamrih*) is itself detrimental to personal success, let alone involvement in the kind of frank, assertive and opportunistic, some would say thoroughly corrupt, style that characterizes national politics. The contemporary political climate bears little resemblance to celebrated standards of kingly demeanour, and it is highly unlikely that the sultan's many allusions to higher moral ground managed to conceal his personal ambitions.

The fact of failure only confirmed his over-ambition, and popular, sarcastic commentary nicely captured the intrinsic futility of the campaign: People joked that the sultan wanted to become the 'king of Indonesia'. This oxymoron nicely sums up the basic contradiction, the sultan's paradoxical attempt to bridge an unbridgeable divide. Yogyakarta is a kingdom, Indonesia is not. It is within the frames of Yogyakarta that the sultan has a logical existence, a justifiable claim to leadership. Trying to convert this legitimacy into the arena of national politics, as he did, only exposes his misjudgement, and thus diminishes his prestige as king. In fact, the presidential campaign ended with the sultan officially apologizing to the people for his failed attempt. Although this unusual public subjection earned the sultan some credit as a modern democrat, it certainly put his status as king in a strange light.

It is fair to conclude, then, that during the presidential campaign there was little in the personal performance of the sultan that legitimized his kingship locally, and thus his claim to governorship. He was not playing up to the mystical traditions of Yogyakarta; rather, he seemed to distance himself quite actively from this source of legitimacy. The campaign, moreover, demonstrated that he did not have enough stamina, or in the *kejawen* interpretation, sufficient *kasekten*, to take on the nation. It only exposed his un-kingly, overt personal ambition. Although the sultan did succeed in reinvigorating the historical role of Yogya during the fall of Suharto, he apparently overextended this victory by elevating his ambitions to the level of the nation rather than being content with the local state. In sum, the presidential campaign made apparent that the sultan's authority is not constituted by way of his personal charisma.[27]

However, as I have emphasized, there is a sense in Yogyakarta that a majority of the population would vote in favour of *keistimewaan* if there was

27 However, Hughes-Freeland raises the interesting question whether the Sultan's charisma may have been reinvented as celebrity in the contemporary context (2007).

a referendum on the matter, thus securing the sultan life-long governorship quite independently of his personal popularity. In order to make sense of this conundrum we have to turn to the third justification of special status, and we also need to introduce the sultan's third public persona.

'Kebudayaan'

Apart from being king and state official, Hamengku Buwono X is also a very active social commentator who gives lectures and writes books. In these he often reasons on a meta-level, reflecting on culture, politics, business and other fields that he actually operates in, in his other official capacities. I do not claim that we find the final key to the 'logics of Yogya' in these works, nor that the sultan is more profoundly an intellectual than king or politician, but they do provide a broader perspective on his projects.[28] I argue that they reflect a new framing of Yogya, beyond history and spiritual cosmology, that reinforces claims to special legal status. The sultan's public commentary grows out of and reinforces a discourse that reconstitutes Yogya as cultural essence, thereby grounding a perhaps even stronger justification for the claim of *keistimewaan*. However, this reframing also bears directly on the role of kingship in the modern state, and I will suggest that it can ultimately be a threat to kingship itself.

As an intellectual the sultan envisions a 'New Indonesia' – *Indonesia Baru* – that is reconstituted in accordance with the 'challenges of the present times' (*tantangan jaman*), defined as 'the era of globalization'. These ideas are conveyed most concisely in his 2007 book 'Retying our Indonesia-ness' (*Merajut Kembali Keindonesiaan Kita*), which can also be read as a political programme prior to his presidential campaign. Devolution of power is central to his vision, but decentralization is here not primarily seen as a quantitative redistribution of power within the state; the sultan argues a much more profound transformation that entails the qualitative inversion of local and central orders. While the modern independent nation-state chose the slogan 'unity in diversity' to project the character of Indonesia, the sultan seems to reverse the holographic order in this motto, claiming that only diversity can create true unity. In contrast to Suharto's unitary notion of 'Indonesia', a uniform whole that embraces and transcends the diversity, the sultan sees the

28 Some Yogyanese doubt that these works are written by the Sultan at all. They see him as a mouthpiece for other interests.

nation as emergent rather than encompassing.[29] It is an entity arising out of the interaction among its component parts; Indonesia is thus in a profound sense dependent on its constituent cultures. Moreover, the sultan sees these components of the nation as incompatible entities; i.e. they are irreducible to any overarching unitary thinking. Diversity takes precedence over unity in a foundational sense. Indonesia can only reach its true nature then – its 'Indonesia-ness', *keindonesiaan* – if local traditions are allowed to blossom. The core concept in this discourse is *kebudayaan* – 'culture' or 'culture-ness'. *Indonesia baru* can only be achieved through full realization of component cultures. This view naturally creates a new role for Yogya and other local traditions in the nation.

It is important to note that this form of traditionalism is actually forward-looking, as it assumes that the potentials of component cultures are not yet realized; they were held back by Suharto's centralized regime. It is not simply a question of maintaining or protecting existing traditions, although this dimension is indeed underlined; the perceived challenge is how to accommodate traditions to the requirements of present and future, how to address the 'unique dynamics' (*momentum tersendiri*) of the times. The overall emphasis is thus on adaptive development of culture rather than preservation. And, as mentioned, globalization is seen as the dominant force of the times, so Indonesia's component parts not only articulate with and constitute the nation, they are also implicated in – and ought to engage – transnational forces. Globalization is a fact one cannot escape, the sultan argues. Nor can one evade what he construes as the core feature of globalization, namely the free market. Capital – and in particular big, transnational capital with its huge transformative potential – is thus a prime mover in the sultan's vision for a New Indonesia, and for the realization of the true potentials of Yogya. He is quite blunt on this point, arguing that 'To face the present challenges, we have no choice but to capitalize all resources we have.' (Hamengku Buwono X 2007:v; my translation).

So here is another apparent paradox in the sultan's projection of identity: he emerges as a neoliberal king. He is not at all embarrassed to integrate tradition and commerce; indeed, it seems to be a major point in his vision:

29 Scholars (e.g. Pemberton 1994) have examined the essentialization and folklorization of regional cultures that followed in the wake of Suharto's centralist, nationalist projects, and Dahles (2001) and Daniels (2009) discuss aspects of these processes in the case of Yogyakarta. Contemporary *kebudayaan* discourse thus has a solid precedent in Indonesian politics, but I am suggesting that the sultan's current formulations of 'culture' contribute to a new and perhaps significant reconstitution of order in the present context of decentralization.

only by marketing its culture can Yogyakarta realize its full potential in the contemporary world.[30] In this discourse *kebudayaan* is a catch-all phrase that embraces absolutely everything that is seen as particular to Yogya – *unik*. It thus encompasses the two other claims to *keistimewaan* I have discussed: Yogyakarta's history and cosmology are part of its *kebudayaan*; as is the landscape, its natural resources, handicrafts, expressive arts, customs and rituals – and Yogyakarta's most central feature, the kingdom itself and its traditions. All these traits are drawn into the sultan's vision of fulfilment through commercialization, hence the title of this chapter: 'Yogya Inc', which is the sultan's term for the new configuration of 'stakeholders' that he envisions in the formation of Yogya (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2009).[31] His solution to the 'challenges of the times' is in fact to commoditize his kingdom.

Touristification is of course a logical outcome of this vision – turning the arts and rituals of *kraton* into public spectacles for the national middle class and foreign tourists (Dahles 2001; Daniels 2009:33; Hughes-Freeland 2008). Indeed, in public discourse this framing of *kebudayaan* now seems dominant in Yogyakarta; questions of marketing pop up immediately when culture is in focus. But the transformation is also evident in the sultan's commercialization of his own land assets; he has no qualms turning royal land into shopping malls and entertainment centres in cooperation with transnational capital. Given the city design, the most central parts – the palace ground and surrounding areas – are highly profitable spots. The most glaring and contested example of this practice was his plan to build a huge car park under one of the most sacred fields in the city, *alun-alun*, the open square in front of the main entrance to the palace. As mentioned, this way of running business – selling the kingdom itself – is another reason why conservative commoners have lost faith in their king. But, again, the paradox is that even many of these critics support the idea of *keistimewaan* – which by implication gives the same sultan even greater leeway to commercialize Yogyakarta.

30 Interestingly, Hughes-Freeland's analysis of the coronation of Hamengku Buwono X in 1989 suggests that this identity may have been foundational for his rule in the sense that commercial sponsors (among them Mitsubishi and Coca-Cola) paid for the ceremony, which was also made an exclusive media event for private TV stations (1991, 2007).

31 The sultan here (2007:145) explicitly refers to a former minister of trade, Arifin Siregar, who during the period of economic deregulation in the 1980s envisioned the formation of a new accord between state and business in Indonesia – 'Indonesia Incorporated' – imitating Japanese means of economic success (see also Mallarangeng 2008:72).

The explanation, I argue, is that the discourse of *kebudayaan* is really taking hold, to the extent that Yogya emerges as its own justification. In this context, the sultan can legitimately claim governorship because he is the most peculiar – unique – feature of all things Yogyanese. As a manifestation of the *kraton* tradition, he guarantees Yogya's 'essence' (*intisari*). In the discourse of *kebudayaan* there is simply no Yogya without the *kraton*. And in the context of decentralization, there is no special Yogya – no claims to *keistimewaan* – without a vital *kraton* that can regenerate the uniqueness of Yogya. I believe this logic plays a significant part in peoples' support for royal privileges: despite his personal shortcomings the sultan is the prime generator of cultural pride in Yogyakarta. He is both the most obvious manifestation of, as well as the most visible agitator for, local identity, for the national recognition that Yogyanese feel they deserve – because of their uniqueness, their 'Yogyaness'.

Beyond any specific king or reign, then, there emerges a Yogya – a unique, essential cultural reality – that suffuses the province and is realized in a wide variety of human practices, but most succinctly in the material and symbolic manifestations of kingship. The *kraton* thus retains its role as an exemplary centre, but in a new and more disenchanted mode. It is not so much the magic of palace practices or the personal charisma of the sultan that upholds royalty and justifies claims to the local state. The *kraton* remains at the pinnacle of the new local order, but sacredness has been transferred to the encompassing entity, to Yogya itself. The culturalizing effect of *kebudayaan* discourse entails a disenchantment and even commoditization of kingship, without necessarily undermining royal power.

This dynamic may throw light on the most puzzling of the sultan's moves: his decision to concede governorship, the very rationale for *keistimewaan* struggle. While there were no doubt pragmatic reasons, related to the presidential campaign, in the broader context of cultural essentialization this decision can also be seen as a tactic of dissimulation. For in giving up claims to governorship, the sultan, in a sense, transferred the desire for *keistimewaan* onto his people, *rakyat*. By inverting the hierarchical logic of kingship, he rendered himself a servant of his subjects, i.e. entirely without ambitions on his own behalf. It is *rakyat* that becomes imbued with agency, not the king. This projection was also apparent in the sultan's explicit commentary: he underlined that he had no personal investment in the governorship whatsoever, but as a servant of the people of Yogyakarta he would heed the wishes of *rakyat*. More generally, to the extent that *kebudayaan* discourse manages to reframe Yogya, the sultan can feel confident that people will work for his royal privileges, that *rakyat* will step forward and beg him to remain king-cum-governor in order to guarantee Yogya uniqueness. Kingship is, however, being transformed in the process, as this request is motivated by

a deep concern for cultural identity rather than a blind subjugation to the traditional authority of a king or an enchanted admiration for his personal charisma.

Projections

Writing in 2011, I speculated on the prospects for *keistimewaan* in Yogyakarta.[32] Would state decentralization entail a return of kingship or the institutionalization of democratic procedures at the provincial level? Summing up developments thus far, I argued that the reframing of Yogya as cultural essence in the context of decentralization was generating strong support for *keistimewaan* in the province. It would be difficult for the central state to ignore this popular mobilization, so I thought it likely that Yogyakarta would achieve legal recognition as a 'special province'. It would be justifiable, even within the post-Suharto state, to grant Yogyakarta recognition for its historical role in the nation and for its highly praised culture. To honour *kraton*, i.e. the tradition of kingship, would have to be part of this recognition. But this would not automatically entail royal control over the governorship, I reasoned; Jakarta would most likely refuse this demand. While the local discourse of *kebudayaan* tended to dissolve of any distinction between culture and politics, rendering the second an aspect of the first and thus justifying a very broad involvement of *kraton* in Yogyakarta affairs, I believed Jakarta would insist on re-establishing this divide. I maintained that the central elite disliked the idea of having an assertive kingdom in the midst of the national heartland and that they would attempt to draw a clearer line between kingship and state in the province.

I pondered two likely scenarios: Given the strong sentiments that the issue raised in Yogyakarta, the central government could postpone the decision to a more favourable historical moment, choosing to continually extend the present sultan's term as governor until his death. This would be tantamount to granting him contingent, extraordinary and not legally recognized rights to governorship. Or, another – ironic – outcome of the struggle would be if the sultan became trapped by his own rhetoric, the discourse of *kebudayaan*. Jakarta might take his claim to be the cultural 'essence' seriously and incorporate this identity into the local state, while stripping him of real political power, i.e. the governorship. He could, for instance, end up as a royal advisor to the governor in clearly circumscribed matters of culture and tradition. The *keistimewaan* legislation proposed by a team of academics at the local Gadjah Mada University reflected thinking along these lines. According to this

32 I have followed the struggle for *keistimewaan* in Yogyakarta for two decades and have updated this text intermittently in accordance with local developments.

model, the sultan would relinquish the governorship in exchange for the role as *parardhya* – a kind of cultural and moral supervisor beyond the everyday concerns of local state administration.[33] In that case we might see his grand vision of 'Yogya Inc.' reduced to 'Kraton Inc.' – a politically disempowered king bound to further his kingdom through commercialization of royal assets.

I noted that this solution would continue a long and general trend of subjection in Java, in which kingdoms become eclipsed by state authority. As John Pemberton (1994) has shown, Javanese kings were simultaneously depoliticized and culturalized during colonial rule; destined to develop their prestige through symbolic elaborations rather than effectual power (see also Sears 1996). Energy went into the refinement of arts, language, etiquette, mysticism, shadow plays and other expressions of grandeur, thereby engendering the notion of 'Jawa',[34] a Javanese cultural essence that, I argued, was now being reframed in the context of state decentralization. National independence and subsequent political regimes only strengthened the subjection of kingship – apart from the Hamengku Buwono court in Yogyakarta, which has been a partial exception. I wondered whether this would be their time to submit to statehood.

Resolution and sequels

The issue was formally resolved with the legal codification of Yogyakarta's special status by the national parliament on 30 August 2012. Surprisingly, Jakarta succumbed to local demands for *keistimewaan* entirely, and as a result the sultan had his traditional privileges backed up by national legislation. According to Law No 13/2012, the governor of the province is required to be the ruler of the realm of Hamengku Buwono.[35] Moreover, the new legislation codified contentious land privileges: *qua* king the sultan had traditional claims to non-private ('public') land in the province, so-called 'sultan ground'. The new law formally acknowledged these areas as the property of the *kraton* as an institution, i.e. the royal house was recognized as a legal subject with property rights.[36] Additionally, the parliament secured direct funding for the upkeep of Yogyakarta's *keistimewaan* from national coffers. In short, we ended up with a law that fully acknowledges royal claims to state leadership at the regional

33 The draft stipulated, nevertheless, that the Sultan retain veto rights in crucial political matters.

34 Java is spelled 'Jawa' in Javanese, and it is common to use this spelling when discussing Javanese culture as a discursive figuration.

35 *Bertakhta sebagai* [literally, to throne as] *Sultan Hamengku Buwono*.

36 The junior royal house in Yogyakarta, the Pakualam, obtained equivalent rights with respect to vice-governorship and Pakualam ground.

level, while securing the ruler permanent access to economic resources that may facilitate the reproduction of his kingdom. One could argue that the new legislation thus institutes a new form of royal political economy in Yogyakarta.

The law also stipulates that, unlike in other provinces, the governor of Yogyakarta is to be sworn in by the national president. This is yet another expression of the central state's willingness to recognize Yogyakarta's 'uniqueness', and heeding this principle in practice, on 10 October 2012 president Yudhoyono officially appointed Sultan Hamengku Buwono X as governor in the state palace of Yogyakarta. It is reported that all commercial activity ceased in the city centre on the occasion; people took time off to celebrate their sultan. Many were astonished by the event, especially given that President Yudhoyono was adamant that he wanted an end to 'monarchy' in Yogyakarta and that the national government had officially endorsed the *parardhya* model as a compromise in December 2010. This position was reiterated as late as March 2012. Instead we ended up with the endorsement and apparent reinforcement of the 'feudal institution' of monarchy in the heartland of Java.

This outcome must be read as evidence of true local strength in the new decentralized order of Indonesia, and the political manoeuvring that led to the surprising result needs to be studied in more detail. It is clear, however, that the role of the sultan's wife – Queen GKR Hemas – must be taken into account. As a representative, and from 2009 deputy speaker, of the Regional Representative Council (DPD) of the national parliament, the queen argued the case in the committee tasked to formulate new legislation. There are also indications that this committee acquired unprecedented rights to influence the case through discussions in the other chamber, the People's Representative Council (DPR) (Syamsi 2012:134–8), possibly reflecting a new role for the regions in national politics. At another level, there was mass organization of rallies and pressure groups, sometimes allegedly involving acts of violence (de Jong and Twikromo 2017:87–9).

While I hold that the legal codification of *keistimewaan* in 2012 is a crucial factor in our analysis of contemporary socio-political reconfigurations in Yogyakarta, as legislation alters 'rules of the game', it is important to emphasize that formal law can never fully cover the complexities of social reality. Positive principles may contain ambiguities that allow space for tactical re-interpretations, and on the negative side, no law can incorporate all eventualities in socio-political developments. This is also the case for Law No. 13/2012, and these legal uncertainties colour current political discourse in Yogyakarta to a considerable degree. Contemporary developments in the province need to be discussed elsewhere, but I will round off my case by

pointing out three issues that indicate how Hamengku Buwono X remains in paradoxical situations despite the legal fortification of his position.

First of all, the sultan did not achieve unconditional control over governorship; in accordance with laws on decentralization, his term has to be renewed every five years, and the provincial parliament must deem him 'fit and proper' to serve as governor. It remains to be seen whether this mechanism can serve as an effective check on his future power, but so far, he has been firmly in control. More implicitly, this principle also engenders problems of royal succession that are not addressed explicitly by the legislation itself. If the sultan is incapacitated as governor, the royal house has to forward another candidate – who is also required to be ruler, i.e. there has to be a simultaneous royal succession. The relation between kingship and statehood thus remains tight and controversial despite the granting of *keistimewaan* status. Given that the sultan is now a senior (71 years old in 2017), it is no wonder that much local discourse concerns the question of succession, especially since, as mentioned, the sultan does not have a son who can ascend the throne.

Once more, the sultan threatens to erode his local standing by violating accustomed ideals of kingship. Apart from the personal, charismatic 'shortcomings' already alluded to (disregard for the spirit queen, explicit monogamous stance and 'inability' to produce male offspring), he now seems determined to break with basic premises of royal tradition by transferring his rule to a female. This intention became evident in May 2015, when he elevated his eldest daughter, Princess Pembayun, to the position of crown princess, renaming her Mangkubumi, the name used for a designated successor. Yet again, he stood forth in a 'cosmic mode' that underlined the inevitability of the moment – making his statement in terms of efficacious speech (*sabda*) and royal command (*dawuh*), and even claiming he submitted to divine instructions (*wahyu*) conveyed through his royal ancestors.

Since the *keistimewaan* law contains formulations that imply male leadership, the sultan's intention to establish a queendom in Yogyakarta raises formal, legal problems. However, the main point here is not how Jakarta reacts, but the local repercussions of his determination to privilege his own offspring over established tradition. These tactics not only provoke a growing number of Islamic hardliners in the province who oppose public female leadership, especially in terms of the religious functions accorded the sultan (the guardianship of Islam), but also cultural conservatives among his own supporters who feel he undermines the spirit of *keistimewaan*. Once more, the sultan's personal ambitions seem to violate the propriety of a king and thus, possibly, the moral basis of kingship itself. Moreover, the decision to forward his daughter has brought longstanding rivalry within his extended family into the open. Several younger brothers of the sultan refuse publicly to

accept his manoeuvring and suggest that the twin office of king and governor be transferred to one of them. In fact, this seems to be a legally appropriate move, as the law does not confer rights on the present sultan's descendants; it only stipulates that future governors be of Hamengku Buwono royal descent.

Secondly, by codifying public land as 'sultan ground', *keistimewaan* legislation provides the sultan with formal means to capitalize assets, and it is fair to say that he has been quite active on this front during the last few years, claiming new areas for property development projects in line with his neoliberal aspirations. Urban development in Yogyakarta is, as de Jong and Twikromo put it, driven by a 'big city ideology' (2017:79). Even though this ambition has characterized the sultan's rule since early on, the law facilitates a more assertive stance and thus aggravates current land disputes. The point is that much of 'sultan ground' has been utilized by Yogyakarta commoners for decades as plots for housing, gardening or commercial purposes. These 'usufruct rights' are often felt as integral to the king-subject accord in Yogyakarta, and the sultan's claim that he is profoundly the servant of *rakyat* (the people) is, naturally, being eroded as ever more people become evicted from their homes. One could argue that *keistimewaan* legislation thus spurs a new and perhaps more visible phase of class differentiation in the province. As mentioned, the law recognizes the institution of kingship as a legal subject with private property rights (Suhartono 2014), i.e. the sultan is being legally inscribed as a capitalist rather than a king.

Finally, formal recognition of *keistimewaan* may also intensify cultural or ethnic divisiveness in Yogyakarta. In general, claims about uniqueness presuppose criteria of inclusion at some level of conceptualization: Who is rendered sufficiently 'authentic' to belong to the community of Yogya? Who is perceived as 'other'? And what happens when 'others' live, work and own property in Yogyakarta? This is an ongoing and unresolved process of identification, negotiation and confrontation that needs to be studied empirically, but it should come as no surprise that the Chinese minority seems to be singled out. Resentment against Chinese has a long history in Indonesia, and local sentiments are hardly an exception. For instance, in popular perception no Chinese lives within the outer *kraton* walls, i.e. in the residential areas that surround the palace: 'the sultan does not allow it'. That this conception is not entirely 'symbolic' but reflects ongoing socio-political dynamics can be seen from the fact that the sultan retains local legislation that disempowers Chinese by formal means. While he is glad to include displays of Chinese tradition into his public festivals and parades to celebrate cultural diversity, according to a regulation issued in 1975, persons of Chinese origin are not allowed to own land in the province even though they have lived in Indonesia for generations and are registered citizens. The same holds for

indigenous persons married to Chinese descendants. They can only lease land for limited periods, after which their land 'revert' back to the king. Despite pressure from national human-rights bodies and local activists, the regulation is still active.

Also other 'outsiders' are targeted; there has been harassment against students from Eastern Indonesia and West Papua, and in some cases conflicts play out along religious rather than ethnic lines (de Jong and Twikromo 2017). In any case, observers note the speed with which Yogyakarta moves from being the icon of diversity and tolerance in Indonesia to one of the most troubled provinces in the country (Muryanto 2017; Muryanto and Perdani 2014). I reiterate that it is too early to draw firm conclusions about new socio-political configurations based on these tendencies. While undermining traditional conceptions of kingship, they are not necessarily evidence of the unravelling of Hamengku Buwono rule, nor of Yogyakarta kingship more generally.

However, following the logic of my argument, a crucial question is whether the sultan's discursive reframing of Yogya as *kebudayaan* is sufficiently strong to encompass and dampen these emerging tensions in society. As mentioned, the degree of 'peace, order and security' in Yogyakarta is seen as indexical, not only of the 'health' of the nation but also the de facto power of the sultan. In other words, we must assume that growing social unrest in Yogyakarta is seen as yet another royal 'failure'. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that most antagonists – those who submit to the sultan unconditionally because he is 'our king', those who worry about his erosion of royal tradition, and even those who see him as a feudal anachronism and/or egotistic power player – seem to converge on the importance of *keistimewaan*. Their adverse viewpoints are to some extent engendered by their shared concern for the uniqueness of Yoyga – a discursive figure that, I argue, is founded in and thus, by implication, reinforces kingship.

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CHAPTER 5

Resistance as a problem

An ethnic minority and the state in twenty-first century Indonesia

Olaf H. Smedal

> *Peasant resistance is any act by a peasant (or peasants) that is intended either to mitigate or deny claims (e.g., rents, taxes, corvée, deference) made on that class by superordinate classes (e.g., landlords, the state, moneylenders) or to advance peasant claims (e.g., to land, work, charity, respect) vis-à-vis these superordinate classes.*
>
> *(James C. Scott, 1987)*

It is probably safe to assume that most anthropologists associate something positive, even affirmative with the concept 'resistance' – not only in the broad meaning the concept has taken on in the wake of works by Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, but in the more specific meaning it has been given by James C. Scott (1985, 1987, 2009), namely, as peasant resistance (cf. also Edelman 2005 and the indispensable earlier work by Wolf 1966, 1982). Resistance is the weapon of the weak and may take many shapes; it is used against the powerful, often the state or oppressive regimes of tenure or production. Given anthropologists' proclivity not to side with the powerful, against the weak and oppressed, the matter would seem already settled.

In my view there is no reason to break with standard anthropological practice here. Rather, I wish to argue that our attention should be directed towards 'the truly weak', so that anthropological activity may effect improvements in their position – so often manifested negatively as lacks (of, for example, opportunities or abilities, or of resources to resist and to raise claims) – thereby improving their life chances. But anthropologists sometimes find themselves in empirical situations where the best course of action in this

respect is far from self-evident, because resistance is political all the way down – as noted by Ortner (1995:177). I shall discuss one such situation as I see it and explain why in this case – and in opposition to what an important NGO chose to do – I cannot support the active resistance.[1]

What follows is in the main descriptive, in that I concentrate on empirical events and their consequences; my aim is not to provide an exegesis of the concept 'resistance' as such (see Hollander and Einwohner 2004 for a useful overview of how variously it has been employed by political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists). Even less is it my ambition here to engage with Foucault's influential work (1982) on how power constitutes subjects while simultaneously subjecting them. As noted by Peter Dew, it is not at all clear how, according to Foucault, resistance can actually occur in practice – if by 'resistance' is meant any act aimed at freedom from power's subjection – for in Foucault's scheme the subject's resistance is itself one of the products of power, as is the very fantasy of an autonomous subject in the first place (Dew 1984:90). Indeed, as Theodossopoulos puts it, 'In real life, it is hard to find subaltern spaces completely uncolonized by power, while in resisting domination, subalterns also (partly) reproduce the categorical structures of domination.' (Theodossopoulos 2014:419).

However, having selected Scott's definition of resistance as the epigram for this chapter, I should nevertheless dwell, if only briefly, on the critique Don Kulick has levelled against Scott's own analyses. Kulick highlights precisely the point I began this chapter with: the almost intrinsically positive valuation the concept has attained. But, as Kulick points out, certain acts of resistance clearly lack the sort of characteristics that in many observers' eyes makes resistance 'noble'. One example is the strategy employed by persecuted and humiliated Brazilian transgendered prostitutes, when they force their customers to pay more than they have agreed to by threatening to scandalize them in public otherwise. The prostitutes thus 'resist by turning the dominant

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1 The argument developed here was first presented at the annual Norwegian Anthropological Association conference in Bergen (May 2009) and in December the same year at a University of Bergen 'Challenging the State' workshop convened by Bruce Kapferer. An earlier version of the chapter was published (in Norwegian) in the *Norwegian Journal of Anthropology* (Smedal 2010). I am grateful for audience comments at both venues, for thoughtful anonymous referee reports on the *NJA* piece, for helpful suggestions by Ingjerd Hoëm and Christian Krohn-Hansen, and for decisive improvements by Anette Fagertun. In Indonesia, I am especially indebted to the assistance and friendship of Asin, Sulaiman Yusuf, Budi Yakin Winata and his family, and Nova Adelia. In Bangka as well as in Penang, Malaysia, David Wilkinson was of great help. The usual caveats apply.

language against members of the dominant group: asserting that the dominant are secretly just as sexually perverse and transgendered as those whom the dominant employ violent discursive and practical arsenals to oppress' (Kulick 1996:7). Kulick's point is that such resistance 'repels liberal attempts to understand it. One would be hard pressed to see anything particularly lofty in it… It is not pretty. But it is resistance nonetheless. What it offers us … is … an acrid corrective to any perspective on resistance that imagines it to be necessarily noble' (Kulick 1996:7).

The example of resistance I describe below is certainly somewhat unsettling. But my intention is not only to report an instance of resistance that challenges Scott's influential work; I also want to take sides on the very issue that the resistance concerns, and to problematize its foundation. To sketch the main point: a small ethnic group in Indonesia – localized in two settlements with a total of some 1,200 inhabitants – has over the past 10 years or so experienced momentous changes with respect to possibilities for economic growth. On the one hand, there is small-scale resource extraction (tin mining); on the other, there is large-scale agribusiness (an oil-palm plantation). The population in one settlement has welcomed the plantation. In the other settlement, where tin is more plentiful, the population has instead protested against the establishment of a plantation in its area. An influential NGO was quick to support this resistance.

There is compelling evidence that both plantations and mining have far-reaching ecological consequences. But, as I shall attempt to show, the ecological consequences of tin mining are far more devastating than those of an oil-palm plantation. They are also practically irreversible. Mining, therefore, cannot serve the long-term interests of the population. By taking sides here, I hope I do not subject myself to (too much of) Kulick's (2006) disturbing critique of anthropologists who study powerless people. Rather, I want to underwrite Ortner's (1995) insight, reiterated by Gledhill (2014:508), that 'Collective subjects engaged in acts that might be described as "resistance" are seldom internally homogeneous'.

I shall soon return to the Indonesian ethnic minority of the title and to the concrete situation it finds itself in – enticed and divided by competing imaginations of progress. First, though, I shall sketch the political-historical and economic context within which any social process in present-day Indonesia plays out.

Recent political developments

After the fall of Suharto and his New Order rule in 1998, Indonesia went through a flurry of sweeping political and administrative reforms under a quick succession of presidents: Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur),

Megawati, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), whose ten year reign ended when Joko Widodo (Jokowi) won the presidential elections in July 2014. Demanded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, these reforms had decisive influence on Indonesian policymaking after the massive unrest in Asian financial markets in 1997–8 (see Hadiz and Robinson 2004, 2005).

A crucial purpose of the reforms was to extract power from the state's top levels (the president, cabinet, parliament and ministries – all located in the capital Jakarta) and deploy it into legislative bodies and elected political leaders at lower echelons all across the nation. Although a detailed account of the workings of Indonesia's political structure is beyond my remit, I should at least point out that the nation has eight politico-administrative levels (see Table 1).

Under Suharto, political and – most importantly – economic power was concentrated at the centre. The reforms sparked off in 2001 sought to divest the political elite in the capital from its monopoly on decision-making and resource allocation and to allow the administrative level of the district (*kabupaten* – formerly known in English as 'regency') a high degree of autonomy. The results of these thoroughgoing reforms are fundamental to understanding political and economic processes at all levels in present-day Indonesia.

With a stroke of the pen, the political and economic importance of the province was greatly reduced. Under Suharto's nearly 30-year-long rule, the revenue that the state appropriated from the provinces was – at least in theory – reallocated to the same provinces according to political priorities. This arrangement secured the less economically fortunate provinces a minimum of public funds to spend. Under the new legislation the province has become, as I have already mentioned, a far less important actor in the economic sense, and instead each district has become economically largely autonomous. All of a sudden, instead of almost all revenue amassed in the provinces being channelled to the elite in the capital, each district (*kabupaten*) now retains up to 90 per cent (this pertains to the fuel tax, see Brodjonegoro 2003:5).[2]

2 Revenue includes taxes (income tax, value added tax, property tax, luxury tax), levies, charges, fees, commissions, royalties and – in the case at hand most importantly: land rent. Instructions for channeling revenue through the system are detailed and complicated, but the two most important items for the argument pursued here are the Forestry permit operating levy and the Mining sector land rent. For both, 64 per cent of the revenue generated in the district remains with the district (Fadliya and McLeod 2010:8; cf. McLeod 2000:36).

Level	**Indonesian term**	**Head**
Nation/State	Negara/Pemerintah	Presiden
Province	Propinsi	Gubernor
District (Regency)/ Major City	Kabupaten/ Kota	Bupati/ Wali Kota
Subdistrict	Kecamatan	Camat
[administrative] Village	Desa	Kepala desa
[local] Community	Dusun/ Kelurahan	Kepala dusun/ Lurah
Neighbourhood/Hamlet	Rukun warga (RW)	Kepala RW
Ward/Quarter	Rukun tetangga (RT)	Kepala RT

Table 1 Politico-administrative levels in Indonesia. Modified after MacAndrews 1986:22–4.

It is easy to get lost in the detailed and interrelated workings of the administrative levels and the effect that the political and fiscal reforms have had on them, but one thing is obvious: The economic prospects of Indonesia's 500 or so districts vary greatly. There are districts in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), rich in oil, coal, gold and diamonds where vast amounts of money circulate; and there are others – especially in the eastern part of the archipelago – where the money generated locally covers less than five per cent of the public budgets (see Vel 2007 for one example). Another development not lost on observers is that the new legislation is de facto an incitement to establish new provinces, districts and subdistricts (see Aragon 2007; Schulte Nordholt and van Klinken 2007:18ff.). In fact, the number of new administrative units in Indonesia has been so striking over the last few years that the phenomenon has become known by a specific term: '*pemekaran*' or 'blossoming'.[3]

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3 As 2009 turned into 2010 there were 460 districts in the country, up some 160 from 1998. By May 2010 the number had risen to 497, two years later to 529 (see *Jakarta Post*, 20 April 2012), before it sank slowly to 514 by July 2017 (for an updated figure, see id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daftar_kabupaten_dan_kota_di_Indonesia). The following illustrates the aforementioned blooming. The island Bangka (which will be discussed further in this chapter) and the neighbouring island Belitung constituted in 1983–4 two districts (*kabupaten*) in the province South Sumatra. In 2000 the two islands became a separate province (usually referred to as BaBel), which is now constituted by seven districts (see Erman 2007b:181n3). This increase was accompanied by a corresponding growth in the number of subdistricts (*kecamatan*) and administrative villages (*desa*). In 2010 Indonesia's minister of the interior was worried; during the previous eight years, a new region had been created every 15 days (see *Jakarta Post*, 29 April 2010). Three years later he saw fit to admonish newly elected district heads not to prioritize 'new cars, official residences, and grandiose office buildings' (*Kompas*, 23 October 2013).

The Lom – an ethnic minority[4]

The group known as Orang Lom has as their claim to anthropological fame (such as it is), that they are Malay but not Muslim. 'Lom' is an abbreviated form of '*belum*'/'*belom*' which means 'not yet', and what the Lom have 'not yet' done is to convert to Islam (or any other world religion, for that matter). To most Malays, to be Malay is to be Muslim. In the early 1980s the Lom numbered about 750 persons. By 2007 their number had grown to some 1,200.[5]

The Lom live on the island of Bangka, practically equidistant from Jakarta and Singapore. The size of the island is almost 12,000 square kilometres or 4,600 square miles and its population is about 1 million. Unlike almost anywhere else in Indonesia, a considerable segment of this population, perhaps some 15 per cent, is made up by ethnic Chinese. The explanation for this unusually high proportion is that the colonial administration imported large numbers of men from the south of China for the purpose of working – as 'coolies' – in Bangka's famous tin mines (the local Malays were considered unfit for the heavy work). Hardly any of them ever returned (see Heidhues 1992; Horsfield 1848).

No one can say how long the Lom have resided in the north-eastern corner of Bangka – their history is simply unknown. In fact, the sum total of information I was able to find on them before my first fieldwork some 35 years ago was contained in some 17 pages, mostly in Dutch, all of them published before 1940 (the first reference to the Lom I have found is Anon. 1862). My

4 The term 'ethnic minority' is sometimes difficult to use in the Indonesian context, especially because the term often connotes 'indigenous population'. Now, in nations such as Indonesia or India or South Africa, with histories of migration, displacement, feuding and intermarriage across sociocultural divides going back thousands of years and concerning hundreds of ethnic groups – who in the Indonesian archipelago themselves often claim origin from somewhere 'overseas' – any use of the term 'indigenous population' raises the immediate and highly charged questions of if there are, in contrast, non-indigenous groups (see Dove 2006; Li 1999, 2000, 2001; cf. Kapila 2008; Kuper 2003) and by what criteria the former might be distinguished from the latter. There are several hundred ethnic groups in Indonesia that qualify for the 'minorities' label, if one simply compares them with the majority population, the Javanese, but some of them have several million members. Many of the 'smaller' groups are in any case majority populations in the islands they consider their homeland and their own representatives effectively run political and economic life there – the Balinese being just one example. But the ethnic group this chapter deals with is, I think, in more respects than one a 'true minority'.

5 I conducted fieldwork among the Lom in the periods May 1983 – December 1984, September – December 2007, and for some six weeks in the first half of 2010.

own attempts to investigate Lom verifiable history were unsuccessful. Bangka Malays often suggest that the Lom are among the island's first inhabitants and despite the fact that they constitute a minuscule part of the population, most Bangkanese have heard about them. When encountering people in Bangka in the 1980s, whether Malay Muslims or ethnic Chinese, and I told them that I resided among the Lom, they were generally 'shocked and awed': the Lom were thought to be the most accomplished black magicians in the island, to be extremely timid, running away when strangers approach, to be speaking an incomprehensible language, and avoiding any kind of formal education (much of which had some truth in it). To the Malays, of course, the fact that the Lom raise pigs and eat lizards, turtles and grubs did not improve their image. I received much the same reaction in 2007 and 2010. Thus the Lom are definitely not among the ethnic groups in Indonesia with 'majority' standing – except on the roughly 200 square kilometres they consider 'their' territory – where their 'custom' (*adat*) applies.

Like most of the rural population in Bangka, the Lom have traditionally lived off the land, despite the notoriously poor soil that the island offers (see Whitten *et al.* 2000:264). They have grown their staple food – dry rice and cassava – in swiddens, kept chickens like all rural Indonesians, hunted for game in the forest; others have more recently (since the 1950s) resided near the seashore, where they have grown coconuts and raised pigs, and a few have taken up fishing. In the 1980s, what little cash they had was mostly generated from cash crops such as pepper and rubber and the occasional trapped game animal. At the time, only a handful of men were wage labourers, employed as loggers or working for the nationally owned tin-mining company.

Prior to my first arrival in 1983, the Indonesian government had recently invested in two settlement projects, each with 75 houses, in an attempt to coax the Lom away from their tiny and dispersed hamlets, and install them near the 'main' road. The first such 'road village' was completed in 1975. It is the southernmost settlement, and it catered for those people who lived in the forest. The other settlement, ready the year before my arrival, is located very near the shoreline, and was established for those who lived north of the low mountain range between the forest settlement and the beach, and for those who had their homes in the coconut groves on the beach.

During my one and a half years among them, most houses in both settlements stood empty. Nearly every household had a house in their swidden – or on the beach – where people spent just about all their time. Nor were the elementary schools that were built a great success: teachers disappeared after a few weeks, partly because of the lore that surrounded the Lom, partly because both settlements were considered 'remote'. It did not help matters that teachers were sometimes posted to the Lom as penalty after having committed some

misdeed or other. But the main reason for the schools' failure lay elsewhere: Lom traditionalists held that education – especially literacy – is taboo.[6]

As I mentioned, by 2007 the Lom population had grown from some 750 to about 1,200. But more striking than the increased density of (now inhabited) housing in the settlements were the signs of increased (relative) wealth. The houses themselves were now built to a much higher standard (the state settlement housing schemes were notoriously rudimentary, and caused much complaint in the 1980s; few are left), and the number of vehicles had increased greatly, especially motorcycles, and several households had managed to acquire pick-ups, jeeps, even trucks. There was now real traffic in the settlements. Furthermore, although the settlements were not connected to the national electricity grid, most people had now bought television sets, satellite dishes and VCD players, along with petrol-driven generators to power them all.

What also soon became clear was the new difference between the forest and the beach settlements. The build-quality of housing, as well as the quantity of expensive consumer items, was noticeably higher in the forest settlement in the south than in the beach settlement in the north. This was surprising: during my fieldwork in the 1980s the beach settlement – with its marketable fish, coconuts and pigs – was the more prosperous. I have already mentioned that inhabitants of both settlements had relied mostly on pepper and rubber production for cash income, but whereas people in the forest had little else to trade, people in the coastal settlement had been more fortunate. Thus, in the last chapter of my book on the Lom (Smedal 1989) I speculated – entirely mistakenly – that of the two settlements, the one near the beach would be far more likely to prosper and modernize than the one in the forest. I could not have been more mistaken. But what had happened? The answer lies in the historico-political management of Bangka's most important natural resource: tin.

Tin mining in Bangka

Indonesia is the world's second largest producer of tin (after China), which has been mined commercially in what is now Indonesia for about 1,500 years (Erman 2007*a*:3). Tin is produced for the global market, and is used as solder and

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6 Equally taboo, I was told, is to put up any building dedicated to prayer, such as mosques or churches, on Lom land. 'Ethnic' taboos of this kind, of which there are several, derive from local myths of origin and strong convictions of the cosmological responsibilities that the Lom shoulder (see Smedal 1989: chapter 4). There are indications that these prohibitions no longer have the regulatory force they had in the 1980s.

in the food industry. It is important to realize that after Indonesia's liberation from the Dutch colonial authorities in 1949, the country's new government – led by Indonesia's first president, the charismatic nationalist and freedom fighter Soekarno – decided to continue the colonial power's policy with regard to tin, which expressed the recognition that it is a nationally strategic resource on par with coal and oil.[7] In the 1950s, Dutch-owned mines were consequently nationalized all over Indonesia. This policy continued under the New Order regime (1966–98) headed by Suharto (who became president in 1969). It was prestigious to be employed in the state-run tin industry, and mining operations were guarded by uniformed security personnel; access to the mines was controlled as if they were military installations. But a combination of several sharp drops in oil revenues (devastating to Indonesia's state finances, and making it difficult to modernize the nation's mining sector), top-level mismanagement and escalating corruptive practices at all levels led to a severe reduction in tin-mining operations in the early 1990s, despite efforts to reduce corruption. The situation was not helped by a metals slump in the world market. New materials (new plastics) were successfully introduced to replace tin in many contexts, and all of a sudden it was impossible to cover the vastly inflated cost – and increasing inefficiency – of tin extraction, with the price that the market was willing to pay for the metal.

But then the situation changed, in part thanks – incidentally – to the global impact of a 'new' invention: the mobile telephone. It – and other pieces of miniaturized consumer electronics – requires much soldering, and hence tin; lead-based solder is now prohibited in many countries. With an average shelf life of a year or two, combined with the attractive cost-effectiveness of mobile telephone networks as compared with the copper-cable infrastructure of conventional telephones, the continuous worldwide distribution of this electronic gadget breathed new life into Indonesian tin-mining operations; and the tin price on the London Metal Exchange rose sharply (see Pöyhönen 2009; Pöyhönen and Simola 2007). But it did not resuscitate the discredited state production companies. Things took a different course in the late 1990s, a point I shall return to. But first I describe some fundamentals of tin mining in Bangka.

7 The exploitation of a country's natural resources always has strategic and security policy aspects, nationally as well as internationally – see, for example, Cronin and Pandaya 2009, where these issues are discussed comparatively with respect to water, forestry and minerals in the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. The Dutch declared tin a strategic resource in a 1916 regulation (Erman 2008:98).

The crucial basic fact is that the deposits are generally shallow. This means that – on land – tin is extracted by strip mining.[8] There are no shafts or tunnels, no elevators to take miners into the bowels of the earth; instead forest is cleared, bulldozers and back hoes (excavators) move in, and aided by access to water the sandy, if often compressed, soil is hosed down and panned in a manner not unlike that in gold mining. In technological terms, tin mining is fairly simple.[9]

Ecologically, the consequences of strip mining are negative and immediately observable: because the topsoil – which contains whatever humus is present – is cleared away so as to get access to the tin deposits, any agricultural investment in abandoned tin-mine land is to no avail. In fact, with the naked eye it is difficult to differentiate recently closed tin mines from those abandoned decades ago. What one sees is hectare after hectare of white sand – a practically sterile substance in which almost nothing can grow (not even the much-feared 'elephant grass' – *Imperata cylindrica*); natural reforestation simply does not take place – interrupted only by enormous remnant pools of stagnant water, eminent for breeding mosquitoes and for spreading malaria. The constant use of water to sluice the soil means that brooks and rivers fill up with silt and spillage. The effect of this is that rivers regularly flood and suddenly take new and unpredictable courses.

The turn that events took in the late 1990s must be understood against the background of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–8 and the above-mentioned deregulation of the Indonesian economy required by the IMF and the World Bank. Over the course of a few years, legislation was put in place that from 2001 onwards altered tin production in fundamental ways. To put it simply, the liberalization of tin production opened the door to small, artisanal mining operations. No longer considered a strategic resource, tin mines were no longer protected by security personnel. No longer a state – that is, a nationalized – industry, anyone could apply for permission to open mining

8 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the massive tin extraction at sea.

9 Except from the use of machinery, tin is mined today the way it 'always' was:

> In Bangka, tin has been estimated mined since the time of the Sriwijaya kingdom, a super powerful and maritime traditional state in Southeast Asia during the seventh century. The system of tin mining itself was not complicated, known as *timah ladang* (tin mined in the field), meaning that tin sand was dug up when people cleared the forests for agriculture. Up till the 18th century Bangka people, as Malay people in Malaysia, mined tin by panning in rivers, between cultivating their fields, gathering forest products and fishing.
>
> (Erman 2008:92, references removed)

operations, and the permission was no longer given at the Ministry in Jakarta, but locally (Erman 2007*b*:181). The formerly omnipotent state tin-mining company was reorganized and renamed, closed most of its operations, and established itself as what it is today: chiefly, a buyer and exporter of tin.[10]

An obvious but crucial difference between the state-run tin mines of previous decades and the artisanal operations now suddenly appearing pertains to size and scale: each state-run mine often covered hundreds of hectares, required much machinery and many employees (many of whom, undoubtedly, availed themselves of the opportunity to strike out on their own). By law, the artisanal mines, using no more than two pieces of extraction machinery, are limited in size to a maximum of two hectares (Hayati 2011:114). As I just noted, from a technological point of view, strip mining is a fairly simple affair. But this does not mean that operations require little capital. After obtaining permission, the aspiring miner would need to hire an excavator/back hoe or a bulldozer to 'open' the land. This task is done incrementally: just to break open a small fraction of a two-hectare piece of land would take two days and cost the miner perhaps 1,000 USD (on credit, of course; few

10 Export of tin from Indonesia is a complicated topic, subject to constantly changing laws and regulations, often in response to fluctuating market prices and in efforts 'to ensure that all tin mined in Indonesia was processed to the maximum level possible within the country to maximize value-added' (Ecclestone 2014). From 2000 onwards, export of the metal has sometimes been quite liberalized, then just as regulated as production once was. Periodically, export of tin sand has been permitted, only to be prohibited again, while export of tin ingots – produced in state-run or private smelters – has been allowed. For the past ten years or so (as of mid 2017), private smelters can no longer export tin ingots (that is a prerogative of the state-run company); they must be worked into solder prior to export. In 2015, Indonesia 'put new export rules into effect on August 1; aimed at regulating illegal mining and supporting the tin price, the rules require exporters to present proof that their tin is from government-certified mines' (Moran 2015). At any rate: as long as tin has been produced in Bangka smuggling, especially to Singapore, has taken place (see Erman 2007a:5–13) and there is much to indicate that practically any tin-related activity has always taken place in a landscape where the border between the legal and the illegal is often vague (Pöyhönen 2009), where the police are deeply involved in smuggling (Erman 2007a:11), and where the conflicting interests between forestry and mining are irreconcilable (Resosudarmo *et al.* 2009; Subiman and Resosudarmo 2010).

villagers have access to this much cash).[11] It is difficult to say in advance at what depth the tin deposits can be found, but anywhere between two and ten metres seems to be common. Next, a diesel-driven pump and up to 300 m of heavy-duty hose would have to be purchased (often second-hand). The purpose of this equipment is first to get water from a nearby steady source into the mine so that the tin that is hopefully there can be panned, and then to pump the used water out again. Moreover, although these artisanal operations are usually owned by a single person, most miners in fact hire people, up to eight, to actually work the machinery and pan the tin (Hayati 2011:129. Finally, many artisanal miners actually work in huge pits long abandoned by the former state-owned company, and one may observe scores of people, men and women, many under age, panning for tin – under dismal working conditions.[12]

Now, the first point to note is that given the combination of an increasing tin price on the world market and the deregulation of tin mining in Indonesia, the number of these artisanal mines or 'unconventional mines' (*tambang inkonvensional*, or *T.I.*) – rose sharply. No one knows the exact number of unconventional mines or pits in Bangka at any one time (Erman 2007a:17), although it has been reported that by 2008 70,000 mines were in operation – of which only an estimated 30 per cent had obtained permission (Hayati 2011:3). Perhaps equally telling: according to the local press, in the first seven post-Suharto years the number of unreclaimed pits (a major but separate issue) rose from 544 to an estimated 6,000 (Erman 2007a:17). More specifically, in the two *desa* (administrative villages) where the two Lom settlements are located, I was informed that in March 2003 there were well over 100 such pits

11 An undetermined number of artisanal miners do not bother to even seek permission and it is anyway difficult to say with any certainty how the informal (illegal?) mining industry is financed; some authors suggest that foreign capital is involved: 'Most illegal mining operations are funded by foreign investors. It is highly unlikely that, given the annual national income per capita of US$725, locals would be able to self-finance billions of rupiah of mining operations involving trucks, excavators, 20-horsepower machineries, smelters, and even ships.' (Cronin and Pandaya 2009:39).

12 A BBC film team recorded examples of these working conditions in their 'Apple's broken promises' shown in December 2014, and currently available (July 2017) at www.dailymotion.com/video/x301ki1_bbc-panorama-apple-s-broken-promises-las-promesas-incumplidas-de-apple_tech. Indeed, according to Bachrul Chairi, the director of Indonesia's Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency (BAPPEBTI), the reason why Indonesia's top tin customers are Apple and Samsung is because Indonesian tin is the purest in the world (Detik Finance, 18 August 2016).

in the northern one and precisely 164 in the southern. According to the then director of the Bangka-Belitung Energy and Mining Agency, in 2008 some 60 per cent of the province's population depended on artisanal mines for their livelihood (Kompas.com 2008).

The second point to note is that this increase in mining generated a lot of wealth among the miners – even among many of the hired hands (often young, unmarried men) – as evidenced by the high number of good houses and vehicles in both Lom settlements mentioned earlier. Indeed, and partly because the world market price of pepper (Bangka's primary agricultural product) had slumped, there is no doubt that Bangka's population as well as its authorities viewed the proliferation of artisanal mines as a welcome solution to the population's economic problems (Hayati 2011:131–2). On the other hand, many of those who still stuck to traditional land-based productive schemes – agriculture and hunting – expressed alarm at what they took to be a rapid and irreversible destruction of agricultural land and game habitat. I have already noted that soil quality in Bangka is extremely poor. But mining operations remove all nutrients; the topsoil is simply washed away.[13]

Finally, not everyone got rich. 'Mining,' a friend of mine said, 'is like gambling', there is no guarantee that investments will pay off, let alone generate profit. One never knows how much tin will be found, and if all the expenses (equipment purchases, bulldozer rental, etc.) have been covered by borrowed money, bankruptcy may be a fact in few weeks. Of course, would-be miners know this better than anyone. Thus, before they begin operations they have the land they have claimed tested for ore (their very first mining expenditure); or, unfortunately, as is common among the optimists and those with the least money, they rely on previous testing – often done decades ago.

It should be noted at this point that precisely because Bangka has long been known to be rich in tin, vast tracts of the island were tested for deposits in colonial times, as well as later, and in more detail, under the Old Order and New Order regimes. But, as I was told time and time again: one cannot trust the test results. They are inherently uncertain; a promising find or two does not guarantee that there is enough tin in a given two-hectare plot to warrant the expenses that mining entails. More crucially, many of the test results, informants said, are entirely fictional. Often, the technicians employed to do

13 The very mechanization of small-scale mining itself has notable negative environmental impact: during the first months of 2010 the daily diesel consumption in the subdistrict where the Lom settlements are located (*kecamatan* Belinyu) had reached 30 tonnes; hundreds of trucks and pick-ups loaded with empty jerry cans queued up in front of petrol stations closed for the night in order to secure fuel for the compressor pumps when the stations opened the next morning.

the field tests decades ago simply lied; the more tin they reported from one particular area, the more they were encouraged to continue testing there, without having to travel elsewhere and set up camp in a new location. Because the results were never double-checked, the technicians could easily get away with doing no tests at all, dreaming up figures for their report sheets and cashing in their paycheques all the same. Thus there are once-hopeful miners around who invested in machinery and began operations only to have to throw in the towel after a few weeks, having totally exhausted their borrowed capital on what was a hopeless project to begin with, and ending up mired in debt as a consequence.

To return to my failed prediction: the intensified tin-mining operations on Lom land following the 2001 deregulation revealed that the tin deposits are far richer in the forest settlement than they are in the beach settlement. However, the advantage of the forest settlement may not last. Partly because of the devastating environmental consequences of mining in Bangka: early in 2007, new legislation made it much more cumbersome and far more costly to open unconventional mines.[14] Thus by the time of my arrival in 2007 the number of such minor mining ventures on Lom land had dropped from the perhaps 275 in 2003 to about 50. Enormous damage had been done by then.[15] But in the meantime, a new economic opportunity had presented itself.

The plantation

When I arrived in Bangka in 2007, the frenetic mining activity was naturally a frequent topic of conversation. But among the Lom something else was attracting even more attention, and gave rise to far more controversy: in 2005, a UK-based agribusiness company – I shall refer to it by its 'acronym', GPL – had begun to develop an oil-palm (*Elaeis guineensis*) plantation in north-

14 That the environmental destruction is glaring, is evident from a Reuters report in 2007: 'The coconut palms on the tropical beaches of the Indonesian island of Bangka open up to reveal a landscape so devastated by mining that it bears an eerie resemblance to the surface of the moon' (Pardomuan 2007). In 2008, a local official estimated that 619,000 hectares (1.5 million acres) had been damaged by tin mining (Davies and Wulandari 2008); this is nearly half of the island's surface.

15 'As one victim summarized the problem, "We have just realized that later, when the tin is gone, all Bangka will be riddled with [water-filled] holes. Even planting cassava will be impossible."' (Heidhues 2007:74, reference removed).

eastern Bangka, much of it in their customary territory.[16] Here is what was stated about the company's goals in 2005:

> The project consists of the acquisition and development of approximately 12,000 hectares which will be planted with oil palms and nearby there will be a smallholders cooperative comprising up to a further 5,000 hectacres [*sic*]. A crude palm oil mill will be constructed to process the fruit from both the project and the smallholders land. [...] The plan is to develop the project at the rate of approximately 4,000 hectares per annum and it will be some six years from now before all of the plantings are considered mature by which time earnings from the first plantings should have commenced. The implementation of the project is conditional upon the necessary local approvals but the board is confident that there should not be any difficulty in obtaining these.
>
> (MP Evans share chat 2005)

From the point of view of national economy, especially in the context of Southeast Asian agrarian transitions more broadly (see Turner and Caouette 2009, cf. contributions in Caouette and Turner 2009), such plantations are of great interest. For decades, Indonesia's export revenue was based on petroleum, but for several reasons the country has long since discontinued its export of oil and gas. One of the products hoped to take petroleum's place is palm oil. In fact, in the mid 1990s Indonesia's goal was to become the world's number one producer of palm oil (Casson 2000:8). Despite the serious setback following the monetary crisis in the late 1990s, this happened in 2006, when the country surpassed Malaysia's output. Palm oil is attractive for several reasons: it is held to have health benefits as compared to other cooking oils (although there is

16 GPL is a subsidiary of M.P. Evans Group PLC, which has considerable economic interests in palm-oil and rubber estates in Malaysia and Indonesia as well as in dairy farming in Australia. The Evans Group has a 90 per cent interest in GPL; the remaining 10 per cent is owned by an Indonesian businessman, Karli Boenjamin.

controversy over this claim);[17] it can be converted to biodiesel; oil palm trees 'produce a much higher yield per hectare than any other seed oil' (Casson 2003:10); and palm oil is cheaper to produce than other vegetable oils (Casson 2003:10, citing *Oil World* 1999). In combination, these qualities mean there is likely to be a sustained future interest in the product. For its part, Indonesia aims to double its 2012 production by 2030 (Gilbert 2012).

But it is no secret that palm-oil plantations are controversial. There are many NGOs – Indonesian and international – whose main priority is to oppose the establishment and operation of oil-palm plantations. The arguments are well known: the photosynthesis of the palms is far less effective than in a regular forest; drained peat soils release CO_2; the plantations are monocultural 'deserts' without game or bird life; the soil turns acidic; the plantations destroy the livelihood of forest peoples. Moreover, there is much evidence that the working conditions of plantation workers are reproachable, and that the quality of people's overall life situation as workers is diminished. Finally, to raze forest in order to produce fuel is short-sighted and wrong, and it is even more morally reprehensible to do it on land already devoted to food production.[18]

But oil palm is not regarded in this negative way at the national level, nor is it – and this is at least as important – by the province or the district (*kabupaten*) authorities. It is now the responsibility of the province and the district to see to it that their expenses do not exceed their income. Thus, a

17 It is symptomatic that whenever I consult Wikipedia's article on palm oil (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palm_oil) it has been updated only days before. Wikipedia's 'talk' ('discussion') and 'view history' pages are in this regard instructive. See also www.worldgrowth.org for an NGO (or another lobby organization for the industry?) that takes a positive stand on palm-oil production. Since September 2009, World Growth, headed by Alan Oxley, has published several reports aiming to counter the campaigns against palm-oil production. See an open letter by a group of scientists accusing Oxley's organization of 'significant distortions, misrepresentations, or misinterpretations of fact' here: www.redd-monitor.org/2010/10/27/who-the-hell-does-alan-oxley-think-he-is. I note that the site shows few signs of activity later than 2013.

18 It should be noted that the forest in question in this chapter is secondary forest; either timber has been extracted in the past or locals have cleared swiddens, and later cultivated pepper or rubber. In this case, therefore, it is not a question of predominantly pristine tropical rainforest, as it may be elsewhere in Indonesia, nor of permanently tilled agricultural land. The following sentence is found in all M.P. Evans Group annual reports since 2008: 'With regard to the new projects on Bangka and Kalimantan, the Group has a clear policy that only heavily degraded land will be acquired and developed.' (2009:24).

crucial corollary to the decentralization policy is that the Jakarta ministries no longer guarantee that there are sufficient funds further down the system. If a provincial governor or *bupati* secures foreign investment, much has been won. An oil-palm plantation is operational for at least 25–30 years.[19] Thus GPL's investment plans were much welcomed by local authorities.[20]

I cannot detail here the steps in establishing a plantation – from forest clearing, establishing drainage canals, planting the palms, via fertilizing and pest controlling, to harvesting the fruit bunches; or how one arrives at the end product, crude palm oil or CPO. But it is necessary to understand that the palm fruits should be processed within 48 hours after harvesting lest their quality deteriorate. Thus, any palm-oil estate is criss-crossed with roads that can accommodate heavy trucks. A typical output per hectare is between one and two tonnes per month, for which the fresh fruit bunches (f.f.b.) must be brought as soon as possible to a processing mill.

When I arrived in 2007, some 2,000 hectares had already been planted in with oil palms (M.P. Evans Group PLC 2008:76). But GPL was in a fix at the time because, while in some areas they had been welcomed, several local communities beyond the Lom customary territory refused to have anything to do with the company. From the outset, part of the problem was that GPL's plantation proposal straddles two separate subdistricts, or *kecamatan*, and four *desa*, and many more *dusun* – or settlements (see Table 1 above), each with considerable autonomy. If these opposed attitudes towards major investment from GPL are interesting in themselves, I have been even more struck by how the Lom responded: practically everyone in the beach settlement was enthusiastic about the new prospects, while people in the forest settlement were not just not interested and actively resisted GPL's plans. In fact, in 2006 they authored a written declaration – or perhaps a warning – to the GPL, telling the company that if preparations for a plantation on forest-settlement land were initiated, villagers would take action.

As I noted above, it is not surprising that oil-palm plantations spark controversy, within and beyond the nation. But what surprised me was that opinion was (and is) so divided among the Lom. Almost exactly 50 per cent of them wished the plantation welcome, while the other 50 per cent protested.

19 Companies such as GPL cannot buy land; land is leased from the state. The standard lease period is 30 years, which, I was assured, can be routinely renewed if the company so wishes. The substantial investments in infrastructure and buildings would necessitate several such renewals.

20 On the relentless spread of oil-palm plantations as an inevitable effect of politico-economic decentralization in Indonesia, see Potter (2009).

'In the past' – prior to 1998 – the state and its security forces would have dealt with the forest population's resistance efficiently and severely. But the political climate has changed completely, and with a vigilant press in place it is simply impossible – even if the state were thus inclined – to follow former procedure. This is all the more true when NGO listening posts may register that there is a tiny ethnic minority whose livelihood is being threatened by capital interests planning to flatten the forest and replace it with a plantation.

But if this were the whole story, if the livelihood of the Lom were actually under threat, why then is local opinion on the plantation so divided, and why is it so neatly divided territorially, between the forest and the beach settlements?

In order to explain why 50 per cent of the population look favourably on the plantation, a few words must be said about the operation's organization. Plantations like this, according to Indonesian law, must consist of two 'kinds' of land: 60–80 per cent of the total acreage can be run directly as 'nucleus estate', in which people are hired to plant, weed, fertilize, clear, harvest and organize test plots, drive trucks and tractors, operate the mill machinery where CPO is produced, and generally manage the entire operation. The remaining acreage, minimally 20 per cent, must be passed over to the local population, conveniently as two-hectare plots that the 'smallholders' – which is what they are known as – cultivate individually as private property.[21] But – and this is a sobering point – when smallholders take over these plots they must also accept a substantial debt. The size of the debt is calculated as a proportion of the expenses the company incurred in preparing the smallholders' plots.

Experience has shown that a major problem with this particular way of proceeding is that a number of smallholders – for a variety of reasons – sell their plots within a few years.[22] Buyers are sometimes fellow smallholders that are willing and able to invest, but equally often they are government employees in a nearby town who become absentee landowners (thus affording the remaining smallholders with an additional employment opportunity). In either case, after a few years these buyers may own five, ten or – in very large plantations – even more than fifty separate plots, effectively undermining one of the most important objectives of the scheme, which is to provide rural people with a steady income (a point exercised in Smedal 2013).

Importantly, in an effort to prevent this from happening, GPL has proposed a very different provision for the Lom. While the principle of a dual organization of the estate remains in place, locals are required to organize

21 The size of this smallholder percentage is ultimately for the office of the district leader (the *bupati*) to decide, considering the local population density.

22 The most common reason appears to be the consequence of insufficient fertilization: a rapid and dramatic drop in productivity.

a cooperative. This cooperative takes on the aforementioned debt in its entirety. But, and this is the crucial point, GPL will also operate this part of the plantation, while the profit – i.e., after the debt costs have been deducted – goes to the cooperative, to be shared by its members. Based on the price that fresh fruit bunches (f.f.b.) fetched in 2000, I calculated that this would represent an income per household per month somewhere between half and twice a teacher's monthly wage.[23] This income, I should emphasize, would go to the households without any of its members lifting a finger.

But while the coastal population looked forward to this possibility, the forest population resisted it and, as mentioned, had even produced a written statement to this effect. I was naturally interested in finding out why.

The situation

It soon became clear that only one person could enlighten me: the forest-settlement headman. Everyone else referred me to him. He had several intriguing things to say and I spent the next few days travelling about, visiting headmen and government officials in several other settlements and *desa*, attempting to verify what I had been told. Most of it was news to me, some of it was inaccurate and some of it was plainly wrong. Perhaps the single most important piece of information that was totally misleading was his message to his fellow villagers that the debt each household would have to take on would be about USD 50,000, while the correct figure is about one twentieth of that (and I should mention that this tallies with what I know about such debts elsewhere in Indonesia).[24]

He had also told them that membership in the cooperatives was restricted to elementary-school graduates (many adult Lom have very little if any schooling) and that GPL's promise of 40 per cent acreage to the cooperative was an empty one, as had been shown elsewhere before. The former statement turned out to be incorrect, and even if there was truth in the second, the cited example had happened many years ago and could not reasonably serve as precedence now. But as it had not been all that difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff in what I had been told, I began to wonder if there were also other things influencing the forest-settlement population.

23 This has been confirmed in the local press (*Bangka Pos*, 31 October 2013) and corresponds with findings from research on smallholder oil-palm income in Kalimantan (Bachriadi and Sardjono 2005:14; Semedi and Bakker 2014:387).

24 It cannot be stated with any certainty how long it will take to repay this debt (approximately USD 1,250 per hectare); it depends on the constantly varying price of CPO (and f.f.b.).

In the forest settlement, as I have stressed already, tin production is still continuing (though at a much slower pace than just a few years ago), deposits being much richer than in the beach settlement. This is why the headman has been able to establish a 'settlement cash-box' – a wise political move: money is available from this reserve for certain, specific purposes, such as the yearly settlement festival (thus villagers do not have to donate 'contributions' from their own pockets) and emergencies such as sudden, grave illness or accidents requiring an ambulance (for which ordinary people would not have money). This cash-box is the pride of the forest settlement and is much envied by people in the beach settlement, where there is nothing of the kind. But what is the source of this fund? It is the unconventional mines (*T.I.*) themselves: each mining operator must pay a monthly fee of about USD 10 (Rp. 100,000). Thus, from the 43 *T.I.* active in 2010, the monthly fee was USD 430 (Rp. 4,3 million) or some USD 5,000 (Rp. 50 million) per year. In 2003, however, the fee from the 164 mines would have amounted to nearly USD 20,000 over the year. In a settlement totalling some 600 persons, a cash-box of this size would seem more than ample.

By establishing the cash-box, the headman has secured himself a wide and solid power base and an apparently lasting popularity as community leader; the cash-box manifests, so to speak, his audacity in confronting GPL and its state supporters. It manifests, too, the economic superiority of tin and mining operations.

But the headman does more: in addition to the levy he collects on behalf of the forest settlement as a collective, he extracts a fee of 10 per cent of the operational costs of bulldozers and excavators on his own behalf. Around 2002–4, these costs amounted to some USD 10 per hour; by May 2010 they had doubled. The fee thus rose from USD 1 to USD 2 per hour. Having consulted with informants, it is reasonable to assume that the number of such pieces of 'heavy machinery' (*alat berat*) that were in place at any one time was between 5 and 25. If one assumes that the machines are operational somewhere between six and ten hours per day, six days a week, year round, it is possible to calculate that the headman over the 2000 – 2010 decade secured himself a yearly income of between USD 10,000 and 75,000. Anyone who

knows anything about Indonesian wages, will know that these are very large figures – especially in a small rural settlement.[25]

It must be remembered also that to the population, the unconventional mines are a continuing source of income; it is from their former swiddens that much of the tin is extracted. To them, the headman's effort (successful, so far) at stopping the plantation from happening means that they can continue to 'eat the forest'. Thus, it is not surprising that the forest-settlement population was both united and galvanized in their resistance to GPL's plans.

I mentioned that several Indonesian NGOs are actively resisting palm-oil plantations and production. Probably the largest and best known of them – WALHI – got wind of the resistance in the forest settlement and was quick to lend their unconditional support to the headman.[26] This in turn led two of the most respected newspapers in Indonesia – the daily *Kompas* (2005) and the weekly *Tempo* (2006) – to report on this alliance between one half of the Lom population and a central NGO.

This phenomenon – that NGOs link up with what Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (1999) has called 'the tribal elder' – has now become fairly commonplace, and a number of social-science researchers have written perceptively about it. Besides Tsing, important scholars on this topic include J. Peter Brosius (1999a, 1999b), Michael R. Dove (2006), Charles Zerner (1993), and Tanya Murray Li (1999, 2000, 2001, 2009), just to mention some of those who work in Southeast Asia.[27] Tsing may of course be correct in pointing out that the possibility for effective environmental action in the rural 'uplands' – far from the metropolitan and usually lowland centres – is greatly enhanced when tribes are joined by activists (see Tsing 2005). But what these authors also stress is the tendency for many of the NGOs to sacrifice descriptions of

25 I happened to visit the headman one day while he was checking the time lists for this machinery. I thought it all the more ironic, therefore, to read the following in a local newspaper a few days later: '[Name of the headman] and other Lom citizens (*warga*) are truly no consumers or hedonists wishing that success in life be measured in faster development and increasing income. For them, real success is the palpable happiness of shouldering the responsibility for preserving rights and natural resources for their grandchildren in the infinite future. Because for them, success is a state-of-affairs where they can live contentedly without destroying, and steadfastly hold on to the responsibility of passing the same right on to their co-citizens and their descendants.' (Siswanto 2007, translation mine).

26 WALHI stands for Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, or The Indonesian Forum for the Environment.

27 See the cognate criticism of how the Norwegian Rainforest Foundation operated in the Mentawei islands outside Sumatra (Eindhoven 2007).

the cultural complexity of the 'tribes' in question on the altar of what they conceive as environmental friendly politics. The NGO accounts tend to revert to Rousseauesque rhetoric, invoking noble savages whose profound knowledge of the natural environment makes them the natural-born stewards of their habitat. The scholars I mentioned contend that in so doing, the NGOs make little effort to complicate their message by incorporating information that runs counter to their main argument, which, to repeat, is that as 'tribes' have lived for so long (if not 'forever') in their upland or hinterland ecosystems, they know best how to exploit the resources while at the same time conserving them in a sustainable manner.[28]

The strategy that these NGOs have adopted is problematic, first of all because they are based on partial accounts of sociocultural practices and aspirations of the inhabitants in the communities on whose behalf they advocate, thus promoting a kind of socio-ecological functionalism few anthropologists now subscribe to. Moreover, having read several NGO publications on the subject of oil-palm plantations I must conclude that they have absolutely nothing positive to say about them, the testimonies by oil-palm plantation 'victims' showing them to be 'pure' victims, through and through (see, for example, Colchester *et al.* 2006; Gelder 2007; Maher 2007; Marti *et al.* 2008). One may be forgiven for assuming that the authors of these reports have chosen to disregard any evidence suggesting that some people actually favour the plantations (cf. Kubitza *et al.* 2018).

But there are other concerns, too, such as the mid- and long-term consequences that NGO reports may have for the communities in question. The crucial issue here is what the state can be expected to do, once it is alerted to the claims made on behalf of a 'tribe'. On the one hand, a plea for unbridled primitiveness – complete with photographic images of, for example, scantily clad women, or of men with loincloths, blowpipes or earlobes with heavy objects in them – can easily backfire as soon as they are presented to a metropolitan and powerful audience whose gut reaction is not to protect

28 On this point, Li's analysis (2010) is particularly sobering. Moreover, NGO's are of course not alone in simplifying matters in this manner. In an instructive article about the role of local communities in resource conservation, Agrawal and Gibson (1999) show that social scientists and foreign aid organizations, as well as state institutions, tend to take it for granted that local communities are relatively small and homogeneous and that people in them share norms and have common interests, and that they – therefore – are best equipped to conserve resources. But as the authors point out, the norms might equally well induce people to exploit resources in a destructive manner, such as when 'land is only useful when cleared of trees and used for agriculture' (ibid.:635).

but to educate, civilize and develop. In fact, the Indonesian state's settlement policy applied to the Lom some 35 years ago is an example of a similar attitude. The Lom were seen as relics of the past who deserved – as citizens – to be brought into the present (Smedal 1989: appendix III). Alternatively, the exact opposite may happen, if the state is persuaded by ecological and human rights activists to treat the 'tribes' as 'indigenous groups' whose sociological arrangements and cultural heritage must be protected against any kind of change as if they were essential givens, frozen in time. Such essentialisms are difficult to reconcile with economic progress based on resource extraction of any kind. Either way, whether the tribes or ethnic groups in question are dealt with in a manner that best serves their interests, however defined, is an open question if. But among those interests one would seem paramount, whatever one's perspective, and that is the survival of the group as such.

Final remarks

In closing, I wish to summarize briefly what, in my view, the heart of the matter at hand is.

The Lom – a tiny ethnic non-Muslim minority, viewed by their politically dominant Muslim neighbours with a mixture of fear (of their allegedly potent magic) and loathing (for their dietary practices) – have never fought for 'their cause'. They would in the past keep to themselves and have been skeptical towards, and attempted to avoid, any effort by the state to enrol them in national development schemes. If it is reasonable to apply the term 'subaltern group' to an ethnic group in Indonesia, the Lom certainly qualify. Now, for the first time, they – or rather, more precisely, one half of them – have not simply disappeared into the forest but instead actively resisted an expansive, transnational agribusiness company enjoying state support. The other half have been looking forward to the company's plans turning into reality.

When I left Bangka in December 2007 the situation was in a deadlock. From the perspective of the beach-settlement population, this was alarming. A few figures will illustrate what I mean. According to the original plans the processing mill for CPO was to be operational in 2009 (the reason it was not was due to the delayed expansion of the plantation) with a production capacity of 60 tonnes f.f.b. per hour. Assuming the mill would be operational round the clock, every day of the week, full capacity would amount to 43,200 tonnes a month or 518,400 tonnes a year. If each hectare produces about 20 tonnes a year (a realistic estimate for mature palms well managed), it would require some 27,000 hectares for the mill to be working at full capacity. I am unclear as to the lower limit for profitable CPO production, but it is not likely to be met even if there is maximum f.f.b. yield in the 2,800 hectares that, according to a 2009 interim report (M.P. Evans Group PLC 2009:1) had been planted by

late 2009. According to the same report, the company harvested 4,100 tonnes f.f.b. in 2009 (sold to a mill elsewhere in Bangka) – enough for three days' mill operation. In the absence of any expansion, these 2,800 hectares would at best produce some 56,000 tonnes per year – slightly above 10 per cent of mill capacity. GPL's shareholders and management could hardly live with figures like that.

I confronted GPL's management with these figures when I visited the site in April 2010, and there is no doubt that they caused concern. Still, a careful optimism that the company would be profitable in a few years' time was expressed: during the first months of 2010 a minor expansion of the plantation took place (taking the total to 3,100 hectares), incremental growth in the following years giving 6.200 hectares by January 2015; and it is possible, I was told, to build a smaller mill than first envisaged, with a variable capacity of 20–40 tonnes f.f.b. per hour. According to the management, it would be too much of a risk to begin building the mill unless 5,000 hectares are secured.[29]

Until the publication in April 2015 of M.P. Evans Group PLC's 2014 Annual Report, it was therefore unclear what GPL's strategy actually consisted of. For a long time I envisaged (and I was not alone) that unless the acreage was sufficiently increased, the company would take the losses that the investments had amounted to and beat a slow retreat. If so, the economic prospects of the coastal population would suddenly appear in a very different light. This is one of the crucial issues: the forest population's resistance would have consequences not only for them but also, and arguably more so, for the coastal population. The people in the forest settlement insist, however, that

29 According to Casson, (2000:26), the minimum requirement for establishing a processing mill is 6,000 hectares. The company has now reached this goal; here is what is stated in M.P. Evans Group PLC's 2014 Annual Report (p. 16): 'The planted area at the end of 2014 amounted to 6,880 hectares in total of which 4,730 related to the Group and 2,150 to the smallholders' cooperatives. Planting progress was relatively modest during the year, amounting to 820 hectares in total, of which 640 related to the Group and 180 to the cooperatives. *Dealings with competing tin-mining interests continued to be very time consuming but it is encouraging that progress, albeit slow, continues to be made* and it remains the board's view that ultimately 10,000 hectares will be planted, of which 6,000 will relate to the Group and 4,000 to the co-operatives.' (emphasis mine). Indeed, by the end of 2016 the area covered by oil palms comprised 9,340 hectares (M.P. Evans Group PLC 2017:83). 10 years earlier, however, GPL had envisaged a total of 17,000 hectares of oil palm (see the entry on the MP Evans Share Chat page cited above); the company had evidently failed to consider the strong local commitment to tin mining.

the quick cash that tin gives is to be preferred. And it is they who have resisted the global capital interests. They have the environmental NGO support.

But in April 2015 it became evident that the GPL mill would become a reality. It would have an hourly capacity of 45 tonnes per hour, expandable to 60 tonnes (M.P. Evans Group PLC 2015:16). The mill was commissioned in May 2016. Apart from producing CPO and palm kernel it has a composting facility; it also collects methane which in turn produces electricity, the excess of which can be sold to the local, state-owned power utility (M.P. Evans Group PLC 2017:14) The company stresses that, 'No effluent is discharged into rivers or water courses' (M.P. Evans Group PLC 2017:29). Moreover, from a trusted source I received news in July 2017 that the number of artisanal mines in the forest settlement then in operation had shrunk to three. In other words, the oil-palm plantation project finally – ten years later than first envisaged, and much reduced – prevailed. Perhaps the increasing disquiet over Bangka tin mining's environmental destruction ultimately made an impact on the people in the Lom forest settlement.

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The question I have wished to illuminate in this chapter is if the anthropologist should – or has any right to – take sides in a political disagreement such as this. I take it for granted that most anthropologists would hold that any position – for or against plantations, in this case – must be based on an assessment of the long-term consequences the choice is likely to bring. In this regard I have become convinced that the plantation serves the long-term interests of the Lom better than do the artisanal mines. Firstly, the income will be far more stable over time and definitely more evenly distributed than the Klondike cash from tin mining. Secondly, even if the plantation scheme were ultimately to fail, it would at least be possible to return to swiddens, rubber and pepper, if that turns out to be necessary. To convert a steadily rising number of abandoned tin mines into forests and swiddens is, if not unimaginable, then in practice impossible: the cost of successful land reclamation is just too high.

More generally, this case can serve as a reminder that popular resistance, and NGO support of it, does not necessarily mean that it is the interests of the weakest, those most disenfranchised, those with the least resources, that are furthered. The case also supports Kulick's (1996) point: popular resistance is not necessarily pretty, nor is it always motivated by noble intentions. Moreover, it shows that we may be well served in investigating beyond the 'obvious' grounds for protest and the most vocal of protests – even as we encounter them among the powerless; they, too, have politics of their own. And finally, we cannot assume that resistance organized by representatives of

forest-dwelling ethnic minorities – even if it is directed at transnational capital interests – automatically serves either local or global environmental causes.

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CHAPTER 6

Sovereignties in the making

Reflections on state and society in the Sudan

Leif Manger

The Sudanese state in crisis

The Sudanese state seems to be in a perpetual crisis. A long civil war divided the country in two, leaving The Republic of Sudan to represent what remains of the old North Sudan, with the capital in Khartoum, and the old 'South', now the new Republic of South Sudan, with a capital in Juba. In both countries war and violence have continued, showing that the old north-south conflict was not the source of all the problems in what was once a united Sudan. Hence, these problems could be discussed with references to both states, but my focus in this chapter is on the old North Sudan. Here many of the earlier conflicts stay on, and issues such as citizen rights, dramatized in debates about the role of race and gender in the society are still relevant. Other issues remain with local and regional governance, education, land issues and general development. Violent territorial disputes in Darfur, the Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains are still going on, and internationally the International Criminal Court (ICC) verdict against the president, Omer Beshir, is an obstacle to international relations.

The basic terrain seems clear. A major transformation is going on. The Sudanese state, also after the secession of the south, cannot be defined in clear-cut Weberian terms. It does not control the means of violence, nor all the territory. Hence, the state has been operating in a similar way to the non-state institutions with which it competes. But the point is not that this situation necessarily challenges and weakens the state. Rather, such competing organizational forms can become parts of the state apparatus, both on a central level, as happened with the Southern People's Liberation Army

(SPLA) before the split, or a peripheral level, as happened with the Jenjaweed, the Darfur based Arab militia that fought and still fights on the side of the government. Hence, we must not take the state with a centre in Khartoum to be a hierarchical organization controlling territory, based on a contract with the people within that territory. Rather, it is increasingly a corporate entity (Kapferer and Berthelsen 2009) struggling to control its own people, while at the same time exploiting them. The combination of rule by presidential decrees and the working of networks operating at the margin of the state, help maintain order, and has become a trend in the country, whether the leader in the Sudan is called Jafar Nimeiry, Sadiq al-Mahdi, Hassan Turabi or Omer Bashir. Hence we need to reflect on some basic aspects of the Sudanese state, which in some instances make it a special case, but which in others make the Sudanese experience part of the contemporary developments of state forms in general.

Two major trends seem to emerge. Firstly, the crisis of the state is related to the problem of legitimacy and sovereignty. This is a focus of this chapter, and will be elaborated upon below. But, the crisis is also about state effectiveness, in the sense that people might not question the legitimacy of the state itself, but they do react to the inability of the state to run things. Hence, whatever legitimacy a regime might have had, it is eroded if the regime is unable to 'deliver the goods'. This (in)ability relates to the economic basis of the state: its organization and its handling of major sources of revenue. This points up a need for a more institution-directed analysis of events. What emerges in the Sudan is a picture of a state that is unable to control developments institutionally. Rather than a Gramscian hegemony being placed upon people and embraced by them, in Sudan the disciplining institutions cannot control things and revert to violence and direct force.

The concept of sovereignty

As I indicated, my conceptual focus in the paper is on legitimacy and sovereignty. My starting point is a view of sovereignty as a concept that has been worked and re-worked in different periods, and in which various understandings of what the concept entails have been bases for political conflicts and the definition of the political field itself.[1] In one sense sovereignty relates to absolute power and authority, over territory and people, and vis-a-vis other similar units outside of the territory. Hence, the concept is closely linked to the historical emergence of the nation-state. But a weakness in such

1 As opposed to the older view of sovereignty as having evolved from a simple beginning in the early modern period in Europe, into a more refined type of concept in the contemporary world.

an evolutionary conception is that it reduces politics to the implementation of a pre-existing principle. Instead, we need to see the history of the concept of sovereignty as a series of re-conceptionalizations, rather than a history of constant refinement towards a 'perfect' end. We should not link it to a state-centric Western history, defined by realist and liberal International Relations (IR) kinds of conceptualizations. We should take a look at how muddled this history is, organized around clusters of key terms through which various theorists have approached the subject matter, drawing on empirical cases. Sudan provides an interesting example by which we can do precisely that. To quote Prokhovnik:

> For instance, one of the keys to sovereignty for Bodin was the idea of absolute dominion, while sovereignty for Hobbes had to include the notion of supreme power. Central to Rousseau's conception of sovereignty are the key terms of sovereignty itself, the act of association, government, the general and particular wills, general and particular laws, and the lawgiver. The important concepts in Kant's theory of sovereignty are right, international relations, publicity, law and representation. The key concepts in Hegel's notion of sovereignty are the state, the constitution, the Crown, sovereignty at home, sovereignty in relation to foreign states, and war. Foucault's theory of sovereignty seeks to bring into the light of intellectual analysis what has previously been excluded and some of his key terms are the contrast between the covert and overt operations of power, the ways in which subjects are constructed, sovereignty as descending compared with disciplinary power as ascending, and the operation of sovereignty through concrete acts contrasted with the operation of disciplinary power through surveillance, normalising sanctions and the panopticon.
>
> (Prokhovnik 2008:4)

Rather than seeing these as evolving understandings of sovereignty, it is more fruitful to see them as different conceptualizations of the term, leading to different empirical emphases in the analysis.

All this is relevant in the Sudanese case to follow. Accepting such a definition of sovereignty, admitting to its dynamic characteristics, it is easy to conclude that the Sudanese state is not in full control of the things we normally associate with sovereignty. Rather than a state in total control of the fields of major concern, we see that some elements have been negotiated away and are stipulated in international conventions or in contracts allowing foreign actors to sanction national policies. But other elements are imposed, by coercion or imposition, by the international community mostly backed by threats of international sanctions. Situations in which this happens include the ending

of war or humanitarian disasters, or arise in relation to minority rights and human rights. International lending and borrowing is another field in which sovereignty can be undermined. In cases where states can not cover their debt, the international community can also intervene through the IMF and World Bank, as we saw during the so-called debt crisis and the policy of structural adjustment with its series of conditionalities. An interesting paradox is that these conditionalities were not adhered to by the Sudan, something they got away with due to geopolitical reasons (Brown 1992). What this indicates is that we see a complexity of factors affecting sovereignty, factors that can be used strategically and rhetorically by the actors to defend various types of actions.

A historical perspective

One important point to make is that what has been seen as a dominant understanding of sovereignty in recent decades is the one based on a nation state and its territory. Stephen D. Krasner, a political scientist, argues (1999) within this framework and states that there are four types: 'domestic sovereignty', which is about controlling one's own territory; 'interdependence sovereignty', which is about the ability to control transborder movements; 'international sovereignty', i.e. being recognized by other states; and finally, 'Westphalian sovereignty', which is about the ability to exclude external actors from domestic authority configurations.

This kind of definition is of course biased towards the European experience, where it is tied to specific historical developments. But as I argue here, there has been a change in the world as to how sovereignty is understood. And I think the Sudan case shows us basic elements of this change: a movement from a view based on a logic embedded in a traditional, Westphalean-based system of International Relations, in which the nation-states and their territory within fixed borders constituted a 'sacred' basis for sovereign states. In the words of Barkawi and Laffey, the 'international' in this way of thinking has been left as a 'thin' space of strategic interaction, populated by diplomats, soldiers and capitalists' (2002:110). What we see is a change from this 'thin' space to a 'thick' set of social relations, 'consisting of social and cultural flows as well as political-military and economic interactions in a context of hierarchy' (ibid.:110). According to Barkawi and Laffey, the change is from state sovereignty to a postmodern global sovereignty, in which sovereignty and other political institutions are grounded in social relations and struggles that go beyond the nation-state itself (ibid.:111). But they also warn us that we should not exaggerate the changes. It is more correct, they claim, to argue that the 'thick' elements have been there all the time, but that they have been obscured by the realist ideology of International Relations that stipulates the Hobbsean dogma that without a state there will be anarchy and chaos. The

focus on the Sudan can serve us not only in allowing understanding of a peripheral case, but also by bringing us into an exploration of global power itself.

African state building – from colonies to nation-states

As we are interested in an African case, it is important to note the difference between European and African contexts. For one, the wars in Europe were over territory, which from about the fifteenth century onwards was fairly densely populated. These wars were fought for land, and states were strengthened in order to fight them. But the strengthening of states could not be done without drawing resources from the people. Hence, the links developed between states and people in terms of payment of taxes, military subscription and the development of roads to facilitate military movements. In such a situation border areas became important, and border fortifications developed that marked the boundary between such state units, protecting against enemies from outside, but at the same time also helping in internal consolidation of the people around the state and in forming links between the rural and urban areas, particularly through trade (Tilly 1990). It is this system that gets consolidated by The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, in which a new system of political order in central Europe was agreed upon, based upon the concept of co-existing sovereign states. A norm was established against interference in another state's domestic affairs. Then, through colonialism, this European model, especially the concept of sovereign states, became central to international law and the prevailing world order.

But Africa is not Europe. In Africa, including in the Sudan, the territories were generally vast and thinly populated, with the centre, or the state, having problems controlling the peripheries, where people could easily leave. The population were engaged in shifting cultivation, with little investment in any particular place, and could easily shift to the peripheral areas of other states. Hence, the imposition of pre-colonial states only extended so far. With colonialism, colonial states agreed on borders that were arbitrary, and contained territories that in many cases were larger than the pre-colonial states could control. The borders came because the colonial powers were successful in creating a consensus around them. Thus, the most remarkable things about the scramble for Africa was how late and fast it occurred, and with how little fighting among the colonial powers.

A major reason for African leaders, at independence, accepting these borders was that they helped protect their states from external interference, both from neighbours and the international system. This turned out to be a very viable decision. But at the same time, the 'African wars of state-making' came to be fought inside these borders, between the states and peripheral

opponents, testifying to the states' failures to consolidate authority over their territories. Furthermore, capital cities were not developed to function as bridges to the countryside, they were made to serve colonial interests and, as a consequence, trade links were dominated by foreign traders. Given this situation, the quest for statehood in Africa has not led to wars over territory. Wars were and are fought, of course, but they are to capture people, not land. Preferably people from outside the borders of state control. The aim is not to create links with people to tax them, but rather to exploit them directly as slaves, either as labour power or as a commodity in slave trade. The violence of the slave trade in Africa is also the violence of state making. Regional power centres could do pretty much what they liked, so long as they paid tributes to the centre. In such a situation, if the centre wants to intervene it can only do so through direct acts of violence. Equating states with control of territory is thus too narrow a framework for understanding the African context.

Creating the nation

A second problem relating to the colonial period and the political units then emerging, is that the concept of the nation was weak at that time, when there was hardly any concern with national identity in the newly established states. The focus, as stated, was on territory and borders. But, as Sudanese developments demonstrate, we also need to be concerned with what goes on within those borders. This takes the discussion on sovereignty in a different direction, and we shall need more precise conceptual tools to capture the dynamics defining such an internal sovereignty. Firstly, it should be noted, the borders created by the colonial powers may have been arbitrary, but they have been far from meaningless. They may perhaps be the most successful part of European colonialism. We see this when we compare the lack of violence in defining borders with the extensive violence employed in many countries in dealing with the nation, and culture, internally. For instance, in Sudan we have seen the importance of the Islamic and Arabic traditions in forging a state tradition, but we have also seen situations in the peripheries working as constraining factors in the processes of nation-building. Rule was formal only in the centres, the peripheries were left to local dynamics. The colonialists were violent and brought many changes, in terms of modernization, commercialization, religions and ideologies; but major aspect of the pre-colonial state continued – the centre did not control the peripheries. In Europe this problem was solved by war. As Anthony Giddens says about the First World War: 'the War canalized the development of states' sovereignty, tying this to citizenship and to nationalism in such a profound way that any other scenario (of how the international system would be ordered) subsequently came to appear a little more than idle fantasy' (Giddens

1987:235). In this sense, lack of war, that might unite the nation, is a factor; as is the presence of the civil wars that split it. Sudan is an excellent example.

The African independent rulers accepted a single sovereignty within the colonial borders, thus establishing a nation-state according to the rules of the UN and international community; but without being able to control the territory itself. Hence, it was the decolonized entity that was awarded status as a state, not the regime's ability to exercise control. As a consequence, small entities such as Lesotho or Gambia could become nation-states and enter the UN, while 'empires' such as the Ashanti could only gain access as part of Nigeria. Independent African rulers ignored their own pre-colonial history and entered a game designed by the former colonial powers. This was perhaps done in the name of modernity, or as a tactical move in order to control and win over opponents, but the result also defined the options available to them in their own national state-making. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) established in 1963 followed the UN policies regarding the new nations and made African regimes insist on the colonial borders as a basis for defining post-colonial borders, thus also securing acceptance in the United Nations for larger territories than they actually controlled or could service. As of today, only Eritrea and South Sudan have emerged as new entities, allowed to secede, but only as a result of decades of war. Most of Africa's weak states have been allowed to survive, and any attempt at self-determination has been stopped by collective African agreement. The interests of African leaders have also been served by international developments. Notably, in the Cold War the superpowers helped presidents quell rebellions for their own strategic interests. Out of this situation, the coup became the common modality for challenging the leaders, not secession. Physical control of the capital city, as a seat of power, became the symbol of a coup's success, not control over territory, ability to collect taxes, wider political legitimacy or any other means. Economically, aid played a role in helping regimes that could not tax their own population. This difficulty increased their reliance on indirect taxes, such as tariffs and export duties; and on the exploitation of mineral resources; and on corruption.

But this cold-war situation changed with the ending of that post-Second World War environment. Globally, this started in the 1990s, while in Africa the new African Union (AU), established in 2001 to replace OAU, followed this trend by opening up the possibility for member states to intervene in fellow African countries, particularly to stop regimes carrying out violence againt their own people. We have seen examples of countries engaging in such operations, either directly, by invasion, or by sending peace-keeping forces to contain violence and protect people. Sudan has been subject to the second option, the deployment of African peace-keeping forces.

The internal problems of nation-building that come out of this history are very evident in the Sudan. The country has been bogged down in civil war for long periods, the last period starting in the early 1980s only to end in 2005, a war that was more or less a continuation of the earlier phase of civil war from the 1950 and 60s to the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972. This 'traditional' civil war started as a challenge to the national government from a major rebel group, and was initiated from within the national army, with clear aims to reform the Sudanese state. These aims continued while the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army was under the leadership of John Garang. His 'liberation' was thus not understood as 'secession' and did not represent a threat to the African understanding of the continuation of the nation-state as it was defined at independence, as a sovereign state within its territory. But this Westphalean understanding of stateship and sovereignty was to change. In the Sudan, this was symbolically represented by the death of John Garang and the taking over by Salva Kiir as new leader of SPLM/A. Under Salva Kiir the aim of the war came to be the establishment of an independent Southern Sudanese state. And, as we know, this was achieved through a popular referendum in 2011. The acceptance of this development is interesting, both because it represented an example of the new direction in African inter-state relationships, and also because it was contrary to what the international community had previously argued for. What was new and surprising was both to have a peace agreement with a clause for secession, and also to allow a promise of a referendum that made such an outcome very likely.

To understand how this situation could develop, it is not enough to focus on the north-south civil war in isolation. We also need to include the other types of wars that emerged during the period. The prime example is the conflict in Darfur. I see this as a typical example of the type of wars that evolved in Africa in the 2000s, and before I explain how it affected the settlement of the larger civil war, I will describe the major characteristics of such wars.

Challenges to traditional sovereignty – the new wars

A major part of the problem in understanding the conflicts is the tendency to see the wars as being between two or several clear-cut units. The formulation by Clausewitz that 'war is the continuation of politics through other means' can be taken to indicate that after the war things return to 'normal', and politics can continue. This clearly underplays the creative potential of violence and war. It also shows how the concept of sovereignty, if taken to describe a static, legal condition, becomes less useful. Rather, we need to build a new understanding of the concept for the contemporary world. The case of the

Sudan shows this very well, as the following discussion shows, both in the empirical picture and the conceptual adjustments that must follow.

One characteristic of 'the new wars' in the Sudan is that they are often about identity politics, i.e. the quest for power is couched in terms of exclusion and inclusion of people in various groups. In general terms this is a version of Faucault's notion of bio-politics, shaped in the context of contemporary state systems. The body and the territory are combined, in that it is often bodies of ambivalence, those that embody contested social territories (Foucault 1977 and 1979) that are targets of violence. But although wars and violence can be explained with reference to ethnicity and gender, i.e. cultural factors, they must also be taken as a language through which other things, economic, material and political, are also being addressed. However, ethnicities are not remnants of the past, but entities continuously recreated and shaped within contemporary realities. Colonialism helped pin down relationships, and thereby made them bases for continuous new elaborations about identities. Colonial policies also helped ordering such identities in new systems of hierarchy, creating new elites based on ethnic belonging that play key roles in todays developments. Finally, we should also note that in so-called 'ethnic wars' civilians are targeted because of the desire to clear areas of people who do not 'belong'. We see this clearing of areas used as a strategy, for instance in order to control key strategic resources. As the war economy is no longer controlled by a state alone, but rather is decentralized and based on exploiting specific resources through outright plunder, black-market trade and external support, even enemies are not what they used to be. In this kind of situation the distinction between 'war' and 'peace' is also diminished, as is the difference between 'soldier' and 'civilian'. But the result of this is not a state of anarchy. The new identity politics and the new wars are not a retreat to anarchy, nor to tribalism or historical tradition. The ways the wars are developing are part of the dynamics of globalization. This makes them very modern phenomena and we have to understand them through the lens of local communities' relationships to wider contexts of economy, culture and politics. Certainly local people are involved, with militarized local and regional elites engaging each other in mutual predatory actions, in which local populations are made to suffer. The failure of political elites has eroded confidence in politics, making people more inclined to listen to alternative voices promising quick fixes for those siding with their group against another. The emergence of new markets, putting weapons within reach of individuals, opening up smuggling as an increasingly important form of trade, with new groups of nouveaux riches becoming engaged both in the new economy and the new politics, also belong in this picture. The diaspora also plays a central role. During the war

the economy continues, with the warring parties controlling markets, prices and 'taxes'.

Focusing on such processes brings us back to our reflection on sovereignty. In the old understanding, the state had lost its grip on its territory, and had a legal right to deal with that situation. In the absence of consensus, violence is used to achieve certain goals, taking over where other forms of power are not available. But through violence and war a new power, a new consensus, can be reached as a basis for a new socio-political organization, built on a new sovereignty. This is precisely what we see, both during the civil-war period and the current crisis in Darfur. In this sense, violence and war are not left behind, to be replaced by a more civilized state system, they are both still very creative forces. But their uses in the contemporary world help transform the participants, and instead of the state triumphing over rebels, we see a transformed state that contains both the traditional Weberian elements based on hierarchy, and a post-colonial, neo-liberal state with elements that are identical to those of the rebel groups they fought. The conclusion then, is that what is called 'power' and 'violence' are not two different principles but are intertwined and constantly evolving, bringing nation-states into phases of decay, and new ethnic sovereignties into being.

Again, bringing such general arguments back to the empirical situation in the Sudan, we saw that the Sudanese state argued that the conflicts discussed are internal problems that any legitimate regime has the right to deal with. But as the regime itself was also a villain in the international community, the 'internal' problems led to international involvement deriving from different types of arguments and producing unexpected effects.

For instance, it was unexpected that the developments discussed in this section made a major contribution towards the Sudanese governing regime, as well as the African states and the international community, accepting the secession of the south. I have pointed to Silva Kiir as the symbolic game changer in the civil war, as he moved the focus from Garang's 'new Sudan' to an independent state in the south. But in the context of the 'new wars' the conflict in Darfur was perhaps a game changer of even more importance (Knox 2012). It moved actors from a principle of stability and non-intervention to one of interventionism and the possible secession of troubled areas. What was dramatized was a new emphasis on identity and ethnicity as a basis for violence, and for 'genocide', which became the dominant Western discourse on Darfur. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was thus worked out in a climate that not only had political effects within the Sudan, but also in the rest of the world, with the USA as the major actor (Jumbert 2015). The government of the Sudan was already stigmatized as a possible supporter of terrorism, and they were accused of violence and the acceptance

of slavery in the civil war with the south (International Eminent Persons Group 2002). Thus the political groups of activists in the countries involved in peace negotiations were already highly critical to what was going on. With the accusations of genocide in Darfur, and the way that particular discourse evolved in the USA, a climate was created in which southern Sudan achieved the right to secession. The modern system of sovereign states based on a defined territory was challenged by a new notion of 'ethnic secessionism'. But that notion could not be enough in itself. The Palestinean and the Kurdish questions should suffice as examples to indicate that this is so. They tell us that there are many homogeneous ethnic communities that do not have nations and state formations of their own. And as we knew then, and have learnt the hard way after secession, south Sudan itself was hardly an ethnically united entity. But in the period leading up to the time of the CPA in 2005, the politics in the USA was dominated by the Darfur conflict, and accusations against the Sudanese regime of ethnic persecution produced a climate of distrust of the regime in Khartoum. The two factors of a weak regime that had indicated a readiness to accept a peace treaty with a clause leading to secession of the south, and an African and broader international community looking for ways to stabilize a country in chaos, produced a peace agreement that was finalized in Machakos and signed in Nairobi. Perhaps the actors involved thought this clause about secession for the south would remain a possibility only, and that the activities in the interim period until the referendum in 2011 would 'make unity attractive'. However, this did not happen, and South Sudan became an independent country. Formally, this was achieved through a referendum, but the basic decisions were already made and expressed in the CPA of 2005, with the acceptance of all parties. This is what was surprising. It was a decision that became a point-of-no-return and a very rare example in Africa of a sovereign state accepting that part of its territory could secede.

Aid and politics

The discussion above indicates the emergence of the new terrain in which the relationships between sovereignty and governance in the international arena have shifted from a cold war 'hands-off' stance to one of intervention; and also from a situation in which national territory was seen as sacred, to one in which a secession of territory could be negotiated and internationally be accepted. Above, I have pointed to a complex space of interaction of factors such as violent war, ethnic genocide and geopolitical interests to explain both the willingness to intervene and to accept outcomes that contradicted a traditional view on sovereignty in the field of International Relations. This stands as an example of a new historical trend within the dynamics of sovereignty. The

field of humanitarian interventions is of particular interest in this period of changing sovereignty. Humanitarianism is, of course, one of the factors that is behind the recent arguments in favour of intervention on the territory of other states. 'Saving lives' is a key argument for the Western self-image of being carriers of 'good intentions'. But there seems to be more to humanitarian assistance than good intentions. Mark Duffield (2009) is one voice that has commented in interesting ways on this situation, linking aid to the global processes of change we are discussing. His argument is that in order to be able to affect behaviour, global governance has made use of a hybrid combination of technologies of governance and sovereignty, producing a new relationships between aid and politics. Aid is not to be seen as a neutral and external force that is only there to do good. Rather, the picture is more complex. Let us see in more empirical terms what such a perspective means on the ground in Sudan.

The international regime of development assistance, and the army of NGOs found around the country, represent a significant part of international and global relations in the Sudan. Such organizations are there to provide 'development' as well as humanitarian aid but, and this is what Duffield argues, the same organizations also become part of the system of governmentality. The Sudanese authorities have since the 1980s worked through the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), established in 1985; the Commission of Voluntary Agencies Commissions (COVA), established in 1993; and then the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), established in 1995. The latter, HAC, represented a merger of RRC and COVA, and became the major institution in the Sudan through which the international humanitarian aid system had to operate. Since the 1980s, and particularly since 1989, Sudanese governments have tried to control the international organizations, but at the same time they have used international relief to further their aims in the war. This was possible despite the embargo on development following the Islamist coup in 1989 (down from 1,907 million dollars in 1985 to 127 million in 1993/4). Even under such constraints the government was able to transform relief into development-oriented programs in areas under their control. This began before 1989. International governmental aid had been around since the Sahel drought in the early 1970s, and was much expanded following the drought in the 1980s and the civil war that started in 1983. The heavy involvement of foreign humanitarian aid agencies was resented by the authorities, but in the context of the civil war they made every effort to make aid itself part of the war. Humanitarian support meant for areas controlled by the government was accepted, while aid to people in enemy areas was blocked. This became a constant problem for the so-called Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), established and accepted by Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1989. The aim

was to reach both government and rebel-held territories and it lasted until the UN took over following the peace agreement in 2005 (Large 2011:170ff.). Hence, ever since those early days in the 1980s, agencies were accused of patching up the negative consequences of the government's policies, and of the rebel policies in the areas controlled by them. In both cases, the agencies did not have much opportunity to influence the direction of their involvement.

But the complicity goes further. For instance illustrated by the effects of the IDP-camps. Such camps for 'Internally Displaced People' became a basic answer to how to provide assistance to people who had to run away from their home areas due to war. The camps were supported by international humanitarian assistance agencies, and again, the agencies found themselves helping the government in solving a big problem, that of dealing with the casualties of war. But while the aid helped keep people alive, it also played a role in the disciplining of people, both in terms of keeping them from fighting but also in terms of submitting them to processes of Arabization and Islamization, a major aim of the Sudanese regime that took power in 1989. The IDP camps thus became sites for new processes of 'classification' and 'subjectification' of people of different ethnic and religious identities. Mark Duffield sees this process as one of the unintended consequences of aid and he links it directly to various issues of governance. In Western Sudan, the focus of Duffield's work on this, he sees both government and NGOs contribute to the creation of de-ethnicized individuals, a process that has resonances with the policies of de-culturation the government were pursuing. But there is also the general effect on identities produced by the bureaucratization inherent in the aid system itself. In the IDP camps the power of categorization also works through statistical categories. People ceased to be people and became 'IDPs', 'households' (HH) etc., thus abstracted into categories that further homogenization and dehumanization. People were/are no longer seen as people, but as statistical categories characterized by economic disparities that can be redressed through development inputs.

But Duffield also finds links to the economic field. Several humanitarian organizations limited aid to the people in the IDP camps in order to create an incentive for the people to work and sustain themselves. Food aid by itself was considered to create passive recipients that over time would lose their ability to take care of themselves and their families. But, says Mark Duffield, through developmental ideas of self-sufficiency, the aid agencies come to offer support to a commercial need for cheap agricultural labour. And he links it to a change brought about by neoliberalism. In the past, development was combined with notions of modernization, driven by investments in technology and trade. In todays neoliberal discourse, argues Duffield, development belongs to those

who can help themselves through the market. Rather than “spoiling” such groups with free aid, they should be encouraged to cover their basic needs through their own labor. And the fact that they end up as cheap labour power for rich land-owners is not considered to be a problem. It is better than falling outside all systems and be left with humanitarian aid only.

To summarize

As we have seen, the problems addressed in this chapter are political in the first place, as it is in the political field that we find the dynamics of the new wars and their effects on the state. Effects that we see can create new nations, humanitarian disasters as well as new identities. And I have tried to link these political dynamics to the concept of sovereignty. Within the field of sovereignty and the way it is being understood we find a basic driving force behind the various dynamics we have discussed in the chapter. On a basic level, what the above shows is that the Sudanese elites have been very reluctant indeed to share sovereignty with other actors. Over the years the elites forming regimes and governments have been challenged by armed groups leading to the co-existence of competing forms of sovereignties in the same area and social space. This is particularly well illustrated by the emergence of “the new wars”. At the same time, and due to a world dominated by neoliberal ideologies, we see that internationally transnational institutions such as the UN, World Bank, IMF etc. all pressed towards an economic liberalization that further hurt the people in the provinces. Such ideologies also affected the aid agencies and how they came to understand their humanitarian mandates. Several effects emerge from this, but in the context of my discussion here they function as examples of what Barkawi and Laffey (2002) called a change from a ‘thin’ to a ‘thick’ understanding of sovereignty. We are now entering the global situation that Hardt and Negri suggested we understand by using their concept of ‘empire’ (2001) as summarized by Hansen and Stepputat:

> The empire is organised by ‘imperial sovereignty’ – constituted by the fast-growing networks of international legal regulation of trade, economic transactions, along with globalized concepts of human rights and development, global cultural flows, the configuration of the international community as a moral and political network of powerful states, as well as complex networks of military alliances backed up by the overwhelming size and sophistication of American military power.
>
> (Hansen and Stepputat, n.d., quoted in Utas, 2009:265–6)

To capture this new ‘thickness’, it is no longer enough to look at sovereignty as a legal norm of non-intervetion between states. The Sudanese

regime is not in full control of all of its territory, nor of the means of violence. There are pockets of competing legitimacy and sovereignty, for instance and most dramatically in Darfur, but also in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile areas. War in these areas produces humanitarian consequences that justify humanitarian actions. But we have also seen that the 'neutral' field of humanitarian assistance can become a dynamic contributor to the ongoing tensions between the state and its opponents. Pursuing an analysis based only on a 'Westphalean perspective' would only produce a top-down view of things. Given the complexity of the new 'thickness' of international relations, we need a bottom-up perspective. One promising line of analysis may be to regard modern Sudanese politics as a politics of subjectivity, rather than as decontextualized institutional processes. This line of thinking might allow descriptions that contain the necessary empirical complexity and help us avoid false debates between choice-theory and social-structural approaches. We need to understand actions within political and economic constraints, as well as the 'ontological underpinnings of moral personhood' (Taylor 2009:165). An important part of this complexity derives from the realization that subjectivity always presupposes inter-subjectivity, and that we need to write the history of such inter-subjectivities, which would entail a combination of the personal, political, economic and moral understandings. The making of subjectivities can be seen as taking place on three levels: it is a political process, in so far as it is a matter of subjugation to state authorities (Government of Sudan (GOS); Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)) with very different rules of the political game; it is moral, as it is reflected in the conscience and agency of subjects who bear rights, duties and obligations; and it is realized existentially, in the subjects' consciousness of their personal relations. Michael Lambek puts it well:

> In assuming responsibility and rendering themselves subject to specific liturgical, political and discursive regimes and orders, people simultaneously lay claim to and accept the terms through which their subsequent acts will be judged. People are agents insofar as they choose to subject themselves, to perform and conform accordingly, to accept responsibility, and to acknowledge their commitments. Agency here transcends the idea of a lone, heroic individual independent of her acts and conscious of them as objects.
>
> (Lambek 2002:37–8)

If we take this as the starting position, we can see Foucault's point that there is no individual subject constructed in the absence of power, and that there are no social institutions that do not bear the imprint of historical struggles over power (Foucault, 1977, in Taylor 2009:163). We can also heed

Mahmood Mamdani's call in *Citizen and Subject* (1996) that we need to pay more attention to political processes within rural communities, to the way state politics are interwoven with everyday village politics, and thereby represent the uneven distribution of power within rural society. In so doing, we also see that such processes are not only characterized by a 'voluntary rendering'. Violence can be a basic part of the process of the politics of subjectivity. In the so-called 'transition zones' in the Sudan, i.e. the areas of the Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains and southern Darfur, the result of the dynamics of the three levels is a movement away from a peaceful co-existence, in which Arabs and non-Arabs, pastoralists and farmers acknowledge that various sorts of political and moral ambiguities, ambivalences and uncertainties are a normal state of affairs in such a transition zone, to one in which dichotomizations based on claims to cultural authenticity dominate. In such a process, mutual respect and ethical rules constraining aggression may become transformed into violent inter-ethnic conflicts. The political dynamics represented by the civil war strengthened these processes and helped introduce new boundaries between people. Thus we see that the politics of subjectivity is also about processes of territorialization and defining power over socio-economic life (Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009).

Turning to the international situation, at times we see Sudan flooded by foreign NGOs, peace keeping troops and international diplomats, all showing the extent to which the international community is an actor in its own right in the country, dramatizing the limits of a Westphalian sovereignty. Again, it seems to be moving us from a 'thin' to a 'thick' understanding of political dynamics in the contemporary world. For instance, new configurations seem to appear and to affect the nature of citizenship in the Sudan in profound ways. Many rights that are tied to the status of citizen are now no longer under the control of the nation-state, thereby showing a shift in sovereignty away from the nation state. International society intervenes through defining 'states of exception' during which the nation-state is pushed aside for a greater cause, for instance in humanitarian interventions, but also with market mechanisms that allow international capital to operate. To justify interventions populations are not targeted on the basis of their rights as national citizens but on the basis of global principles of general humanity, and a list of human rights. People are not treated on the basis of a range of citizen rights, but as victims of an extraordinary situation, and therefore as eligible for international protection, which often is translated into a legitimizing principle for interventions, in the processes of which the victims are transformed. In general, we see a major change from the 'thinness' of the Cold War era, in which the West supported allied states against 'hostile' ones, to a 'thick' contemporary pattern in which the same representatives of the West protect and assist 'victim populations'

against 'failing states'. Humanitarian emergencies call for interventions with reference to human rights, turning zones of emergencies into zones of exception and exclusion. Dealing with such unintended consequences brings about ever new developments and unintended consequences that affect us all. We are thus all part of the new 'thickness'.

Some general consequences of the changes seem to be visible. We see the many places in which new systems of sovereignty are happening, whether instituted by warlords, drug cartels or other mafia-type organizations combining wealth and power. But we should not forget the workings of the state either. For instance, states may belong to the group of actors just mentioned, running their own schemes to enrich themselves. Hence, the privatization of the state being a major trend in many Third World areas. But despite of all challenges to the nation-state in recent years, it is still given a privileged position in the global political order. This is a fact that might work either way – strengthening the state; or weakening it, through international sanctions. But, we should not underestimate even weak nation-states' ability to engage their army, bureaucracy and capital to penetrate the communities over which they claim control. Nor should we underestimate their ability to influence the cultural aspects of society, through categorization, regulation, and routinization of everyday life and of encounters between subjects and state institutions. The state is certainly being challenged, but the ways it is challenged are not given and require empirical studies.

One example of how unpredictable such processes are is found in the current developments in Sudan. It illustrates what happens when a problem is no longer confined to the Sudanese state and internal processes in Sudan, but rather emerges within Europe itself. Let me explain. Sitting in Acropole Hotel in Khartoum in February 2017, I could read in the English language newspaper *Sudan Vision* about a report released by the European United Left/Nordic Green Group (GUE/NGL) of the European Parliament. The report, based on infomation presented by a field mission organized and funded by these groups, looked into the situation following the EU Trust Fund allocation of 878.8 million euros for migration control in the African Horn, with an extra 115 million euros for the Sudan. In addition, the EU Development Fund has also allocated 1.98 million euros as a 'special measure for Sudan'. The money was supposed to go towards the Valetta Action Plan, which aims at 'the prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and the trafficking of human beings', and the improvement of migration management. To follow up on this, The Border Migration Management (BMM) and the Regional Operation Centre in support of the Khartoum Process and AU-Horn of Africa Window (ROCK) projects were both approved in 2016 to start using this money. What the report and the mission uncovered, however, was a series of

human-rights breaches: with the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces in charge of the northern borders, abuses were unchecked and out of control.

So there has been, and still is, collaboration between EU and the Sudanese authorities with regard to stopping migration flows across the Sudan. This is covered by the 'Khartoum process', which the EU has provided a lot of funding to in order stop so-called human trafficking, and demonstrates another aspect to the dynamics of sovereignty: the international community, in the form of the EU, helping the Sudanese regime strengthen its grip on its border regions. The irony is that the so-called 'Rapid Support Forces' assigned to patrol border areas towards Libya are paramilitary, with origins in the 'Janjaweed' militia that operate in Darfur. RSF is now partly incorporated into the Sudanese national army, and they have been given the task of stopping migrants and refugees. and of returning them to their home country. This illustrates a dynamic mentioned earlier, that the state centre and peripheral and violent groups may come together in new ways, creating new institutional processes.

But this time around the international community is not talking about genocide, ethnic killings or human-rights violations. The European interest is clearly shaped by issues of public order at home. We all remember the political crisis and the moral panic caused by a sharp rise in numbers of migrants and refugees arriving in Europe in 2014–15. The associated problems created a public opinion in which European states could introduce new policies of control. It is interesting how this links to discussions of sovereignty. What we heard from European governments was the Westphalian version of such sovereignty – we need to control our borders, and who is crossing those borders, in order to know who is within our territory.

One consequence was that the two processes of 'managing migration' and 'managing conflicts' were brought together in the context of security. The arguments were clear. The notion was that certain spaces (in the South, of course) are violent by nature, other spaces (in the North, of course) are defined by peace, democracy and rationality. Such an understanding drives policies in the security sector away from 'our' spaces in the North towards 'their' spaces in the South. 'Our' security is linked to the problems of failed states, displacement and human-rights abuses, and the activities of criminal middlemen, thus changing our focus from economic and social issues that are the foci of traditional humanitarian aid, towards civil and political problems in which the two dynamics are linked, for instance through the concept of 'transitional justice' (see, for example, Duthie 2012). In such a situation we can see mechanisms at work that reflect the nature of global power itself. Politics is becoming more globalized and intensified, and more driven by 'public panic'.

One result of this situation has been for the EU to 'move' its borders to Sudan, and to let Sudan control them. Hence the Khartoum Process, and hence

a new acceptance of the Sudanese regime that can only serve to strengthen it. But this leads to the kind of uncertainty discussed in this chapter, albeit now in a Europe whose leaders argue that their political systems are based on democratic principles, and that defence and protection of sovereignty must be 'democratic', following international agreements and principles of human rights. The policies to keep the refugees out are often based on so-called 'democratic mandates' emerging in elections. But in some places such political majorities are used to allow policies that seem to contradict international agreements and human-rights legislation. This puts us in the complicated situation of asking whether these policies should be 'democratic', in the sense that any majority in any election should decide the way forward, or whether there are principles of justice that would override such a mandate. Here we clearly see important constraints on the sovereignty of any nation-state in its dealing with its own problems. We have been living through a historical period in which such issues have seemed to be limited to nation-states in the South, with their rigged elections and phony majorities. In those cases, solutions such as 'humanitarian interventions' and 'regime change' are frequently argued for. But these problems have now arrived in the North, where the only response has been to shore up 'fortress Europe', this time by Sudanese proxy.

Sovereignty, one last time

What has been presented above is yet another way of thinking about sovereignty. Not as a continuation of earlier ways of conceptualizing it, but rather as configurations that pull the concept in new directions. Hence, a substantive conclusion is not possible. I have touched on many ways of defining sovereignty, but it is not possible to say that any of them were wrong. Rather, they derived their meaning through the type of empirical situation they sought to explain, and were useful in sorting out certain aspects of developments. This is true both for the conventional definitions and the contemporary debates. For the latter, the redefinitions became necessary in order to explain the changes of politics and of the activities within the political field. What we see is that politics does not reflect a state of nature, but rather consists in a series of claims, which can be underpinned by power. Categories are not natural, but contestable. In the same way, a concept such as sovereignty is also political, in that it directly affects our understanding as to what the political means, defining its boundaries against law and its constitutional basis. What is important in drawing in more contemporary theories, such as those of Foucault, is that they highlight the role of power in social relations, as being part of the social realm itself, rather than as an external factor to be rid of. Hence, what we learn from this type of thinking is that we need to pose, as a central question, the negative effects of state sovereignty and the new system

of global governance on the goal of freedom: not only the of the Sudanese, but also our own. One step in this direction is to re-invent politics and sovereignty, and to free them from their current bio-political moorings.

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CHAPTER 7

Pastoralists at war with the state

Historical armed violence in the shadow state of north-eastern Uganda

ERIA OLOWO ONYANGO

Introduction

In north-eastern Uganda, the pastoral frontiers occupied by the Karimojong people remain a contested territory that has never been fully incorporated into the nation-state. In this area, the state's assumption of certain functions in order to demonstrate its existence became the defining moment for war with the citizens. In this setting marginalized groups are fiercely attempting to reassert their autonomy and control. The reality behind the chaos in Karamoja is that the government of Uganda is not in very good control of events. In recent times, the state has itself conceded that there are serious doubts about the functionality of its institutions in the region. Firstly, it has recognized that currently the army, or the security apparatus in general, does not have the overall monopoly over the means of coercion because of the widespread proliferation of small arms and ammunition. Secondly, it accepts that many state institutions and structures used in governance, such as the police, judiciary and prisons, are hardly operational, and that this undermines the government's capacity to ensure order. Thirdly, it also admits that the trend of armed violence in Karamoja, and the impact this has on local access to resources necessary for survival, has affected the capacity of the institutions of government to provide services, especially the security necessary in a very troubled region (Republic of Uganda 2007).

The basis of this dreadful relationship is historical.[1] Neither colonialism nor any of the succeeding regimes in Uganda have accepted that the Karimojong should be allowed their own way of life. The managers and representatives of the state, along with the rest of Uganda, have stereotyped the Karimojong as backward, obstinate and unruly people. The state generally prefers to understand them as people who are stuck to traditional pastoralism in an era of economic and social transformation. So, policies are designed to deal with such 'problem' people. There are laws that are made specifically for them, though without any consultation, which try to enclose and permanently settle them by force (Barber 1962; Dyson-Hudson 1963, 1966; Gulliver 1955; Lamphear 1976, 1994; Mkutu 2003; Novelli 1988; Quam 1996). For this, and other reasons, they have persistently fought hard to protect their own autonomy, with the end result of war between the state and the Karimojong.

This state of affairs raises a number of serious questions. For instance, do the Karimojong consider themselves as part of the 'nation-state' or 'people' of Uganda? Why does the state persist in trying to uphold the principles of a 'state', even at the cost of destroying the Karimojong? Who is responsible for the armed violence in Karamoja? Does this violence shed light on the general socio-political situation in Uganda and the region as a whole?

To understand why the Karimojong continue to fight organs of the state and prefer to manage their own affairs, we need a broader focus in which wider historical, socio-economic and political contexts are made relevant. We need a perspective which traces the development of the contemporary states; one which shows how the establishing of nation-states has interfered with existing links between groups; how problems between various pastoral groups become nation-state problems; and how commercialization, urbanization and the general modernization drive shape the adaptive responses of groups to the growth of the state. We also need to look at the ways in which political and economic reorganization of such societies after colonialism affected many social groups, and how pastoral groups in particular have been systematically marginalized. With this history of state neglect, the pastoralists have been driven to consider themselves enemies of the state. Applying a broader

1 The situation has been similar for all of the past national governments: the colonial military administration of 1911–21, the colonial civil administration 1921–62, the first Obote (Uganda People's Congress – UPC) government of 1962–71, Idi Amin's military rule 1971–79, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) Interim administration of 1979–80, the second Obote (UPC) administration of 1980–5, the Okello military junta of 1985–6, and Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) government from 1986 onwards. The Karimojong have fought them all, and continue to fight today.

perspective will demonstrate that pastoral groups have not been static entities imprisoned within their 'traditions', but are always in a process of transformation (Manger 2002). From colonial times to today, these groups have not recognized central governments. For instance, the Karimojong pastoralists continue to seek their autonomy and prefer to be peripheral to the Ugandan state, which they have never consented to join, not even at independence (Knighton 2005:75).

This chapter uses ethnographic material collected during my doctoral research in north-eastern Uganda (2006–9) to interrogate the relationship between the state and the Karimojong. It argues that their hostile relationship has less to do with any collapse of the modern state than with the manner the state has been conceived right from the colonial era to present. By tracing the roots of the socio-political development of the state in Karamoja, this chapter will show that the armed resistance to the state has been neither static nor self-contained, but instead has been part of an evolving process of historical, political and cultural change particularly influenced by the shifting relationships with the state. I begin with an analysis of the way socio-political violence in the Karimojong society is closely attached to the failure to integrate them into the modern nation-state. I further explore how state failure to exercise its mandate of social control and regulation of the use of force provokes a shadow state that in turn galvanizes further challenges to the state in the region.

The pastoralists in perspective

The region of Karamoja in Uganda comprises vast dry-land areas in the north-east of Uganda, north-west and north-east of Kenya and neighbouring areas in southern Sudan and southern Ethiopia. It is largely occupied by nomadic pastoralist communities dependent on livestock – cattle, sheep, goats and camels. Of these, cattle are the most important, being used for their milk, meat and hides, as well as providing the basis for marriage contracts, alliances with neighbours and ritual/religious ceremonies, and many other cultural practices. For this most important aspect of their livelihood, they rely on access to water and pasture. Living in dry lands, such resources are scarce and are under increasing pressure (Mkutu 2005).

Scarcity caused by extreme weather conditions and other human-generated conditions characteristically result into conflicts, and these have indeed been endemic amongst the pastoral and agro-pastoral people in the region, both between and within ethnic groups. Some of this takes the form of raiding or cattle-rustling, which has a long history here, and has to some extent become an aspect of traditional pastoralist culture. Cattle raiding has been commonplace in much of the region and has served a number of

purposes: to restock after famine or disease (thus serving as a mechanism of redistribution of cattle within the region); to obtain the required number of cattle for a bride price; and to tutor and help young men become warriors (Mkutu 2003, 2008a, 2009). Thus, the region for the most part is formed as a battleground on which armed cattle rustlers engage enemy groups, or exchange deadly fire with the state security apparatus, or lay deadly roadside ambushes, or pillage villages – all under the guise of cattle raiding.

More recently, widespread civil wars in the region – especially in Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan – have ushered in a booming illegal market in, and commonplace illicit use of, small arms, especially Russian made AK-47 guns. These weapons quickly became integrated into the burgeoning ethnic tensions and were eventually incorporated in the conflicts over natural resources and cattle rustling. This, coupled with porous and expansive national borders, weak national governments and deficient state-security systems, has exacerbated the persistent problem of inter-tribal and cross-border warfare. For example, for pastoralist's communities living along national-border areas in the region, weapons are acquired openly as a means of providing security for livestock, but later become facilitating tools in traditional practices of cattle raiding (Mirzeler and Young 2000; Mkutu 2006, 2008b; Stites *et al.* 2007). The use of such modern weapons has turned such traditional practices into uncontrollable and deadly warfare. Moreover, as these pastoral areas get saturated with arms, the pastoralists themselves become suppliers of arms to other groups across the borders.

State and pastoralist relations

In understanding state–Karimojong relations, our starting point should be to appreciate that state formation is grounded in historically determined cultural and social conditions. Only by identifying and investigating how specific states deal with major challenges to their existence and by proceeding with systematic comparisons can we hope to advance our understanding of the current challenges to the state in a truly global perspective. Many non-Western states, such as those in Africa, cannot be reduced to Western notions of what a state is supposed to be or how it is expected to operate. Such 'Western' notions clearly build on Weber's understanding of the state as based on bureaucratic and institutional organizations of power that, by virtue of its monopolization of violence in the territories it defines, mediate and regulate the terms of social and public order. It is questionable whether such an ideal-type state was ever found even in Europe, and we now have to move beyond this Weberian ideal type and recognize the fact that the state itself is embedded in a matrix of cultural and social relations that help shape a particular form of organization.

Thus, the ‘state’ is not a clear-cut concept, but rather one that is filled with ambiguity and is constantly being ‘re-invented’, even though it is still used in much international discourse. As already noted, for any particular case we need to revert to a cultural historical starting point in which several factors are considered. The East African states emerged out of an interaction between different peoples and ecological zones, and hence varying adaptations. For instance, the highlands and lowlands zones of Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Nile Valley savanna in the Sudan and the dry lands of Karamoja. In some places, the state centres were in the highlands, in others they were in the valleys, but the exploitation of lowland and savanna areas were basic mechanisms in maintaining the viability of these states. The imposition of colonial boundaries did not change this pattern, and some of the current problems faced by these states cannot be understood unless the exploitation of various regional groups and their elites are considered.

Such are the complexities that surround the establishment of the state in Uganda and the subsequent challenges to the state order in some regions. The processes of forming a nation-state in Uganda started with colonialism. The colonial authorities had to devise means of creating some form of collective identity that would hold the new formation called the ‘Ugandan nation’ together – some form of ‘imagined national community’ out of the related but dissimilar cultural groups (Anderson 1983). Deliberate efforts were made, not only to build new imaginary boundaries to social interaction, but also physical, cultural and political boundaries (Manger 2002).

From the start, colonialism faced the daunting task of bringing together diverse cultural groups to establish a nation-state. In some contexts the reorganization of power amongst existing societies met resistance that was forcibly subdued by the colonial apparatus. But, while it is clear that all nation-states have developed out of imagining different communities, the historical circumstances in which they emerge differs from place to place. In countries where the groups that merged were of multiple and strikingly distinct cultures, the imagined community of the state was usually based on a cultural definition of statehood. Uganda, on its way to becoming a nation-state, first as a British protectorate in 1894, was a highly multi-cultural society. On arrival, the British established some form of administration all over the country, except in the Karamoja region (Barber 1962). Karamoja was left un-administered for a very long time because the hostile ecological conditions of the region did not support the production of cash crops, such as cotton or coffee that could service industry in England and finance its administration (Barber 1962; Welch 1969). The only activity for which Karamoja was known at that point, was the lucrative ivory and slave trade with the Arabs and the Abyssinians (Ethiopian) in which exchanges of guns were also made (Welch 1969).

Although elements of statehood began to feature in Uganda, the colonial administration divided the country according to their presumed relevance to their imperialist aspirations. This led to southern Uganda being developed in areas of commercial agriculture, and the north pursuing guard duties in the armed forces; the pastoral Karimojong had no obvious roles in the colonial scheme and were edged out of national integration, particularly the psychological consciousness of a common national identity. This was one of the colonial legacies. One that not only established ethnically based regions but also ethnic- or tribally oriented local political organizations that fostered forms of ethnic nationalism and separatism that, in many cases, had not been present prior to the British colonialism. First, the British helped create a state that was 'foreign' to its citizens; second, they fostered a new national identity that was selective; third, a very significant aspect to the relationships between different groups began to emerge – the way the issue of identity relates to the boundary processes between them. The boundary developments unfolded into processes of change after the establishment of statehood that lead to national integration and modernization.

Emergence of the shadow state

By the end of colonial period, pastoralists throughout the entire Horn of Africa region found themselves, literally, at the margins of every state. Pastoral social order was in disarray, with people being cut off from their kin, customs, leaders, markets and sacred places. As a result, social cohesion, economic security, and political ties were seriously impaired. The disintegration of the pastoralist domain proved to be an enduring legacy of colonialism, as the fracturing of pastoralist communities has not healed, but has instead becoming a point of friction with the state. The lifeline of pastoralism, free movement, was also challenged by the boundaries of the new states, triggering resistance. But while colonialism relied on the creation, maintenance and exploitation of ethnic differences in setting up indirect rule, the disorder created remains an obstacle to the establishment of the modern nation-state. The post-independent state viewed pastoral areas as regions outside the state's control, a reality that would portray Uganda as a failed state. In reaction, they heightened attempts to coerce the pastoralists into integration within the new state, and to force them to adopt economically 'modern' ways of living.

The ensuing violent defiance of the state should not therefore be considered in isolation. It was very much a part of the historical processes of the formation of the modern states in the region, and it has remained part of the continuing global politics. For instance, the failure to fully incorporate the Karimojong into Ugandan state sovereignty lies at the core of failure to deal with violent non-state sovereign actors who do not respect borders. It is also

part of the context of the non-territorial 'sovereign' organizations that operate as a shadow state challenging the modern state – a notion which drives us to rethink the conventional Weberian concept of the state.

A concise Weberian account would reference three basic features that a modern state should have: a legislatively regulated administrative and legal order; binding authority over citizens and a defined territory; and a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Sovereignty rests on these features. But there are cases when they are usurped, not only in terms of recognition of sovereignty, but also and especially with regard to the management of the social conditions of citizens.

In this respect, the pastoralists' context reminds one of the shadow states that exists in many of Africa's war-prone regions. A shadow state (Reno 2000) is a form of personal rule; that is, an authority based upon the decisions and interests of an individual or a few individuals, rather than upon a set of written laws and procedures, even though the formal aspects of government may be said to exist. Reno argues that shadow states are typified by the use of semi-feudal system of patronage and typically supported by a regulatory environment and system of contract enforcement provided by organized (or in some cases disorganized) criminal structures or other non-state actors that utilize non-legitimate force.

In other cases where there is wrestling for political power, the shadow state is established by high-ranking politicians and business men who collaborate to wield significant political power through the private control of resources and the illicit markets for such goods. These powerful and clandestine networks of politicians, warlords and businessmen can manipulate the formal institutions of the state and create conditions favourable for investment in illicit trade. These networks often involve transnational corporations, humanitarian agencies, and drugs and weapons traffickers, who may serve to bankroll the shadow state. Shadow states thrive in chaotic political atmospheres where institutions of the modern formal state appear, or are in reality, absent. The absence of state control paves the way for the emergence of new elite groups of warlords to take control of the social order.

Historically un-administered pastoralists

The British had realized that the growing ivory and gun trade was facilitating a robust military build-up in Karamoja. Therefore, after their initial neglect, they moved quickly to restrain any possible emergence of strong Karimojong autonomy. The intervention did not so much remove Karamoja from neglect as impose a strict domination, with the intention of ensuring complete submission to colonial authority. The declaration of Karamoja as a closed district in 1911 therefore marked the beginning of a deliberate strategy to

isolate, marginalize and control the Karimojong. There would be no contact between these rebellious people and other groups already brought under colonial control. Furthermore, the British knew that isolating the Karimojong required a powerful force. An army had to be stationed in the region to counter the tenacity of the warriors. Therefore, a contingent of Kings African Rifles (K.A.R.) was deployed and a military occupation of Karamoja effected (Barber 1962). A special paramilitary Police force was also deployed. They enforced disarmament and collected most of the guns, with a view to stopping the emergence of militias. Many of the Karimojong, however, resorted to the traditional spears they had prior to getting guns. The British noted this, but did not consider it much of a threat, and during the period of colonialism they referred to this rearming with spears as *mukuki* in Kiswahili.[2] This beginning to forceful disarmament was to define state–Karimojong relations in the years to come. Today the elderly Karimojong refer to this period as *ekaru a'mukuki* (the year of the spear).

Fearing their military prowess, the British preferred to isolate the Karimojong rather than attempt to integrate them or persuade them that they were citizens of the nation of Uganda. The colonial state became increasingly pre-occupied with their possession of guns, and mechanisms of bringing them to their knees, rather than directing attention towards the setting up of institutions that would inculcate statehood in the region. What followed was years of tension, as the British imposed very stringent laws that made it difficult for the Karimojong to raid their neighbours. The British used state apparatus to put in place mechanisms that secluded these 'natives' from other ethnic groups in eastern and northern Uganda. It was during this period that they created the long-lasting prejudice that the Karimojong are primitive; an epitome of which was the warning sign they put at the entrance to Moroto town. This billboard directed visitors' gazes to the naked tribesmen of the pristine 'real Africa', and telling them, 'You have reached the heart of Africa.' (Akabwai and Ateyo 2007). The prejudice that the Karimojong cannot adjust to modern life, and that the rest of Uganda will not wait for it to develop, has its roots here.

The establishment of the colonial state found the Karimojong already armed. By the time colonial administration took control over the region cattle raiding and gun-running were already lucrative businesses. The Karimojong bartered ivory and cattle for weapons (Barber 1962; Lamphear 1976; Pazzaglia 1982). By this time armed violence was already noticeable between and among the Karimojong and their neighbours, and some people had begun to establish

2 Kiswahili which was the language of the Swahili became the official lingua franca of the British colonialists in communicating with the Karimojong.

private armies to out-compete rivals in the ivory trade. The potential for violence increased as competition between the Abyssinian merchants and the Swahili culminated into agonistic training and arming of the Turkana, Dassenetch, and Karimojong, supposedly to protect their ivory caravans from rivals and local populations that might attack them (Akabwai and Ateyo 2007). By the time the British moved in to set up their administration, these developments resulted into the creation of pockets in which private armies were forces to reckoned with. It was the sight of these well-armed groups posing a threat to the British that forced them into action in 1911.[3]

It was the presence of these private armies and the perception that they were dealing with people who were well-armed that drove the colonial administration to disarm and pacify the region. They met with stiff resistance however, and the British to resorted to a scorched-earth policy to force compliance. As with most of the pastoral groups in East Africa, the Karimojong did not easily succumb to colonial rule. They put up sporadic but formidable resistance that was partly perceived as a refusal to accept incorporation into state systems. According to Barber (1962), it was the British backed King's African Rifles that managed to pacify the Karimojong and set up the first government outpost at Koputh.[4]

When the British colonialists finally established the indirect rule system of governance in Uganda, Karamoja was at first apparently left out. For instance, in all other parts of the country each district was run by a District Commissioner (DC), who administered through appointed local collaborators as traditional chiefs (Mamdani 1995). For a long time Karamoja was the only region administered by military officers and the KAR (Barber 1962; Lamphear 1976; Pazzaglia 1982). And when the British finally set up a centralized form of administration, they swept away the local institutions and practices and commanded conformity with the colonial administration orders. This succeeded in breaking up the traditional sources of power that the local Karimojong used to preside over their state of affairs (Barber 1962:122; Dyson-Hudson 1966; Lamphear 1976; Pazzaglia 1982). Indeed, upon gaining control of the region, one of the first steps which a British commander called Tufnell

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3 The military strength sighted among the Karimojong groups were a threat and only military response was considered, thus beginning the militant relations with the British

4 In 1911 the British did not find much resistance among the tribes of northern Uganda apart from the Karimojong, where they had to fight hard to bring them under colonial rule. The colonial officer in charge of the region was called Tufnell. Karamoja was then one district.

took was to establish chiefs in Karamoja (Barber 1962; Pazzaglia 1982) – appointing his own to take charge of the situation.

The colonial policy during this period was arbitrary, and did not build on any tradition on the ground. All the colonial regime's attention was focused on reducing the military might of the Karimojong. They ignored the fact that the institution of elders played a key social-control role and neither consulted nor appointed elders to take on responsibilities of administration. Tufnell chose men whom he considered to be of social standing in the society, particularly those who were not so old as to be physically incapable of carrying out duties. Preference was also given to Swahili speakers (Barber 1962:113). The chief's main role was to maintain order in their community, and to mobilize free labour and food whenever the colonial authorities demanded them. Karamoja was administered as a single district from 1911 until 1971,[5] when it was divided into two administrative districts, Northern Karamoja and Southern Karamoja, later renamed Kotido District and Moroto District (Quam 1996).

In this way, the Karimojong were systematically left behind and misleading and pessimistic stereotypes began to be formed about them. The idea began that the Karimojong and 'modern life' were mutually exclusive. The discourse about their pastoral development in general began to be constructed in terms of a string of oppositions: nature versus civilization; nomadic versus the progressive sedentary livelihood; traditional versus modern; engaging in irrational practices versus rationality; subjugating women versus gender sensitivity; group (ethnic) domination versus individual freedom. Such stereotypes portray the Karimojong as people with no moral standards, as wild and unruly. This was the thinking that informed policy-making, and which led to the intention to keep them away from contact with other tribes, to avoid their violent ways and conflict with the other tribes (Barber 1962).

In these circumstances, the colonial state pursued an indifferent development policy. Oral accounts reveal that it was not until the 1950s that the colonial state established a development project for Karamoja to supply cheap meat to the already developing southern urban centres. Embarrassed by the growing gap between Karamoja and the rest of the country, this is when the protectorate government constructed several dams and water holes, and introduced ox-driven ploughs in the fairly fertile and arable areas around the mountains in Kaabong. It was not until 1948, twenty-seven years from the establishment of the protectorate government, that the colonial administration posted a veterinary officer in Karamoja. It was not until 1958 that they instituted a district development plan to 'persuade an extremely backward pastoral people who are many years behind the other tribes

5 It was the government of Amin that divided up Karamoja into two districts.

of Uganda to adopt a money economy and a settled way of life' (Gartrell 1988:206). In line with this, the Karamoja Cattle Scheme was set up, primarily to organize marketing and destocking of cattle. The scheme had a monopoly for buying cattle, and usually offered very low prices, becoming an instrument of exploitation of the pastoralists. By the time of Uganda's independence in 1962, the scheme had succeeded in providing cheap meat to the south. However, it failed to integrate the Karimojong into the cash economy. They simply used cattle marketing only as a way to avoid famine.

In fact, the state continuously reasserted its control in a direct and military way. It would confront offending groups without looking at the wider socio-economic implications. The Bataringaya report (1961) – set up by the post-independence government to look into the Karamoja problem with a view of finding a permanent solution to their dislike of the state – also influenced policies. While it diagnosed a remedy that included a sterner administration, establishment of district council systems as elsewhere in Uganda, better roads and communication network, it also considered the problem to be a political-administrative one requiring the beefing up security (Akabwai and Ateyo 2007).

Equally disturbing for the Karimojong were the colonial policies that targeted confiscation of cattle as a punishment for committing acts of violence. Cattle are the most valuable resource for the Karimojong, and they respond to their targeting viciously and with all their energy. This was clear when the environmental and social pressures increased and raids into the neighbouring Teso sub-region escalated. As a result, in 1958 the Legislative Assembly passed the Special Regions (Karamoja) Ordinance Act 19, which gave the Provincial Commissioner of Karamoja the powers to declare any section of the region a 'prohibited area'. It legalized movement restrictions on both cattle and humans, and it delineated Karamoja from the rest of Uganda. It was after this law that the colonial government 'littered' a few police stations in the region to provide machinery for subjugating the Karimojong (Barber 1962; Gartrell 1988). This is also the legislation expelled all the traders from the district, effectively cutting Karimojong off from any form of outside contact or influence. This law also demanded groups swear 'peace bonds' that committed them as a group to ensure that no one amongst them would engage in acts of violence. Any breach of these pacts, especially through cattle raiding, would lead to the entire (ethnic) group living in the area being punished through confiscation of cattle as a 'collective fine' (Republic of Uganda 2007).

This set the tone for Karimojong–state relationships in the years to come. By the time the ordinance was repealed in July 1961, the scale of cattle raiding had greatly increased. The enforcement of 'collective fines' actually triggered

more conflicts,[6] with violence resulting from cattle raids becoming more frequent until the government felt compelled to act. To the Karimojong the suspicion that the state was at war with them was confirmed, and they felt they had to fight for their cattle. Indeed in 1962, the 4th Battalion of KAR was deployed in Karamoja to restore law and order. With this deployment, the precedent that only the military could bring order in Karamoja was reinforced. The state presence became more and more militarized with further legislation enacted to address the situation. To augment the military action, the Administration (Karamoja) Act No. 17 of 1963 was passed (Republic of Uganda 2007). This gave the Karamoja Administrator wide administrative and judicial powers to facilitate quick military action against cattle raiding. Nonetheless, cattle raiding persisted and even increased, leading to further amendment of the act.[7]

The state responses to violence took the trend of amending and altering the laws, with measures that oscillated between extensive marginalization and outright military occupation. The (Karamoja) (Amendment) Act of 1964 was no exception. Having failed to take effect, it was amended by Cap 314 Act 13 of 1970 (section 241) and subsequently repealed by the Special Regions Act (Cap. 306) in the revised Laws of Uganda. 'To-date, it stands out as a piece of legislation on the statute books intended to make provisions for the prevention of cattle raiding and stealing. The existing Special Regions Act empowers the concerned Minister, through a statutory instrument, with powers to declare any area to be a "special region" (section 2), where entry of any person into that area without the permission in writing of an administrative officer is prohibited (section 3[1]).'

Law enforcement or state reprisal

Despite all efforts to amend and make watertight the provisions in the Special Regions Act, they were never enforced. Both structural and social conditions on the ground continued to make their implementation impossible. The closest the state came to enforcing the act was the ban on livestock markets in Karamoja in May 2002, following the launch of forceful disarmament

6 The fines which were in the form of confiscation of cattle made the Karimojong feel they were justified in raiding to recover their losses. At this moment, the state itself began to be viewed as a raiding party.

7 The implementation of these laws remained wanting in several respects. First, the Karimojong did not accept them; second, the personnel at the district level could not enforce the laws, because local people did not respect them – respect remained for the traditional structures that the colonial state authorities simply ignored.

operations during 2001–2. But the disarmament could not be enforced in its entirety because it lacked the required legal basis, as it was issued as a military order by the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) command in Karamoja, not as a statutory instrument by the concerned minister, as required by law (Oxfam 2004). All this evidenced the reality that Karamoja was treated as a separate 'state' from Uganda. For instance, a section of the 1964 Administration of Justice (Karamoja) Act points out that Karimojong once arrested are considered guilty until the person proves otherwise,

> … jettisoned the normally strict rules on admissibility of evidence, placed sole discretion in the hands of a single judge, and overturned the time-honoured legal principle of the presumption of innocence in cases within the district. Indeed, any person who was accused of engaging in a cattle raid, in which someone had been killed, was presumed guilty until they had proven their innocence.[8]

Furthermore, a number of legislative measures were taken to check the illegal possession of firearms. These were not very different to those the colonialists took. The post-independence state continued to pursue legal options that were impossible to implement. For instance, the 1955 British Firearms Ordinance, which was used to restrict gun ownership but in reality never worked, was repealed to be replaced by the Firearms Act of 1970. This act made it an offence for anyone to possess a firearm without a license. Section 3(1) of the Firearms Act (Cap. 299) states that, 'No person shall purchase, acquire or have in his or her possession any firearm or ammunition unless, in respect of each such firearm, he or she holds a valid firearm certificate.' Anyone who dared possess a gun without license, would upon conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or to a fine not exceeding twenty thousand Uganda shillings, or both (Republic of Uganda 2007). Although these statutes are still in force to this date, no serious implementation of the Firearms Act, 1970 has been recorded. It therefore serves no meaningful purpose, and fails to forestall armed violence as intended.

Instead, to date, the state is still determined to use military campaigns to disarm the Karimojong warriors. This use of military force against citizens of Uganda is derived from the laws of the UPDF Act (1995) (Cap. 307), in which

8 Oxfam conflict study report quoting Oloka-Onyango, Gariyo Zie and Frank Muhereza, *Pastoralism, Crisis and Transformation in Karamoja*, IIED Drylands Network Programme, Issues Paper No. 43. June 1993, p. 4

the Karimojong are subject to military law, 'for being in unlawful possession of arms, ammunition, equipment and other prescribed stores ordinarily being the monopoly of the army'. The penalty, upon conviction, is death (Section 33[1],[2]). This law is applied together with the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002), which came into force in the aftermath of the September 11 attack in the United States of America. In addition, Section 10 of the Suppression of Terrorism Law states that, 'Any person who aids or abets or finances or harbors, or in any other way renders support to any person, knowing or having reason to believe that the support will be applied or used for or in connection with the preparation or commission or instigation of acts of terrorism, commits an offence and shall on conviction, be sentenced to death.' This law was meant to reinforce the Firearms Act 1970, which aims at preventing people like the Karimojong from obtaining weapons (particularly small arms or light weapons) within or outside Ugandan territory. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2002 also addresses this in sections 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The sentence prescribed for supply of weaponry or explosives on conviction is death. Likewise, the sentence upon conviction for recruiting, financing or harbouring terrorists is also death.

So, the state argues that the carrying guns by civilians is a violation of the Firearms Act (1970), the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) Act (1995) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002). Since these guns are illegally held, the owners are taken to be criminals and, in the new terminology, terrorists, who should treated as such. One thing is clear, all these acts are intended to show that the state has the monopoly of force. Indeed, force has always been the state's preferred means of enforcing compliance. The state's claim to the monopoly of the use of force and the Karimojong's insistence on their own use of force makes confrontation unavoidable. What the state has failed to consider is that the Karimojong are not accustomed to being given instructions or orders. To the contrary, they have been, for a long time been accustomed to making individual decisions about things that mattered most to their lives,[9] and are used to leading an independent lives, freely moving to places of their choice and going about their different roles either as an elder, warrior or herdsman. Thus, the introduction of civil administration that confines their movements, defines their behaviour and imposes hitherto unknown things such as compulsory community work and porter jobs (Barber 1962; Lamphear 1976; Pazzaglia 1982) is an anathema.

9 The Karimojong make their own decisions about things such as movement to particular areas for water and grazing, decisions about when and where to raid cattle for food or marriage, decisions about who should be punished and for which crime. They do not see any justification in the state taking over those functions.

Opposition to post-colonial brutality

The special laws for Karamoja all reflect one thing, that cattle raiding and possession of weapons were the primary security concerns for the state. These laws were not intended to provide effective governance. With excessive use of force, the post-independent state managed to register some success in restraining cattle raids in the short term. It employed brutal methods to confiscate Karimojong livestock and to force them to disarm; while their neighbours, the Turkana and Pokot of Kenya, remained heavily armed. In the period from 1962 to 1970, the Karimojong felt unprotected and extremely vulnerable. When Idi Amin Dada came to power in 1971, heavy deployment of the military in the region dealt the Karimojong a further blow. The army disarmed most of the warriors and confiscated their cattle on the slightest provocation, and did not give them a chance to rearm and fight the Turkana and Pokot.

With excessive brutality, Idi Amin's army pursued cattle raiders with a vengeance. But whenever they recovered livestock, rather than returning the cattle to their rightful owners the soldiers took possession of them before selling them to local cattle traders. This was an era in which the people of Karamoja faced both armed raiders and a thieving army. It also saw an unofficial policy of harassing and brutalizing the Karimojong. Amin's and subsequent armies have all been noted for their brutal interactions with the Karimojong.[10] While there has never been an official state policy directing the army to torture the Karimojong, since Amin's time the Karimojong have persistently suffered extremes of torture, humiliation and all manner of human-rights abuses. It is to this manner of treatment that they respond with violence, especially on matters concerning the state.

In 1975, the military government of Idi Amin passed a decree that changed the land-tenure system. This decree was underpinned by the assumption that many of the people occupying prime land were standing in the way of progress and should be displaced. Henceforth, all land in Uganda was to be vested in the state in trust for the people so as to facilitate its use for economic and social development. In other words, all land in Uganda became public land and was administered by the state. This had implications for Karamoja. Vast expanse of land crucial for seasonal transhumance was taken by the state. The fertile land north of Kaabong was converted into Kidepo Game Park to facilitate the development of tourism. Large chunks of land in various places were also gazetted as forest reserves, mission stations and administrative centres

10 Human Rights Watch was very critical of human rights abuses by the UPDF in their HRW 2008 special report of violations in Karamoja. The army has been accused of torture, rape, pillaging, detention and arbitrary killings.

(Bazaara 2002). In effect, the state facilitated a reduction in grazing lands in the context of a rising population. This led to severe food shortages, famine and serious conflicts amongst the Karimojong groups. Knighton (2006) emphasizes that while all human activities other than those connected with the management or utilization of wildlife resources were strictly prohibited in the parks, the pastoralists' 'range management system'[11] was in expansionist mode, with more livestock and more herders than ever before.

In Karamoja, access to land is largely a function of the community, lineage and family members. Customary land is used for communal grazing as well as a corridor for other groups migrating in search of water and pasture. Thus the loss of these areas to the game parks and reserves has had severe consequences for the sustainability of pastoral livelihoods on the remaining common rangelands. With grazing areas reduced and the corridors closed, the state has encouraged enemy groups to draw nearer to one another, leading to more clashes and a heightened the need for more security in terms of guns. This facilitated the vicious cycle of the region's chronic livelihood difficulties, forcing warriors into the alternative option, raiding. Because the Karimojong feel no one can order them around, whenever hard-pressed they turn more to their weapons for security, livelihoods and status (Mkutu 2006). To many Karimojong pastoralists, it is the gun which enables them to maintain or regain the pastoralist identity which has been threatened since their 'condemnation to closed districts'.

But it was the fall of Idi Amin in 1979 that perhaps had the greatest impact on state–Karimojong relations. When the military garrison in Moroto was abandoned by the fleeing government troops, the Matheniko took the chance to loot the weapons left behind. It was at this point that the severity and scale of violence in the region escalated. Armed with modern weapons, the Matheniko raids became more frequent, serious and daring. The well-armed Matheniko raided other groups with fewer arms, and were even capable of countering government troops. Faced with the task of guaranteeing their own security and survival, the less well-armed groups exploited the lapse in state security and turned to the illicit and informal gun-running business in the border areas to acquire weapons. This situation came about because of the state failure to provide security and much-needed livelihood options. The guns the Karimojong rushed to acquire were primarily acquired to ease the imbalance of power between the different groups and to offer protection to their communities and their cattle, and then secondarily to make retaliatory attacks.

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11 The Karimojong traditional pastoral systems under which each community has full control over the management of its own resources.

Thus, although tough legislation and military action continued in the post-colonial state, they did not stop violence in Karamoja. The issue for the Karimojong is survival, but state responses are often politically motivated and usually in the form of coercive measures that merely focus on weapons rather than definite settlement of local problems. Over time, even the various state agents (mainly the military) positioned in Karamoja have become intertwined in the web of political and money-making ventures cropping up out of the disorder. With an apparent absence of an effective government at the local level, the state authorities at the district headquarters have continued to rely on heavy deployments of the army to solve every problem.

Marginalization – a weapon of the state

Given the historical context to state presence in the region, social services and the general infrastructure associated with modern states, such as roads, housing, health and education facilities, local administration offices, courts, police and prisons, are almost non-existent in Karamoja. This state of affairs highlights Karamoja's remoteness and lack of integration into the nation-state. As government services are typically absent in this area, the stark reality is that the state hardly ever plays a role in its security.

Since the colonial period, the state has alienated Karamoja. This has been evident in the isolationist policies of the British, the absence of state institutions from the time of independence, and the total absence of government and judicial systems in some areas to date. To a certain extent, this marginalization arose out of the non-acceptance of Karamoja as an essential part of Uganda; but most importantly it came about due to lack of comprehension of their way of life, particularly with regard to recognition of pastoralism as a viable mode of production suitable in arid lands. It is from this lack of clear understanding that the common saying in most parts of Uganda of 'we shall not wait for Karamoja to develop' was coined – based on the opinion that the Karimojong are still primitive despite the many years 'development' has been in Uganda. This thinking has dominated state policies on Karamoja, effectively obstructing any focus on the regions specific problems. In doing so, it has seriously diminished hopes of state investment in the region and likewise has reinforced the Karimojong's belief in cattle raiding as an alternative livelihood, and increasingly, with armed cattle raiding, as a commercial enterprise (Mkutu 2007).

According to most Karimojong youth, especially the warriors, the government is only concerned with the violence emanating from cattle raids when they involve the non-Karimojong ethnic groups neighbouring Karamoja. The government shows little interest if the cattle raids are within and among the Karimojong, (Oxfam 2004). What the government wants from

the region is the guns, which they think are plentiful. Thus the only time the state seems to get into contact with the Karimojong, they are either subjecting them to forceful permanent settlement or other authoritarian and heavy-handed efforts to make them conform to sedentary life, and, most importantly, they are forcefully disarming them. Such perceived indifference, rather than being a deterrent to the Karimojong's association with violence, has actually strengthened their resolve to reject the authority of the state and to remain apart.

By the run up to Uganda's independence from British colonialism in the early 1960s, Karamoja was already being treated as if it were a separate 'state'. For instance, Karamoja did not play any role in the nationalist politics leading to Uganda's independence in 1962. The region did not even participate in the first general elections for Legislative Council seats in 1959, and was hardly involved in the political parties that participated in the politics of the 1961 and 1962 elections. To demonstrate that the region had been left out of the nation-state, when the Munster Commission that was appointed to propose constitutional amendments in 1961 reached Karamoja, the people there told them that the district should remain under British administration 'because Karamoja was not yet ready for Uhuru' (Mirzeler and Young 2000:414).

Since then, the post-colonial state has made a number of laws that specifically target the 'war machine' at Karamoja. They regarded Karamoja as a 'special' region because of its armament. A 1961 commission that was tasked with finding a lasting solution to the 'Karamoja problem' said in its findings that the region differs from all other Ugandan districts in that it 'is primitive to the extreme and is occupied by a people whose main occupation is cattle herding'. The commission observed that, 'We are not dealing with mean and cowardly thieves who know that what they are doing is morally wrong and is not admired by the society they live in; we are dealing with determined brave warriors who will stop at nothing to achieve their aim.' In their conclusion, they pointed out that 'The only force they will respect is that superior to their own and the only authority, that which can fight and defeat them.' (Ocan 1994:137).

In 1963 the Obote government decided to position a battalion of the Uganda army in Karamoja, ostensibly to protect and ensure state sovereignty by dealing a blow to the Karimojong war machine. While the Obote regime generated state-planned development initiatives specifically for Karamoja in the areas of livestock disease control, cattle commercialization, food security, rural water supply, education and health facilities, the Karimojong remained aloof and did not cooperate. The district government staff, who were mostly from other areas of Uganda, became discouraged and feared working among armed and fighting warriors, and many quit the region. According to Mirzeler

and Young (2000), the 1966 District Annual Report concluded on a note of surrender to circumstances; 'All of us would like to see Karamoja developed as fast as possible so as to catch up with the rest of Uganda but the major problem is how to do it.' (Wozei 1977:218). The irreducible alterity of Karamoja remained embedded in state discourse, within which the Karimojong were 'the natives': unclothed, unschooled and indolent (Cisternino 1984; Mirzeler and Young 2000).

Before the Obote government could penetrate the inner workings of the Karimojong, his government was overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971. Being the military man that he was, Amin galvanized the army garrison in Moroto, used it to completely disarm the warriors, and dealt with the Karimojong brutally. For instance, he launched a campaign to instil modern modesty in Karamoja, imposed clothing on them and ordered the killing by firing squad of all those who defied his orders and possessed a gun, or just dared walk naked. In response to Amin's murderous rule, the Karimojong ceased trafficking guns, but began fabricating their own guns using steel tubing of metal that they looted from school furniture and the iron roofs of government buildings. These homemade guns were then used to attack isolated police outposts, where they would easily overpower the few policemen.

The wider perspective in the Great Lakes region

When looked at from a wider perspective, there is a close relationship between the local and ethnic conflicts and the regional wars in the Horn of Africa, and the cross-border proliferation of weapons. Recent increases in weapons proliferation have been linked to the end of the Cold War proxy wars that have seen long armed conflicts in among others, southern Sudan, northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Somalia within the same region of sub-Saharan Africa. These 'wars' are fought at multiple levels – involving nations, regions, ethnic groups, clans and lineages (Markakis 1994).

Thus the 1979 revolution that overthrew Amin was a war between Amin's Uganda and the Tanzanian state. When the war reached Karamoja, it involved Ugandan exiles just as much as the Karimojong. But most importantly, it became a prelude to a fresh wave of uprisings in Africa. It ushered in an era of destruction of dictatorial regimes by insurgents from the rural peripheries or neighbouring states. As noted earlier, the trend followed in Chad (1990), Liberia (1990), Ethiopia (1991), Somalia (1991), Rwanda (1994), and both Congos (1997). But this brought with it a phenomenon whereby the overthrow of a government would lead to the dismantling of the existing national army, along with all the other security apparatuses. The result was that the former soldiers disappeared back their birth places in countryside, with all the

sophisticated weaponry that they can conceal or put up for sale on the black market.

Black markets where guns are easily and cheaply bought began to proliferate in the region. As a consequence, there was a widespread creation of militias that are much better armed than those of the past. This sudden and continuous growth of huge black markets in weaponry was key to the expansion of armed conflict. The Ethiopian and Somali armies that were disbanded in 1991 were some of the largest and best equipped Cold War armies of Africa. The remnants of these huge armies disappeared into the countryside along with their weapons. During their heydays, the despotic rulers of these countries purchased huge quantities of weapons from the mainly bankrupt states of the former Soviet Union (Young 2002). These weapons eventually found their ways into the hands of insurgents, who trade them for cash or cattle in the black market.

As noted earlier, this region of Africa is best been known for its arc of violence, in terms of internal rebellions and interstate conflicts. Africa's longest civil wars occur here (Assefa 1999). Amongst them is the civil war in Sudan in the neighbourhood of Karimojong. To a large extent, the perception, attitudes and actions of parties involved in these various conflicts continue to shape the process of militarization in the region. The affected states persistently refuse to acknowledge that there are real internal problems that require attention. Meanwhile, the victims of injustice are left with no other option but to fight for their survival. Conflict then escalates beyond the control of the initial actors and the emerging insurgent groups launch their recruitment campaigns among disenchanted civilian groups (Wasara 2002). In this way, the civilian population gets sucked into the conflict; often building clandestine militias and self-defence groups. This is exactly the case in the border areas of Sudan, Kenya and Uganda. The long years of state neglect has produced thousands of idle youth (*karachuna*) in the Karamoja region. It is these *karachuna* who have found easy sanctuary and 'employment' in armed banditry and cattle rustling. They have taken advantage of the disruptive civil and interstate wars to acquire modern assault rifles for their private causes.

In addition, the dissolution of the big armies that dictatorial regimes in the region built provided reservoirs of redundant warriors without any skills beyond soldiering. Such jobless but trained military personnel fitted quickly into rebel and cattle rustling ranks. In Uganda, for instance, the post-Amin governments recruited many Karimojong into the army as a way of 'regional balancing'. Many of these Karimojong men were given training in one of East

Africa's finest military academies in Munduli.[12] When the army disintegrated, most of them took their skills to the dry lands of Karamoja. It is little wonder that the raids became more deadly when these ex-soldiers began deployed their talents.

Hence these years of militarization became critical influences in the broader context of violent conflicts in the region and the dry lands in particular. Contrary to the common impression that it was the 'fall of Amin' and looting of Moroto barracks that heightened the levels of armament, an array of factors existed. And these need to be looked at in a broader historical and regional perspective. The reality is that most of these wars of 'liberation' in the Great Lakes region have been superseded by organized violence associated with the breakdown of the states. As a result of war, the states in the region fragmented and their key institutions of social control broke down. With the prevalence of failure, the state is displayed in crisis, and its use of violence to suppress local- and sometimes ethnically based challenges, such as those of the Karimojong, encourages yet more violence. Hence violence becomes part of the state 'culture' that is incorporated into the state identity. The failure of these states in fulfilling their mandates has eroded people's faith in state protection. They have failed in the state's fundamental role, protecting its citizens, and blame the widespread weapons trade flourishing in the region. Indeed, some recent literature has largely focused on the role of modern weapons in exacerbating defiance of state authority. They argue that the entry of small arms amidst resource competition and scarcity has escalated the violent relations between pastoralists and the state (Mirzeler and Young 2000); and that the state raiding for guns among the pastoralists has also changed the normative order. While this is accurate, the nature of the policies adopted by different actors in pursuit of different goals complicates the situation. As noted before, the colonial policies deliberately marginalized and confined the Karimojong. It is now clear that the post-colonial governments have continued with the same approach. What is more, the state has given promises, reneged on them, and yet expected the Karimojong to comply with their demands.

Conclusion

This chapter shows that a consideration of the war with the pastoralists in Uganda brings the nature of the state into question. It brings forward the idea that a state carries with it a definite set of responsibilities to its people, and that there are a range of mechanisms it employs to fulfil such responsibilities. The chapter thus demonstrates how warfare within some weak states neither

12 Munduli is a military academy found in Tanzania that has trained most of East Africa's army generals.

symbolizes the dismemberment of state order nor efforts towards nation-state building. Instead, internal warfare, as with the pastoralists, leads to the rise of self-styled warlords and other armed factions, who develop a shadow state that exercises political control through other channels than state-building stategies.

In the case of the Karimojong, the contemporary armed conflict with the state draws its explanation from earlier experiences, all the way from colonial period to the post-independence era, which began as a crisis of legitimacy for the state and its institutions. British colonialism had already laid the grounds for the current war with pastoralists through their expansionist violence, coupled with the manner in which they manipulated the pre-existing ethnic differences, and their divide and rule policies. This established the basis on which the state implemented the social and economic policies that fractured the fragile conglomeration of disparate groups of people in areas such as north-eastern Uganda. Such state policies not only undermined the faltering legitimacy of the state, they also impeded the emergence of Ugandan nationalism and generated ethnic, religious and regional divisions that were to contribute in later years to instability and political violence.

The chapter also interrogates in greater depth the hostile relationship between the state and the Karimojong, showing how state interventions and the movement of political and economic forces influenced the transformation of the state. The socio-political and economic environments that are set by the state in the form of policies, laws and 'quarantine' of pastoralists' nomadic character are perceived as competing processes that stimulate challenges to the state. This chapter shows that the interventions by the state have only created new disruptive forces external to the pastoral society. Even where the state imposed its own chiefs, they lacked power, the institutions didn't function and there was an apparent discontinuity between the state and the society. The state is in crisis, and sometimes the presence of the shadow state only legitimizes the challenges to the state and entrenches the local moral perceptions that contribute to constant resistance.

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CHAPTER 8

Buddhist cosmological forms and the situation of total terror in Sri Lanka's ethnic civil war

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Introduction

Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define. It is widely used, though not exclusively, to describe violent acts directed against state orders, its agents or institutions and, especially, its citizens. The terrorist's aim is to challenge the authority and sovereignty of the state, often, if not always, to achieve a new basis and structure of political and social order. The concepts of terrorist and terrorism are largely pejorative, indicating persons and organizations acting outside the moral domain of the law supported by states and their embracing international organizations, e.g. the United Nations. While the concepts describe much state action (state terrorism), to which the category of *war crime* is applied, they most often function to distinguish the legitimate violence of the state from the illegitimate violence of those who oppose it. The terms terror and terrorism are tied to a state-affirming discourse, indeed are part of a structure of political dominance that those who would be terrorists are concerned to expose and to resist. For this reason, many of those who are defined as terrorists prefer such terms as rebel, revolutionary, freedom fighter, guerrilla etc. that carry a more widely acceptable moral worth. Indeed, many of yesterday's terrorists are today's state leaders.

The concepts of terrorist and terrorism are relative to context, situation and positioned perspective, rendering them particularly resistant to definition in the abstract. They can merge with numerous other forms of violence that may otherwise be conceived as distinct. The terms terrorist and terrorism are subject to much ambiguity (Hoffman 2006; Laqueur 2001). However, in our opinion the concepts broadly apply to realities, and the agents of such realities, founded on an extreme fear or overriding expectation of life's extinction

and the destruction of its circumstance. Furthermore, the concepts largely refer to attacks that radically disrupt the taken-for-granted understandings underpinning civil and social life and their routines, as well as whoever or whatsoever guarantees these; for example, the institutions of the state and/or socio-cultural values. Terrorist acts and a situation of terrorism often accompany war, but their character, at least for many caught up in them, refuse even the rules or 'laws' of war (Walzer 1997). Terrorists and, especially, the terror and terrorism that may come to define situations of daily existence, defy the conventions and moralities of ordinarily established life, and form intensely liminal moments at the edge of life, virtually spaces of death (Wyschgorod 1990). In our discussion we conceive terrorism as a phenomenon that defines an overall situation of terror in which all – even those who are deemed to be the terrorists or the instigators of terrorism – become determined or subordinated to the radical life-extinguishing uncertainty that is the situation of terror. This is such that ongoing civilian or social and cultural existence, the routine continuity of life, comes under the constant threat of imminent destruction.

The Black Tigers, key instruments of annihilation belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the political organization of the ethnic Tamil minority in resistance against the order of the Sri Lankan state, until their extinction in May 2009, were the epitome of terror and terrorism for the Sinhalese ethnic majority, as for many Tamils. The Black Tigers were a suicide squad and were intensely revered as martyrs who willingly sacrificed themselves to the cause.[1] They were responsible for the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka, and other prominent Sri Lankan politicians and state functionaries (including Tamils who sought more peaceful solutions to issues addressed by the LTTE). To the Sinhalese, the Black Tigers achieved an almost demonic status, being conceived of as virtually invincible in their destructive and disordering capacity. The Black Tigers intensely manifested the absolute threat to Sinhalese routines of life, as well as political and social hegemony, that the LTTE aim of Tamil political independence came to mean for many in the Sinhalese majority. As icons of terror, the mere rumour of the presence of the Black Tigers in civilian space could spark panic and fear, creating a situation of terrorism into which all semblances of routine and everyday order dissolved.

For Tamils in the Jaffna area of the Tamil north of the island – following the defeat and extinguishment of the LTTE and occupation of Tamil territory

1 Selvadurai and Smith note that the Black Tigers developed the 'most extensive, systematic, use of suicide bombing as a strategic tool before 2003' (2013:547, 555–6).

by the victorious Sri Lanka Army – the figure of the 'grease demon' epitomized Tamil abjection and their subordination within a situation of terror. For a time, Tamil women reported being attacked and possessed by shadowy demonic figures, blackened in grease – a method of camouflage of the Sri Lankan (Sinhalese) special forces.[2]

In both Sinhalese and Tamil cultural and ritual traditions the demonic is the complete obverse of divine hierarchy, and threatens the total disordered fragmentation of existential orders and their coherence achieved under the sign of the divine. Typically, demons (*yakku*) are beings of rapacious and ravenous desire that come from the outside, intruding into the heart of domestic space, family and kinship, throwing them into disarray as well as the cosmic order upon which depend the routines of life in its many different social and political aspects (Kapferer 1983). The victims of demonic attack, in ordinary everyday life, are most often women, largely because they are the regenerative centres of households and embody in themselves the condition of the wider realities (affecting both women and men) that extend from the household into the external world. Demons are thoroughly voracious immoral beings who consume everything in their path. For a period the 'grease demon' was an image of the total transmutation of the Tamil situation into one determined by terror, in which life and its circumstance had become tenuous in the extreme.

We address the matters of terror and terrorism in the context of Sri Lanka's civil war, which lasted from August 1983 to May 2009. The war was initiated by an act of terrorism, the killing of 13 Sri Lanka Army soldiers by the LTTE in Jaffna in July 1983. This militant political organization was under the leadership of Velupillai Thiruvenkadam Prabakharan, a lower-caste son of a minor civil servant. Motivated by a consciousness of the social and political disadvantage of the Tamil ethnic minority (approximately 11–12 per cent, in comparison to 75 per cent of the majority Sinhalese, in a total population of 21

2 Yasmin Tambiah notes, the Sinhalese armed forces became a 'source of cultural-moral corruption via sexual violence, liquor, pornography, and prostitution' among Tamil women in the north-east (2005: 248). In the aftermath of the war there was a spate of attacks on Tamil and Muslim women. in particular, in the north and east by individuals labelled 'grease *yakas* [demons]'. The lack of a serious response by the security forces, other than to crackdown on protesters in the north and east, especially in Jaffna, confirmed the near-total collapse of trust in law enforcement among Tamils and Muslims, in particular. This phenomenon was symptomatic of the collapse of Tamil familial and social networks that the Sinhalese military occupation precipitated with ever increasing force after 2009 (International Crisis Group 2011:30–1).

million), largely concentrated in the north and east of the island, Prabakharan's militant terrorist organization had made little headway until the Jaffna killings. The terrorist act provoked extensive rioting by the majority ethnic Sinhalese against Tamil civilians, mainly in urban centres (mostly in the capital of Colombo), in which between 400 and 2,000 Tamils died and almost no Sinhalese (Harrison 2003). The progress of the war which then developed was to take many twists and turns, including a period when the LTTE came to control most of the territory in the north and east of the island, where most Tamils lived. For a while, the LTTE created a virtual nation-state of its own, with a small navy and a tiny air force. Indeed, the creation of this virtual state in part heralded the demise of the LTTE – for by becoming spatially static it became vulnerable to attack by the official state. Consequently, the suzerainty of the LTTE and the vision of many Tamils for a separate state came to a devastating end on a tiny isthmus at the north of the island in May 2009. Here, by conservative estimates, upwards of 40,000 trapped Tamil civilians and the last cadres of the LTTE were slaughtered in the final push of the Sri Lanka army.[3]

We discuss the overall situation of terrorism in Sri Lanka as an emergent phenomenon of the civil war. As such, terror came to embrace most communities in the heterogeneous cultural and social world of Sri Lanka. The civil war is conventionally described as an explosive extension of long-simmering tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils, and so it was. But the common description of the war as an ethnic war between the two populations glosses over the facts of its complexity, in which Tamils and Sinhalese were embroiled in terrorist acts, both as perpetrators and victims, in the course of the war, as were members of other communities (e.g. Muslims).[4] There were numerous instances of cross-cutting alliances across different communities, and of violent conflict of a terroristic character within them (e.g. Tamil against Tamil and Sinhalese against Sinhalese) that cannot be reduced to ethnic, cultural or religious differences. The description of these developments as producing a total situation of and for terror in Sri Lanka, attends to a diversity of forces (some of which are not necessarily reducible to the key parties on the ground) producing a lived reality in which terror or its expectation comes to condition life. As in many current contexts of civil war (those in Iraq and

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3 Weiss (2011) and Harrison (2012) both give compelling accounts of the circumstances that led to the final massacre.

4 Too many accounts of Tamil resistance to the state have pathologized the agency of Tamils involved in such resistance (Hettiarachchi 2013:105–21; Samaranayake 2007:171–83). Our analysis of terror resists this and is a further development of earlier work (Kapferer 1998; Kapferer and de Silva-Wijeraratne 2012).

Syria and in the Republic of South Sudan, for instance), the terror perpetrated or participated in by all sides, willingly and unwillingly, can also be sustained, even facilitated, by shifts in the balances of power in the surrounding geo-political environment. Such was certainly the case for Sri Lanka.

Major principles in the formation of Sri Lanka's situation of terror

The situation of terror in Sri Lanka ought to be interpreted as one of a hegemonic crisis centred on the integrity of the sovereignty of the nation-state and the character of its domination by the Sinhalese ethnic majority. Nationalist and populist perspectives on national history and religio-political values (in which Buddhism grounded in folk practice rather than textual doctrine was of pivotal focus), were integral to the violence of the terror that developed.

Our discussion concentrates on two aspects: a) the central ideological discourse of Sinhalese Buddhist history founded in the texts of the great Pali and Sinhala chronicles written by Buddhist monks and relevant to much religious and ritual practice; and b) the structural dynamics of the terror, the violence of which took various directions conditioned on the one hand by the conflicts born of social and political fragmentation and uncertainty regarding sovereignty and, on the other hand (paradoxically, perhaps), by attempted institutional resolutions of these conflicts resulting in an intensification of terror which became critical to state control and sovereignty, as well as to resistance to it.[5]

Our attention to the ideological discourse based in the Buddhist chronicles and folk traditions relates to what we and others regard to be their over-determining role in the overall situation of terror that obtained in Sri Lanka. This was so for those in control of the apparatuses of the Sri Lankan state and for those who resisted it (Tamils, Sinhalese and others). Key events in the Buddhist chronicles and folk traditions assumed a central discursive position in political processes as a consequence of the struggle between fractions of the bourgeoisie (particularly Sinhalese in relation to each other, and in competition with members of other ethnic communities) for control over the executive machinery of the state. The Sinhalese elites, especially, appealed for support from the urban working-class and rural masses on the basis of common identity in ethnicity, religion, caste and the Sinhala language (*swabasha*). Their unity (of elites with the Sinhalese mass) in the imagination (Anderson 1991) of history of Sinhalese nationalism was articulated in repeated reference

5 By 'institutional' we mean formal peace processes that created the conditions for Sinhalese nationalists to mobilize against the liberal gestures intrinsic to these processes.

to events drawn from the ancient Buddhist chronicles concerning the triumphs and tribulations of a succession of Sinhalese kings. The mythopoeia of this history became widely accepted as truth, and was made relevant to modern politics as a function of its promulgation through state-controlled institutions (educational and archaeological), further enhanced by their everyday significance in religious and ritual practice. We add that the myths of nationalist history achieved virtual existential and passionate intensity, an ontological potency, because of their embedding in everyday religious and ritual practice – these being domains of fertile ontological ground in most cultures and frequently exploited as such in popular movements that come to involve acts of terror.

Ernst Cassirer (1946) argued for the deadly potency of the political myths of Hitler's Third Reich, stating that they could, in effect, equal or exceed the destructive capacity of the material weapons for war. The myths of state history in Sri Lanka came to have a similar force, via the popular passions expressed in a terror born of resistance to the hegemonic order the narratives legitimated, and the reaction to such resistance. Moreover, the logics of the socio-political order integral to the event of the myths made the objects of nationalist ardour become, we suggest, more than mere charters for nationalist action, actually providing the performative impetus for such action and being vital in the orientation to terror and its effects.[6]

The importance of the myths in the production of the terror is not, of course, independent of grounded political and social structural processes that are through and through the effect of recent colonial and post-independence history within an overall context of globalization (Gunasinghe 1996). Indeed, the myths achieve their significance as a function of this history, as indicated by our stress on their use in the dynamics of class interest fuelled by ethnic nationalism. The terror of the civil war was built on such a basis, and we focus specifically on a structural dynamic that at once describes the process of the formation of what we understand as the overall situation of terror in Sri Lanka, and also, in certain senses, accounts for it, as it directed the course of the destruction and fear of the terror.

6 We thus modify Malinowskian accounts of Sinhalese myth as merely charters for action (Obeyesekere 1990). The logics of the myths came to operate at ideological depths with virtually ontological impetus.

Thus we address the main lines of the terror as developing around what is the dominant ethnic political cleavage[7] between the majority Sinhalese population and the minority Tamils, which became sharper in definition as a function of the war itself (i.e. the social and political opposition between the ethnic categories evolved through the events of the war). The terror and its fluctuating intensities shifted in accordance with the balance of power between the two major populations, defined and made party, willingly, to the unfolding conflict.

Viewing the dynamics of the war as a whole, and in outline, the more the balance of power tipped in favour of the Sri Lankan state and the majority Sinhalese, the more the Tamil side became politically fractured, as was reflected in the formation of rival Tamil resistance groups and violence between them.[8] This was so both in the early stages of the war and at the end, a factor that hastened the war to its tragic conclusion (Selvadurai and Smith 2013: 555). A similar pattern occurred on the Sinhalese side of the ethnic divide when Tamil forces momentarily gained a degree of ascendancy. With the virtual elimination by the LTTE of other Tamil resistance groups by the end of the 1980s, the balance of power shifted in the direction of militant Tamil resistance. Accordingly, socio-political fractures, already apparent within the Sinhalese population and represented in the 1971 Sinhalese youth insurrection of the Maoist Peoples Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP),

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7 The concept of 'ethnic cleavage' or structural cleavage we borrow from Max Gluckman's (1958) seminal discussion of the circumstances of developing apartheid in South Africa of the 1930s. There he described the white/black cleavage as infusing all forms of social relation throughout the socio-political formation. In Gluckman's analysis, the degree to which one or other side of the cleavage is dominant affects the intensity and pattern of conflict on either side. To put it simply, the weaker side of the cleavage experiences a fracturing or fragmentation of its social relations. In the apartheid situation of South Africa the dominance of the whites was a critical factor in producing conflicts and rivalries among Africans that augmented white power. A similar principle operated in Sri Lanka. The fluctuations in power or degree of dominance achieved by either side influenced the opening or closing of conflicts on either side. This can be conceived of as having a feedback effect. For example, when the Tamils under the LTTE began to get the upper hand, this created fissures within the Sinhalese side of the cleavage, having the effect of prolonging the terror and shifting the focus of its intensity.

8 The emergence of the LTTE as the dominant militant Tamil resistance group in the mid 1980s was itself the product of an internecine conflict between numerous Tamil militant factions in the 1970s and early 1980s.

precipitated an increase in Sinhalese violence against the state and its ruling elites.[9]

The unrest within the Sinhalese population was one motivation behind the acceptance by the Sri Lankan government of the intervention of Indian military forces to contain and subdue the now dominant power of the LTTE.[10] This inflamed Sinhalese nationalist passions, which were intensified when the Indian military forces suffered significant losses at the hands of LTTE guerrillas. Further fractures were opened in the Sinhalese population in the face of sometimes stunning LTTE military successes against the armed forces, and devastating LTTE incursions into Sinhalese dominated areas. Terrorist action by the Sinhalese JVP against the Sri Lanka government reached a peak in 1989–90 (Kapferer 1997b; Rampton 2012). This included a second insurrection by the JVP, far more violent than the first in 1971 (Halliday 1971), which was suppressed by state agencies with a great loss of civilian life, the full extent of which remains hidden to this day (Kapferer (1997a:287–97; 1997b).

The major factor tipping the balance of power in favour of the Sri Lankan state was the blocking of supplies to the LTTE, and its proscription as a terrorist organization, as a consequence of the growth of international terrorism, especially following the 9/11 attacks. This, plus significant military assistance to the Sri Lanka government from Pakistan and China – to some extent related to geopolitical shifts in the balance of power, representing a challenge to the authority of Western powers that Sri Lanka was able to exploit – placed severe brakes on the potency of the LTTE (not to mention the losses experienced by the LTTE over the long period of the war, disproportionate to those suffered by the Sri Lankan state).[11] Moreover, the Sri Lanka state re-asserted its sovereign autonomy, which had been weakened by LTTE successes and political conflict between sections of the Sinhalese population.

Total political control, through state machinery, was progressively realized, and was accompanied by an increase of the ideological force of mythic history supportive of Sinhalese hegemony. This corresponded with the coming to

9 The violence was pronounced in the southern, western and central Sinhalese dominated provinces of the island (Kapferer 1997b).

10 However, at the time the Sri Lanka Army had gained the upper hand and Rajiv Gandhi, the then prime minister of India, was at that time concerned to prevent the potential consequences of the defeat of the LTTE. Sri Lanka's openness to the intervention by India was occasioned by the threat to government from within. Political unrest among Sinhalese in the south had gathered steam with the JVP's resurgence.

11 www.thesundayleader.lk/2010/02/07/hambantota-in-the-great-game-of-the-indian-ocean/; in.reuters.com/article/2009/07/01/idINIndia-40731520090701.

power of President Mahinda Rajapakse and members of his family in 2005. That is, as a function of the dynamics of the war, one powerful fraction of a divided Sinhalese bourgeoisie (with firm ties into the south of the island, for many the heartland of Sinhalese national consciousness) gained virtually absolute command over the machineries of state. As we will develop more concretely below, the net result was that the Tamil side of the ethnic cleavage was radically weakened, and its own internal structures of relations began to fracture (a situation exploited successfully by the Sri Lankan state). The terror of the LTTE's campaign started to include Tamil civilians as well, and the situation of total terror became increasingly focused on the Tamil population alone, and then later, at war's end, expanded to include liberal civil-society actors.

We now detail key aspects of what we have outlined as the two strands of our argument concerning the development of the overall situation of terror in Sri Lanka – the ideological and the socio-political dynamics of events. We particularly focus on the final stages, where the terrible ideological potential of the ancient myths was realized.[12]

The ancient chronicles: some salient logics

The cosmology of the ancient Buddhist state,[13] to which contemporary Sri Lankan Sinhalese leaders imagine themselves to be ideologically co-extensive, presents the violent power on which its order rests as ameliorated by its righteous orientation to the Buddhist ideal of moral virtue.[14] In other words, the human-annihilating force of state power is justified when directed to the foundation of an order premised on Buddhist value. Brought into the service of the interests of a contemporary state, not only do Buddhist values legitimate state violence, they also remove many of the limitations on violence, in that Buddhist morality becomes a force for violent terror rather than a means for its restriction.

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12 For a more complete account, see de Silva-Wijeyeratne 2014; Kapferer 1998.

13 The ancient Buddhist state was more akin to a mandala. Wolters (1968) first emphasized the concept of the non-bounded mandala within the framework of Southeast Asian historiography. The mandala 'reflected the networks of loyalties between the ruler and the ruled, and among rulers, all of whom aspired to be the highest lord of the area over which they claimed sovereignty' (Chutintaranond 1990:90).

14 By 'virtue' we allude to the Pali Buddhist concept of *sila*, which means 'moral conduct'. In everyday worship, Sinhalese Buddhists will enter into periods of intense moral observance (*sil*). In Buddhist historiography, violence has a moral purpose if its telos is the restoration of the moral order of Buddhist kingship.

The ancient chronicles (the *Dipavamsa*, *Mahavamsa* and the *Culavamsa*)[15] present an argument that the life-annihilating violence of the state in (re) formation is legitimate if directed, oriented and encompassed by Buddhist value, and describe the historical progress of the Sinhalese commanded state in these terms. The first Sinhalese state was founded by the mythic hero, Prince Vijaya, in an act of annihilation of the original inhabitants. This has a strong sense of immorality and of betrayal (symbolically condensed into Vijaya's breaking of his marriage vow to his accomplice, Kuveni, in the annihilation).[16] It is Vijaya's breaking of his vow that evokes Kuveni's curse upon Vijaya, and by extension the Sinhalese people. In popular Sinhalese Buddhist understanding, the suffering of personal anguish, including for many the suffering endured by the civil war, is put down to this curse.[17] It is crucial that Vijaya's action is not bound by Buddhist morality. The Sinhalese state of Vijaya was not a Buddhist state, hence its unmitigated violence and Vijaya's role as a somewhat dubious hero.

The *Mahavamsa* (compiled by monks in the fifth century CE) recounts the story of the main Sinhalese hero, Prince Dutthagemunu (a figure of contemporary Sinhalese nationalist mobilization), who leads the Sinhalese Buddhist resurgence against King Elara, the Tamil overlord in a period of Sinhalese Buddhist decline. Dutthagemunu, born in fulfilment of a vow to the Buddha by his mother, himself vows to restore the glory and order of the Sinhalese Buddhist state, which he does (together with his ten demonic paladins), re-establishing Sinhalese Buddhist sovereignty. The slaughter of the final battle is morally exonerated in its orientation to Buddhist value (Obeyesekere 1990:63). It marks the completion of Dutthagemenu's vow, and

15 The chronicles represent the most significant texts among the *vamsa* literature in Sri Lanka, and constitute the principal source of mytho-history in Sinhalese Buddhism (Kemper 1991:34–41). *Vamsa* alludes to 'lineage' or 'descent'. In the Hindu-Buddhist tradition, ideas and knowledge are recited by one generation in order to be learnt by the next, this being the means by which practices and institutions survive in historical consciousness.

16 As the *Dipavamsa* and *Mahavamsa* chronicles recount, Vijaya, upon arriving with his proto-Sinhalese followers from India to Sri Lanka, enters into a pact with Princess Kuveni, the daughter of the ruler of the original inhabitants. Vijaya vows to marry Kuveni if she would help him to establish his rule. Kuveni is a sorceress and she assists Vijaya in the slaughter of her own people. But Vijaya breaks his vow and Kuveni curses him and all his successors. The anguish of Kuveni is the subject of much popular drama and poetry.

17 Common Sinhalese healing rites (*tovil*) start their process with offerings to Kuveni in order to appease the effects of her curse (Kapferer 1983).

that of his mother (Viharamahadevi), to re-establish Sinhalese Buddhist state hegemony and the values of its order. Dutthagemunu, through the sacrifice of the last battle of his reconquest, transforms, out of a virtually demonic mien, into the epitome of the ideal Buddhist priestly recluse. He becomes a figure of non-worldly attachment and non-violence, the embodiment of Buddhist value. The slaughter of his Tamil foes is represented in the texts as a legitimate and potent violence in its orientation towards the establishment of a state order within Buddhist value, the destroyed Tamils being 'willing' victims of sacrifice. The dead Tamil King is effectively given the full honours of a sacrificial victim.

There are two critical features of the ideology of state legitimacy integral to the ancient stories of Dutthagemunu: firstly its hierarchical logic; secondly the centrality of this logic for the socio-political integrity of the totality (or national whole) under Sinhalese Buddhist sovereignty. The logic of hierarchy[18] may be referred to as a system of successive encompassment that centres around an opposition between those, on the one hand, oriented to Buddhist ideals and those, on the other hand, oriented either to their contradiction (the demonic in the Sinhalese system) or to values outside Buddhism. Sinhalese and Tamil (epitomized by Dutthagemunu and Elara) are symbolic markers or terms in the oppositional logic of the hierarchical order, and in understandings of the transformations or transitory progress affecting persons in the order. Thus Dutthagemunu (his symbolic figuring) changes in the course of his progress – effectively from a demonic attitude to one of pious virtue – as he advances to his goal. In a strong sense, the demonic generates through the force of an immanent logic - the progressive emergence of hierarchical order directed towards Buddhist value.

The understanding of the integrity of the totality or whole, in the context of the texts, is hierarchical in the sense that every part of the whole, all the elements or differentiated parts of the whole, are conceived to be in harmonious (or mutually supportive) interrelation as a function or premise of Sinhalese dominance and the Buddhism that is the justification of such dominance. The texts recounting Dutthagemenu's reconquest, and the narrative of his progress, express the harmonization achieved in the

18 We stress this to distinguish the logic of the texts (as well as the mytho-logic of rites that makes reference to textual traditions) from common-sense notions of hierarchy as stratification in contemporary contexts and in much usage in Western discourse. Hierarchy in our conceptual usage constitutes the logic of the totality, every part of the totality manifesting the logic of the whole. This is premised on the Sinhalese/Tamil opposition with Sinhalese (and Buddhist value) being in dominant place.

establishment and acceptance of Dutthagemunu's and Sinhalese hegemony. The champion of King Elara's Tamil forces falls in an attitude of submission before Prince Dutthagemunu, ending the violence, an event that coincides with Dutthagemenu's transformation into the epitome of Buddhist value, one who compassionately encompasses and guarantees the unity of the whole.

These logics of the texts achieved particular significance through the ideas and social dynamics of thoroughly contemporary modern realities, rather than through their past relevance, or through the world of the texts in and of themselves, except in Buddhist rituals, which in many ways provide a vital vehicle for their continuity (de Silva-Wijeyeratne 2014; Kapferer 1998; Seneviratne 1999). Thus, the force of a hierarchical logic receives particular accentuation in the individualism of modernity.[19] Such individualism is a global phenomenon largely connected to the transformations of capitalism, and was established in Sri Lanka through the application of Western modernizing practices (founded on individualist and secularist values) through colonial rule. Individualism, in our analysis, is a particular value commitment that conceives social processes as reducible to the individual person or entity, so that the whole (society) is no less nor more than the sum of its parts. In effect, as most nationalism illustrates (Anderson 1991), the individual subject (part) is identical with the totality (as this is imagined). There is a part/whole identity, so that the one is the other and vice versa, and this is a hallmark of modern subjectivity. In short, nationalism builds its populist force in such a process, as a dynamic of modern individualism within an ancient hierarchical logic. This is so, regardless of the political hue of the nationalism, whether it is right or left in persuasion.[20] In the intensification of the part/whole identity of modern nationalism, the individual becomes a manifestation of the national whole and its integrity, and vice versa. It follows, in terms of the hierarchical logic of the ancient texts (which is also a powerful dimension of everyday healing rites that are performed for persons from all social classes), that the fragmentation of the national whole is also a fragmentation of the person or individual who identifies with the terms of national (state) integrity. All nationalism, in some way or another, is a force, a religiosity, of reactive suffering, but this reaches a particular intensity (what we describe as the demonic intensity of the terror) in situations such as that in Sri Lanka, where national consciousness is mediated through a state ideology framed by the ancient texts (Tambiah 1992:78–9).

19 This is an argument developed by Louis Dumont (1980) on the basis of his earlier work on caste hierarchy in India including a discussion of the ethnic violence that occurred at the time of partition in 1947 (Dumont 1986).

20 This argument is developed in relation to other general arguments of nationalism in Kapferer (1998).

We stress one overall point: implicit in the logic of the ancient texts (and in some of the everyday practices of ritual) carried into the political processes of the present, is the engagement of destruction (and by extension terror) as a legitimate means for the attainment of an order replete with Buddhist values. The state was open to the great risk of an end- (Sinhalese Buddhist hegemony) justifies-the-means kind that motivated the development of an overall situation of terror.

Mythic horizons and the progress to terror

Post-colonial political leaders in Sri Lanka, such as S.W.R.D.[21] Bandaranaike, Ranasinghe Premadasa, J.R. Jayewardene and Mahinda Rajapakse, displayed a propensity to imagine themselves as embodying the transformative potential of Sinhalese hero kings. Their actions were shrouded in Buddhist morality, but this did not extend to the development of a policy framework that would address Tamil political grievances. By the mid 1970s an armed Tamil youth insurrection (organized by class and caste) in the northern Jaffna peninsula was imminent.

The background to militant Tamil nationalist resistance to the state was formed by a series of legislative and constitutional innovations between independence and the mid 1970s.[22] The key event in the undoing of the independence settlement was the passage of the *Official Language Act* in 1956. Its impact was devastating, creating a form of educational apartheid that (with the exception of the Anglicized elites) drove communities further apart. In one fell swoop, the Burgher and Tamil administrative class were disadvantaged from securing promotion in the public service, and a key avenue of material improvement for the Jaffna Tamil bourgeoisie was cut off.[23] While many in the Burgher administrative class chose to migrate, their small numbers making more militant options futile, the Tamils chose resistance to their growing marginalization.

While the mid to late 1960s saw some minor respite, the Sinhalization of the state was pursued with zeal by Mrs Bandaranaike's government in the 1970s. Consequently, constitutional Tamil nationalism gave way to a more

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21 We have used initials for Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike and Junius Richard Jayewardene, as this is how they are ordinarily referred to in Sri Lanka.

22 No sooner had Ceylon gained independence in 1948, than the first legislative enactment passed by Parliament disenfranchized vast swathes of Indian Tamils working on the tea estates.

23 The Burgher communities are formed by descendants of European settlers from Portugal and Protestant Europe that arrived in the island from the sixteenth century onwards.

militantly nationalist and class-conscious Tamil youth movement on the Jaffna peninsula, which started advocacy of a separate Tamil state of Eelam by military means. By the end of the 1970s, the competing claims of Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism increasingly revolved around the axes of contested territory – physical, institutional (by this we mean the machinery of the state) and economic.

In the eight months leading up to the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983, the government fermented an 'atmosphere of repression and insanity' (Hoole 2001:90). This extra-legal assault on Tamil activists, politicians and people – particularly in the ethnically diverse east – was couched in terms of a response to a Naxalite conspiracy orchestrated by the Communist Party, and other Left activists. The conspiracy was masterful government propaganda, and ensured that President Jayewardene comfortably won the presidential election of 1982.

President Jayewardene appropriated the performative potency of ancient mythic reference far removed from its ritual register. Intrinsic to his self-imaginary was an invocation of the tropes of Buddhist monarchy, especially its centralizing aspect, which allowed him to see himself as the successor to a line of Sinhalese kings from Vijaya. The Buddhism of this lineage received more powerful expression from his prime minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who expressly articulated a link to the Buddhist hero, Prince Dutthagemenu (Bartholomeusz 2002:56).

Violence erupted In Colombo on 24 July. The spark that lit the fuse was the funeral of thirteen Sinhalese (all Buddhist) soldiers, whose bodies were brought to Colombo and prepared for burial in a mortuary next to the cemetery. In the emotionally charged atmosphere of the cemetery, as the gathered crowd awaited the burial ceremony, the Sinhalese nationalist monk Elle Gunawanse incited the crowd to move against the Tamils. The violence initially broke out in the vicinity of the cemetery itself.[24] But the attacks on Tamils and Tamil-owned enterprises spread, beyond Colombo, to Kandy and the hill country. Evidence of the state-orchestrated nature of the terror was not concealed – those leading the attacks carried voter lists, as well as the addresses of Tamil owned businesses (Tambiah (1992:73). By the end of the

24 For accounts, see Hoole 2001:105–8; Tambiah 1986:21–33. A useful description is presented by Weiss (2011:50–5), who also sets out some of the other atrocities committed by Tamils and by members of the Sri Lanka government, prior to the full outbreak of civil war.

riots the Tamil merchant class was in ruins, with these Sri Lankan citizens reduced to refugee status, low in the hierarchy of Sri Lanka's social order.[25]

The terror was hierarchical in intent – that is, it sought to re-subordinate the Tamil other who threatened the unity of the state with a virtual ontological appeal. Refracting the logic of a healing ritual, acting 'with the force of their own cosmic incorporation' (Kapferer 1998:101), Sinhalese rioters fragmented 'their demonic victims as the Tamils threatened to fragment them, and by doing so resubordinate and reincorporate the Tamil demon in hierarchy' (ibid). Such violence, by restoring the integrity of a fragmenting Sinhalese Buddhist social order, also restored the personal integrity of the Sinhalese individual, restoring their unity with the nation(al) whole as 'both the anguish of the person and the anguish of the nation are overcome in the power of hierarchy' (1998:111).

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The state-sanctioned terror of July 1983 joined modern and individualist ideological values, expanded in nationalism, to values of more ancient provenance contained in the chronicles of the Sinhalese kings. Intrinsic to the emergence of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism as an ideological practice was a specific ontology of the relation of the person to the state, such that the condition of the person and that of the state become synonymous with each other. Thus, the attack upon the national integrity of the Sinhalese nation by Tamil militants was synonymous with an ontological breach of the (Sinhalese) person and the order of the world in which Sinhalese ethnically identified persons drew their integrity (Kapferer 1998:83). Sinhalese passions fired, Tamils literally burned in their houses in order that the hierarchy of the Sinhalese Buddhist state could be restored. Terror became the performative logic and expression of the Sinhalese Buddhist subject under threat, and the means for its reintegration and the reintegration of the order upon which it depended.

The years from 1983–2015 not only witnessed the encompassing logic of state terror directed at both Tamil militancy and the general Tamil civilian population, but also saw the state unleash the terror of a regenerative violence against the Sinhalese subaltern in the late 1980s (an intra-civil war among

25 The riot succeeded in reordering the ethno-social composition of capital in Colombo. Post-1977 economic liberalization had ruined the Sinhalese dominated light-industrial sector, while the Tamil and Muslim trading and service sectors had benefited (Gunasinghe 1984:211–12).

the Sinhalese majority).[26] This intra-civil war was precipitated by President Jayewardene's decision to enter into the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord with the Indian Government with respect to the devolution of power in Sri Lanka.[27]

Buddhist violence has canonical roots that stress the 'ethical qualities of the righteous party by showing that although they are compelled by circumstances to engage in war for the purpose of self-defence, they do not resort to unnecessary acts of cruelty even towards the defeated' (Premasiri 2006:84). Such nuances did not inform the protagonists – rather both sides were able to draw on the canonical tradition in the pursuit of ever more vile acts of terror, if the result of their execution was to be the fashioning of a more righteous Buddhist society. The Maoist JVP led the resistance to the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and what they imagined as a thoroughly unrighteous and un-Buddhist set of proposals that would fragment the *dhammadipa* (the island of the dhamma), which in the popular Sinhalese imagination was bequeathed by the Buddha in order that his dhamma (the moral law) may be preserved in one place, the island of Sri Lanka (see Tambiah 1992:85–8).

Weber described the state as any 'human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber 1991:78). The JVP's challenge to this monopoly was met head on by the righteous fury of the state. The new president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, was not burdened by the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord and hence was able to position himself against the JVP. The destructive and reterritorializing force of the state was unleashed once the JVP made the mistake of targeting public property (as well as the families of the armed forces), both disabling the state and affecting the ability of the urban Sinhalese poor to manage their daily lives. It now became the duty of a patriotic Buddhist government to annihilate the JVP, with the defence minister, in the process of reclaiming territory that had fallen under JVP control, even claiming that he was guided by the Buddha's invocation that nothing was permanent.[28]

With the JVP insurrection crushed, the state could once again focus on combating the terror of the LTTE. Despite a number of aborted peace processes in the 1990s, the LTTE proved to be a very effective military organization, and by 2000 they had brought the state to the brink of collapse. When the last and final peace process was launched in December 2000, both the LTTE and the government committed themselves to exploring a federal

26 See International Crisis Group 2010a.

27 Devolution was primarily directed at the non-LTTE Tamil political leadership, who had been advocating administrative decentralization since the late 1940s.

28 In 1989 and 1990, following bomb attacks in Colombo by the LTTE, many Sinhalese citizens were on the point of fleeing the city.

model of decentralization. Although both parties were culpable in the failure to find a compromise solution in the peace process, that the LTTE did not seize this opportunity now appears a major error of strategy. When President Rajapakse was elected in November 2005, the peace process effectively died. The LTTE were happy to trade on the new president's Sinhalese nationalist reputation and recommence what looked like the easy task of renewing their military campaign. However, Chinese military assistance to Colombo ensured that the LTTE would not have a second chance at peace.[29]

President Rajapakse was elected in 2005 on a platform to defeat the LTTE. Fortunately for him, the US led 'war on terror' resulted in the proscription of the LTTE as a terrorist organization, effectively cutting off most of its diaspora material support (de Silva-Wijeyeratne 2006). With Chinese technical support, the regime moved to control access to cyberspace by placing restrictions on NGOs and foreign correspondents trying to access the war zone. In the shadow of the state's military success, as 2006 drew to a close, the 'crushing absolutism of power contained in cosmic metaphors' (Kapferer 2001:61) was brilliantly invoked by Rajapakse, when posters appeared declaring him a reincarnation of Dutthagemenu who would, like the king in his struggle with Elara, vanquish the demonic forces of the LTTE (De Votta 2007:9; Kapferer and de Silva Wijeyeratne 2012:152–3). The state's military strategy also encompassed the wider Tamil civilian population in the north-east, whose deterritorializing potential would be subjected to a radical re-subordination at the base of the Sinhalese Buddhist state. In aid of this strategy (and adopting a classic state tactic deployed in myriad anti-Left counter-insurgencies in Latin America in the 1970s–80s), the Sri Lankan state also relied on an array of Tamil paramilitary forces who inflicted a reign of murderous terror on Tamil civilians (Selvadurai and Smith 2013:558). This often functioned as an extension of state terror, but could at a rhetorical level often be distanced from the state and positioned as acting beyond the legitimate violence of the state (Lofving 2009:187–209).[30]

Before the commencement of the final campaign against the LTTE in June 2006, Tamils living in Colombo and in the tea-growing hill country were required to be registered at police stations. Both private and public businesses

29 Keim and de Silva-Wijeyeratne 2010. From 2006 China provided more than fifty per cent of Sri Lanka's external funding and arms imports. In the final military campaign, India provided intelligence and radar equipment, while Pakistan trained Sri Lankan pilots (Selvadurai and Smith 2013:562).

30 See *Report of the Secretary-General's Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka* (2012:76–9).

were required to register details of Tamil employees.[31] The abiding image of 2007 was of Tamils being evicted from their temporary lodgings in Colombo on spurious counter-terrorism grounds.[32] The powerful analogy with the series of pre-Nuremburg administrative measures directed at limiting Jewish participation in public and private life in Nazi Germany was clear to the discerning observer.

Once unleashed, the ferocity of the military campaign against the LTTE was ontologically grounded – indeed it was this that gave the violence its ferocity: its purpose was regenerative, to re-encompass the fragmenting logic of the Tamil hinterland of the north-east within the hierarchical order of the state, with difference encompassed within the unifying moral force of the state. The intensity of the negating terror (that is 'negative' freedom in its purest form) directed against Tamil civilians in the final stages of the war was merely one more ideological gesture in the armoury of the Sinhalese Buddhist state – it refracted an ontological ground in which the demonic can take on a Tamil persona (Comay 2011:ch 3). Given that in and through Buddhist ritual the demonic can become 'Tamil' in Sinhalese Buddhist consciousness (in the healing rites of the south there is a Tamil demon), the mediation of this metaphor through a colonial/post-colonial bureaucratic register of identity has in the recent past rendered all manner of taxonomically directed terror possible. The metaphor of the demonic has become all too real, as both Sinhalese Buddhist healing rites and anti-Tamil violence are directed at the same telos: reaching an ideal aesthetic harmony between the Sinhalese Buddhist state, nation and people.

Constitutive acts of regeneration in Sinhalese Buddhist thought depend on the immanent logic of violent terror. This is an aspect of major sorcery rites for Sinhalese Buddhists, with the most widely known rite engaging the story of Mahasammata (an earlier incarnation of the Buddha and the world-originating king) to heal or re-integrate the fragmented body of the victim (Kapferer 1997a). The symbolic force of the rite involves the re-origination of the order of the state in accordance with righteous Buddhist principles, to which the victims of sorcery must be oriented. Ultimately, demonic forces destroy themselves (which is one possible interpretation of the Dutthagemunu story). A feature of the anti-sorcery rites (and also the Vijaya and Dutthagemunu myths) is that victims (or those embodying the suffering of the nation) move

31 These requirements were eventually rescinded.

32 In a rare instance, the Supreme Court intervened and suspended the evictions, following a petition by the Colombo based NGO, the Centre for Policy Alternatives.

from a liminal, marginal position ('virtually' outside the state) to a position at its generative centre, one encompassed and potentiated by Buddhist value.

Rajapakse similarly moved from a liminal or peripheral position in the Sinhalese southern hinterland (near the mythical place of Dutthagemunu's birth) to become president, overcoming the grip on the Sri Lanka Freedom Party held by the influential Bandaranaike family. The latter were associated with the ruling landed aristocracy of the Kandyan kingdom of the last Sinhalese kings, conquered by the British in 1815. Rajapakse's lineage were largely representative of a powerful rural and urban bourgeois class fraction in many ways opposed to the Kandyan elites. In a certain sense, he was a ritualist of modernity, an articulator of rising Sinhalese (and Sinhala-speaking) petty-bourgeois interests who was able to forge a new unity between the bourgeoisie and the general populace. Such a unity was expressed in a further intensification of the mytho-history of Sinhalese Buddhism and the fundamental righteousness of its motivation to terror and the violence of a 'final solution'.

Writing of significant government victories, the capture of Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass, that were preliminaries to the defeat of the LTTE, Dr Susantha Goonatilake wrote in the *Sunday Times* (18 January 2009):

> It was a victory reminiscent of Dutu Gemunu who over 2,100 years ago as a child in the deep South described the helplessness of being pushed into the country's extreme corner by a Tamil invader. Gemunu broke loose. But keeping with Buddhist ethos he paid homage to his dead adversary Elara. Prabhakaran is no just adversary. He must be eliminated.

As a consequence of defeating the LTTE, in some Sinhalese quarters, Rajapakse had achieved the status of a Buddhist king. Like Dutthagemunu, whose own journey toward encompassing his own terrifying demonic potential began from the margins of the polity (Magama), in the south of the island controlled by his father, Rajapakse's own transformation in status to that of ordering beneficence began in Hambantota, also in the deep south of the Sinhalese Buddhist heartland.

In and through the final phase of the war, as well as the post-war settlement that the Rajapakse's sought to consolidate, terror became an overt

and open dimension of the everyday.[33] This found awful expression in the final moments of the LTTE and of a large number of Tamil civilians who found themselves trapped on a tiny isthmus in the north of the island at the end of war in May 2009, the LTTE having corralled civilians into this strip of land. Some forty thousand Tamil civilians, herded into a small 'no fire zone' (defined as part of an agreement between UN Agencies and the Sri Lanka military high command), were slaughtered by concentrated Sri Lankan artillery fire using coordinates supplied by the UN for the dropping of relief food parcels (Weiss 2011).[34] This was a force that redefined the conditions of possibility of both the social and the political. The grim conclusion to the war – which involved the virtual erasure of the LTTE's material presence and the execution and often mutilation of symbolic figures in the LTTE, as well as the humiliation of survivors – carried echoes of the logic of the military struggles between Sinhalese hero kings and Tamil 'usurpers' in the ancient Pali chronicles (Kapferer 2001:56–63; Roberts 2004:151–3).[35] The humiliation of the Tamils continued, from the post-war internment of over 300,000 Tamil civilians, to the act of forcing Tamils in Colombo to fly the Sri Lankan national flag; these were acts designed to facilitate the reterritorialization of the deterritorializing consequences of Tamil militant agency, while simultaneously reintegrating their demonic force at the base of the hierarchical order of the Sinhalese Buddhist state.

The Rajapakse's and their allies in the media and military sought to reduce the Tamil civilian population to a permanent subordinate status. In the aftermath of the war this agenda was driven by Gotabhaya Rajapakse and Basil Rajapakse in particular; the latter, as head of the all-purpose Ministry of Economic Development, sought to occlude the participation of Tamil civil-society groups in the redevelopment of the north-east (Fonseka and Raheem 2010; Rampton 2009).[36] In spatial terms, the Tamils (and Muslims in the east) became subject to a process of physical encompassment as an ideologically

33 On the violation of international humanitarian law by the state, see International Crisis Group 2010a. The state's post-war strategy has had a devastating impact on Tamil women in the north, many of whom increasingly head households – the men having either been killed in the war or disappeared in the silent terror unleashed by the security forces in the north in the aftermath of the war, leaving these women increasingly vulnerable to hidden violence in the new domestic arrangements that they have to forge (International Crisis Group 2011).

34 See, www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIJav9HgEwc.

35 See, vimeo.com/26647448.

36 See also, Minority Rights Group International 2007; Centre for Policy Alternatives 2009, for more details on this.

motivated programme of resettling Sinhalese colonists and their families was rolled out, at the expense of resettling displaced Tamil civilians back to their ancestral lands.[37]

In the course of a thirty-year civil war against the Tamils in general and the LTTE in particular, Sri Lanka was transformed (perhaps partially as a consequence of the war) from a nation-state into a corporate state, with new rhizomic forces of caste and family alliance (other than those connected with the Anglicized elites of the colonial and immediate post-colonial past) capturing the apparatuses of state and further subverting the residual principles of good government upon which state offices and functions had been based in the period up to the early 1970s. Since the end of the civil war, and simultaneous with the increasing economic role of the military, the 'controlling agents of the corporatized Sri Lankan state [started] to redraw the internal ethnic and social delineations of the state in line with the sentiments of popular sentiment, but no less in the oligarchic interests' (Kapferer 2010:143) of those who control the institutions of the state.[38]

Under the Rajapakses, Sri Lanka's future was clear – 'the emergence of Bonapartism centred on the capture of centralised state power' (Kadirgamar 2010:24) and the subsequent physical and existential encompassment of the

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37 In many instances Tamil owned land has been expropriated with a view to either resettling Sinhalese families or developing niche tourist resorts over which there exists no local accountability, including tourist resorts controlled by the Sri Lankan armed forces. As an instance of the pervasive presence of the Sinhalese military in Tamil civilian life in post-war Sri Lanka, Kumaravadivel Guruparan (2016) notes that 'reading camps for school children, organizing village development committee meetings, conducting pre-school teachers training, recruiting farm workers and preschool teachers into the civil defence force to work in Sri Lankan army run farms and Montessori schools, filling teacher shortages are example of projects through which the Army seeks to normalize its presence in the North and East'.

38 Under the Rajapakses, dominant capitalist interests generally associated with global capital simply switched sides, aligning themselves with the Bonapartist trajectory of capitalism. By late 2014, these very same economic interests made a strategic decision to abandon the Rajapakses, with their dependence on popular Sinhalese sovereignty, when it became clear that the US-EU-Indian axis was moving to subvert the Rajapakses' dependence on Chinese aid and investment in light of the threat to Western interests that such aid posed – these interests moved back towards supporting their traditional political allies in the pro-Western United National Party led by the current Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe (Ratnayake 2016; Sunil 2016).

Tamils in the hinterland of the state.[39] Encouraged by Sinhalese nationalists, the regime sought to reorient Sri Lankan politics along the lines of Malaysia's '*bumiputra*' model, featuring a ruling national party controlled by the majority Sinhalese while incorporating ethnic minority politicians and granting 'them patronage to distribute to their ethnic constituencies, with some limited regional power but no independent political power at the centre' (International Crisis Group 2010b:13–14). That this lacked any democratic accountability and would become the basis for further instability in the north-east was lost on the regime (Buruma 2009; Khoo 2005).

The mission of the Rajapakses was clear: to systematically alter the demographic landscape of the north-east, a project motivated by the ideology of Sinhalese myth given new ontological ground in modernity. It was anointed with Buddhist zeal – no sooner had the war ended, than President Rajapakse's wife visited Jaffna, at the northern tip of the island, in June 2009. She accompanied a statue of Sanghamiththa, the first woman Buddhist missionary to Sri Lanka, and the daughter of King Asoka, the great ruler of the Buddhist Mauryan Empire that dominated north and middle India from 320-180BCE. The statue was enshrined in a newly built Buddhist temple in Maathakal in the high security zone – once gazetted in parliament, Tamil and Muslim landowners were unable to seek legal redress in the courts with respect to establishing title to land within these designated 'high security zones' (Minority Rights Group International 2007:3). This symbolically unifying moment, in which the link between the dhamma and the land was re-established, was simultaneous to the continued dispossession of non-Sinhalese residents in Maathakal – Buddhist value and violent dispossession went hand-in-hand with each other.

State terror also extended to eviscerating the memory of the Tamil struggle in the north-east, where the army methodically erased all traces of the LTTE and their fallen.[40] Kilinochchi's cemetery for the LTTE dead has been

39 We refer to the Rajapakses in the plural in order to include the President's two brothers (Gotabaya and Basil), the architects of the military defeat of the LTTE and the post-war settlement respectively.

40 As a precursor to events after 2009, between 2006 and 2007 the army, pursuing the logic of reterritorializing a landscape that under the LTTE had been severed from the spatial imaginary of the *dhammadipa*, destroyed ten cemeteries for the LTTE fallen in the eastern districts Batticaloa, Ampaa'rai and Trincomalee (McDowell 2012:33).

totally eradicated and the Tamil dead effaced.[41] In the centre of Kilinochchi, the army erected a victory monument: a giant concrete cube with a bullet hole cracking its fascia and a lotus flower rising from the top (McDowell 2012:34). Writing in *The New Yorker*, Jon Lee Anderson recounts how soldiers stood to attention before a marble plinth, whose inscription extolled the Rajapaksas' leadership during 'a humanitarian operation which paved the way to eradicate terrorism entirely from our motherland, restoring her territorial integrity and the noble peace' (2011:49–50).[42] The emotive force of this inscription is driven by an ontological appeal, one which imagines violence in the service of Buddhist value. Violence in the name of humanitarianism is analogous to the regenerative logic of violence in Buddhist myth – that which is external to the encompassing order of the Buddhist state (and hence Buddhist value) is in a potentially threatening and violent relation to it. It is this potentiality which generates the terror of the state as immanent within it, and this, in its performative, force, that guarantees the unity of the Sinhalese nation(al) whole.

The terrifying potential and totalizing unity of Buddhist piety married to violence is further exemplified in the form of the Jaffna war memorial for the fallen of the state. In the inscription on the memorial, Rajapakse – in the manner of a Buddhist monarch – is fashioned as the 'Lord of the Three Sinhala Countries' (TriSinhala), a unifier of the island under the umbrella of an all too actual Sinhalese Buddhist popular sovereignty.[43] Through the memorial, Rajapakse establishes a genealogical link to the ancient kings like Dutthagemenu, who built relic shrines to the Buddha in the aftermath of having waged war. Within this mythic horizon, Rajapakse's defeat of the

41 The Sri Lankan army website at the time drew on the Sinhalese nationalist invocation of the Aryan racial trope. It referred to the Indo-Aryan settlers who had first settled the island. Such sentiments drew on Max Muller's conflation of Sinhalese linguistic and racial identity and the characterization of Sinhala as an Indo-Aryan language (Tambiah 1992: 131).

42 Nearly all LTTE memorials and graveyards in Jaffna and Vanni constructed for their dead have been destroyed (groundviews.org/category/issues/end-of-war-special-edition/page/2). The evisceration of memory has extended to the Sinhalizing of Tamil town names in the Eastern Province (De Votta 2007:48; Ranetunge 2011; McDowell 2012:34). Since the election of the President Sirisena in 2015, there has been a relaxation in the restrictions placed on Tamil civilians commemorating their own war dead (International Crisis Group 2017:23).

43 The construction and placement of such monuments speaks to the continuation of a Sinhalese nationalist war by other means (Hyndman and Amarasingham 2014).



Figure 1 *Victory Monument, Puthukudiyiruppu. Northern Province, Sri Lanka. Photo by Adam Jones, Ph.D./Global Photo Archive/Flickr.*

LTTE momentarily brought to an end the cyclical cosmic journey of unity, fragmentation and reordering; the Sinhalese Buddhist state, nation and people finally seemingly unified within a hierarchical relation. The memorial expresses ontological force – Rajapakse's journey from the margins of the Sinhalese Buddhist heartland in the south occupies the same ontological ground as that of the Buddha, who in the *Mahavamsa* ordains the island as the *dhammadipa*. It is full of ontological meaning, grounded in a terror lacking all restraint.

Conclusion: aftermath and rumblings

While Rajapakse was defeated in presidential elections in January 2015, the institutionalization of terror is not completely undone – all evidence points to a fraught process in which the Sinhalese security establishment will take their time, with Rajapakse and the violent potential of Sinhalese nationalism remains ever present on the political horizon. Indeed at the time of writing in 2017, the failure of President Sirisena to pursue liberal constitutional change effectively has enabled the Rajapakse cabal to mobilize the forces of Sinhalese populist opposition to any constitutional accommodation with the Tamil minority structured upon greater autonomy for the Tamil dominated north-

east of the island.[44] The activation of cosmic metaphors under Rajapakse's presidency, within the contemporary state's bureaucratic register, has resulted in a continued movement towards greater and centralized totalitarianism. In the manner of a Buddhist king, Rajapakse, and Sinhalese leaders before him, pursued a thoroughly ordering violence, one whose performative logic is writ large in Sinhalese Buddhist historiography. Akin to the repetitive structure of a musical chorus the dominant refrain of this historiography is that of transformation, a cyclical movement through unity, fragmentation and reordering – constitutive acts of regeneration in Sinhalese Buddhist myth that reveal the immanent logic of terror, terror actualized in the name of Buddhist value. A state order that is unencompassed by Buddhist value is effectively a potential threat to both individual Sinhalese Buddhists and the state order itself, as both are threatened by fragmentation; for the ideal Buddhist state is one that encompasses the individual. It is in these terms that we must understand the violent logic of state transformation in both the Sinhalese Buddhist myths of kingship and the all too real acts of state regeneration engineered by President Rajapakse.

An ordering or reconstitutive terror became a characteristic of the post-war dispensation under President Rajapakse. This is a terror that resonates with the encompassing logic of Buddhist kingship – as, for example, presented in a Buddhist *sutta* (sermon) called *The Lion's Roar of the Wheel-turning Emperor*.[45] But the logic of kingship in the aftermath of British colonial unification of the island is mediated through the logic of the bureaucratic state – one that is fashioned in a very utilitarian vein as a result of the

44 Not only do some Tamil political prisoners remain unreleased (Somachandran and Jayanth 2016), but more recently the Mahanayakes (senior Buddhist monks) have started to agitate against constitutional reforms on the grounds that the process was being orchestrated by the Tamil diaspora and the West – external, potentially demonic forces that threaten the physical integrity of the island (www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/president-represents-litmus-test-for-political-reform).

45 The *Cakkavatti Sihanāda Sutta* is a narrative on Buddhist kingship (*rājadhamma*). In it, the *dhamma* as a cosmological law regulates the world and, as truth (embodied in the Buddha), shows the path to *nibbāna*. This encompasses the rules of kingship and simultaneously kingship has its 'source in [the] *dhamma* and is ideally a concrete manifestation of it' in the socio-political order (Tambiah 1976: 40). The *cakkavatti* is portrayed as a wheel-rolling monarch who extends his kingdom by conquest merely to increase the geographical scope of the *dhamma*. The text portrays a social order that is in a state of degeneration, a process that is only put in reverse by the birth of the *Metteyya*, the next Buddha to be.

recommendations of the Colebrooke-Cameron Commission of the 1830s.[46] Having shifted the register of terror and violence from the ontological to the epistemological, devastating consequences can befall those who threaten the hierarchical order of the Sinhalese Buddhist state as they are resubordinated within a resurgent hierarchy – indeed resubordination is the condition on which hierarchy can be regenerated and the world renewed.[47] Herein resides the echo of classical Buddhist kingship and the association of the latter with 'constitutive acts of world renewal, in which the king-elect was transformed into a god or re-renewed as a god' (Roberts 1994:68).

Our argument has asserted that terror is fundamental to the (im) possibility of the state, and that the state and counter-state organizations (be they Sinhalese or Tamil) are in an immanent relation. Counter-state bodies do not represent a deformation of the liberal promise of constitutional rights intrinsic to the telos of the constitutional state (not that we suggest that post-colonial Sri Lanka has ever been a constitutional state), but are rather the very agents that render the state possible, whether at the level of the imaginary or of actuality. We have shown that the Sinhalese myths of state, which have their

46 We believe it is pertinent to draw a comparison with European historiography here, Hegel's engagement with the French Revolution in particular. Our argument has maintained that paradoxically, as terror may be ranged against and destructive of social and political orders, a key dimension of terror is frequently its emergence as a constitutive force and the very condition of political and social orders. A classic example of this paradox of terror is the Terror of the French Revolution, whose dynamic of destruction was an emergent property of its paradox, at once ending one order and creating another. The intensity of the French Terror was, perhaps, as Hegel suggested, because it was confined within its own annihilating logic and, most importantly, operated without constraint, and these conditions of possibility of absolute freedom paradoxically unleashed an annihilating terror directed at any potential restriction, including any posed by the citizenry themselves (Comay 2011:ch. 3). Not surprisingly this negative freedom is encapsulated in the logic of negation that characterizes all nationalist terrors, and which is directed at identifiable ethno-religious others who threaten the absolute freedom of a dominant ethno-religious self/group.

47 In the precolonial period, Buddhist texts and chronicles, and conceptions of kingship grounded in Asokan principles, spoke to a karmic understanding of the political. That is, the telos of the texts or rites of kingship were ontological inasmuch as they spoke to questions of being-in-the-world. However, under the conditions of colonialism as instituted by the Colebrooke-Cameron Reforms, these texts and rites began to be read as outlining how the social and the political ought to be organized in the future, ideas that related specifically to the context of Sinhalese nationalism.

origin in the ritual world of Sinhalese Buddhism, only achieve their ideological value within their actualization in the political, including war as a critical dimension of the political. The reliance on mutilation and dismemberment of those Tamil insurgents opposing the state suggests that Tamils (both insurgents and civilians) were imagined as posing an existential threat to the 'sacred fate of the community' (Strathern 2012).[48] This point is not unique to Sri Lanka's state of total terror, it is one that has been made in reference to the Rwandan genocide: under certain socio-political conditions threats to the state, to the spiritual domain and to the person can become conflated, rendering the existential challenge of territorial division always thoroughly political (Taylor 2012).

Overall, this essay has explored what we understand as the total situation of terror that discovers its dynamic through social-structural processes mediated by the state. The state is implicated in the production of what we describe as the creation of a general situation of terror; and we have shown how the Sri Lankan state was central to the terror that engulfed much of the population. Most striking in this intensification of terror was a mobilization of myth in popular consciousness, demonstrating the political potency of the Sinhalese Buddhist myths of state. This mobilization released these myths from their moorings – they ceased to be limited to the domains of temple and ritual.

Most analyses of terrorism in Sri Lanka have focused on the Tamil insurrectionists. This reduces discussion of the contribution of other parties to the overall situation of terror, the Sinhalese JVP for instance, whose anti-state action was sometimes modelled after Tamil LTTE practice. Most under-examined was the action of state agents (the military and paramilitary organizations in which ordinary citizenry became involved). But critically, the Sri Lankan state itself (both institutionally and ideologically) was the key player in the definition and orientation of terror, itself an essential instrument in the human and social destruction that was to render Sri Lanka, for well over 30 years, a demonic-plane of terror and terrorism.

Our focus began with the mythology of state legitimacy, one premised on Buddhist value, that in its articulation in the context of the post-colonial state became a focus of Tamil contestation and violent resistance, as well as a force in the terrorism of state reaction. As such, the situation of Sri Lanka is another instance of the way religious value harnessed to state power can exacerbate what much political philosophy relevant to contemporary democracies would conceive as the underlying contradiction between the egalitarian potential of

48 In the popular Sinhalese imaginary, the Buddha bequeaths the Sinhalese with the task of preserving the *dhamma* in the island.

the social and the limiting force of state power. This is particularly so where religious ideology is tied to sectional interests of an ethnic and class character, as in Sri Lanka. The situation is exacerbated further, as in Sri Lanka, where the mythologic is already integral to routine practices of self-affirmation and social constitution (and restitution) or is deeply hegemonic in the sense that Gramsci (2005), for example, expressed.

What is possibly more distinctive, regarding the role of Buddhist value in Sri Lanka, is that in Sinhala folk traditions especially, Buddhism is integral to the crisis of the state. Furthermore, the state, and the circumstance of society within it (in conflict or harmony), is a metaphor for manifold personal crises (often expressed in the form of illness, frequently characterized as demonic). This is overtly acknowledged in the Sinhalese Buddhist texts of healing that recount events in the history of the Sinhalese Buddhist state as intimately reflective of issues pertaining to the restoration of individual well-being through the transformation of destructive anti-human and anti-Buddhist-order-of-things into a force submissive to and constitutive of Buddhist value. Metaphors of the righteous (and encompassing, totalizing) Buddhist state are central to many rites concerned with affecting both individual health and the order of community and society. In post-colonial Sri Lanka what was metaphor was reinvented as political and social reality, and as we have described, became a motivational and structuring dynamic integral to the development of an overall situation of terror and terrorism. Our approach then has been holistic and has resisted the reductionism that conceives of terror and its dynamics as either an anti-state or an anti-social-order process. Our analysis has re-centred the importance of the state in the understanding of contemporary terrorism. Our aim has been to set the ideology of state crisis (and their resolution) in a global context of state transition and transformation, and of the shifting networks of the global corporate state – it was, after all, the Washington-New Delhi axis that masterminded the demise of the Rajapakses' programme, as China's intervention on the side of the Sri Lankan state proved too destabilizing for dominant Western-Indian interests in the island (Parajasingham 2017). The situation of terror and terrorism in Sri Lanka assumed its dimensions in the context of global forces affecting state sovereignty and changes in the balance of world power. Sri Lanka was a state in political and economic crisis that opened fractures among the political elites formed in the various relations of caste and ethnicity. Terror was shaped in the conditions of such crisis and itself (terrorism) became a vital element (both as a state and state-resistant practice) in the political transformation of Sri Lanka into a more authoritarian form, in which the rights of all citizens were threatened, a realization in modernity of the potential of the illusory imagination of an ancient polity reinvented as the resolution of the fissures

that are thoroughly of contemporary political and economic processes. What we have shown is that the mythic achieves its popular potency through the mythopoeia of everyday rites whose dynamic logic (of myth and rite) embeds a particular discourse of state power, and that this became a vital force in the contemporary circumstances of Sri Lanka's state crisis.

Acknowledgements

We wish to acknowledge the support of the EU Advanced Grant Egalitarianism project in the research and writing of this chapter and a Visiting Fellowship from Griffith University which enabled Professor Kapferer to carry out research in Queensland in 2015.

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CHAPTER 9

Inside and outside the state in Italy and Botswana

Historical and comparative reflections on state apparatuses of capture and rhizomic forces

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It is certainly true, that 'the State as such … cannot be easily attacked or destroyed' (Badiou 2005:110). Even in the current age of neoliberalism and intensified globalization, argues Harvey (2006:28), the wide-ranging reconfigurations of state institutions and practices indicate that the state is not redundant. Harvey substantiates, convincingly, the claim that states have the capacity to prevail in the face of new challenges in a radically changing world. In my view, these notions reflect the fact that states are vested with a transcending omnipotence that, in the words of Kapferer (2008:7), is 'oriented to achieving an exclusive and overarching determining potency in the fields of social relations in which it is situated and which state or state-related practice attempts to define' (see also Gulbrandsen 2014:14ff.). At the same time, however, Clastres (1989:189ff.) was certainly right in contending that no matter how omnipotent and sustainable they are, states are always circumscribed by non-statist forces, exterior to the state, working – at least potentially – in ways destructive to the order of the state.

This duality of forces that, on the one hand, are vested in the state and, on the other hand, surround and confront the state, suggests a fundamentally antagonistic relationship between the interiority and exteriority of the state. Such a conception is reflected in Deleuze and Guattari's (2003:424ff.) important view of the state as vested with an 'apparatus of capture' that is always challenging and being challenged by rhizomic forces denoted, in these authors' terminology, as 'war machines'. In their conception, the strength of 'the State' basically depends on the capacity of the 'apparatus of capture', as they argue that 'the State is sovereignty. But sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, appropriating.' (2003:360). They hold that

the state is vested with sustainable 'organs of power' and 'has always been in relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship'. This is not a matter of 'foreign policy' in relation to other states. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari's concern is with, on the one hand, 'huge world-wide machines' like multinational organizations or religious formations such as Christianity and Islam, and on the other, 'local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in relation to the organs of State power' (ibid.).

These are, as suggested, all forces exterior to the state vested with a capacity to challenge the state, i.e. 'war machines', which, in Deleuze and Guattari's conception, always operate in fundamental conflict with the order of the state and its 'apparatus of capture'. In their scheme, the 'state apparatus of capture' and the 'war machine' are irreducible to one another while simultaneously having no independent existence; they co-exist in 'competition in *a perpetual field of interaction*' (2003:360, italics original). The state is hence always potentially or manifestly threatened by its exteriority; that is, by what 'escapes the State or stands against States' (2003:361).

In these authors' conception, such antagonism does not involve, in any sense, a stable balance of power. On the contrary, the relationship is highly dynamic; any successful advance of the state apparatus of capture readily triggers war-machine metamorphoses, generating rhizomic forces in new disguises. Hence, states are always challenged by forces exterior to themselves or are facing the challenge of capturing what escapes their structures of domination. But, of course, the ways in which the interior-exterior dynamics have worked themselves out differ tremendously cross-culturally and historically.

I have found these theoretical considerations helpful in my present effort to discuss transmutations of power in processes of colonization in the long-term perspective of changing historical realities. I am pursuing this overall issue by, firstly, discussing colonial states' struggles to expand their realm in the face of challenging rhizomic forces. Secondly, I want to address the challenge for post-colonial states of establishing a modern, independent state, in view of their generation of new exteriorities, even at the heart of the state, manifesting rhizomic forces in ever changing disguises. In order to demonstrate how contrastingly the expansion of colonizing forces can work themselves out in different colonial contexts and historical situations, I shall pursue these issues by reflecting comparatively upon the colonization of the island of Sardinia in the Mediterranean, and of the Tswana and other peoples of the present Botswana. In this, I shall draw upon my recent fieldwork in Sardinia and many years of research in Botswana.

As we shall see, while Sardinia was subject to consecutive colonizing states, from the Phoenicians onwards, these always struggled to gain full control over the population of the island. However, Britain's establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was hardly ever resisted; to some extent, it was even appreciated. The development of the modern Italian state by capturing Sardinia into its trajectory is perceived by many Sardinians I have encountered as highly exploitative, and is even seen as another colonization of the island. The establishment of the modern state in Botswana brought, by contrast, the Tswana and other peoples of that country into full control of the modern, post-colonial state. In both of these cases, we shall see how the modern state is vested with a forceful apparatus of capture, containing a pervasive capacity to incorporate the population into its structures, yet at the same time creating new exteriorities with challenging potentialities.

I want to demonstrate that state interior-exterior dynamics in the two cases differ sharply by means of what Sahlins and others have dubbed uncontrolled comparison, which I find helpful in achieving a higher degree of reflexivity conducive to comprehending the significance of some important cultural and social-political phenomena pertaining to the two cases (Herzfeld 2001:259ff.). Due to space limitations, and because I have analysed the Tswana case extensively in previous publications,[1] my analysis will privilege the Sardinian case, using the Tswana for comparative reflection. Nevertheless, I will represent the two cases sufficiently comprehensively to demonstrate huge differences in forms of colonial state expansion and modern state formation in relation to challenging forces generated in exteriorities of the state.

Challenges of colonial state formation

Located in the middle of the Mediterranean, the population of Sardinia has, as far back as historical accounts go, been in interaction with peoples from the wider world. While there is evidence of human settlements on the island dating as far back as 120,000 BC, the first records of actual colonial settlements, by Phoenicians, 'only' go back to 900 BC (Tanda 1995). During Sardinia's prehistoric past, its population was ostensibly in full control of the island, especially in the era of what is presently conceived as the Nuragic civilization (e.g. Lilliu 2003). The people of this era have left momentous stone constructions – according to some sources more than 8,000, erected from 1,800 BC onwards – that are, to a great extent, still found over significant parts of the island. They feature in popular discourse as major symbols of a proud ancient past of prosperity and social order, although very little is actually known about their social and political organization..

1 Especially, Gulbrandsen 2014; see also 1993, 1995, 1996a and b, 2003 and 2007.

The Nuragic era allegedly prevailed for some 1,500 years; that is, until significant exterior forces commenced encroachment on the island. There appears to have been a soft start to what, in due course, would become ever more violent confrontations between internal and external forces. Thus, the first historically recognized people of significance to arrive – Phoenicians from Carthage – restricted, in the beginning, their occupation to establishing some coastal settlements, including Tharros, ostensibly in peaceful intercourse with Sardinians. However, when the Phoenicians, around 650 BC, established a military force and expanded into the island's fertile plains, they began exploiting the wheat production there at the cost of the indigenous population. In due course, they also extracted salt and silver. The Sardinians responded to the intrusion by violently attacking Phoenician settlements. By calling upon assistance from Carthage, the Sardinians' offensive was successfully counteracted and the Phoenicians took firm control of significant parts of southern Sardinia.

The long Roman era on Sardinia – lasting for almost 700 years – was initiated in 238 BC, in the wake of the First Punic War, with the establishment of Sardinia and Corsica as Roman provinces (Mastino 1995). Existing coastal settlements on Sardinia were expanded, and new ones were established and populated by Roman immigrants. Wilson points out that Sardinia was more fertile than Corsica and represented 'a major corn supplier of Italy at the time of the late Republic; herein lay her sole political importance. Yet her inhabitants were not to be trusted, *banditry was rife*.' (2006:442, italics added).

This observation of banditry reflects that, first Phoenician, and then Roman expansion into Sardinia's fertile lowland plains, progressively instigated Sardinians to escape into the highlands of central Sardinia. These regions of the island were highly inaccessible – and remained so to a significant extent into the twentieth century – which meant that they were only partially under Roman and successive colonizing states' control, despite the deployment of military garrisons in places such as the present-day village of Mamoiada in the central highland of Barbagia.[2]

2 According to Wilson (2006:443) 'The sending of 4,000 Jewish dissidents to Sardinia in A.D. 19, as raw recruits to help quell the still rebellious interior, with a clear hint that they were expendable in case of disease, suggests continuing problems in establishing a firm military stranglehold. To Rome this was the hostile territory of Barbaria, and although its collective peoples (civitates Barbariae) are recorded as paying homage on an inscription of either Augustan or Tiberian date, a military garrison of auxiliary units was needed to keep a watchful eye on the interior for much of the first century.'

We have at hand the initiation – some 2,000 years ago – of a very long series of relationships of conflict between the successive state forces colonizing Sardinia and the resisting populations of the island, generating, as I shall explain, patently rhizomic forces, the remains of which are still at work. In other words, the generation of exteriorities to the state – which has been identified in many parts of the Mediterranean (see, for example, Hobsbawm 2003:7ff.; Sorge 2014) – has a very long genealogy in Sardinia, where anti-state orientations are still, as we shall see, quite strong.

From the time the Romans were defeated by the Vandals in 456 AD and until the eighth century AD, the island was invaded by Vandals and Byzantines, with the latter finally withdrawing in response to mounting Arab attacks.[3] At that time, indigenous state processes were set in motion through which the island was divided into four sovereignties, known as *giudicato* (pl. *giudicati*),[4] each with military forces to defend their respective realms against the notoriously challenging Arabs. Moreover, for the exercise of jurisdiction and collection of tax, each *guidicato* was divided into administrative units (*curie*) comprised of a number of villages. The *guidicati* had no feudal structure (see Bloch 2004:247), but were supported by a class of independent landlords to whom I shall return in a subsequent section. The *guidicati* came under the influence of Genevan and Pisan forces. Furthermore, Pisa's attempt to frustrate the Papal State's (under Innocent III, r.1,198–216) effort to establish authority in Sardinia was only partially successful (see Moore 1987).

After a complex interplay between Sardinian and external forces, the island was finally conquered by the Kingdom of Aragon in the early fifteenth century; the Spanish henceforth embarked on colonizing the island. That was the end of indigenous state processes in Sardinia, as the Spanish colonial state entailed the progressive formation of a new hierarchical order, notably by establishing a feudal system with predominantly Spanish nobles as landlords. This nobility's integration into the colonial state is underscored by the fact that numerous landlords retained their residences in Spain, and were closely connected to the Spanish crown. Compared with Britain's light colonization of the Tswana (see below), which entailed virtually no settler colonization (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 1 and 2), the Spanish on Sardinia set in motion a much more radical transformation, in which the Spanish themselves engaged extensively, in particular by appropriating vast areas of fertile land and establishing feudal structures of domination.

3 See Galoppini 1995; Mastino 1995; Tanda 1995.

4 They grew out of the preceding Byzantine administrative division of the island (see, for example, Galoppini 1995).

This feudal system was instrumental in the colonial state's efforts to expand its realm on the island by capturing ever larger sections of the Sardinian population, especially on the plains, and subjecting them to heavy taxation, fees and obligatory services (*corvè*). Hundreds of fiefs occupied large parts of Sardinia's most productive land, catching people up in feudal structures controlled by the colonial state. During the centuries of Spanish exploitative colonization of Sardinia,[5] most of the Sardinians – largely an impoverished population recurrently victim to plagues – experienced the colonial state as a persistently brutal force of repression.

This brings me to a chief concern of this chapter: how the expansion of the various colonial states into the island of Sardinia entailed a polarization between state forces and local communities, a process lasting for about four centuries. The repressive Spanish colonial state caused many Sardinians to flee, notably to locations beyond the territorial limits of the feudal structures and colonial state control. This consolidated some sections of the population in the mountainous heartland of predominantly shepherd communities, above all the central highland of Barbagia (a named derived from the Romans' identification of the population as 'barbarians').

These communities – composed of shepherds with great capacity to move and hide in terrain quite inaccessible to colonizing forces – generated a multitude of rhizomic forces consisting of highly mobile bands that raided, in ever new disguises, feudal estates and villages in the lowland. Sardinians' reactions to the colonizers' conquest thus took many forms, yet might be summarized by the generic notion of banditry (*banditismo*; see, for example, Moss 1979). The structural contradictions vested in the relationship between statist processes and the challenging forces beyond their reach has, as we shall see, set the stage for the generation of rhizomic attacks on the order of the colonial state in successive historical contexts.

Sardinia presents a case that resembles many colonial-state situations around the world, characterized by an expanding colonial frontier of exploitative forces. Such settler-state developments were, of course, also distinctive of southern Africa, where violent expansion of imperial and colonial forces gave rise to European regimes, capturing indigenous populations into state structures of brutal racist domination. As I have discussed extensively

5 As Berger (1986:136) notes, 'the feudal system was particularly parasitic, since large surpluses extracted from rural producers were removed from the island to fund the courtly lifestyles of absentee feudal lords who maintained their residence in Spain. According to Mori (1966), of the 376 fiefs eventually created by Spain in Sardinia, 188 belonged to residents of Spain while 32 were in the name of the Spanish king himself.'

elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 1), in this violent context, the ruling groups of three major Tswana kingdoms (Bakwena, Bangwaketse and Bangwato) – located beyond the expanding frontier of the settler-states of Rhodesia and South Africa – accepted rather than resisted the British decision to take direct control over the vast tableland between Transvaal and the present Namibia.[6] Determined to establish supremacy of this enormous territory at minimal cost, the British were advantaged by the existence of a number of Tswana kingdoms (*merafe*, singl. *morafe*) that proved highly instrumental to implementing principles of indirect rule, as they established the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885 (preceding the present modern state of Botswana established as an independent state in 1966).

These *merafe* had, over the preceding hundred years, grown very significantly in strength and scale, as the kingship-monopolized fur and ivory trade had tremendously reinforced their apparatus of capture. The proceeds of this trade resourced the expansion of a cattle-centred political economy that strengthened the apparatus of capture vested in these polities, expanding their socio-political hierarchies by incorporation of vast alien groups. They were largely groups on flight westwards from the violent turmoil in the Transvaal, only to be incorporated in the structures of these Tswana *merafe*. The rhizomic potentialities of the increasingly complex assemblages of people of different origins were, as I have explained elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 1993, 2007), efficiently counteracted by a powerful mill of assimilation vested in the hierarchies of the politico-jural courts of the *merafe*.

Such a state apparatus of capture, embedded in each of the Tswana *merafe* officially recognized by the British, constituted a major force that proved to be highly instrumental for expanding the control of the colonial state beyond the limits of these *merafe* (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 1). At the same time, the Tswana kings (*dikgosi*, singl. *kgosi*) of each of the *merafe* within the Protectorate prevailed as the supreme authority over all the peoples living in the territories demarcated and assigned to each of the *merafe* by the colonial state, denoted as 'tribal reserves'.

6 The British' decision to establish the Bechanaland Protectorate was ostensibly much motivated by increasing German activity in the western part of Southern Africa. The British worried, argues Sillery (1974:75), 'that the Germans might join hands with the hostile Boers, or with the Portuguese, or even with other Germans who were in East Africa, cut the road to the north and thus permanently bar the Cape from access to central Africa?' As Maylam (1980:25) states, being 'in danger from three sides: South African Republic, Germany and Portugal', the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate served the British imperial interests in blocking South African and German expansion.

It is true that the practices of incorporation and assimilation into the dominant Tswana *merafe* were met with considerable resistance from several larger communities that opted for a direct incorporation in the colonial state. However, assisted by the colonial power at the very few occasions when violent enforcement was required, the Tswana rulers compelled these communities to subject themselves to these rulers' domination.

The colonial situation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate contrasts sharply with that of the Spanish one in Sardinia, where rhizomic forces worked in ever more challenging ways. This difference reflects the manner in which the respective state apparatuses of capture were operating in the two contexts. The Spanish established a colonial state by creating a feudal structure in the hands of mainly Spanish lords, who appropriated vast parts of Sardinia's fertile land. They expanded, as suggested, violently into the island in ways that created extensive exterior spaces, especially as substantial sections of the Sardinians escaped into the not easily controllable highlands, generating progressively more challenging rhizomic attacks.[7]

The main interest of the British, however, in the overall control of the vast territory of the southern African interior, was the blocking of other expanding, imperial forces. Only a very small colonial state administration was established, as the British relied on a selected number of Tswana rulers to control people and territory. These were rulers in control of polities with their own inherent apparatus of capture, which ensured that vast subject communities were brought under colonial state government (Gulbrandsen 2014:46ff.).

Smaller groups of people living scattered in areas distant from Tswana royal towns were captured by the Tswana and brought into serfdom, or they escaped to parts of this enormous country that were not under Tswana control. While Sardo communities of Sardinia's heartland were breeding grounds for mobile bands with extensive rhizomic capacities, the numerous small semi-stationary or mobile groups, like the foraging San-speaking peoples that resisted Tswana state apparatuses of capture by moving beyond their frontier, never had any force with which to challenge the *merafe* or the colonial state. With the Tswana pastoral frontier expanding far into the Kalahari, these peoples – classified by Tswana as inferior human beings – were progressively caught up in Tswana hierarchies, virtually as serfs (Wilmsen 1989:64ff.). They formed a highly exploited 'underclass of herders' at Tswana 'cattle posts' (ibid:130ff.), or they escaped the Tswana by moving to distant areas for hunting and gathering only – in due course – to find their

7 Actually, this process of escaping colonizing forces had already been anticipated in the times of the Romans (Meloni 1990).

hunting grounds deteriorated by cattle farming, whose spatial expansion were accelerated by post-colonial 'development' programmes. Foragers' highly egalitarian-commensal orientation did not provide the cultural or social conditions for standing up against these forces (Gulbrandsen 1991), in salient contrast to Sardinian pastoralists' competitive egalitarianism of *banditismo,* which instigated rhizomic attacks on the successive colonizing state forces.

We have, in other words, two radically different processes of colonial state expansion. Under the conditions of societies within the Protectorate, the British easily established a mild overrule that peacefully and efficiently captured the Tswana *merafe* and all other peoples into the order of the colonial state. The Tswana polities embodied state apparatuses of capture that were strengthened under colonial conditions and hence highly instrumental in expanding the interiority of the colonial state. The Spanish – and, as we shall see, subsequently, the kingdom of Piedmont – were far less capable of exploiting local structures of authority vested in feudal and semi-feudal landlords for capturing highland Sardinian communities into the interiority of the state.

Intensification of rhizomic forces in Sardinia

Having thus explained why the colonial state apparatus of capture in Sardinia gave rise to much more challenging, violent reactions than in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, I shall proceed by examining more closely the historical development of the apparatus of capture versus war machine/ rhizome dynamics in the Sardinian case. The violent character of the colonial state apparatus of capture and the generation of rhizomic forces became ever more evident after Sardinia had, by virtue of the London Treaty of 1718, been handed over from Spain to the kingdom of Piedmont on the mainland, which was ruled by the House of Savoy. By this territorial expansion, the House of Savoy elevated itself to what was named the kingship of Sardinia, albeit they remained seated in Turin. During the first hundred years of Piedmont-Savoy overrule, the efforts to crack down on what was identified as Sardo banditry intensified, although only to the effect of stimulating violent reactions in ever new ways. Hence, the state's apparatus of capture – in its violent form – provoked an expansion of the exteriority of the colonial state on Sardinia, generating ever more challenging rhizomic forces.

This development gained further impetus after Piedmont-Savoy was conquered by Napoleon (1798) and brought into the orbit of the associated enlightenment and revolution. Under Napoleonic supremacy, feudalism was abandoned and land was commercialized, entailing 'a shock to the still relatively traditional economic structure by introducing a set of successful commercializing reforms that utterly transformed north central Italian society'

(Ziblatt 2006:62). In due course, this transformation paved the way for the industrialization that gave rise to the dominant position – ever since – of the North, in the modern Italian context. The force of the Piedmont-Savoy rulers, evolving thus, proved highly instrumental within the major state-formation process on the mainland, which ultimately culminated in the establishment of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, following the annexations of several polities along the entire length of the Italian peninsula by the House of Savoy.[8]

With the fall of feudalism on Sardinia, a new colonizing tactic was implemented. As the customary communal land-tenure system was perceived as a major condition facilitating the prevalence of mobile pastoralists and hence *banditismo*, Piedmont-Savoy rulers initiated a land-enclosure movement on the island by the *Editto delle Chiudende* ('Edict of closure') of 1820. Although this reform was, at an overall level, probably related to the enclosure movements of the wide-ranging agricultural transformations in Europe in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in Sardinia the reform aimed at capturing pastoralists into structures of tight state control. That is, by tying them to a restricted piece of land as cultivators and developing an enterprising patronage class of agriculturalists with a dependent client class of agricultural labourers.

However, this endeavour was largely unsuccessful, mainly because the new landlords found it more beneficial to invest in sheep than agriculture. Many of them appropriated as private property vast areas of communal pasture, upon which impoverished pastoralists had depended, generating wide-ranging rhizomic forces that manifested in extensive sheep robbery and riots, and a series of murders of landlords (see Clark 1996:83; Lai 1998:76ff.; Sorge 2015:34f.). The state reacted with armed retaliation that further heightened popular reactions to the perceived escalating state oppression. The prevailing challenges to the state were also aggravated by feudal landlords' support of the peasantry, motivated by fear of their feudal estates being dissolved and made available for market transactions, as had been the case on the Italian mainland.

Despite this, only a decade after the introduction of the enclosure policy (1835), the Piedmont did indeed endeavour to modernize Sardinia more comprehensively by abandoning the feudal system on the island, as they had on the mainland. This venture amplified deprivation amongst the pastoral section of the population that depended heavily upon access to feudal land for off-season pasturage, generating further violence. Moreover, due to access to favourable French and US markets – where Sardinian cheese was treasured – the value of sheep and pasture increased substantially, escalating competition

8 The House of Savoy ruled Italy until 1946 when Italy was declared a republic.

for beast and land, and hence adding momentum to rhizome-generating forces.

In other words, state efforts to capture the challenging pastoral communities into a controllable societal fold, through projects of economic modernization and privatization, had serious repercussions. The consequent enhanced value of sheep and (now increasingly commoditized) land only intensified violent pastoralist attacks on farming communities (see Del Piano 1995:276). In the emerging imaginary of state officials – and, apparently, the Italian mainland population – this trend of violence identified Sardinia as a dangerous island, plagued extensively by delinquency. Thus, when the Savoy-driven process on the mainland culminated with the establishment of the modern nation-state of Italy in 1861, *banditismo* was, from the outset, recognized as the single most challenging problem facing the modern Italian state on Sardinia.

In order to establish a 'scientific' knowledge base for comprehending the problem, Niceforo (1977[1879]) conducted a major sociological study that initiated a long ethnocentric tradition of research, identifying pastoralists of the interior of Sardinia as constituting the island's *zona delinquente* ('a criminal area'). The pastoralists were alleged to be vested with a pathology that could infect the other, ostensibly healthy part of Sardinia (Marongiu 2004:73ff.; Schweizer 1988:21). The state saw this as a serious problem and major challenge that resulted in the development of a new and violent apparatus of capture in the form of a major military campaign, known as *caccia grossa* – 'the big hunt' (Brigaglia 1971:113ff.). A 'hunt' that fed into the dynamic of progressive polarization, expanding the exteriority of the state and hence the spaces with the potential for generating rhizomic forces.

During the twentieth century, economic development in Sardinia was focused on coastal areas, while the pastoral communities of the interior remained in an economically depressed backwater. These circumstances gave rise to a new kind of rhizomic activity, as *banditismo* now manifested itself in a major wave of kidnappings of people of power and wealth in urban centres and tourist zones, reaching their apex in the 1960s and 1970s (see Marongiu and Clarke 1993). For example, one high-profile target was the luxurious ghetto of the Aga Khan initiated exclusive tourist development at Costa Smeralda, where highly affluent and conspicuous consumption was displayed a relatively short distance from deprived pastoral communities of the Barbagia. The Italian state reacted to these challenges by substantially extending and strengthening its military police force (*carabinieri*) in all the villages of the Barbagia, and by deploying special state troops, *i caschi blu* ('the blue berets'**),** who embarked on spectacular hunts for bandits in the high mountains of the central Gennargentu range. This campaign, which at times amounted to no less than guerrilla warfare, only reinforced popular

ideas about Sardinians' capacity to stand up against the state. This occurred in a context where 'bandits' were often celebrated by people in Sardinia – far beyond Barbagia – as hero figures; the most famous ones[9] featuring in films that reached the wider world, where they were very well received.[10]

In other words, a major effect of the tremendous expansion of violent state power in efforts to bring the Barbagia under control was the reinforcement of an imaginary in which the Italian state was a brutal, alien force. This development exacerbated a major challenge to the state: people's rejection of the state's claim of a monopoly of jurisprudence and the exercise of violence. From the state point of view, these challenges further confirmed Italian notions of Sardinian primitivism rooted in pre-modern backwardness; that is, conditions in obvious conflict with the major virtues of a modern nation-state.

The prevalence of banditry in Sardinia in the context of the Sicilian mafia

The heroization of bandits reflects a prevailing undercurrent in the population against agents of the state and affluent people. This corresponds with Hobsbawm's (2003:20) notion of 'social bandits', identified in his seminal work on banditry as,

> peasant outlaws whom the landlord and state regarded as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case men to be admired, helped and supported.
>
> (Hobsbawm 2003:20)

Blok (2001:22) has attacked this notion by claiming that 'Hobsbawm's comparative treatment of banditry over-emphasizes the element of social protest while at the same time obscuring the significance of the links that bandits maintain with established power-holders.' What Hobsbawm has

9 Amongst these was perhaps the most famous bandit on Sardinia in recent times, Graziano Mesina of Orgosolo. He was a hero-bandit in the view of many Sardinians in the 1960s and 1970s, especially because of his exceptional ability to escape from jail (see, for example, Pisano 2004; Ricci 2009). Schweizer (1988:222) relates that 'The young good-looking bandit Graziano Mesina… was found in one study to be the most popular model for young men in Sardinia, before the football hero Gigi Rivi… TV teams and reporters came even from the mainland to get the story of the popular "king of the mountain region" (Marongiu 1981).'

10 Notable films were *Banditi a Orgosolo* (www.youtube.com/watch?v=itnOVhr3H7w) and *Disamistade* (www.youtube.com/watch?v=ON3SvjIn458).

identified as 'social banditry', Blok (2001:16) insisted, is empirically highly marginal, as 'bandits quite often terrorize those from whose very ranks they managed to arise'. With reference to a broad range of case studies from different parts of the world (ibid.:22ff.), Blok argued that 'banditry' most commonly appears in the form of robber bands that selfishly struggle for power and wealth by means of violence, and with little regard to the social status of victims. He claimed that rather than being governed by 'Robin Hood' virtues, bandits are often associated with oppressors and rarely with the oppressed. Bandits' association with the holders of power, he claims, reflects their dependency on protection, increasingly so the more successful they are (ibid.:18). Blok (2001:21) pointed out that in mid–nineteenth-century Palermo many delinquents and bandit leaders in Sicily 'were given special responsibility for public security', an avenue to 'respectability' as institutionalized in the mafia. In other words, there are 'conversions in which bandits turn into retainers and help reinforce oppression of peasantry'.

Blok's attack on Hobsbawm's analysis and his attempt to establish a different theory of banditry receives no support from my Sardinian ethnography, however. In this context, the notion of *banditismo* includes a wide range of violent practices that have never, as in Sicily and some other places, operated in support of the state, a ruling class or other elites. Hence, rhizomic forces generated in the contexts of Sardinia and Sicily have worked in radically different ways. This contrast can be related to Blok's (1974:10) point that in Sicily the '*Mafia* emerged in the early 19th century when the Bourbon State tried to curb the power of the traditional land-owning aristocracy and encouraged the emancipation of the peasantry.' The consequent abolishment of feudal rights and privileges, the formation of new entrepreneurial elites and the rising aspiration of the peasantry set the stage for the development of mafia (see Schneider and Schneider 1976:174ff.). Persons 'were recruited from the ranks of the peasantry to provide the large estate owners with armed staff to confront both the impact of the State and the restive peasants … turning outlaws and bandits into allies' (Blok 1974:11). And, note, the development of mafia activity involved, in this rendering, significantly more than organized violence: it captured people into structures of protection in a context where this could not be provided by the state. In particular, it ensured the entrepreneurial and propertied classes a degree of security that the weak presence of the state on Sicily was not able to provide (see Gambetta 1993).

Although the development of mafia on Sicily thus involved a certain degree of institutionalized – i.e. statist power beyond official state institutions – its relationship to the state proper became on the whole ambiguous rather than antagonistic. Their complex intercourse has been examined in a number of studies (e.g. Lupo 2004; Pezzino 1995) showing the extent to which mafia

activities and organizations have been conducive to the state's societal control and political leaders' electoral support, at the same time as representing major challenges to official virtues of democracy and state justice.

Many scholars have tried to come to terms with the conditions on Sicily responsible for its distinctive form of mafia practices and organization. Davis (1998:217), for one, argues interestingly that the 'paternalistic order' of the South collapsed much earlier than in Lombardy, Piedmont and Tuscany, making the South 'one of the principal epicentres of political upheaval, revolution, and endemic unrest and protest in Europe down to the middle of the nineteenth century'. It was in this context of a weak state and elites that had lost their grip on the societal order that the mafia emerged, filling a power vacuum. As this argument goes, because of the prevailing strength of its 'paternalistic order', the North was conversely saved from the development of mafia structures at that time.

What about Sardinia – an Italian region that apparently shares many of the features of the Italian 'South' (see Clark 1996)? The island is, in this context, a deviant case, not only in relation to Sicily, but also in relation to the northern as well as southern part of the Italian mainland. Although feudalism was abandoned about the same time on Sardinia and Sicily, *banditismo* was not transformed into *mafioso* activity on Sardinia, mainly because there was no critical power vacuum to fill as in Sicily. The Piedmont-based colonial state kept the Spanish landlords under tight control at the same time as it facilitated the establishment of a new land-owning class dependent on, and thus loyal to, the Piedmont regime. Moreover, the landlords on Sardinia were under significantly less challenge by rhizomic forces than on the far more populous Sicily, where a much larger deprived peasantry gave rise to mounting attacks.

As in northern Italy, the peasantry on the Sardinian lowland plains, where the large landlords were concentrated, was to a great extent kept in the fold of a 'paternalistic' order, which was, if required, backed by a highly present colonial state. At the same time, Sardinia differed notably from the North in the existence of large territories beyond the immediate domination of landlords and the overall control of the state. Hence, *banditismo* continued to prevail as a major challenge to the state and the elites, composed predominantly of landlords. But, as I have now explained, the conditions were absent for the formation of mafia practices and structures.

While Sardinian *banditismo* thus remained a force of violence challenging social order as seen from the point of view of the state, the formation of the Sicilian mafia represented a no less challenging rhizomic force. Thus, in both cases, challenging forces exterior to the state have prevailed. But there is a notable contrast between the two islands. The mafia evolved as a force by actively infiltrating the state at its core, creating rhizome-generating spaces

exterior to the state apparatus of capture, yet always within or in the vicinity of state institutions. Hence the mafia's considerable impact on the development of modern Italy. In Sardinia, by contrast, bandits made no such attempt to infiltrate state institutions by secretive intercourse with its agents. Rather, as I shall now discuss, *banditismo* here – and other practices like that of the *faida* challenging the state's insistence of a monopoly of physical violence – have provoked the state to expand very substantially its apparatus of capture; predominantly by a strong presence of police forces all over the island.

Challenging state monopolization of violence: protecting the cultural wealth of *faida*

It is a crucial point that the challenges of the state are culturally anchored in pastoral communities of Sardinia in ways that go significantly beyond 'social protest'. Practices of violence here are closely linked with the symbolism of *onore* (honour) and the cultural construction of manhood, as in many other pastoral communities of the Mediterranean (e.g. Herzfeld 1985). Although the heroization of bandits who were attacking people of prominence and wealth, often attached to the state, finds resonance in a deprived population (the Robin Hood aspect), popular admiration of bandits is mainly conceived in terms of their fearless forcefulness, cleverness and independence. Esteemed above all is their ability to hide and survive in the wilderness for weeks, if not months; in particular in the highly inaccessible *supramonte*. Amongst the people of Barbagia the capacity to abscond from state military police forces, especially, symbolizes the celebrated virtue of being *balente*, which signifies a person's proficiency in standing up, with force, fearlessness and shrewdness, against any danger. Such a person is attributed with *balentia* (see Pigliaru 2000:218ff.) and, in challenging agents of the state, they epitomize the highly appreciated force inherent in Sardinian communities that came home to me as I listened to narratives about their claims to control over the *carabinieri*. An example would be the tale of an outlaw, hiding in the mountains, who came to the village to marry his fiancée in the parish church, an event followed by *pranzo* and *cena* with hundreds of guests – including the head of the local carabinieri.

Balentia might well be seen as a 'key symbol' (Ortner 1973), containing a cluster of codes and values articulated through practices that demonstrate a person's force, bravery, stamina and courageous independence. This is a quality closely associated with the idealizing notion of *noi pastori* ('we pastoralists'), referring approvingly to people who successfully struggle to master a highly competitive, even violent lifeworld in Sardinia's wilderness. To be a pastoralist means to be located in an environment with a constant threat of livestock rustling, and thus the danger of losing the major source of

one's livelihood. At stake is also the pastoralist's reputation as a capable person (*abile*), connoting *balentia*. That is, a man left alone with the herd in the wilderness and successfully warding off livestock rustlers is typically reputed as *balente*. A *pastore* who has raised his reputation as *balente* – for example by successful sheep stealing – is a person who is less vulnerable to being robbed, except by persons of equal strength, courage and cunning.

Practices of sheep stealing make up quite elaborate 'games' within pastoral communities, and might entail violations (*violazioni*) perceived as damaging to a person's and his family's *onore*, calling for retaliation of a kind that sometimes escalates into a major *faida* (vendetta). A *faida* would typically progress, first, by sheep slaughter – a warning ('next time it's you') that might be reinforced by cutting the throat of the other party's horse, only to culminate in murder, often in the form of assassination. This is a practice of violence that is, as Pigliaru (2000:139) has elaborated, regulated by an intricate code, which he transcribed in writing as '*Il Codice della Vendetta Barbaricina*'. This codex frames social dramas that might, with intervals, prevail for decades, involving a 'game' of violence that demonstrates the capacity of its central actors to respond to being offended (*offeso*) by violence in ways that express fearlessness, independence and shrewdness. That is, in practices allowing a man to feature as *balente*. This demanding and indeed dangerous game is followed closely by the local community, which – though always observing the dictum of *omerta*, the oath of silence – tacitly evaluates the performance of those engaged; profoundly activating discursive practices centred in virtues of *balentia*.

From the Italian state-government point of view, the practice of *faida* represents a major challenge. Firstly, of course, because the local communities fiercely resist police involvement and hence contest the judicial authority of the state and its claimed monopoly of the exercise of physical violence. Secondly, the *faida* is seen as the epitome of Sardo primitivism, in particular as agents of the state readily condemn this practice as an indication of a disturbingly low valuation of human life and a disrespect of the rule of law. All the state efforts to counter these challenges by hunting down murderers have largely amplified the virtues of *banditismo*: the capacity of the retaliating parties in a *faida* to escape the *carabinieri* is indeed a major dimension of *balentia*. Conversely, from a local perspective, popular practices of dealing with violence are a question of realizing major indigenous virtues. Murder cannot, according to their value orientation, be dealt with properly by leaving it with the police – arrest, court trials and imprisonment. Rather, the state practices of dealing with it are counterproductive and incompatible with proper practices of re-establishing and enhancing *onore*, because this requires that blood is retaliated with blood within the context of *faida*.

The progressively increasing presence of the *carabinieri* in the mountainous interior of Sardinia in the 1960s and 1970s thus added considerable momentum to the long-term dialectical dynamics of mutual antagonism between the state and the population, and hence to rhizome-generating polarizations between the state and pastoral communities, which remained only partially captured into the interior of the state. The celebration of *banditismo* as a virtue that manifests the strength and capability to stand up against an encroaching and colonizing state could be conceived of as a major counter-hegemonic force. Furthermore, as I have indicated above, these challenges spring from an indigenous socio-cultural dynamics of violence that centre on virtues of *onore* and *balentia*, signifying core elements of the symbolic wealth vested in these communities. The practising of these virtues through *banditismo* and *faida,* as mentioned in the indigenous codex of *Il Codice della Vendetta*, represents a major challenge to the state for the obvious reason that these violent practices are entirely incompatible with the modern state's insistence on a monopoly of violence. During recent decades, considerable counter-forces have been at work, modifying people's acceptance of physical violence as a measure to settle conflicts, creating considerable disagreement about the codification of *balentia*. Nevertheless, according to my records, this virtue readily instigates actions of an anti-state orientation.

In conceiving this codex thus, as a matter of indigenous law incompatible with modern state law, an intriguing contrast emerges with the Tswana in the context of the modern state of Botswana. In Botswana, indigenous ('patrimonial') institutions of jurisprudence were from the outset captured into the modern state, as major instruments of societal control. They have continued to operate largely according to customary principles, at the same time as they are subject to a modern state-controlled customary court of appeal. The process of harmonizing state and 'tribal' jurisdiction was developed within the context of the colonial state and has by and large been continued; indigenous jurisprudence has thus been incorporated in the post-colonial state's administration of justice (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 4). This continuity is important for comprehending the strength and stability of the post-colonial state in Botswana. A massive flow of court cases, initiated at the descent-group level and appealed through the hierarchy of courts of the *merafe*, has contributed enormously to the reproduction of institutions that resolve most conflicts in a peaceful manner in ways that keep vast sections of the population in the societal fold (Gulbrandsen 1996b, 2014:165ff.).

This practice is premised, as among the Sardinians, upon an acute consciousness of the high value of popular engagement in dealing with conflicts. However, while the practices of *faida* are often driven by perpetual retaliations, operating violently in secret dyadic relationships (*omerta*) in

the pursuit of *onore* and a demonstration of *balentia*, the Tswana place tremendous value upon everybody's engagement in the treatment of conflicts and tension amongst people in their public councils (*kgotla*) in the process of reconciling conflicting parties. In Tswana ontology of power, peace and harmony (*kagiso*) are always of prime importance for keeping sociality cool. To avoid heat in all social relations is perceived as imperative, because *kagiso* represents the overarching and the cosmologically determined condition for promoting fertility, health and prosperity (Gulbrandsen 2014:174ff.). In this context, the state prevails as 'super-structural' in Foucault's (1980:122) sense, by capturing into its interior popular institutions of social control as well as the wealth of symbolic authority vested in these institutions (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 4).

It is true that in Sardinia during the interregnum between the withdrawal of the Byzantines and the initiation of Spanish supremacy, the island was divided into four *giudicati* (see above) that were developed largely in order to establish military forces against Arab attacks (see Boscolo 1978:112ff.). This development gave birth to two sets of indigenous Sardinian law codes – *Statuti di Sassari* (1316) and *Carta de Lugo* (1395). But jurisdiction in these cases was exercised through hierarchies of courts, with a collection of villages at the lowest level, in the hand of a ruling class of mighty landlords. It was in no sense popular and integral to society in the manner of the Tswana. Tswana jurisprudence, on the other hand, was based upon the highly inclusive and popular code of *mekgwa le melao* ('custom and law'), which facilitated a tacit and pervasive capture of the population into the structures of the state; whereas Sardinian law codes were both largely framed in the interest of the ruling class and, explains Berger (1986:130), 'primarily concerned with protecting and stimulating grain production'. This means that, during the time of the *giudicati*, there was only limited penetration of the legislation and administration of justice into areas that were predominantly occupied by pastoralists. The *giudicati* did not, therefore, seem to embody such apparatuses of capture as the Tswana kingdoms.

The expansion of the modern state and issues of legitimacy

Banditry in Sardinia, as I have explained, never had the conditions for the development of a mafia like that of Sicily. Neither has banditry given raise to violent political movements against the state, as found in other European 'peripheries', such as the Basque Country and Corsica. In discussing why this has not happened, let me take my point of departure in the encounters I have had with people around the island. In these I have often sensed a highly ambiguous – if not antagonistic – attitude to the Italian nation-state, particularly in comparison with my experience of how readily most

people of Botswana have accepted – even strongly appreciated – the post-colonial state (albeit not always its political leaders). I have frequently found myself participating in conversations, in many different quarters, where strong opinions have been expressed about being exploited by an alien and external power – in some people's view, even to the extent of considering Sardinia as still being colonized. References are typically made to Italian state appropriation of vast areas for military purposes, including the use of Sardinia as a testing ground for Italy's NATO allies and the establishment of the largest NATO airport in the Mediterranean. For many years, American nuclear-submarine bases featured as an epitome of external encroachment and domination. The perceived abuse of the island as a dumping ground for dangerous waste, including nuclear waste, symbolizes to virtually everybody with whom I have discussed this matter in Sardinia, the exploitative character of the Italian state (see, for example, Codonesu 2013).

The idea of the Italian state as a dominant and destructive force is sometimes epitomized by Sardinians imagining the Sicilian mafia operating in the disguise of state officials. For example, as one of my acquaintances complained, 'virtually all the prefects sent from Rome to our island are actually Sicilians…' Such conspiracies have many expressions, a more recent one referring to the Chinese's ostensible destructive penetration into the Sardinian economy, which, in popular discourse, involves a plot in which the Italian mafia joins forces with the Chinese mafia. As for the state's justice, this is not only challenged by highland Sardinians' rejection of the state monopolization of violence in some contexts. As elsewhere in Italy, the judicial system is perceived to be as infiltrated by personal relations and private interests as political life is in general. Recently, a major conflict built up in Sardinia regarding the installation of windmills for the generation of electric power in areas where they clash seriously with environmental interests. Popular protests levelled against the state were strongly nourished by the fact that the state supported off-island companies that wanted to exploit the island without generating any local benefits; it was also protested that the state had allowed strong mafia interests – allegedly Cosa Nostra – to infiltrate political bodies in the pursuit of reaping grand profits.[11]

Despite the popular critical views on the Italian state, Sardinia has not, I reiterate, developed the kind of permanent violent political movements that have become prevalent in other European peripheries. There have, however,

11 For example, *L'Espresso*, one of Italy's two major weekly magazines on political and societal issues, published, as the lead article (6 May 2010), a story about the way the Cosa Nostra is linking up with the state and regional leadership in an attempt to penetrate the emerging sector of green energy.

been a few – unsuccessful – attempts along such lines that illuminate the constraints involved. In the late 1960s, 'radical Sardinians believed in a guerrilla struggle to earn independence for the island, [coining] the slogan "*oggi banditti domani partisan*" ("today bandits tomorrow resistance fighters")' (Schweizer 1988:223). However, this never eventuated. Between 1978 and 1982 Barbagia Rossa operated as a militant popular organization with a strong communist orientation, hostile to the substantial increase in the number of military bases on the island. Many violent attacks were mounted against the military installations, but the organization remained without significant appeal to Sardinians at large. To a considerable extent the members of the Barbagia Rossa, which was linked with the Brigate Rosse on the mainland, were viewed by many people as criminals, because of their violent approach, rather than freedom fighters. After four years, the group was dismantled and its members jailed.

Despite the negative attitudes prevailing in the population towards the Italian state, the large majority of the people have been captured into its order. This means that mobilizations against the Italian state rarely exceed the limits set by state law. Heatherington's (2010:184ff.) accounts from the typical village of Barbagia *banditismo* – Orgosolo – illuminates how outlaw resistance to the state is currently perceived by quite a number of people as operating detrimentally to their interests. In discussing this community's attempt to challenge a major state encroachment – the establishment of a National Park on their pastoral commons – this author explains how popular protest involved constructing a 'moral discourse of embodied connections to land and landscape not only as actual herders but through broadly shared ties of work, food, and history linked to the Commons' (ibid.:186–7). As part of their attempts to establish authority as the authentic custodians of the commons, the organizers invited many people from different parts of the island to a festival in the honour of a local female icon, signifying their genuine connection to the landscape that was about to be appropriated into the domain of the state. This effort involved the demonstration of virtues that had resonance far beyond the Barbagia, above all that of hospitality.

The endeavour was, however, totally undermined by an ostensibly shocking action exercised by some elements within the community. A wild sheep – the 'poster-animal' for the pro-park movements in Sardinia, including the World Wide Fund for Nature – was found slaughtered and hanging at the crossroad leading to the festival, along with red spray-painted threats to politicians of all levels. The action, condemned by many as a disgrace, was attributed to a group naming itself 'Armed Anti-Park Front' that had already acknowledged vandalism and threats. It is precisely the tacitly accepted and capricious character of such violence that underscores its rhizomic character.

It is contradicting and undermining of local popular efforts to gain broader support for a challenge to the state in the wider Sardinian context by appealing to virtues that are also held by people beyond the limits of the highlands of Barbagia.

There is a heightened fear amongst villagers in the highlands of perceived malicious and violent practices, including *faida*, that have, as I have explained, ideally been conducted according to the above mentioned '*Il Codice della Vendetta Barbaricina*' in the pursuit of *onore*. The societal transformations over the last few decades have set in motion trends deteriorating the ideals of this *codice*. While *faida* used to be clearly restricted to two distinctive factions within a village, such factions have increasingly become linked to external networks through which foreign killers are recruited. They now operate in non-localized gangs, allegedly sometimes with *mafiosi* connections. These networks, which might include members of feuding families who have migrated out of the village (see Cossu 2007:174), are working in much harsher and more unpredictable ways than before. It is hence not unusual to hear complaints from villagers who say that they feel trapped in dangerous games of organized criminality, characterized by the highly unpredictable exercise of violence. In the view of my interlocutors, this conduct of *faida* conflicts seriously with virtues of *onore* and *balentia* – and hence is sometimes spoken of as *balentia negativa*.

The exercise of the kind of violence with which I have been concerned here has hence become much more unpredictable than before, readily leaving not only the feuding factions but the whole community in anxiety and fear. Many people I have met see this as a corruption of the principles and virtues of *faida* that makes these communities increasingly receptive to the state hegemonic discourse on justice, order and the criminalization of ancient practices of violence that have considerable symbolic value. Popular concern in these communities about this trend finds its expressions in calls to be, as in one community widely reputed for highly violent *faida* (Orune) put it, '*piu umana e piu civile*' ('more human and more civilized') (Contesta 1996:131).

The increasing ambiguity of *banditismo* is manifested, above all, in the linking of persons associated with pastoral communities with networks of trafficking – drugs, prostitutes and weapon – spanning Sardinia and beyond. This development raises great anxiety and fear everywhere, including in Barbagia communities, about the serious directions now taken by violent practices on the island. From the point of view of Sardinian highland villagers, the symbolic wealth vested in *Il Codice della Vendetta Barbaricina* and the esteemed virtues of *banditismo* are hence vulnerable to desecration. Moreover, the distinctiveness of Barbagia *banditismo*, as consisting of locally esteemed practices challenging social order and state jurisdiction, has been more

and more distorted by manifesting – in most people's view – mainstream organized criminality.

The expansion of the modern state as super-structural: 'positive' interventions of the state apparatus of capture

At the same time as people in the highlands have developed an increasingly critical attitude towards violent practices, and a more accepting orientation towards the state exercise of jurisdiction, they have also been captured into the interior of the state by its extensive exercise of positive power, in the Foucauldian sense (1980:121f.). When the Italian state started to penetrate Sardinia in the 1870s, the island was characterized by poor communication that made many communities isolated and the Sardinians divided. The communities themselves were organizationally focused as *famiglia*,[12] a social form founded on the principles, internally, of solidarity and mutual support. Externally, the *famiglia* was linked to individuated networks of friendship (*amicizia*), mediators (*mediatore*) and patron-client relationships. The local communities have, as explained above, generally been described as tense and competitive, and are characterized by families' and individuals' defence of livestock, land and honour (*onore*). Under these circumstances – and in a context of inequality of wealth and thus power – people have sought the protection of patronage. At the arrival of the agents of the state, existing and new networks of patron-client relations have developed and progressively captured people – directly and indirectly – into dependency on the state, which accelerated as the welfare state developed after the Second World War.

From an early stage in the development of the modern state in Italy, explains Pareto (1950), patronage became pervasive in political life. With such a conjuncture of internal and external premises for organizing relations of power on Sardinia, it is no surprise that patron-client ties emerged as the dominant mode of local political organization. Gaps in the system – between village and town, and between villagers and the governing elite – opened up for mediators and patronage (Weingrod 1968:391). The generation of clientelistic networks by state agents was tremendously amplified after the Second World War, when the Democrazia Cristiana (DC – the Christian Democratic Party) was in power for almost 40 years, and in control of the vast resources of an ever expanding welfare state. The intertwining of party and state gave rise to what was known as a *partitocrazia*, by means of which the DC penetrated the state, taking control of a large number of public institutions. Patron-client relations became pervasive at all governmental levels, not only in Sardinia,

12 That 'family' encompassed, at the most, parents and their unmarried children and married sons with their offspring.

but also throughout Italy (Newell 2000:48). Of course, the Catholic Church represented a major and tacit force underpinning this development (see Pollard 2008:157ff.).

While the militant political movement Barbagia Rossa has remained with virtually no popular support, Sardinian political parties that have worked peacefully, on constitutional premises, in the pursuit of greater – even, by some, full – independence for the island, have also not been very appealing to the electorate. This reflects the fact that the Sardinian branches of the Italian national parties have been well resourced to expand clientelistic networks that have captured the Sardinians into a perceived dependency on the state. The national political parties have successfully created an image of themselves as indispensable in advocating Sardinian interests in Rome.

The extensive clientelistic networks that have captured much of the population into the structures of the state are, of course, neither formal nor official parts of governmental institutions. They are, in a profound socio-cultural sense, formations vested in the population that both pre-date and go beyond the modern Italian state government, and, crucially, infiltrate this government in ever new ways. I shall return to their consequent ambiguous relationship to the state. In the present context, I want to emphasize that they illuminate the way the state prevails, as already suggested, by virtue of being 'superstructural in relation to a whole series of existing power networks' (Foucault 1980:122). This is, as suggested above, in important respects the way in which the colonial state brought itself into control of the peoples of Bechuanaland – by capturing into its interior the structures of a number of Tswana *merafe*. Elsewhere I explain extensively how these 'patrimonial' assemblages of power were, by de-colonization, quite smoothly incorporated into Botswana's modern state formation (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 3–7).

Even more importantly, indigenous relations and institutions in Botswana, as well as clientelistic formations in Italy, have, paradoxically, facilitated another important aspect of modern state formation: the governmentalization of the state in Foucault's (1978) sense. Governmentalization captures the population into the structures of state domination through subtle and tacit practices, in which the state works on people's subjectivities in an effort to feature as a positive force in popular imagination, especially through the implementation of welfare programmes. This concept helps us to identify and comprehend processes by which the state expands by intervening as a highly constructive force, with schools, health services, roads and other welfare facilities. Elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 7), I have explained – in the case of Botswana – how such interventions generate a register of new desires and dispositions that bring the population into dependency on the modern state, with all its welfare practices and provisions. A similar notion of state

'positive' power obviously pertains to the Italian state's post-Second World War interventions on Sardinia. In combination with the rise of capitalism and the market economy, the governmentalization of the state has in both cases contributed to a tremendous expansion of the interiority of the state.

Development of new spaces for the generation of rhizomic forces

It is an irony that with an expanding interiority of the state, new exteriorities – actual or potential – are developing, as reflected in Deleuze and Guattari's notion of their mutually conditioning existence (see introduction section above). It is true that clientelistic networks have contributed immensely in capturing the population into a kind of dependency on the state that significantly reduces the potential for them to become a challenging force. Nonetheless, the political practices of particularism, the private character of political relations and the harsh and secretive exercise of power in clientelism represent major challenges to the ideals of the modern democratic state – they all contradict virtues of universalism and transparency. These are some of the grey areas in which rhizomic forces thrive, even at the heart of the state. Examples may be found in the representations of Berlusconi's corrupt practices and his connections with mafia forces.

These grey areas are evident at all levels of the Italian government, and so are popular images of rhizomic forces and abuses of power that challenge the ideals of a state that provides welfare and justice for all citizens. In Sardinia, such imaginaries – fictional or real – of abuse of power amongst people in official positions, might well provoke popular reactions in the form of violent attacks on such people by, for example, setting fire to their cars or placing a bomb on the doorsteps of their houses. Because of the clientelistic and hence privatized character of the political field, popular activism in public space is restrained, often compelling people to express their challenges to the state and its agencies in a violent language. In other words, rank and file sections of the population – the vast majority – are readily generating an(other) exteriority to the state, where rhizomic forces thrive. What is more, the secretive character of violent practices is equally pertinent within the political field, and are a major premise for many people's avoidance and even fear of engaging in politics. It seems evident that the perpetuation of violent practices reflects their longstanding genealogies on the island, and the reproduction of the virtues of revenge in many fields of the contemporary society.

The development of exteriorities to the modern state in Botswana, as well as the imaginaries of rhizomic forces there, are very different. Rather than privatized clientelistic networks, indigenous polities in Botswana contain institutionalized hierarchies of authority that have proved to be very instrumental in capturing the population into the predominantly public,

state-centred networks of power (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 4–7). There, modern political practices and governmental institutions ensure the distribution of public resources according to universal principles to a much greater extent than in Italy. Politicians have come to power, particularly during the first independence decades, without extensive corruption, mainly because they were in a position to tap the state treasury through parliamentary-sanctioned programmes, projects and policies of 'development' (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 3). This represented a major condition, during the formative decades of the post-colonial state in Botswana, for the capture of all the significant elites of the country into the process of state-formation, ensuring the strength of the state and a high degree of stability in the political leadership. There was, however, a turning point in the late 1980s, when a tremendous expansion of urban centres and the non-farming sectors of the economy was in progress. With the resources of the state treasury deriving from diamond mining, ever stronger private interests penetrated the organs of the state, as reflected in an increasing number of corruption scandals (Good 2008).

These developments – the 'legal' tapping of generous 'development' programmes as well as mounting corrupt practices – brought a number of people rapidly to power and wealth, while the vast majority remained in poverty. As I have explained elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 2003, 2014:ch. 8), this development gave rise to a popular discourse of 'ritual murder', in which people of power and wealth – chiefly elite politicians – might be suspected of using the occult in abuses of power. That is, in the popular imaginary, there evolved a space at the heart of the state where people empowered themselves by means of such highly unconstitutional methods as killing a girl to obtain perceived highly potent 'medicine'. In this imaginary, such people are secretly engaging in violent battles for power and wealth, generating disastrous 'heat' that is perceived as destructive to *kagiso* at the state centre, and which is therefore damaging to the entire nation. This case illuminates how the conception of rhizomic forces at the political centre – anchored in indigenous cosmology – has given rise to a subaltern popular discourse that attacks the perceived dangerous and destructive exercise of power amongst people in control of the state.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have been centrally concerned with transmutations of power relations in a long-term perspective. Inspired by Clastres, and by Deleuze and Guattari's conception of forces working inside and outside the state, I have attempted to demonstrate how differently state forces penetrate populations in contrasting colonial situations and historical contexts. On the one hand, the British colonizers readily captured the Tswana kingdoms into their structures

and made the local institutions instrumental in bringing the population under firm control with a minimal exercise of violence. As these kingdoms themselves embodied state apparatuses of capture, they proved highly useful for implementing principles of indirect rule. This meant that practically all the peoples of the Bechuanaland Protectorate were quite peacefully brought under the control of the colonial state, and remained so for about eighty years.

On the other hand, while the successive colonial states in Sardinia have had few problems in bringing the lowland populations under their control, colonization of the highlands has been met with severe resistance ever since the Phoenicians expanded into the island some 2,600 years ago. This resistance has, to a great extent, been a matter of escaping state control by creating spaces outside the state with considerable potential for generating rhizomic forces that recurrently challenge civil security and state order. These forces reflect a rejection of state's insistence on the monopoly of physical violence. The confrontational relationship between the successive colonizing states and the highlanders finds, as I have discussed, its most vigorous expression in the practices of *banditismo*, which are greatly determined by highlanders' cultural valorization of a distinctive form of honour that finds its most prominent expression in virtues of masculinity and virility (*balentia*).

The Tswana – and peoples they have captured into their socio-political structures – quite readily identified with, and submitted to, the hierarchical and institutionalized order of their kingdoms. Moreover, as I have explained, the Tswana strongly valued non-violent practices of conflict resolution in the pursuit of the highly esteemed value of reconciliation and hence *kagiso*. This involves practices and institutions of jurisprudence that became integral to the colonial state, and then the modern state of Botswana.

Unlike the Tswana, the Sardinian highlanders have no indigenous institutionalized structure beyond the level of *la famiglia* for conflict resolution. This, in combination with a strong orientation towards competitive egalitarianism centred on virtues of *balentia*, readily led to never-ending vendettas – highly esteemed practices of violence that highlanders have fiercely protected against police interference. The state insistence on the monopoly of physical violence has been strongly resisted.

The colonization of the peoples of the Bechuanaland Protectorate resulted in a transmutation of power, in the sense of expanding and strengthening domination of the Tswana kingdoms, in addition to propelling their integration into the interior of the colonial state. By contrast, the transmutations of power caused by the colonizers' intrusions on Sardinia have entailed progressively increasing polarization between state forces and the highland population, and recurrent challenges from the exterior of the state. Only recently has a very different mode of power transmutation been initiated, with the establishment

of the modern welfare state after the Second World War. This was, I have explained, a matter of a governmentalization of the state that in Italy – as well as in Botswana – immensely reinforced the state apparatus of capture.

In Botswana, the institutions of the Tswana kingdoms proved highly conducive to a major transformation in the exercise of power, embedding most of the population in the development of the post-colonial state. In the Italian context, this reinforcement was facilitated by pervasive structures of patronage that proved very instrumental in the state government's penetration of Italian society, including the interior of Sardinia. Nevertheless, in both cases we have also seen how these recent transformations of power relations have given rise to new exteriorities of the state, with rhizome-generating potentialities that encourage people to call for civic order and a state that supports the common good.

Acknowledgements

I am most grateful for all the helpful comments received during my work with this chapter, from Noar Ben-Yehoyada, Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, John Comaroff, Elsa Kaarbø, Adam Kuper, Franco Lai, Dante Oleanas, Antonio Pusceddu, Theodoros Rakopoulosa, Antonio Sorge and Alessandro Zagato. Bruce Kapferer has been a highly stimulating discussion partner, always with challenging comments that are indeed appreciated. I am also most thankful for Sean Kingston's careful editing, which has significantly improved the chapter.

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CHAPTER 10

Arts for the people

Public support and private patronage

Judith Kapferer

Private patronage of the arts (music, painting and sculpture, literature, drama, architecture) has a long history, and one closely bound up with mediaeval, Renaissance and post-Renaissance politics, in particular (see Burckhardt 1990; Cummings and Katz 1987; Elias 1982; Kempers 1987; Kettering 1992). Conversely, public support for the arts, largely through the operation of modern state power, has a fairly short and recent history (see, for example, Minehan 1977; Pearson 1982).

It is support for the arts that is my theme here. I want to examine the idea that such support, public or private, moves both corporate and state economics and politics into ever closer alignments of their respective governing projects: the taking and keeping of the power to direct mundane and extraordinary events in public and private lives. My discussion is largely confined to the development of the arts in the United Kingdom.

I argue that the intersection of power, politics and the arts in everyday life has far-reaching implications for the constant reconfiguring of the ideologies and institutions of contemporary state apparatuses. In shaping views of the significance of the cultural in the constellation of social affairs, the relation between commerce, the arts and the state runs deep (see, for example, Higgins 2009; Lewis 1980; Rawsthorn 2006) Thus I propose to explore the extent to which consumer patronage and state mediation of the arts have an impact far beyond worldly considerations of price and value in the art market. They also, I contend, alter the role of state and commercial collaboration in the legitimation of a capitalist social order.

An analysis of the validation of state power and its relation to private and individual or corporate command, as demonstrated in the world of the

arts, may further understanding of the increasingly complex relationships between the state, the business corporation and what we may call 'the people' today. It may also shed some light on connections between the state and the corporation with regard to some of the difficulties experienced in controlling or guiding private profit and political interest in the direction of popular sentiment and democratic agreement.[1] The policies and practices of the state that engage with the economic and financial activities of production, distribution and consumption of material and non-material goods alike can be construed as accommodating the interests of national and international political and economic players. At the same time, policies and practices which impinge on the economic and financial activities of capital accumulation have been increasingly turned to the benefit of the political economy of both states and corporations, and, as I will argue, to the detriment of the non-material conditions of existence.

Cultural elites and popular arts

The arts have always depended on state, individual and, latterly, corporate patronage for their sustenance, but the present context brings new controls to bear on creative practice and production. In the past, artists of all kinds were thoroughly aware of the constraints under which they laboured, but now there is a view abroad that though they are convention breakers, enduringly critical, they may now be more prone to ideological direction than hitherto. Of course, artists are well aware of this possibility. By dint of prizes and awards from official and/or eminent bodies charged with the maintenance of what constitutes accepted modes of cultural practice, artists have been intermittently consecrated and brought into the fold of the state nobility (see Bourdieu 1996). Simultaneously these honours confer an aura of legitimacy to the state dispensing them.[2] This is a process that Deleuze and Guattari (2004) would describe as an 'apparatus of capture', a practice of defanging oppositional protest not unlike Marcuse's (1964) 'repressive tolerance'.

1 The conduct of foreign affairs and treaty obligations are obviously mutual concerns, as are state efforts to shore up both local economies and the entire economic system; but the ideological ramifications of all these arrangements are arguably of equal significance for the consent or dissent of whole populations in the operation of the global management of human events and social-cultural well-being, at least in the long run.

2 In addition, such personages as sports people, environmentalists, charity workers and philanthropists have, increasingly frequently in the United Kingdom at least, been granted honorary degrees and/or rewarded with peerages, and raised to the status of a new and unelected aristocracy with political influence.

Nonetheless, much music, literature or art stretches, even moves beyond, the limits of propriety or political rectitude, or at least initially appears to do so. The ongoing research on art fairs on which this chapter has been partly based has utilized ethnographic methods such as participant observation, as well as historical records and documentary analysis, to explore meanings of innovation and self-promotion in a context of commercial competition and the pursuit of social status. Much of this reflects the ideas of originality and sensation which characterize art worlds. I have focused on the Frieze Art Fair in London, founded in 2003, which is one of the best known of these fairs, having been developed by people who felt the need for a distinctively British (specifically English) presence in the visual art worlds of the twenty-first century. Like all such events, the fair is first and foremost a trade fair, sponsored by interested commercial establishments of a related mercantile nature (banks, insurance companies, luxury goods): a venue for buying, selling and negotiating purchases and accumulating prestige. Sideshows include specially commissioned works, educational activities for children, talks and discussions (*in situ*), and gallery tours complete with champagne breakfasts in the city – all facilitating social-network formation and the gleaning of gossip and information about and amongst artists, dealers, curators and collectors. In fact these 'sideshows' are vital to the commercial production of the fair: though central, not peripheral, they are largely invisible to ordinary fairgoers.

An event like Frieze is less about the expansion of limits to artistic freedom, and more about presenting a simulacrum of that freedom – staying within the limits while appearing to break out of them. The parameters of this world include not only artists and their patrons, but also the congeries of artworkers (see Becker 1982) surrounding them, all of whom are, to a greater or lesser degree, concerned with finance, administration, aesthetic judgement, reputation, conservation and repair, as auctioneers, specialist removers, valuers, insurers and so on. Spin-off occupations are evident in this milieu where innovation and invention are prized – industrial designers, publicists and patent lawyers, for example. For all, the profit motive is always somewhere in their calculations and judgements, as well as, or even more than, aesthetic considerations (see Jones 2006:40; also Moir 2004).

Chin-tao Wu (2002) notes the irony for critical artists and their work, like that of Hans Haacke, 'a quintessential critical voice against the power of business, not only in the art world, but in contemporary society also'. How, she asks, does corporate ownership affect the reception and interpretation of Haacke's works, and how in turn does the critical edge of his work serve the owner's interests? '[O]wnership of Haacke's work has not only minimised the critique that the artist was attempting to make in his works but has actually, and radically, redefined the very meaning of the piece: a work that set out to

criticise the corporation has ironically ended up standing for the so-called liberal and "enlightened" face of business' (2002:267; see also Rancière 2009:37). This appropriation of the field of critical art – Picasso's *Guernica* or Duchamps' urinal for example – is testimony to the ideological power of ruling elites, an apparatus of capture that re-values, subverts and simultaneously devalues artworks in contemporary social and economic conditions. The role of the professional critic is highly complicit in this moment of capture, orienting buyers and sellers as well as mere onlookers, directing and moulding ideals of taste, sensation and the spectacular to those of the bell-wethers of informed (and later public) opinion.

Public support for the arts grew in the wake of the Enlightenment (see Kapferer 2008) and, particularly, Victorian concerns for egalitarian access to non-material goods like literacy, electoral reform and freedom from want. Matthew Arnold's (1993) definition of culture as 'a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world' was a watchword for the aims of a worthy citizenry intent on elevating thought and deed among the general population State processes were central to the support of these aims, and the state mediation of 'the cultural' bloomed in the twentieth century, following modern and postmodern definitions of the aesthetic.

Terrance Johnson (1972) makes the point that consumer patronage and state mediation – of education, medicine and the arts, for example – were instrumental in augmenting the professionalism and power of those practitioners engaging in mutually satisfactory relations with the state and ruling elites.[3] A telling indication of state interest in the arts and its relation to popular understandings is encapsulated in the idea of the government Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in

3 The formation of professional associations gave shape to the status-seeking of the twentieth century in ways not dissimilar to the changing attitudes to the professionalism of Italian painters in their gradual moves from craft guilds and princely patronage to the academies from the sixteenth century onwards (see Kempers 1987), and latterly to the art, drama schools and conservatoriums of today. The conjunction of professionalism and managerialism from which these latest controlling bodies arise may be connected to the rediscovered authenticity of archetypal forms, from Tate Modern to Tate Britain, the Old Vic to the Globe Theatre and back again: a re-forming of the old demotic by the new, and a re-invention of the notion of popular entertainment.

the UK. This ragbag of concerns[4] conveniently designates four important ideological apparatuses of the state, rendering the department's domains visible, bureaucratically planned and controlled – in partnership with private capital, cultural organizations, corporations and foundations.

In this context, what benefits does their support for the cultural sector accrue to the state, private individuals and corporations? Cynthia Freeland (2001) details the civic pride of burgeoning American cities, as the nineteenth century progressed, in their establishment of local art galleries and museums, which served as visible signs of wealth and status. The pecuniary emulation and conspicuous consumption described by Veblen (1970) in 1899 was one facet of this development, showing that private wealth and ostentatious display could go hand in hand with notions of civic duty and loyalty to localist pride. Lamont (1992) notes that today 'some Americans differ from the French in the emphasis they put on *buying* culture. A few respondents indicated that they interpreted the purchase of art as a manifestation of high *social* status, along with re-decorating one's house, driving luxury cars, consuming expensive wines and meals, and staying fit.' For the French (in Lamont's opinion, clearly indebted to Bourdieu 1984), 'consumption of high culture is not a signal of high social status but a way to signal cultural status *in order to gain social status*' (1992:108–9 my emphasis; see also Wu 2002).

These 'leisure class' preoccupations of the later nineteenth and the twentieth centuries can now be seen as steadily (if disingenuously) 'democratizing' the cultural, now a 'demoticized' space; while the space of the public sphere has diminished, surviving only in isolated pockets of critique and resistance to the privatizing and corporatizing of the public realm. The term 'demoticizing' here connotes the demotic or populist demotion of the arts to the field of entertainment, and the patronizing, condescending, talking down to and fobbing off of would-be students, practitioners and lovers of the fine arts.

In this respect, things are rather different in the Scandinavian welfare states, and to a lesser extent also in some other western European countries with well-developed and self-conscious cultural traditions. The kind of dirigisme that lurks in some of the Scandinavian states' welfare programmes rests heavily on a state-wide consensus about the public good (in education,

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4 Sections include international sporting tournaments and championships (football, tennis, Formula 1 etc.); alcohol and entertainment; architecture and design; arts; broadcasting; communities and local government; creative industries; cultural property; gambling and racing; government art collection; historic environment; honours and ceremonials; humanitarian assistance; international; libraries; museums and galleries; national lottery; research and statistics; sport and tourism.

health, welfare, leisure and the arts) on one hand, and an adamant individualism on the other.[5]

Other states, perhaps not so successful in this field, adopt blunter methods of facilitating the control of popular sentiment, using the persuasive power of advertising and the mass media in general to maintain cultural-ideological hegemonies (Adorno 1991; Gramsci 1971; Herman and Chomsky 1998; Williams 1980). This has been a fairly productive ploy, as evidenced by spectacular blockbuster exhibitions, media support and long queues to see shows crowded with schoolchildren and tourists. Other audience members – regular ticket holders, sponsors, donors, trustees, high-ranking civil servants in government culture areas, journalists, curators of other museums and galleries, 'flagship' theatres and orchestras – may have already been to a 'private view' of the show at no cost to themselves, enjoying the publicity, cocktails, canapés and company of other producers and consumers of the spectacle of the commodity. The ruling bodies of sports clubs, local, national and international, enjoy similar rights to insider status and social connections. 'By means of the spectacle the ruling order discourses endlessly upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self praise.' (Debord 1995:19).

This suggests a clear distinction between spectators and practitioners. Middle- or working-class spectators, students and even neophyte collectors are apparently irrevocably separated from those who control the fates of artists and their works. The demoticization I am adumbrating is revealed in the process of distinguishing the participants of the private view from the general public. The ownership of the event, demarcated at Frieze for example by cordoned-off areas for VIP ticket-holders, journalists, eminent practitioners and collectors with their advisors, is in the hands of an elite band of international cognoscenti: the educated, the knowledgeable and the rich – a world unknown to the ordinary fair-goer. Their presence and their gossip-column credentials burnish their reputations while enhancing their added value to promoters and entrepreneurs. In this they provide the spectacle of

5 In Norway, for instance (see, for example, Rueschemeyer 1997), the 'social partners' of state, business and labour have evolved a practice of negotiating a consensus premised on the equality of all citizens, by way of extending an ideal of universal social risk (see Esping-Andersen 1989). Here population size (in Norway about 4.5 million) has been an important factor in supporting the arts at the national, county and even the village levels, as has been the development of the economy via North Sea oil, where the state controls over 50 per cent of the revenues. For instance, it is customary in Norway for the state to enter into partnerships with commercial companies like Deutsche Bank and other international firms to sponsor many of the annual 'big ticket' art exhibitions and music festivals throughout the year.

consumption without which any such event may be deemed a failure, rather than a return on the promoter's investment. The collusion between private and corporate patrons of the arts, and the state, is starkly illustrated by their mutual interests in the cultural field.

Are the elite arts then a closed shop open only to a select group of initiates, or to those for whom the arts are taken for granted as a kind of birthright? Are the arts an endowment of education, habit, habitus and custom, the heritage of the cultural capital upon which Bourdieu (1984) expatiated so tellingly? Who has the wherewithal to indulge a taste for the fruits of the labours of artists and crafts people, especially the works of well-known and highly remunerated practitioners whose reputational credit enhances the social and cultural standing of dealers, collectors or critics themselves?

We have here a case of (with apologies to Hamlet) 'caviare and opera to the general' as a distinctive and exclusive cultural characteristic of ruling groups. Cultural control is practised through the ownership of old masters' paintings or the works of contemporary artists, architects, furniture makers and landscape gardeners, past and present, a currency recognized and built up by a commercial market that, despite the protestations or caveats of many collectors, is in the end nothing but a venue for the trading of luxury goods. Numerous publications and broadcasts authored by journalists, biographers and the denizens of art schools relentlessly laud and shamelessly toady to the masters of the arts universe, preserving the myths of altruism and corporate responsibility (see Bishop and Green 2008).

By contrast, cultural control is exercised over popular cultural pursuits, especially those immediately accessible to a mass audience (such as popular music, cinema, television or social media) and created by a subaltern class of actors, musicians, writers, animators, directors, technicians, producers and so on. Such control is directed by an uninitiated body of people – Gramsci's organic intellectuals and those who, however highly and formally educated they may be, have little experience of the fine arts. This is the problem of Bourdieu's *Distinction* (1984) and Bourdieu and Passeron's *Reproduction* (1977): the accumulation of cultural capital is guarded by those who already have it. While there is no reason that outsiders cannot be taught and encouraged to develop similar attributes and tastes for aesthetic gratification, schoolchildren (amongst others) are generally denied this opportunity (see Artmonsky 2010).

Support for the arts: individuals and corporations

Institutional education supported by collectors and corporations rejuvenates and passes on the accumulation of cultural capital to new generations. In many countries, national schools, like university arts or humanities faculties and provincial colleges of art and design, music and drama, are now degree-

granting universities. Degree courses are also offered at, for example, the Courtauld and the Warburg Institutes in the UK, the Broad Foundation in the USA, the Sandretto Re Rebaudengo art-education and workshop programmes especially for youth in Turin, the Ullens Center for Contemporary Art in Beijing, the Fundacion Cisneros in Latin America, and so on. All are concerned with the education and training of new generations of artists and art workers.

For example, Eli Broad says that the mission of the Broad Foundation (see *ArtAxa* 2009:12) is to

> foster appreciation of contemporary art by increasing access for audiences worldwide… In 25 years the Foundation has made more than 7100 loans of contemporary art available to some 475 public institutions with combined annual visitors of more than 100 million'. The Foundation has created the Broad Contemporary Art Museum in Los Angeles and given $10 million to art acquisition.
>
> (www.broadfoundation.org; also Freund 2009)

Charles Saatchi is perhaps the most widely known of these educators, thanks in part to his championship of Young British Artists of the 1980s and the splash he (as entrepreneur) and they made at the Sensation exhibition in 1997 in London and later in New York. Although reputedly wary of interviews, Saatchi has made his opinions freely available to others in his autobiographical publication (2009) and through his opening of a gallery at Chelsea Barracks, where items from his collection are displayed and where educational activities are encouraged. Along with the *Sunday Telegraph*, Saatchi established in 2009 an annual Schools Art Prize (sponsored by Deutsche Bank): £10,000 is awarded to the art department of the school where the winning pupil is enrolled, with £2,000 for the winner; £5,000 each goes to the schools of the second and third placed pupils, who are given £1,000 each.

It is in these schools and competitions that patronage is, as ever, important for the furtherance of artists' careers and for the philanthropic satisfaction of the patrons. The personal style – of speech, manner, dress, deportment, demeanour etc. – of players is still a clear marker of insider status, with artists themselves often being distinguished by their eccentricity. The contestants in Saatchi's television production *The Best of British* were required to submit a photograph of themselves. But long-standing elite patronage is frequently now offset by new wealth, political or economic power in fields well beyond the arts. The leisure class is still regularly replenished by the injection of new capital (Veblen 1970) and dynastic marriages that unite wealth with hereditary distinction. Corporate support is furnished by the directors of large firms, often acting as trustees or major financial sponsors of eminent museums,

galleries, orchestras and so forth. These roles are often filled by the spouses or other relatives of the magnates concerned, and Veblen's depiction of the conspicuous consumption of the women of the ruling class is as apposite now as it was then.

For some time now, particularly since the end of the Second World War, with another leap forward in the 1980s, corporate donations to public institutions have become more and more a feature of state expectations. Prominent among these are obeisances to the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility espoused by large financial houses, legal firms, banks and insurance companies. Most of these corporations with acknowledged corporate responsibility to a wider public maintain some connection between their original business interests and their beneficiaries, e.g. Deutsche Bank's support for Frieze Art Fair or Free Form's Arts and Regeneration Programme 'Making Art*work*', in partnership with the East Thames Housing Group. Lloyds of London's mentoring of local working-class youngsters with an eye to later Lloyds' employment in the insurance or related businesses (Kapferer 2008) provides a further example.

Links among private (non-government) entities in the arts world are common: directors of commercial firms, trustees, boards (of museums, galleries, orchestras, theatres), advisors to collectors and corporations, board members and private collectors mingle at ruling-class functions with media critics and directors of philanthropic foundations. At the same time, government department heads and important civil servants find a place among these foundations and the board rooms of major companies with stakes in the worlds of the arts, thereby sealing the public-private interests of both.

Such interests can be demonstrated, for instance, by the venerable auction house of Sotheby's, established in London in 1744 and with, today, offices in London, New York and Singapore. Sotheby's also offers degrees in business and arts, and often supports graduates into the auction business or related careers in management and finance. Sotheby's negotiates traffic in artworks around the cosmopolitan world of collectors and dealers in the northern hemisphere. In less than one month in 2009, there were sales in London (12), New York (8), Paris (3), Amsterdam (2) and one each in Milan, Toronto and Zurich.

The artworks on sale at this time had their origins in Europe, North America, Asia, Africa and Oceania. The works for sale included pre-modern, non-European traditional, modern, and, though less frequently, contemporary items. (Collectors who specialize in contemporary art and design are interested in art fairs and student productions rather than auctions, because, they say, they are likely to be less expensive and may be a good investment for

the future – Saatchi 2009). Conversations and public communications at fairs are also thought to be fertile grounds for searching out potentially successful artists, and collectors also pay attention to word-of-mouth private sales. Many buyers are single individuals or couples, whose purchases remain in their own houses, bank vaults or warehouses, but other works may be placed on long-term loan in public galleries or museums, especially in the USA. One celebrated case of such public spirit, is the role that the fortune of the industrialist Andrew W. Mellon played in the establishment of the National Gallery of Art in Washington DC in 1941.

Such art placements fulfil the obligations of family or foundation to the 'public good' criterion, while relieving owners of the burdens of insurance, security and maintenance. They also allow space to be freed up in private houses, perhaps for rehanging or new acquisitions. Many collectors, such as Andy Stillpass of Cincinnati, Howard Rachofsky of Dallas, Patrizia Sandretto Re Rebaudengo of Turin, or Michael and Susan Hort of New York (personal communication Louisa Buck 2008), financially support artists they have noticed at earlier exhibitions, and commission work from them. They usually make the point that they dislike selling their paintings, sculptures, photographs or installations, on the grounds that they love the works and would not have bought them otherwise. On the other hand, the practices of 'selling on' and 'bidding up' (the latter occasionally and somewhat sheepishly, if at all, admitted, and much less readily discussed) are testimony to the pecuniary motivation for some sales. It is gossip amongst collectors and their advisors, and the inspection of who is buying and selling works that are expected to become fashionable, that fuels the raising of prices in this manner. The world of collectors is one in which artists are encouraged and nurtured by owners and dealers. There are traces of a Renaissance-style treatment of such patronage in the contemporary context, though the freedom of artists to move around, change dealers and so forth is much greater. An example of such manoeuvres was the sale by Sotheby's (which waived its fee for the transaction) of works by Damien Hirst that realized over £111.5 million in 2008. Hirst's established dealers, White Cube and Gargosian Galleries, were cut out of the entire operation, though there were rumours that they themselves had propped up prices on the day (www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4795010.ece).

The auction rooms at Sotheby's in London themselves are like a little auditorium, with the video screen, assistants and the auctioneer's desk on a raised platform, with a bank of proxy buyers and their telephones located to one side. To the other side are hung a number of the paintings being auctioned, with buyers scattered around the room. Bidding seemed (in December 2009) to be split roughly 30–70 between the buyers physically

present and the telephone bidders, who, of course, remain invisible and anonymous. The drama of the auction room was diminished by the absence of so many buyers; the atmosphere being de-personalized and businesslike, and the action mediated by those who can be regarded as trainee auctioneers, with qualifications in fine arts and related backgrounds – specialist telephonists, the equivalents of the 'spotters' of yesteryear. Ronald Jones (2006:40), for example, applauds the cross-pollination of the arts world afforded by qualifications in interdisciplinary studies, while demonstrating some wariness of the effects of Richard Florida's (2002) 'creative economy' – a hugely expanded definition of 'creative' to include 'an *economy* [my emphasis] of borrowed ideas, stimulating creative hybrids' and marketable commodities.

The insurance company AXA (AXA Art Insurance Limited) specializes in the insurance of artworks, productions and arts equipment: 'AXA Art do more than simply settle a claim when the unexpected happens. Supported by the AXA Group we combine global strength with a personal touch, collecting art and collections around the world' (www.axa-art.co.uk/Content.asp?ID AREA=5&TIPO=A&IDCONTENT=464&C). Art AXA has its own annual journal, *AXA Art Review Magazine*. Its 2009 contributions included a piece entitled 'What price the art market?' (Gage 2009) covering the preceding year's financial events, with the art market holding up better than many in the 2008–9 recession, particularly for collectors/investors. Interviews with collectors and a conservator, as well as an article about AXA's new product for the care and insurance of musical instruments, were featured, and were mainly written by in-house experts:

> AXA Art is committed to partnerships and projects within the art world, globally and in North America. By way of supporting initiatives that foster the preservation of works of art and by offering our in-house expertise to cultural partners [in conservation and repair, for example], we are able to support and protect cultural heritage.

Research grants in conservation are awarded, and risk management of storage facilities is provided by AXA and Global Risk Art Survey Platform.

Art AXA sponsors a number of art fairs and organizations featuring art, music and literature, many of which are directly connected to their insurance business. These include the Art Dealers Association of America, a collectors' forum; TEFAF (European and Fine Arts Fair) and the Association of International Photography Art Dealers (AIPAD). Sponsorship is also supplied to both Art Basel and Art Basel Miami, the Toronto International Art Fair and Frieze Art Fair. It is also Annual Corporate Partner of the Southbank Centre and sponsors the Buy Art Fair in Manchester and the Glyndebourne

Midsummer Nights. Until recently, corporate benefactors could reliably be found funding and sponsoring a wide variety of arts. But since 2008 philanthropists have become more cautious about their spending. So too have governments.

State mediation of the arts

Perhaps the best known of all state-mediated programmes – almost a template for them – was that initiated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's depression-era support for the poor and unemployed, the Works Progress Administration. This provided not only employment in public works, like road- and dam-building, but also work in the arts – literature, painting, theatre (see, for example, Bold 2006).

The state has a mixed record in supporting the arts at a national level. In many cases, the ruling-class domination of political policy and practice has led it to reflect their own leisure interests, include collecting and owning artworks as well as an extravagant style of life and the purchase and/or maintenance of stately homes and gardens. Until the latter half of the twentieth century, members of this class frequently saw it as their duty to represent sectional interests in parliament and the shouldering of the white man's burden in the colonies.[6]

As an institution of the state, the British Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) operates on a different level to the actions of individuals. It has undergone a number of transformations, from the Ministry of the Arts in 1964 to the Department of National Heritage in 1992 to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in 1997 and more recently incorporating 'Digital' in 2017. The inclusion of media and sport within its remit indicates that government thinking is concerned with culture in the broad anthropological sense, rather than with the fine arts alone. Other governments around the world also use this portmanteau nomenclature, often adding leisure, heritage or tourism to their portfolios, though most are content

6 But the winds of change were not only blowing across Africa in the 1960s but in the imperial homeland itself. In Britain the rejuvenation of the Labour Party opened up new political concerns about health, housing and education, with ideas about the role of the arts in the production of ideological myth-making seemingly in abeyance. Up until the end of the twentieth century, the (New) Labour Party Prime Minister had eschewed any interest in the arts, concentrating instead on rationalist economic policies, in common with the leaders of the United States of America and other Western nations. The policy of devolution to the constituent parts of the United Kingdom left state interest in the arts to such regional bodies, themselves struggling with devolved economic conditions.

with a simple Ministry of Culture. This assortment of interests gives one to understand that such a ministry/department is of secondary importance to national questions involving finance, trade or foreign affairs, for instance, and ministers themselves are often shuffled around the cabinet to permit promotion or demotion. According to the home page of the DCMS, it aims to 'support the pursuit of excellence, and to champion the tourism, creative and leisure industries'. So the arts, now officially demoticized, are condescendingly thought of as primarily providing entertainment for a wide range of citizens in their leisure hours, becoming infantilized to cater to a much larger, and avowedly non-elitist, clientele. Further, in 2005 the DCMS,

> broadened [its] existing links to the creative *industries* by taking over responsibility for fashion design, advertising and *the art market* from the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), formerly the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.
>
> (DCMS, 3 July 2017; added emphases)

The media have become the conduits through which the arts and sports are filtered. The DCMS, the Ministry of Education and the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) have rearranged their portfolios, purging the so-called creative industries from the latter, and ingesting, repositioning and realigning the universities with the business interests of the national state (Stevens 2010). The DCMS and the BIS are quite separate channels for mediating the world of the arts on one hand, and the schools and universities on the other. In their concentration on 'value for money' academic fiefdoms have had to rejig or revise their core curricula to fit in with business priorities, and the arts have become further demoticized.

State mediation and public-private partnership

One important method of achieving state mediation of arts has been the intervention of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). These have been conceived of as a panacea for ideologically favoured business corporations and cash-strapped governments in particular state instrumentalities (like telecoms, transport, health, education and public utilities like water and power generation) to lessen the impact of the financial austerity, which continues to this day. Those public industries which form the bedrock of the commonweal in social-democratic societies have been brought into partnership with private companies in an arrangement called a Public Finance Initiative (PFI) that was formulated in Australia in the 1980s and imported to Britain in 1992. Business firms were invited to collaborate with the state in financing the production

of the common good while reconfiguring it as a commercial, profit-making enterprise.

The collaboration between state instrumentalities and business corporations has been much admired by private companies, politicians and many administrators in public agencies and government departments, citing 'value for money' and efficiency in service delivery. On the other hand, while the state and the corporations have a mutually backslapping relationship, there remain euphemistically named 'information asymmetries', with knowledge firmly retained in corporate hands while state functionaries remain in ignorance of the operations of the PPP/PFI.

In the case of the arts in Britain, something rather different has had to be invented in order to fit in with the Zeitgeist of private ownership in all fields of public good. Given that the arts have always been the Cinderella of state funding, their fate, from schools onwards, has rested in the balance between public and private/corporate support. In this respect, the Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport pointed to the way as to how the arts were to be conceived.[7] The Department set its sights on the populist support of entertainment and sports, those very arenas where private patronage was already flourishing through the ownership of cinema chains, press empires and television stations, and in entrepreneurial action, the promotion of popular music performances and the employment of highly paid managers and performers in sporting clubs.

In 2005 London was awarded the right to stage the XXX Olympiad in 2012. Amidst general rejoicing fuelled by the media, 'photo opportunities' and personal appearances of former Olympic champions, the DCMS announced the use of government backing and the National Lottery to help fund this adventure. The arts world was not impressed by the consequent reduction in its cultural funding (see Alexander 2008), nor, as time went on, were members of the public-at-large. Compulsory purchases of buildings, gardens and common land were carried through despite protests from ratepayers and the denizens of rental accommodation in the affected areas. Though it was bruited abroad that the social and cultural regeneration of the East End of the city would be brought about by this redrawing of boundaries, landscapes and streetscapes, locals were and still are not convinced. The 'Cultural Olympiad' which was then advertised, possibly to mollify the arts lobbies,

7 The Arts Council (Williams 1989 provides a critique of its earlier operations), the Art Fund (already dependent on private personal donations, bequests and consortia to secure purchases for the state) and the National Lottery quango (representative of 'casino capitalism', see Strange 1997) were charged with the obligation to support the national estate, the territory of the DCMS.

arranged (among a number of activities) to choose twelve artworks – tapestry, installations, community painting – to include citizens from around the country, enabling them to participate in this world event, and to claim some ownership of it. Other funding for music, dance and theatre in the provinces, with a particular emphasis on youth, was also set aside.

'Value for money', the catchphrase of both the state and the corporation, has retained its influence since the Thatcher years, though it has been steadily transformed into 'Whatever the market will bear'. The furore for sports and athletics which developed was further prompted by government announcements: '[Former Prime Minister] Gordon Brown vowed to bring back competitive schools today [14 August 2008], saying it had been wrong to discourage children from competing against each other.' (Summers 2008). This pronouncement further rejuvenated a hitherto recession-beset 'leisure Industry' and a revival of opulent leisure centres and other forms of organized recreation involving keep-fit classes, personal training and membership of private clubs centring on golf and sailing. These clubs were established as exclusive venues for activities of a ruling class that could afford the massive fees and the social contacts required for membership, coaching and equipment – as well the entrance fees for the Olympic Games. Here we plainly see bread and circuses for the masses contrasting with the caviar and opera tastes of the cultural arm of the bourgeoisie.

Debord's (1995) critique of the spectacle, and Juvenal's (2004), are apposite here. As the latter famously put it: 'Only two things concern [the people]: bread and the Games' (X:80); and Debord: 'The spectacle is a permanent opium war waged to make it impossible to distinguish goods from commodities.' (1995:30). Here we have the state and corporation in mutual embrace, locked together through myriad connections and networks (in boardrooms, trusteeships, fundraising circles), a seamless interweaving of class, status, economic, political, social and cultural power. '[B]ureaucracy's power [is] the power of a separate class' according to Debord (1995:81). That separate class has close affiliations with what Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) characterized, after Djilas (1983 [1957]), as the New Class, while Gouldner (1979), from a different political perspective, stressed the importance of technocracy and bureaucracy in the formation of such a class, or better, class fraction. Thus the relation of the state (civil or public service, administration, permanent and unelected functionaries) and its ideological apparatuses (especially the arts) is mediated through its own bureaucracy and the bureaucracies of business. What is encouraged, permitted, prohibited or ignored in the world of the arts is filtered through hegemonic perspectives that render critique almost unthinkable. Rancière (2009:34) follows Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) in observing that

> May ’68 supposedly prioritised the themes of the artistic critique of capitalism – protest against a disenchanted world and demands for authenticity, creativity and autonomy – as against its ‘social’ critique, specific to the working class movement: the critique of inequalities and misery and the denunciation of the egotism that destroys the bonds of community. These are the themes that have arguably been incorporated by contemporary capitalism, supplying those desires for autonomy and authentic creativity with its newfound ‘flexibility’, its flexible supervision…

In its collusion with and dependence on capital, the state itself is corporatized. The spectacle, which is at the root of commodity fetishism, along with Baudrillard’s (1975) mirror of production and Lefebvre’s (1984) society of controlled consumption, is the cornerstone of control society (Deleuze 1995).

Corporate patronage and state mediation have, through the mechanisms of the PPPs from which they benefit, amassed the social and cultural capital to steer the direction of popular sentiment towards an agreed evaluation of the arts in everyday life – as also in health, education, welfare and public housing. State and corporate notions of such approved national representations of individualism, competition, independence and nationalism themselves often conceal the expressions of envy and *ressentiment* which are evoked. The minority arts interests espoused by the *haute bourgeoisie* are thereby protected by pricing and more subtly by social arrangements linking arts directorates.

The continuing conjunction of corporation and state that I have been exploring finds expression at all levels of government. Both national and lower-level constituencies – regions, counties, municipalities – look to local and/or non-metropolitan sources for funding and popular support (with occasional inputs by state arts instrumentalities like touring companies, or grants for specific projects) in sub-national districts.[8] These arrangements leave corporate and private endeavours to provide at a city level what the state does not (see e.g. Jones 2008). Civic duty and corporate responsibility for social control and public order (however altruistic or hypocritical) can thus justify the benefits accruing to local support for the arts.

8 In the United States city governments like that of Cleveland (Leedy 1991) or Philadelphia (City of Philadelphia 2009) benefit from the backing of residents with a financial stake in, and a history of supporting, the arts, while largely absolving the federal authorities from dealing with cultural affairs. Such joint ventures may seem to be of a peculiarly North American nature, resting on a secure local tax base, a robust individualism and a suspicion of state control of public goods like health, welfare and the arts.

These exercises generally bring in pillars of the community, local arts supporters and business firms, in efforts to include the general public. Indeed, the general public may have often instituted and organized its own local expressions of artistic talent and display, but these may nevertheless still be seen as a threat to public order. Such an outcome was demonstrated by the (unsuccessful) attempted takeover of the annual Notting Hill Carnival in August 2005 by local government officials of the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Greater London Authority (Kapferer 2008). The GLA organized a competing festival in Hyde Park, but the Notting Hill event still went ahead and has continued to take place, with more performers and increased crowds. The process of emasculating the carnival was, however, achieved by other means, such as the advertising of the event as a general party for tourists and young people, without reference to the original celebration of the emancipation of slaves by Toussaint L'Ouverture in Santo Domingo/Haiti in 1793–5. Public order has at the same time been ever more strictly organized during the three carnival days, with large numbers of police in prominent attendance, enforcing crowd control by barricades and patrolling the boarded-up shop windows of the local burghers.[9]

Who benefits?

It has been common to perceive an opposition of access and popularity on the one hand, and elitism and excellence on the other in the sociological literature of the arts, much as in any other socio-political field (see, for

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9 The 'new deal of the mind' is an example of another avenue for state–corporate collusion that harks back to the Works Progress Association and the post-Cold War BBC's 'Marshall plan for the arts' (a more inclusive 'mind') as models for regenerative cultural activity in the 'Western' world. This new deal built on Margaret Thatcher's 'enterprise culture' project (see Alexander 2005), and was launched in England in 2009 by a group of journalists, politicians and arts administrators, and in the United States by President Barak Obama. Private persons and representatives of business interests highlighted the concerns of the arts, languishing amid the depredations of a sharp downturn in the economic confidence of the business world. Leading lights of the venture included journalists, academics, well-known museum directors and so forth. The enthusiasm generated was fleeting, and has since been further watered down and much entangled with attempts to engage the 'culture industries' in regenerating the arts in a stagnant economy, with many protestations about wasted cultural expertise and increasingly numerous unemployed young people. It is the use-value of the arts that is seen to be the saviour of the entertainment industry and the wider political economy (see Florida 2002). The New Deal of the Mind faded away after 2013.

example, Alexander 2005). It is a tenet of social-democratic dogma that social equality in all areas of political, economic and cultural activity is to be maintained and strengthened by a continuing emphasis on an 'inclusivity' attempted, if not ensured, by the social-democratic state. This is – and always has been – contrary to the credo of capitalist accumulation that privileges competition above cooperation and mutual aid in everyday life. As such, the arts, embedded in the cultural, become ingested into the political economy, and their role in furthering their inclusion in such areas as commerce and education becomes infantilized and demoticized.

The result is plain to see in the fields of community and public art. Too often in Britain, education in the arts is turned to the purposes of leisure and recreation beloved of state instrumentalities like the DCMS and semi-public institutions like the Arts Council. Regional and city governments in Europe and Scandinavia fulfil the same role in sub-national bodies, where local businesses, municipal councils and private persons form a core of interested patrons – as in the USA. Patronage is the foundation of support for the arts at all levels, and as such it can be given or taken away at whim – depending on the economic circumstances or political fortunes of patrons, whether state, individual or corporate (see Bishop and Green 2008).

The balance between individual and corporate patronage, state mediation and public-private partnerships in the arts has shifted over the last two centuries. The use of private fortunes to shore up social status and public prestige has facilitated mutually satisfactory arrangements with tax authorities; it has thereby enabled the works of the national estate (artworks, theatres, museums, heritage sites etc.) to benefit by the acquisition of important material artefacts and the purchase of private goods for the commonweal. The possession of these goods is ideologically central to the cultural practices of the nation in its control of such perilous ideas as nationalism, patriotism ethnicity and class. In this endeavour, the role of corporatism is crucial. The corporation, as a body invested with leadership in the economic and political arenas, has spread its tentacles into the party-political world, increasing its grip on government policy and the concomitant dependency of the state. In the arts, as elsewhere, state policy is focused on the market of financial and cultural-ideological goods, to the exclusion of other branches of government, especially in those public expenditures hitherto entrusted to the state.

In these circumstances state control of arts and cultural policy is loosened, allowing non-elected bodies to redirect those ideological apparatuses that have the greatest reach into everyday conceptions of culture, and thereby expanding the possibilities for accumulating cultural capital to a new definition of 'high' culture. In effect, the reign of populism, on grounds already prepared by widening socio-political ('inclusive', 'non-elitist') horizons, is capturing

a much broader territory for a new dominant, even imperialist, class, one capable of enfolding both popular and elite culture within its wings. State and corporation are seemingly wrapped in a mutual embrace, locked together through a myriad connections and networks, in a seamless interweaving of class, status, economic, political, social and cultural power.

Bread and circuses, caviar and opera here generate a densely woven tapestry of a demoticized social formation that is difficult to unpick. Such dismantling requires a constant critique that could begin to unsettle and delegitimate the corporate social and cultural order of the nation-state. It is in the practice of constant critique that the opportunities for regeneration lie. 'Critiquing the critique' (Rancière 2009) may indeed throw up fresh understandings of social and cultural power, whereby at least some sections of the arts and the broader intelligentsia can be enrolled in the production and creation of new directions for reinvigorating democratic discourse and action. It is possible.

Acknowledgements

As ever, I thank Bruce Kapferer for his unfailing support and encouragement over many years. My thanks go to the members of the Social Anthropology Institute at the University of Bergen for their thoughtful comments on this chapter; I have also to thank several colleagues in the Sociology Institute at the University of Bergen for tolerating my interest in what were often to them unfamiliar areas of research.

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CHAPTER 11

Repressive ententes, organized crime and the corporate state

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The emergence of the corporate state

This chapter addresses the rise (or perhaps return) of corporate-oligarchic states in the post-war period, and seeks to think through the different varieties of these new forms of state in various conjunctures of time and space in the contemporary world. Much of the essay is devoted to a treatment of the emergence of the southern Italian corporate state utilizing the 'extended case method' (Van Velsen 1967). This is entirely appropriate, given that this case study puts under contrastive critical scrutiny certain theoretical claims that associate the 'West' with the ideal of the modern Westphalian democratic state, and associates other regions of the world with imperfect and flawed copies of it, such as the 'failed states,' of Africa, or 'military dictatorships' in the case of industrializing East and Southeast Asia. These claims arise from an evolutionary modernist schema that denies the coevalness of the latter with the former (Fabian 1983). To avoid Eurocentrism in fact, one might do worse than look more closely at Italy in the centre of Europe, to ask, critically, do the Italian state, and the European Union of which it is a political component, approach this theoretical ideal; or does Italy represent a quite different state form – the corporate-oligarchic state (Kapferer 2005)? The chapter argues the latter position, and proposes that a reexamination of the corporate state in the Euro-American centres of world empire – whose ideologists quickly couple 'democracy' with the 'market,' and 'progress' with the 'war on terror' – is critically overdue. At the same time, however, the rise of the corporate-oligarchic state form is a world-wide process not limited to the Euro-American centres, because the corporate state is defined by the institutionalization of horizontal or rhizomatic forces of speculative finance and organized violence,

whose movement overflows the territorial boundaries of official 'nation-states' to transform the everyday lives of populations of polities far from the imperial centres and capitals (Kapferer 2005, 2010; Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009).

It is crucial in what follows to understand that corporate-oligarchic states are above all imperial structures of rule, although these states vary in terms of the scale of their modes of financial and violent control and the scope of their effects. Their financial and military-police powers connect the centres of these states to their peripheries by enforced debt servitude and violent securitization and repression. However, as shall be seen in the Italian case, these horizontal forces of finance and violence redound ('blowback') from the peripheries and pervade the centres of empire, so that the everyday life of populations in centres (e.g., Rome, Washington DC) and peripheries (e.g., Campania, Afghanistan) converge increasingly around debt, security, and policing. Given these imperial structures of flux and rebound, the essay asks: what kinds of corporate states are coming into existence, and what kinds of repressive ententes are these corporate states forming with the populations they directly rule that allow such rule to continue?

This essay argues that the potentials for and contexts of the emergence of the corporate-oligarchic state form can be read 'in miniature' from an extended case discussion of the Neapolitan corporate state, which combines elements of the official post-war democratic-liberal Italian state, legal corporations and businesses, with organized criminal groups, themselves of a corporate order. Associated with a period of savage capitalism extending without apparent limits through the political and technological artifices of globalization, the Neapolitan corporate state shows features common to the emergence (or re-emergence) of this state form: the orchestrated capture of the official state by corporate forces and personnel; exacerbation of class and ethno-racial divisions among the populations ruled; the initiation of wars, feuds and violent incursions to gain control over markets and resources deemed vital to a consumerist social order; the plunder of the state treasury to build up private wealth for corporations and for elites committed to a cosmopolitan globalization; the use of predatory finance to subdue populations ruled within a regime of stable indebtedness; and the formation not of a 'social contract' between the state and the citizenry, but instead of a multipartite set of 'pragmatic' or economistic understandings and accommodations between the official state, corporations and the people they govern.

In this essay, I refer to the set of understandings and accommodations as the 'repressive entente' between the corporate state and the populations it rules. Since the official state and corporations (legal and illegal) are not completely integrated in a functional sense, this repressive entente is, at present, not well understood, because it is misread as 'the social contract'.

Classic theorizations of the state by Hobbes (1952), Rousseau (1938) and others mislead when they propose that states originate in social contracts between the 'people' because a state or Leviathan is required for political protection and the common good. In contrast, this essay proposes that it is not a social contract, but rather a repressive entente, or set of de facto understandings and agreements between the official state, corporations (in whatever form – legal, illegal; large, small; directly state connected or 'autonomous') and the populations that the official state and corporations taken together govern. Such arrangements are marked by publicly recognized major asymmetries, not balances, of power, among those who come to agree to them. These ententes have originated historically in the interaction between states which already exist, the corporate organizations they are aligned with, and the populations they come to rule, and not in some primal 'contract' among 'the people' that results in the establishment of the state to protect the population and maintain order. The classic social-contract accounts of state origin are myths of bourgeois-state legitimation that presuppose the existence of atomized proto-bourgeois individuals existing outside of 'political society'. In contrast, since the advent of industrial capitalism, the centralized political system, 'the state', has reached understandings with corporate organizations about the ways in which each will accommodate to and support the other in the common project of governing the populations they rule: extracting taxes, taking the slaves' produce, plundering the state treasury, sharing booty from conquest, conscripting the population, creating monopoly markets for commerce, and even nurturing selective subaltern groups, e.g., the police, and labourers in arms manufactures. Those who belong to the population ruled are more or less aware of the major features of these accommodations.

What makes this a 'repressive' entente is that as long as corporate-state elites maintain financial and coercive institutions deemed necessary to the protection of and everyday life among the majority of population, then the population is reconciled to the de facto rights of state and corporate elites to otherwise prey upon them, and in even more extreme forms, on other national populations. This understanding is quite clearly not the same as the roseate view of contractual equality celebrated in bourgeois political theories of 'freedom' and 'liberty'. Repressive ententes are therefore far from the idealized social contracts of classical theory. All the same, while it would be hyperbolic to see these ententes as the source of legitimation to which members of the population ruled defer in sheep-like fashion, it is correct to see them as recognized arrangements of 'make do' that reconcile the public's recognition of the corporate-state elite's right to rule with the potential threats of arbitrary state policing and violence against an indebted population. Moreover, some significant proportion of the population directly derives its employment

as the state's soldiers, debt collectors and loan sharks, arms makers, police, mercenaries and private contractors working on behalf of the military, security and financial arms of the corporate state.

Therefore, when a large proportion of the population can 'make do' because some groups among it are favoured by elite patronage, when the shadow of organized state violence passes over but does not land on them but is instead directed at external enemies, and when this elite orchestrates structural conditions like 'easy credit' and bank deregulation that allow the population to 'get by' with chronic indebtedness, then a widespread sense of a repressive entente prevails. Conversely, when significant proportions of a ruled population cannot 'make do' under a current state regime, this destabilizes rule. In its imperial centres the failure of a repressive entente takes the form of the withdrawal of the population from direct state administration (e.g. participation in the black economy and tax evasion in the European Union), while in the peripheries (e.g. Afghanistan), it is manifested in flight, internal displacement and rebellion. Since these reactions generate the compensatory or dialectical formation of yet other corporate-state structures, repressive ententes are structurally unstable. Their failures undermine specific corporate states, even as the reactive formations such failures generate reinforce the emergence of new corporatized and oligarchic polities.

In the case of corporate-oligarchic states, the substance of a repressive entente is to be found not in the legal 'rights' and 'obligations' of citizens to be taxed, to vote, to serve in the military, as in the case of the modern nation-state; but rather in economistic notions of the population's subsistence centred on its dependence on corporate-state military and finance arms for employment, for the management of debt, and for 'protection', i.e., relative freedom from direct violence. This is relative freedom, that is, for the majority relative to minority racial and ethnic groups against whom 'full spectrum' corporate-state policing and violence are acceptable, when they are cast as the cause of the misery of the larger population. Repressive ententes depend on the sustained functionality of the state's horizontal institutions of finance and organized violence, and not on the 'effectiveness' of its administration. As long as these are maintained, the majority population will accede to being so governed with a high degree of alacrity. Self-brutalization and -objectification occur: people 'make do' when they can, with what they can get.

In what follows, I first describe the contemporary forces of 'globalization' which have led to the resurgence since the 1980s of corporate-oligarchic states in the dominant region of the world, the US-European 'NATO imperium', that is, the system of the imperial centres of the United States, European Union and Japan, and their peripheries connected by military and financial power. I then follow this broad analysis with an extended case study of the Camorra

organized-crime syndicate and its organic relationship to the corporate state of southern Italy. For this reconstruction, I draw in detail on the important analysis by Roberto Saviano of the Camorra and its organic connections to the official Italian state (Saviano 2007). Finally, I suggest that the example of the Italian corporate state, with the current resolution of its 'southern question', can illuminate the mechanisms through which contemporary corporate states gain consent to their rule from the populations they rule.

Features of neoliberal globalization

The ostensible philosophy of rule of the contemporary corporate state is known as neoliberalism, or market fundamentalism. It takes the forms, simultaneously, of explanation, class ideology, public rhetoric, capitalist fact 'on the ground', mythic doctrine and attempted hegemonic project for the restructuring of 'society' in the name of 'globalization' – and comprises a project led by corporate and political elites and their intellectual spokespeople in the West, during a period of systemic economic decline. Neoliberalism is also the language that hails the corporate-oligarchic state, and resonates with its functional logics. Over the last three decades within the NATO imperium, neoliberals' successful institutional penetration and transformation has involved privatization, structural adjustment, implementing free capital flows, eliminating social welfare subsidies and instituting economism, and is at this point almost ubiquitous, even as these policies have led to a profound financial and economic crisis in the centres of the imperium since 2007. Neoliberalism's unannounced premise is that of empire – that there are political organizations which have the power to put into effect their profoundly plutocratic vision of the world, and to make that vision – one of economism and consumerism guaranteed by systemic violence – a reality everywhere, while allowing extraordinary rates of accumulation of wealth by corporate and political elites by the dispossession of the common properties of the majority of the worlds' populations (Harvey 2005; Nonini 2007). This is of course the formula of the corporate-oligarchic state. Dispossession has had catastrophic consequences for rural populations – ecological despoliation, forced urbanization, civil war, internal displacement, famine, disease. During the last four decades, the institutions of the modern nation-states of Euro-American social democracy, erected in the post-war period as immunizations against Soviet and Chinese communism, have been 'rolled back', and the new institutions, practices, rituals and discourses of an economized society have been 'rolled out' in their place through political measures (Peck and Tickell 2002).

Neoliberal globalization has arisen within, and to some extent reflexively contributed to, a process of economic and environmental decline in North America, Great Britain, Western Europe and Japan associated with the uneven

geography of capitalist development, in particular with the chronic crises in capitalist over-accumulation in the Western centres and in Japan (Arrighi 1994, 2007; Harvey 2005; Itoh 2005). Anglo-American neoliberalism articulates the corporate-oligarchic state's new agenda, that is, the corporate and political elites' response to economic decline since the 1970s. Decline in corporate profitability between the 1970s and 1990s led to an export of investment capital to the peripheries of Latin America and Southeast Asia; more recently, corporations have shifted into financial capital and speculation (Arrighi 2007; Dicken 1998; Harrison 1997; Harvey 2005; Kalb 2005; LiPuma and Lee 2004). Over the same period, there has been the post-Fordist or flexible restructuring of the capitalist labour process, including deindustrialization, chronic unemployment and under-employment, and the emergence of hyper-sweated work conditions and white-collar de-skilling, all leading to deepening indebtedness among the majority middle-class population. These are now downwardly mobile and placed 'at risk' of major deprivation in crucial dimensions of their life course (healthcare, retirement, education, and above all employment) (Aronowitz and Di Fazio 1994; Foster and Magdoff 2009: 6; *New York Times* 2005; Schor 1991; for ethnographies, see Newman 1988, 1993).

With respect to state finances, new corporate campaigns have plundered state treasuries through the secretive expansion in state funding for the 'national security complex' of private military, police and security forces (Barry 2010),[1] and through the use of corporate contractors to supplant the official state civil services in administration. Corporate and wealthy families' tax-evasion strategies (e.g., use of offshore financial centres) and tax-reduction policies have also contributed to decreasing state revenues. These measures and the enormous cost of imperial wars without end (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008) have led to the emergence of a chronically indebted official state in the US and Great Britain and other countries of the European Union, and to the elimination or reduction in welfare benefits to the populations ruled. The cultural consequence has been a redirection by the middle-class majority away from an identification with the modernist nation-state (Friedman 2003)..

As a consequence, decline in the Western centres of capitalist accumulation has been accompanied by increased class polarization between elite capitalist and state groups, on one hand, and the rest of the population, on the other; and by the fragmentation of pre-existing national identities, leading to the

1 In the USA, the national-security complex is 'a new type of public-private partnership – one that spans military, intelligence and homeland-security contracting' (Barry 2010:11).

emergence of new sub- and ultra-nationalist collective identities, such as indigenism, chauvinist racial and ethnic identities, and gender and sexual identities, and by the rise of diasporic 'long-distance nationalist' (Anderson 1994) transnational identities that transcend the putative 'nation-states' of the West and are closely associated with the operation of transnational corporations and firms (Friedman 1999, 2003; Friedman and Friedman 2008a, 2008b).

The forms that these new sub-, ultra- and trans-national identities have taken have varied depending on the social positions of the groups that express them. On the one hand, new cosmopolitan economic, cultural, and media elites and state officials have reoriented themselves away from the nation-state and nationality towards new transnational political formations and sources of capital accumulation, like the European Union and World Trade Organization, while grounding their subjectivities in the cultural experience of 'globalization', i.e., the consumption of luxury goods and luxury (and virtual touristic) experiences (Friedman 1998, 2003).

On the other hand, the non-elite majorities residing in the centres of the NATO imperium, that is, the populations of North America, Britain, Europe and Japan, have experienced first-hand downward mobility, deindustrialization, unemployment and chronic indebtedness. The repudiation by these nation-states and their elites of what the majority took to be national social contracts (i.e., the 'unsettling' of post-war dispensations or the welfare settlements of North America, Britain and Europe, see Clarke 2004) led to a widespread rejection among the populations of these nation-states of their modernizing projects. In reaction, some of those ruled have developed anti-modernist collective identifications, often fundamentalist indigenist or racialist affiliations, which reorient their everyday lives away from their disappointments and disenchantment with the nation-state (Friedman 2003; Friedman and Friedman 2008a, 2008b).

Nonetheless, the majority of the population have 'settled in' to the new arrangements of a repressive entente with the new corporate-oligarchic states in question. In the case of the NATO imperium, this is the implicit guarantee by the corporate state (whose contours of plutocratic rule are widely recognized as facts of 'nature') to the majority that their consumption-driven 'way of life' will be maintained and that some of them will be employed in the national-security complex, as long as there is implicit popular support for imperial ventures that seize control of the resources required for their consumption (e.g. petroleum, precious minerals). Even the poorer and minority sub-populations – at least those in the USA who are not incarcerated – can be 'bought off' by their economic conscription into the militaries engaged in the wars that, in popular and media imaginaries, ensure that the 'oil

will keep flowing', while their transformation into oil's warriors is celebrated simultaneously as economic 'opportunity' and patriotic service to the 'nation'.

The language of neoliberalism spoken by the corporate-oligarchic state takes various national forms in its institutional instantiations. In the case of the USA, a neoconservative racialism has emerged as one of its manifestations. Its proponents – local 'growth machines' (Logan and Molotch 1987) and their clients (e.g. local right-wingers, Chamber of Commerce spokespersons) – are allied with, but subservient to, a transnational form of American neoliberalism. This latter is promoted by corporate elites, US state officials, and the vast apparatus of private arms manufacturers, security firms, lobbyists, think-tank intellectuals and pundits who articulate the projects of the imperial corporate state (Frank 2008). This alliance drives the combination of economism, consumerism (and consumer debt) and militarization that define the 'way of life' of the US populace.

Within the European Union, European-based corporations link up with EU Commissioners and parliamentarians through elaborate lobbying arrangements (Coen 1997, 2007), national governments accede to EU neoliberal standards of governance that require the slow demolition of previous social-democratic welfare policies, and increasingly indebted majority populations scapegoat immigrant workers as the cause of their miseries. Elsewhere throughout the NATO imperium, in the wake of the 1980s–90s structural-adjustment policies that beggared post-socialist and post-colonial states, there have emerged new expressions of ultra-racism and xenophobia (as in eastern Europe – Rigi 2003); endemic ethnic-based civil war over mineral and other resources (Bayart 2009; Mbembe 2000; Reyna 2003); areas of mafia control (e.g. eastern Europe, central Asia, the Mediterranean – Nazpary 2002; Saviano 2007; Schneider and Schneider 2003); and zones of NGO sovereignty, as in Africa (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Mbembe 2000). Furthermore, each such region has formed distinctive financial, security and military alliances with the combined US and European Union corporate mega-states, i.e. the centres of the NATO imperium, that aspire to being 'global'. As final recourse, the 'free market' is pronounced as equivalent to 'freedom', which in the lexicon of Euro-American neoliberalism is reducible to the right of a country to experience the NATO imperium's military invasion, occupation and forcible appropriation of its industrial resource materials, especially petroleum and minerals. The wars upon the resource-rich peripheries of Iraq, Afghanistan and Colombia provide useful demonstration models of what happens to recalcitrant peasants unwilling to surrender sovereignty over the resources that make a consumerist 'way of life' possible in the West (Klein 2007; Perkins 2007).

Only in China has a coherent national regime of economic regulation emerged which is autonomous from the Western imperial and financial order,

and, in the latter respect, is coming to re-order world-wide imperial structures. The Chinese Communist Party's alliances with domestic capitalists allow for the industrial hyper-exploitation of the 'floating population' of rural farmers in the new industrial export 'zones of exception' (Ong 2006), while seeking to defuse massive labour unrest (Lee 2007) and protests against environmental degradation (Nonini 2008). Even in China, the repressive entente between the state, industrial capitalists, organized criminal networks, the urban middle classes and rural farmers is being challenged by the incapacity of the Chinese industrial economy to expand indefinitely, of foreign countries to buy its exports, of its middle classes to consume without limit, of its farmers' daughters and sons migrating to find industrial jobs, and of China's air and waters to absorb industrial toxins without reaching saturation point.

These are the unstable conditions that mark the emergence throughout the world of corporate-oligarchic states whose populations are riven by ethno-racial, class and regional schisms. Above all, the neoliberal period has manifested two short-term complementarities: one, between the accelerated circulation of finance capital, speculative desires and predatory financialization (e.g. subprime mortgages and their securitization) and the growing consumption needs and addictions of the populations ruled within the NATO imperium; and a second between the hypertrophy of security-military industrial complexes, private militaries and war-making in the imperial peripheries, and the consumer desires that fuel the demand for commodities that make the declining 'good life' possible among the governed majorities. These represent the historical conditions in which repressive ententes between corporate states (with their corporate constituents) and the populations they rule are being formed.

Stable debt formations and the rhizomes of the corporate state: what is 'made in Italy'?

The horizontal processes of corporate-state formation appears in the hypertrophy of these states' financial-security complexes. Arising from the financialization and neoliberalization agendas set by states described above, the large middle-class populations of the European Union have increasingly turned to financing their consumption desires, and increasingly their daily needs, through putatively stable forms of indebtedness, such as property mortgages, personal bank loans and credit-card advances. Over this period, there has been an incremental shift from a future-oriented use of 'credit' as a means of financing family property toward a present-oriented habituation to the use of credit for the maintenance of a consumption lifestyle, for access to funds in the case of medical or personal emergencies, and even for purchase of

necessities such as food and rent among those who have become unemployed or underemployed, especially since the onset of economic crisis in late 2007.

Currently, the official unemployment rate throughout the EU is 8.8 per cent (Eurostat 2017), while as of 2011, 11.4 per cent of all EU households were officially 'over-indebted' ('in arrears with payments over the previous 12 months' on utilities, rent/mortgage, and loans – Gaetano 2013:5). According to one study, 'the sharp increase in the level of indebtedness of households has been a major driver of financial fragility in the EU' (Bouyon and Musmeci 2016:2). Large proportions of the EU middle classes, consistent with the continent-wide speculation in property, have over the last decade taken on extensive mortgages and personal debt, even as the number of jobs have continued to contract.

In Italy, household debt levels were 88 per cent of disposable income in 2015 (OECD 2015), and the official unemployment rate was about 11 per cent in 2017 (Eurostat 2017). But who knows what proportion of people in Italy are truly unemployed? According to estimates, Italy's 'black economy' constitutes about 25 per cent of its GDP (Segal 2010), and a huge number of people are employed by it. What we do know is that in Italy, as elsewhere in Western Europe, the labour power of the middle and working classes has been severely devalued over the last three decades through the globalization of the labour market via outsourcing and subcontracting of production in global supply chains extending from the most labour-intensive factory regimes of China to the shopping malls of Milan, Rome and Florence. Still, over the last twenty-five years, the Italian economy has been celebrated as the seventh largest in the world, while its high-end branded commodities in clothing, accessories, shoes, appliances and power tools – index goods for wealthy elites around the world – have burnished the label 'Made in Italy.' And the declining middle classes of Italy and the rest of Western Europe, increasingly burdened by debt, unemployment and underemployment, keep on buying them.

However, things are not what they seem in the Italian miracle, consideration of which needs to juxtapose the celebration of the virtues of a flourishing industrial northern Italy with Italy's historic 'Southern Question' (Gramsci 1971). The renowned flexibility of the small, family- and worker-based high-tech industrial enterprises of the 'Third Italy', with its hub in the northern provinces of Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Piedmont, and set off from the declining Fordist industries of Turin and Milan, has been portrayed as central to the Italian 'success story' (Piore and Sabel 1984). Since the 1980s, Italy's success within the EU has, the story goes, built on the achievements in northern Italy of their small-scale, but efficient and very productive, manufacture of high-end and high-quality goods, leading to widespread prosperity and a standard of living enviable by global standards. Despite its

regional branding within the 'global economy', however, an increasingly large proportion of the high-quality goods that northern Italy 'makes' are actually produced elsewhere – in southern Italy, in provinces such as Campania and Calabria in the case of certain luxury goods, and in China in the case of textiles, tools and electronics. As most such goods made in these areas are counterfeits or knock-offs, often of very high quality, they continue to sell – but at far below their catalogue prices, which is why the indebted middle classes can continue to buy them. Here, Italy's Southern Question must be considered.

If enhancing the 'biopower' of subject populations is what states do (Foucault 1991), then a scrutiny of this situation reveals the active governance of the corporate state manifested in its horizontal, rhizomic institutions of violence and finance. A remarkable recent ethnography by Roberto Saviano, *Gomorrah* (2007), takes us into the inner workings of the Italian corporate state, and its organic connections to organized crime in southern Italy.[2] To start with, a large proportion of the small factories of southern Italy that produce the knock-offs marketed in the north, as well as of the factories that are the legal subcontractors of the brand-name fashion houses of the north, have their production financed by organized criminal syndicates, as in the case of the Camorra Secondigliano 'System' of Naples. Small subcontracting factories in Naples and its surrounding towns employ highly skilled labour working at a hyper-exploitative pace set by the intense competitive price and time pressures of the bidding regime imposed by the brand-name houses, and produce goods of very high quality, while other factories produce the near- and not-so perfect counterfeits sold at deep discounts. These arrangements of flexible production are the only way in which Italian manufacturers are able to compete with Chinese producers, who in addition to their factories in China have begun opening factories in Italy to produce high-quality goods: 'made in Italy'. Camorra thugs do not even need to maintain labour discipline; that is done more than adequately by the competitive pace of the factories, as well as the workers' clear understanding that they are fortunate to have any job at all, given endemic regional high levels of unemployment. Unlike Italian banks, the Secondigliano System will extend credit to the illegally operated factories whose proprietors do not own land as collateral.

2 In addition to his own ethnographic observations as a life-long resident of Naples and interviews of residents, Saviano also summarizes the findings from testimony at the trials of Camorra leaders, from the confessions of *pentiti*, or 'turned' Camorra bosses, and from government commissions of inquiry. As of this writing, he remains in hiding from the hit men of the Camorra.

In this respect, the entrepreneurs of the Camorra System, like the family managers of the 'legitimate' brand-name northern and central Italian companies they service and emulate, understand clearly the dynamics of the new, flexible and savage capitalism, as well as the needs of their ultimate clientele – the stressed middle-class consumers of Europe, whose incomes have been ground down by the financial exigencies set by austerity politics:

> Consumer goods have replaced the nicotine habit as the new contraband. A cutthroat price war is developing, as discounts mean the difference between life and death for agents, wholesalers, and merchants. Taxes, VAT, and tractor-trailer maximums are the deadwood of profit, the real obstacles hindering the circulation of merchandise and money. To take advantage of cheap labor, the big companies are shifting production to the east, toward Romania or Moldavia, or even further – to China. But that's not enough. Merchandise is cheap, but it enters a market where more and more consumers with unstable incomes or minimal savings keep track of every cent.
>
> (Saviano 2007:15–16)

The global devaluation of labour and the deflation of the price of consumer goods, including narcotics, are the hinges between the official state, organized criminal networks like the Camorra System, and the consumption-driven and addicted middle-class populations caught up in the economism and consumerism of contemporary Europe.

The livelihoods and subsistence of the population of metropolitan Naples have become increasingly dependent on the System and its governance structure. Regional apparel factories flourish in part because of the low prices of the smuggled textiles they use. Although 20 per cent of the textiles imported from China to Italy by declared value come through the port of Naples, 70 per cent of their quantity comes through the port. This statistical paradox can only be resolved when one realizes that a huge proportion of Chinese textiles are smuggled in through the port and evade import duties, and this can be credited to the managerial skills of the System and their affiliates. System clans also provide employment to hundreds when they oversee the smuggling through Naples of enormous quantities of Chinese-produced electronics, appliances, power tools and both 'real' and knock-off goods sold as brand names like Canon, Hitachi, Bosch, Hammer and Hilti, as well as cocaine from South America and heroin from the Middle East. The System not only finances production, but also oversees the distribution and transport of these goods, as the clan's business leaders in the town of Secondigliano control the downstream ends of the apparel and accessories supply chain by

managing and financing the distribution channels, warehouses, retail malls and clothing outlets, both within Italy and elsewhere in Europe and beyond, while orchestrating the smuggling of other goods (notably narcotics) through these links in the supply chain – thus meeting the demands for consumer goods and narcotics of the consumerist, debt-stressed and habituated middle-class populations of Italy and Western Europe.

The System's operatives also improve on classic extortion methods when they extend loans to local retailers when banks will not, allowing shopkeepers to buy goods for cash at a discount from suppliers, but requiring 50 per cent of the profits in return. When shopkeepers fall behind in repaying System loans out of their profits, the System shows its generosity relative to banks: while the latter would foreclose on their properties and evict them, the System merely requires increasingly high percentages of their profits, while allowing them to remain as experienced, salaried employees (Saviano 2007:49–50). Many other Napolitani find weekly salaried work servicing the System's open-air markets in narcotics in the towns of greater Naples, as lookouts, cashiers, pushers, storehouse operators and keepers of drug caches in their homes (Saviano 2007:64). Local youth are a favourite target for recruitment by the clans in the narcotics trade (and were even trained as teenage hit men during one clan feud), while older children are hired to drive and unload trucks with toxic waste in local landfills, and to set over-full waste dumps on fire. One clan even allowed residents of Secondigliano and other nearby towns to invest in its booming cocaine business: 'Retirees, workers, and small businessmen would hand over money to agents, who then invested it in drug lots. If you invested your pension of 600 euros in cocaine, you'd double your money in a month.' (Saviano 2007:52).

The organization of the Camorra System is ideally suited to the tasks of post-Fordist governance through a combination of financial leverage and violence. In its clans based in the towns to the north, west and east of Naples, leadership is based on charisma backed up by hands-on intimidation and violence, but their business models show the flattened horizontal organizational structure promoted by the business critics of Fordism, as clan bosses and capos rapidly recombine clan members, including hit men, their non-clan affiliates and local youth, into flexible teams that seek (and sometimes compete violently) to rapidly establish control over markets in illegal and legal commodities throughout Campania and beyond (Saviano 2007:38–59). In their quick adaptability and labile responsiveness, these mafia organizations are the epitome of the flexible entrepreneurial, informal and improvisatory new savage capitalists of the post-Fordist era. Backstopped by violent control over markets and their operation, theirs is a world of extraordinary cost-cutting, tax evasion, the short-circuiting of labour laws and regulations, the

destruction of labour's collective bargaining potential, the corruption of state officials, and the externalization of all possible costs to poorer and less powerful residents and to the environment of Campania. Nonetheless, this is a world still centred on the provision of cheap commodities on a mass scale to the increasingly indebted middle-class populations of Italy and beyond, who ask no questions but buy at the lowest price.

'For us the state had to exist and it had to be that state'

Through these mechanisms, clan leaders join with local officials to govern. The official region of Campania, and Naples its capital, and the Camorra System, have formed a corporate state that is exceptional within Europe, and to some extent even within Italy itself. But it is not merely a 'zone of [neoliberalism as] exception', as Ong (2006) would have it, but also a core zone of the corporate state and its oligarchic networks. The horizontal wings of governance – financial control and organized violence, yet organized to develop the biopower of the residents of Naples and the towns surrounding it, and extending far beyond Campania in Italy and indeed beyond Italy to Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America – have already been mentioned. One might add that System clansmen appear to be on very good terms with certain major Italian corporations. In the case of one clan, its boss acted as sole wholesale representative for several major Italian food corporations, including Parmalat, within the Naples region; although he exacted a 'tax' from them, he guaranteed them distribution of their products throughout the region, while also requiring discounts from them, which appealed to retailers. As a result, from 1998–2003 these food corporations experienced a 40–80 per cent increase in annual sales, although their spokespeople, when asked, insisted they had been subjected to clan intimidation (Saviano 2007:50–1). And like any capable local government officials might, members of the Camorra System have maintained good 'foreign' relations with corporations and governments beyond the Campania region, in this case by efficiently and cheaply disposing of their toxic and illicit waste, as discussed below.

The horizontal functions of the Camorra combine with the vertical, territorialized body of nested bureaucratic offices of municipal governments, with which the Camorra have influence. Over the last twenty years, the Camorra has consistently sought and achieved control over officials, and have established a presence in the municipalities (*commune*) of Campania, i.e., of the city of Naples and the scores of towns to its north, west and east. According to Saviano (2007:46):

> Campania is now the Italian region with the highest numbers of cities under observation for Camorra infiltration. A total of seventy-one municipal administrations have been dissolved since 1991. An extraordinary number, far surpassing that in the other regions of Italy… In the province of Naples alone, town councils have been dissolved in… [lists 31 towns]. Only nine of the 92 municipalities in the province of Naples have never had external commissioners, inquiries or monitoring.

Government enquiries have documented that Camorra clan businesses have set zoning regulations, taken over local sanitation services, successfully speculated in land through tips provided by government officials, controlled the construction of shopping centres, and imposed on municipalities' patron saints' day festivals, which have depended on clan-owned companies for services (Saviano 2007:46–7). And Camorra clan leaders mobilize fellow clan members, employees and supporters to turn out the vote for the candidates of their choosing in local elections.

The periodic nationwide anti-mafia campaigns by the Italian national government since the 1980s have involved a continuous process of monitoring of the influence of organized criminal networks within regional and municipal governments, with the national government intervening to assume direct control over bureaucratic offices whose occupants are found to be under mafia control. However, Saviano maintains that the numbers of official inquiries etc. involved index not the failure, but the continuing success of Camorra penetration of the municipal governments of Campania. Far from seeing the occasional official inquiries by anti-mafia commissions, the large-scale raids by *carabinieri* of Camorra enterprises, and the mass arrests and mega-trials of Camorra leaders leading to long-term imprisonment, as a defeat of Camorra influence, Saviano views these efforts instead as inducing a renewal and consolidation process through which the next generation of clan leaders are able to show their initiative, innovation and daring as entrepreneurs of violence by successfully murdering competing clan leaders and their hit men, gaining control of markets, and thus coming up through the System. These manoeuvres are, as it were, the equivalent of the high-risk, career-making civil-service examinations of the older Fordist accommodation. Through these means the Camorra System cements new connections with the Neapolitan corporate state.

The clan wars that ensue after the imprisonment of clan leaders, which are related to competition over control of the markets in narcotics and other illicit commodities, are ferocious and deadly, and inflict large numbers of collateral casualties: from 1979 to 2005, the murders by Camorra hit men in Campania have been tallied at more than 3,600 deaths (Saviano 2007:119–20). Public

assassinations of rival clan bosses, the ambiguous extension of enemy status to those who are neighbours or acquaintances of clan members, and the public display of the mutilated and tortured bodies of enemies, have engendered a deep and pervasive sense of bodily insecurity and anxiety. Even so, the raids by *carabinieri* against clan leaders and their followers elicit sharp antagonisms from local residents who have benefited from Camorra patronage and services. Note elements of the repressive entente manifested when, during one massive police raid, Saviano observes the rage of local women as they set trash cans on fire, and throw things at *carabinieri* who seek to arrest their sons and brothers:

> To the women here it [the police raid on drug traffickers] reeks of mockery. The police and bulldozers haven't come to change things, but merely to help out whoever now needs to make arrests or knock down walls. As if all of a sudden someone changed the categories of interpretation and were now declaring that their lives were all wrong. The women know perfectly well everything is wrong here; they didn't need helicopters and armored vehicles to remind them, but up till then this error was their principal form of life, their mode of survival. What's more, after this eruption that will only complicate their lives, no one will really make any effort to improve things.
> (Saviano 2007:94)

Many are those who, even if not clan members, benefit from the System's extraordinarily wide span of control over all sorts of resources and people.

The process of conflict between the national state and the Camorra is therefore no 'crisis' within the formal institutions of the nation-state – the situation has gone far beyond that point (if it was ever at it). It instead represents an ongoing process of re-institutionalization, a dialectics of conflict management and resource control through which new frontiers of governance come under the purview of the corporate state. One is reminded of Gluckman's (1956) argument about civil war in southern Africa, in which rituals of rebellion involving contending lineages led, not to a change of system state, but to a reaffirmation of the structural arrangements on the ground – in this case, a comparable outcome leads to consolidation of the corporate state. One of the more remarkable interviews with *pentiti*[3] clan leaders that Saviano cites occurred in 2005, when this man compared the 'philosophy' of the Camorra to that of the Sicilian mafia, which had engaged in a campaign of assassinations of government prosecutors and other officials in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Schneider and Schneider 2007:316):

3 *Pentiti* are ex-clan leaders who have collaborated with state authorities by detailing clan organizations and operations in return for reduced prison sentences.

> We lived with the state. For us the state had to exist and it had to be that state, except that our philosophy was different from the Sicilians. Whereas [Cosa Nostra boss Salvatore] Riina[4] came from island isolation, an old shepherd from out of the mountains, really, we had surpassed those limits and we wanted to live with the state. If a state figure stonewalled us, we would find someone else who was willing to help us. If it was a politician, we wouldn't vote for him, and if it was an institutional figure, we would find a way to swindle him.
>
> (Saviano 2007:190)

Or, as Saviano himself put it, 'the state-antistate paradigm doesn't exist. All there is, is a territory where you do business – with, through, or without the state.' (Saviano 2007:190).

Governance of, by and for garbage – and the Italian economic 'miracle'

Is the Italian national state itself the exemplification of the 'pure' nation-state form – or does it instead embody corporate oligarchic characteristics? While this question cannot be answered here, it is pertinent to mention one reviewer of Saviano's book who observes that 'the powers of the Camorra … are inconceivable without the indifference, neglect, or collusion of large numbers of Italy's politicians' (Stille 2008:4). Since the apex in the early 1990s of public antipathy toward the mafia and the enactment of severe laws which would have seriously weakened organized crime in southern Italy, the candidates for Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's 'good government coalition' had actively campaigned in southern Italy to weaken these laws and denounced the power of investigative magistrates and the supposed harm done to southern regional economies by investigations into organized crime (Stille 2008:6–7). And, as is well known Berlusconi himself was under investigation on a variety of criminal charges linking him to organized crime. One convicted Sicilian Cosa Nostra boss was caught on a wiretap as saying 'Berlusconi in order to resolve his problems has to resolve ours', while in 1994 after Berlusconi's coalition won almost all of Sicily's parliamentary seats, another Sicilian mafiaso was recorded (on police wiretap) as exulting, 'Beautiful, all the candidates my friends, all of them elected' (Stille (2008:7).

Saviano's (2007) study demonstrates yet one further reason, in addition to providing commodities to an increasingly over-indebted middle class, that

4 Salvatore 'Totò' Riina, Cosa Nostra boss from Corleone, and the most notorious boss of the Sicilian mafia, was tried and convicted of ordering the assassinations of two anti-mafia prosecutors in the early 1990s.

the Camorra System has its unannounced admirers and supporters outside Campania – in ways that illustrate its existence as the amplified horizontal rhizomic arm of the corporate state. As it turns out, no less than 43 per cent of Italy's rubbish and toxic waste ends up in the province of Campania, most of it concentrated in landfills and dumps in and around the towns of the larger metropolitan Naples region (Stille: 2008:1). The majority of this garbage is not produced locally or regionally, but rather comes from the industrial zones of northern Italy – the regions celebrated as responsible for Italy's prosperity as the world's seventh largest economy, and a prominent member of the European Union. The traffic in the illegal disposal of much of (perhaps a majority of) northern Italy's ordinary and toxic industrial and urban waste is under the control of the Camorra.

According to Saviano (2007:283), it is estimated that 14,000,000 tons of this garbage has escaped official inspection, and most of it ends up in southern Italy, in Campania, Sicily, Calabria and Puglia. Over the last two decades, often on a daily basis, caravans of trucks have borne tons of ordinary rubbish and toxic industrial waste from northern Italy to illicit landfills in northern metropolitan Naples and the 115 square mile urbanized area located between the city and the town of Caserta to the north (Saviano 2007:283). The inventory of estimated deliveries is astounding: 18,000 tons of toxic waste from Brescia delivered to areas between Naples and Caserta since the 1990s, 1 million tons from northern Italy moved to landfills in the town of Santa Maria Capua Vetere in a four year period, 6,500 tons of garbage arriving from Lombardy to one town near Caserta over a 40-day period (Saviano 2007: 284). Garbage itself is chemically transformed in the process: heavy-metal waste is ground up and added to fertilizer; garbage is mixed in with asphalt to pave the roads; a garbage 'triangle' of three towns near Naples has been named 'the Land of Fires' because over-full landfills, most with toxic waste in them, are set on fire by Roma boys hired by the clan, in order to burn the garbage so as to move more into its place (Saviano 2007:296).

The disposal of northern Italy's industrial and urban wastes overseen by the Camorra takes place outside the official inspection arrangements and regulations for environmentally appropriate waste disposal at going market rates required by the European Union, and this illicit trade is enormously profitable big business (Rosenthal 2009). Saviano points out that 'the market rate for legal disposal ranges from 21 to 62 cents a kilo, while the clans provide for the same service at 9 to 10 cents a kilo' (2007:290). What would a northern small factory manager in Tuscany[5] or a municipal waste disposal official in

5 Saviano acerbically refers to Tuscany in this context as 'the most environmentally conscious region of Italy' (2007:293).

Milan, each seeking to cut costs as they compete on 'the global market', not love about the Camorra arrangement – if one put aside personal ethics and the liveability of the environment? As a result, Saviano estimates from the findings of one investigation that in only four years, the Camorra clans brought in 44 billion euros revenue from illicit garbage disposal – most of it dumped on lands controlled by the clans in and near Naples, but the rest of it smuggled overseas through narcotics routes to Albania, Costa Rica, Mozambique, Somalia, Nigeria and, most recently, China (Saviano 2007:283, 294).

The Camorra clans do not buy the garbage directly from its northern producers, but rather employ 'stakeholders' who are brokers that deal directly with northern manufacturers and sanitation plant managers; the clans finance the operation, control the trucking of the waste to Campania and find, then cajole, pay and threaten local farmers to offer up their land as waste-dump sites, and hire older local children to operate the trucks that deliver the garbage to the actual landfills – a necessity, as so much of it is toxic and adult drivers refuse to dump it themselves because it is such hazardous cargo (Saviano 2007:298). The 'stakeholders' are, however, professionals, often highly educated abroad, who act like enterprising local officials working for the corporate state: they are 'the real criminal geniuses of illegal toxic-waste management … [and] have come to constitute a regular managerial class' (Saviano 2007:288). They approach industrialists and plant managers with their price lists for services, showing an adroit savoir-faire towards their northern clients through their comprehensive knowledge of toxic-waste disposal, while never implying to their clients that they offer illegal services.

This entrepreneurial intelligentsia of garbage, the stakeholders, are in fact the epitome of what Jonathan Friedman (2003) has referred to as the hybridizing cosmopolitan elites who promote globalization. Saviano recounts his experiences accompanying one such stakeholder, and listening in on his mobile-phone conversations with clients: 'He'd supply instant advice on how and where to dump toxic waste. He'd discuss copper, arsenic, mercury, cadmium, lead, chrome, nickel, cobalt and molybdenum, move from tannery residues to hospital waste, from urban trash to tires, and explain what to do, carrying in his head entire lists of people and places to turn to.' (Saviano 2007:292).

Saviano and the stakeholders he talks to make the case for the market value of such a massive, complex and comprehensive service for the new savage capitalist economy of Italy. Franco, one stakeholder, asks Saviano: 'Does this job disgust you? Robbe', do you know that the stakeholders are the ones who made it possible for this shit country to enter the European Union? Do you know how many workers' asses have been saved because I fixed it so their

companies didn't spend a fucking cent?' (2007:292). After his own analysis, Saviano is convinced:

> By combining all the data from the Naples and Santa Maria Capua Vetere public prosecutors' investigations from the late 1990s to the present, it is possible to calculate the economic advantage for businesses that turn to the Camorra for waste removal as 500 million euros. I knew these investigations reflected only a percentage of the actual infractions, and it made my head spin. With the dead weight of disposal costs lightened by Neapolitan and Casertan clans, many northern businesses were able to expand, hire workers, and make the entire industrial fabric of the country competitive, which is what pushed Italy into the European Union… [Camorra clans] offered a criminal service that relaunched and energized the Italian economy.
>
> (Saviano 2007:292–3)

Whether this claim can be substantiated is another issue. What is certain, however, is that it points to a set of new governing processes that link the corporate state directly to the management of the Italian and European Union economies. It represents, in short, a claim made by a corporate-oligarchic mode of governance – part of a broader, perverse and repressive entente initiated by the corporate state not only with business and political elites beyond Campania, but also with the downwardly mobile middle classes of metropolitan Naples and Western Europe.

Even so, the repressive entente has its limits. In and around the towns where neighbours and friends exchange stories of their suffering from terminal cancer, where the incidence of cancer mortality in areas where waste is dumped has increased by 21 per cent in a few years (Saviano 2007:297), some residents have declared 'enough'. In terror from the build-up of toxins in their air, soil and water, and the sickness it causes in them, they have begun protesting the reopening of waste dumps and building of new incinerators, and 'resist till the end rather than having their hometown become an uncontrolled depot for new dregs' (Saviano 2007:296). In one town near Salerno, residents formed picket lines to block access by the trucks to a landfill reopened by a government official (Saviano 2007:295–6). Meanwhile, educated youth who can escape the region, leave.

Into the heart of darkness: the problem of 'consent'

Why, despite the multiple horrors perpetrated by the elites of the southern Italian corporate state, and their clients, on the people of Campania, do the people consent to being governed? This is the classic problem of consent,

for it is taken for granted that no state system can exist for any length of time when the consent of 'the people' to be ruled is withdrawn. It is easy, of course, to argue that there is no such thing as a homogeneous bloc called 'the people' from whom consent could be secured. But everyday forms of state formation, invested in the performances and rituals of sovereignty, suggest that widespread majorities of people ruled do, in fact, find enough in common to offer something like consent, if no more than deference and compliance to the demands of the rulers for taxes, conscripts and so forth. In other words, people do not offer their consent so much as endure political conditions that for many take the form of 'nature', including 'human nature.' One does not, after all, consent to 'the weather', but must live through it and do the best one can.

As an explanation, this has much to offer as an account of the basis of state sovereignty. Nonetheless, it suffers from two problems. First, it lacks specificity: there is the need to ascertain the social and political conditions under which people come to see oppressive rule as inevitable, indeed natural – if, that is, any act of compliance or deference is not *ipso facto* to be seen as proof that the people who act in this way see rule as inevitable and natural. Second, it fails to come to terms with conceptualizations of consent to class rule, such as Gramsci's (1971:12) theorization of 'hegemony', which he characterized as 'the "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.'

Within anthropology, a certain domesticated, even 'house-broken' view of hegemony has prevailed that sees Gramsci's work on hegemony as 'the kind of Marxism that one could bring home to Mother': where a certain idealist determinism is invoked to define 'hegemony' as the cultural equivalent of the air we breathe.[6] In contrast, the findings of this essay are far more consistent with the theorization by Gavin Smith, who argues that the process of constructing hegemony takes place through the attempted implementation of political and social projects, and produces certain cultural effects, instead of being defined by them (Smith 1999, 2007). Moreover, these projects are ones

6 For example, there are the widely cited formulations of Raymond Williams (1977:110) – 'it is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world'; and of Comaroff and Comaroff (1992:28–9) – 'that order of signs and material practices, drawn from a specific cultural field, that come to be taken for granted as the natural, universal, and true shape of social being'; and synonyms like 'doxa' (Bourdieu 1977) and 'dominant ideology' (Abercrombie *et al.* 1980). See also Ortner 1984.

that combine persuasion, economic coercion and violence; the institutions of civil society, including corporations; and the official state apparatuses of repression and propaganda. This much more complex vision of 'hegemony' seems truer to Gramsci's own (1971) conception than the idealist determinism that represents conventional wisdom within cultural anthropology. These combinations of stratagems of rule are often not pretty, when, for instance, state or organized mafia violence or financial leverage, military invasion or flights of capital disinvested from a population 'soften it up' for the rhetoric that follows, and leads to popular consent to rule (see, e.g., Perkins 2004, 2007). This more robust conceptualization of 'hegemony' and class rule is one that 'most Marxists' would decidedly not want to bring home to 'Mother'.

Central to hegemonic projects and the processes underlying them in the case of consent, at least to the corporate state, but I think more broadly, are the complex interplays between processes that inflict violence, economic deprivation and suffering on large numbers of people, as well as offering them employment and financing a stable debt servitude, and the cultural responses of a population to these actions that they perceive as arising from certain powerful state structures and the groups who support them. This is the curious combination of protection and predation that constitutes the basis for popular consent in such systems. This shows precisely the value of the concept of 'repressive entente' proposed in this essay in explaining how it is that those ruled consent to the rule of the corporate state.

The repressive entente in the case of the people of metropolitan Naples exacts a very high price – in endemic violence, public murders, ghastly tortured bodies, sexual assaults, machismo and domestic violence, local neighbourhood shakedowns by armed young clan thugs, narcotics addictions, people forced to live in a vast cesspool and garbage pit of toxins, and pathologies that these toxins inflict on bodies. All this comprises an overall brutalization of the regional population. Nonetheless, people in Naples and the towns surrounding it can get by and 'make do'. What the repressive entente between the corporate state and the middle classes of Western Europe exacts as its price has yet to be determined.

In the case of the corporate state of southern Italy, the complex and multi-partied arrangements that have generated the repressive entente that binds the population of Campania and, I would argue, the population of Italy and elsewhere in Western Europe, to the corporate state, and comprises their so-called 'consent' have been described in this essay. The process of generating such an entente can be analyzed in terms of the relations between dyadic pairs.

Camorra crime bosses and local state officials

We have found that a repressive entente arises when private corporate interests, including those of organized criminal syndicates, join with official state functionaries and elected politicians to situate the central 'business of the state' as the private accumulation of capital ensured by both Camorra clan and official police violence. While the former is crucial to achieving and maintaining successful control over markets, and milking exceptional wealth from them, the latter, in its periodic persecutions of Camorra bosses, allows for a process of renewal of Camorra entrepreneurial initiatives to take place. In return for such assistance in clan projects that milk the state treasury, local elected officials receive the material benefits of Camorra clan friendship, such as bribes, and of course electoral assistance.

Camorra clan bosses and organizations and their affiliates, and the small manufacturers, enterprises and municipalities of northern Italy

This is a 'normal' business relationship in the sense that, at least in the sphere of exchange, putative equals, a seller and a buyer of waste and toxins, reach a mutually acceptable price far below the legal market price, and both are 'better off' from the exchange. It is a relationship between technocrats, often highly educated, sophisticated and connected by a *habitus* of manners which treats a distasteful subject in a tasteful, even stylish fashion. This is the kind of relationship, based upon flexibility and the efficiencies of the marketplace, that should be celebrated by neoliberal advocates. Moreover, it is a relationship based on externalizing the social costs of processing and disposing of northern Italy's urban garbage and industrial toxic waste in ways that allow northern Italy's corporations to remain 'competitive in the global economy'. Everyone wins! – with the exception of the cancer-ridden residents of the toxic-waste dumps and landfills of metropolitan Naples and the towns of northern Campania.

The political officials of the national state and the Camorra

As suggested above, highly placed politicians of the Italian national government and the Camorra and other organized criminal syndicates of southern Italy appear to have had warm and cordial relationships based on mutual benefit. These were formed both directly (e.g. through the organized-crime links of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and his clients), and indirectly through the northern industrialists who bankrolled their elections, and no doubt made clear their appreciation for the services provided them by Camorra waste-disposal businesses, and other organized-crime enterprises, and thus offered further support to the Camorra.

Municipal and regional state officials, and the residents of metropolitan Naples and Campania

While Saviano has little in detail to say about this relationship, it is quite clearly antagonistic, as in the case of the women who attacked the *carabinieri* who came to arrest their brothers, fathers and sons during the periodic mass raids against Camorra enterprises. It appears that, in so far as there is extensive support and positive regard between the population in residence in Naples and the towns around it towards the official, elected government, it is only in so far as the latter are viewed with favour by the clans and their bosses.

The relationships between the Camorra and the residents of metropolitan Naples and Campania

The foregoing analysis has shown that the practices of the Camorra clans are organically connected to the everyday livelihoods of the people of metropolitan Naples and the surrounding region. In a region and a country whose industrial base has been increasingly hollowed out by the economic restructuring of post-Fordist savage capitalism, the Camorra ensure thousands of people the means of subsistence, directly and indirectly: the seamstresses and tailors labouring in the sweatshops on the counterfeit and 'real' goods; the narcotics and arms peddlers; the clans' hit men and enforcers; its business managers, the smugglers of enormous tonnages of Chinese and other imports through the port of Naples; workers in the regional construction industry, which is controlled almost entirely by the Camorra; the mothers who take in the wages of the children who now engage in pitched battles in clan feuds, drive the trucks that unload toxic waste, and set the landfills on fire. Moreover, clan-financed and -managed manufacturers produce high-quality goods, while also smuggling in other such goods from their Chinese sources, and provide both at low prices to the regional middle-class population. For such economic 'protection' in a perceived 'global economy', whose capital circuits would otherwise bypass their towns and themselves, consign them to the scrap heap of history as redundant, it appears that the people of Campania support these various forms of Camorra enterprise that allow them bare-bones livelihoods and cheap commodities in abundance, and even provide them with the narcotics that give them solace at low prices. In return, they offer compliance and deference grounded in fear – but also admiration. However, residents appear to draw the line at being physically consigned to scrap heaps – the protests against the new incinerators and burning of landfills indicates that the mutual support between the Camorra and townspeople has its limits.

The Camorra system and the middle classes of Western Europe

Finally, it is unclear to me to what extent the distressed and downwardly mobile middle classes of Western Europe are aware of forms of misery that allow them to benefit from the counterfeit and knock-off apparel, accessories, power tools, shoes etc. at low prices that are ubiquitous in the shopping malls and flea markets of Paris, Berlin, London, and of cities and towns elsewhere in Europe. They may be more aware of connections between narcotics trafficked by the Camorra and the costs of addiction that their cities, neighbourhoods and even family members or themselves have to bear. Nonetheless, they share one specific characteristic with the populations residing in metropolitan Naples and northern Campania: about certain things, they ask no questions; about those things, no questions should be asked. This everyday silencing is found widely among the middle classes of Western Europe, including Italy, and is constituted by self-imposed silences, not absences, but willing and intentional decisions to remain ignorant about things that are perceived as unpleasant and, under some circumstances, even dangerous to talk publicly about. This is the response of a large number of people who feel increasingly desperate, displaced and isolated from one another. This is an active form of consent to class rule within the broader transnational corporate-state formations of Western Europe, not just of southern Italy.

Coda: repressive ententes and corporate-oligarchic states in comparative perspective

In conclusion, this chapter highlights the need to examine, in comparative perspective, how repressive ententes between the corporate state and the populations they rule operate, how they come into existence, how they are maintained and how they would come to an end. This should be a fundamental objective in the theoretical study of the corporate-oligarchic state.

It is not possible here to offer an extensive discussion of another example of a corporate state and the repressive ententes it has formed with the populations it rules, but a short account may suffice. In his recent book *The Limits to Power*, the political scientist Andrew Bacevich (2008) has argued that something like the repressive entente between the Camorra syndicate and the people of Campania described in this essay exists in the world's mega-corporate state, the United States. He makes a strong case that the consumption desires and addictions of the US population are fundamental to their consent to unending imperial wars in the resource-rich regions of the Middle East, South America and elsewhere. 'Freedom' is, as US citizens have been repeatedly told by their leaders, the freedom to consume – at any price to the rest of the world. As George H.W. Bush declared in 1992, 'the American way of life is not negotiable'; George W. Bush immediately after 9/11, 'take

your families and enjoy life, the way we want it to be enjoyed'; and George W. Bush in December 2006 at the peak of US military casualties in the Iraq war, which fortuitously coincided with the peak in the Christmas shopping season, 'I encourage you all to go shopping more' (quoted in Bacevich 2008: 53, 60, 61 respectively).

Bacevich (2008:9) writes, 'as the American appetite for freedom has grown, so too has a penchant for empire. The connection between these two tendencies is a causal one.' There is an 'ethic of self-gratification' that has become well-established among the US population: 'For the majority of contemporary Americans, the essence of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness centres on a relentless personal quest to acquire, to consume, to indulge, and to shed whatever constraints might interfere with those endeavors.' (Bacevich 2008:16). This ethic, however, comes with a very high price – popular commitment to what appears, especially since 9/11, an unending series of military campaigns, invasions, occupations, CIA and Special Forces incursions, mass killing of civilians, kidnappings, tortures and disappearances in secret prisons, special renditions, kidnappings and drone missile attacks. These measures are all announced as synonymous with the Global War on Terror and Homeland Security, but actually appear more directly identified with imperial attempts to gain dominance and control over markets in petroleum and industrial minerals, and to preserve the value of US dollars as the 'reserve currency' for wealth received in trade for them. The terms 'freedom', 'liberty', 'way of life', 'enjoy life' and 'shop' form a string of syntagmatic elements whose further negative coupling with the terms 'terror' and 'security' provide the rationale for militarization and imperial war among a majority of the US population.

The situation in the USA is, one must add, far more complex than this. As in Europe, the lower-class population in the USA is increasingly economically stressed, underemployed and unemployed, and downwardly mobile, but they are even deeper in debt from mortgages, credit cards and education than their counterparts in Europe; increasingly less secure in terms of health care and retirement; and as dependent as middle classes in Europe on cheap manufactured imports from China. These are all signs of their devalued labour, lives and net worth. Where Western Europe has Naples to smuggle the goods in, the USA has 'free trade' and Wal-Mart as its favoured instruments of price deflation.

Moreover, the complex and multifaceted accommodations that make up the 'total package' of the repressive entente that connects the US mega-corporate state to the population draw in the transnational corporate elites and the political leaders whose services and votes they buy through campaign finances. They depend on the enormously expanded 'national

security complex' (Barry 2010) of private military/intelligence/information technology/security contractors and consultants who now devour the state treasury, while they employ hundreds of thousands of people. They rely on the organized political right wing, which has reinvented itself as a corporate syndicate (Frank 2008:94–5).

These arrangements drew on the financial elite, consisting of transnational investment bankers and hedge-fund managers, who got their cut from the bond trade, from their speculative takings from subprime mortgage loans and credit-default swaps, and after the 2008 financial crisis, from the US 'Troubled Asset Relief Program' and the recent quantitative easing that allowed them to recapitalize their accounts after their speculation almost crashed the global economy. To these takings, one can also add their off-the-books fees from assisting the money laundering of Mexican drug traffickers (Smith 2010) and brokering instruments for tax evasion by corporations and wealthy families sending capital out to offshore financial centres, as evident in the releases of the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers.

Despite this broader complexity, the majority of the US population, judging from its hostility toward the anti-war movement since 9/11, appear to consent to the Mephistophelian bargain which trades their right to buy what they wish, to waste energy conspicuously on their sports utility vehicles and the consumers goods they purchase, and to engage in 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' in exchange for their active support of the imperial wars that make their profligate 'way of life' possible.

It is perhaps a relief to qualify that such a claim is not a definite finding, but functions more as an heuristic device. Much more needs to be done in the way of ethnographic and historical research in order to discover answers to the question: why do the people ruled by corporate states – like the United States and southern Italy – consent to the atrocities committed by these states and the elites who lead them?

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AFTERWORD

Notes on crisis and transformation of political orders in the global arena

Jonathan Friedman

Britain voted recently to leave the EU, to the fury of EU President Jean-Claude Juncker, and the process of separation may drag on for years. Catalonia tried to vote to become a new autonomous nation state, and Madrid sent in the *guardia civil* and confiscated all the papers from 100 voting stations, as well as abusing Catalonian voters, while the EU did nothing. The leading Catalan politician was forced into exile and Madrid rescheduled the vote, but the pro-autonomy faction of the population proved again to be the majority, creating further tensions. Scotland, like Catalonia, may want to become an independent member of the European Union following Brexit, and we may recall 'Europe of the Regions,' a significant movement of the early 90s (Magone 2003). Northern Italy may also want to exit, along, perhaps, with Poland and Hungary. The gigantic consolidation process, or super-state formation, represented by the recent history of the EU is in a serious crisis. This has occurred following a protracted period in which the European Commission became the effective governing organ of the Union, though it has no direct relation of accountability to the masses of the national electorates. On the contrary, commissioners are a second-order political fact, elected by other elected officials, as ministers of governments or bureaucrats. Furthermore, it is stipulated that the president of the commission is to be loyal to the EU as a whole rather than to the nation-state from which he is recruited. While this might seem to avoid a certain national bias, it also creates a situation in which the higher-level instance takes precedence over all of the lower-level instances in the nation-state order. This is occurring in a context in which the accountability of politicians, or whatever one might call democratically elected representatives, is coming into question. Is the EU a kind of superstate in relation to its members? It has been said that

over sixty per cent of all legislation in Britain from 1993 to 2014 originated in the EU.[1] Now of course this issue is contested and complex, but there is a visible transformation of state power in this situation. The so-called populist revolt against the EU is a sign of a crisis in the construction of what some have called a new and absolutist imperial order.

These recent events reflect the can of worms explored in this volume, the relation between state and society in the contemporary situation. Bruce Kapferer's introduction outlines some of the major issues in this current emergence of new forms of state power, as well as discussing the rather sparse involvement of Anthropology in problems that have traditionally been the domain of political science.

Anthropology in the past has dealt with the state in two principle ways. First, as an end point of early cultural evolution, as made famous by the neo-evolutionary school in both anthropology and archaeology. This framework was much criticized, especially following the decline of modernism in the 70s, and was not so much concerned with understanding the nature of the state as with tracing a historical trajectory, similar to historical-materialist evolutionary models, from egalitarian to increasingly hierarchical polities, with an endpoint in the state, in which reciprocity is replaced by tax/tribute and so-called re-distribution, and which is a hallmark of the emergence of class structure and the end of kinship-dominated social orders. In the post-evolutionist era, works such as those of Clastres (1998), while maintaining the basic evolutionary framework, if not the evolutionary model, explored more fully the contrast between egalitarian and state orders, arguing that the former were actually organized to prevent the latter, which could only be understood as catastrophic, in the formal (i.e. mathematical), as well as real, sense. Clastres' perspective is not so different from other interpretations that emerged in the 70s. The evolutionist Flannery (1972) spoke of what he called 'usurpation' of a higher function by a lower one, such as when a particular strategy of warfare and expansion takes over a former higher-order function of sacredness. In Clastres' scheme, warfare is a key aspect of the appearance of the state. In Flannery's scheme, elaborated upon by Rappaport (1977, 1979), a ritual-based hierarchy takes on the activities of warfare and political expansion. The priest becomes a warrior, or rather combines the two functions, making warfare a sacred institution. Clastres refers to this as a kind of historical revolution, the coup that makes the state the original *coup d'état*. The cause of the shift is ultimately population pressure and competition for resources, or simply conflict itself. Marcel Gauchet wrote an excellent and important essay (1977) exploring the nature of power, the sacred and the emergence of

1 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36473105.

the state, which is an elaboration on Clastres' formulation, in which he poses the question of the transition. He notes importantly that the locus of political power is the sacred, so that the real transition must be one in which a living person comes to occupy that locus: an 'empty' space at the start, occupied by the ancestor or the god who is the source of all social existence, wealth and power. In my own early work on the 'tribal' structures of Upper Burma and Southwest China and the emergence of what Marx called (in my paraphrase) the 'Asiatic state', I tried to construct a process by which hierarchization via accumulation of prestige in a competitive kinship-based order led to the transformation in which the village or regional temples became the residences of the chief, and in which the gods were not only ancestors of the population as a whole but, more specifically, closest ancestors of the lineage of the emergent chief. The latter began his political career as representative of the people to the gods, but, if successful, ended as representative of the gods to the people. This all makes sense in the logic of kinship. The model is simple: to be able to give bigger feasts one must have a better connection to the gods, as it is they who are the source of fertility. As a better connection is identical to a closer kinship relation, it implies that giving bigger feasts is equivalent to being closer kin of the gods, creating in this way what is called a conical clan structure. All of this implies, in my analysis, which contains more variables than can be discussed here, a process of ranking within a larger kinship order that links humans to gods. The actual shift to statehood in this process requires an autonomization of the highest political rank, which is perfectly possible within a cosmology in which humans merge with gods, who are the real powers that be. The issue of representation is critical in understanding this process, as is the relation between state and people that is central to this volume. In the analysis above, the state can be designated as the first ruling-class formation insofar as the state is itself a class, monopolizing, initially, access to the sacred, which is tantamount to the forces of nature that make social reproduction possible. The ensuing transformations of the theocratic order of the state generate the various forms of polity that are described in the historical literature. The transformation of contemporary states encompasses a logic that is similar to this primary emergence of the state.

The contemporary state in transformation

This volume concentrates on the state in the contemporary world, or perhaps, as I would designate it, within the world or global system. Are there specific tendencies in nation-state structures in this age of so-called globalization? Some anthropologists have argued that globalization itself (however poorly defined) is destroying the nation-state via large-scale flows of capital and people, i.e. that the state is losing control over its conditions of existence




Figure 1 *Per cent of employment in manufacturing, US Bureau of Labor Statistics.*

(Appadurai 1996, 2006). After years of celebration of globalization, a new negative paradigm crept into the field sometime around the crisis that began in 2000 and culminated with the crash of 2008 – neoliberalism, the dark side of globalization which was otherwise lauded as bringing the world's cultures together. Without the menace of neoliberalism, it is assumed that we shall move beyond the nation-state into a diasporic world where each transnational ethnic group, to say nothing of other groupings, will maintain contracts with the separate states within which they operate (Appadurai 1996:22, 2006:37). This, I would contend, is a projection of the current tendency to diasporization in some sectors of the world, which has certainly not led to the end of the nation-state, even if it has clearly had a disintegrative effect on the national component of the state. If we consider the beginnings of this scenario, I would suggest that globalization itself is a very inaccurate gloss for a complex of phenomena that are linked, as Braudel (1977) understood long ago, to the decline of hegemony. They include: the decentralization of capital accumulation (export of capital, emergence of transnational corporations) that started in the 1970s and is related to the emergence of cheaper and more profitable production zones (primarily in East and South Asia). This is in itself an aspect of the increasing relative costs of production in the old hegemonic centres, due in great part to the increase in wealth of the working class. Following the export of capital there ensued a crisis of the state, which had lost the basis of much of its financing and went into debt. There was also a re-adjustment of capital to a situation in which the new possibilities of investment were all of a financial order, from speculation to real estate to the culture 'industries', and where de-industrialization was the order of the day.




Figure 2 Employment in 1970 and 2005 (after Economist 2005).[2]

Needless to say it was, primarily in the USA, a golden age for senior academics, as the new competition encouraged salary hikes to attract the highest-ranking scholars (however one defines that), all of which was related to the increase in liquid capital that itself is directly related to de-industrialization. The neoliberalism that emerged in this period was the result of the re-organization of what was left behind when production was outsourced to other parts of the world. Industrial hubs become financial hubs, with finance the only remaining growth sector, based on turning money into more money without passing through production, as Marx would have said. The industrial working class dwindled to a fraction of what it once was, and large pockets of former workers lived in increasing poverty. For the USA the decline was remarkable, but it was similar in form for most Western countries (see Figures 1 and 2).

On might argue that this is all due to increasing technological productivity – which is partly true, but there was also a major shift in the economies of these countries from production to services and, of course, to finance, at the same time that production shifted to East and South Asia.

Into all of this comes a flow of people from a periphery that is increasingly disordered by the contraction of the hegemonic West, a kind of implosion of a formerly well-ordered imperial structure. There are new elites, as I suggested, and they are those living off what might be called fictitious capital, non-productive capital, which is the core of the financialization process. The rise of populism begins in this period. This is not a class struggle. It is a struggle of a former working class to maintain a fading existence. The new cultural elites lose interest in them, who have become obsolete, and instead concentrate their attention on the new population of immigrants. There is a transformation of the former left into what is best described as a new bourgeoisie of media,

2 www.economist.com/node/4462685.

political and academic elites, self-appointed to rule the brave new globalized world, which in reality is something closer to and rapidly approaching a *Blade Runner* world of enclavized populations in a state of low intensity warfare. But in the enclaves of the wealthier classes, the world is different; their gated communities are quite safe, at least for the time being.[3]

The nation-state in particular has undergone major transformations. The contemporary state, or its political class, is not so concerned with the integrity of its territory. When it was based primarily on the mass of taxes paid by ordinary citizens that may have been the case; but the state today is closer to what has been called the 'market state' (Bobbitt 2002), or better, the 'corporate state' (Kapferer 2005; Kapferer and Bertelsen 2009) which is no longer focused on the national but has gone global, in the sense of playing the international flows of finance, people and trade, where it is focused on what might be called global tax farming, both within and beyond its state boundaries (Vlcek 2017). It is notable that what is called New Public Management emerges in this transition as a tool of governance that in its quasi-formalist quality elevates bureaucratic control beyond the reach of democratic process. The state has consequentially become less accountable to its democratic base, which is one of the causes of an emerging populism, and there are, thus, strong counter tendencies to try and silence the 'people', a process that has been discussed for quite some time, now in terms of creating passive subjects rather than active citizens (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). This is the cosmopolitan state identified with the world rather than the nation. The state is not the victim of so-called globalization, as is sometimes reflected in the rhetoric of politicians like Tony Blair, who wrote 'I hear people say we have to stop and debate globalization. You might as well debate whether autumn should follow summer.'[4]

The tendency to treat global processes as facts of nature confronting the state might seem to make sense. But on the contrary, the state is a principal actor in these processes. In this sense one might even speak of a reversion to absolutism, suggested above with respect to the EU, in which sovereignty is re-transferred to the state and its congeries of political, economic and cultural elites. This is not the work of pernicious planners and neoliberal entrepreneurs. It is an essential element of the logic of global process. It might be interesting to compare this to the so-called mercantilist period in European history, in which states vied for trading profits in the world market and where the relation between 'East India companies' and states was more than a loose

3 It is to be noted that violence is always distributed unevenly in both time and space, and that for some life can go on quite normally in many of the worst war zones.

4 www.theglobalist.com/tony-blair-on-globalization.

articulation between the state and capital, as detailed in Kalb's fascinating chapter in this volume.

But the political elites that are enmeshed in the process of cosmopolitanization, which is clearly in their interests, have, as representatives of a superior instance of the social order, taken on the function of re-socialization of citizens in their transition to subjects. The 'people' are transformed in this process into a motley collection of particular identities (gender, ethnic, religious etc.) and it is noteworthy that mass immigration and multicultural policies are integral to this transformation of the state. If the state is no longer an extension of the 'will of the people' it takes on the character of a *primus inter pares* among distinct populations. This is expressed in the translation of the democratic process into an essentialized package of correct democratic values inherent in those who were formerly mere representatives of electoral outcomes. It accounts for the increasing intervention of the state into all domains of society, what Kapferer might call a vertical rhizomic colonization of the social order, and as expressed in Judith Kapferer's discussion of the state in relation to art in this volume. One might add the broadcasting media to this picture, and question the way control is exerted over the imaginaries that we consume. It might be noted here that this inversion of functions, from representative of the people to autonomous representative of embodied 'democratic' principles is similar to the inversion of functions in early state formation, where the head of state transits from representative of the society to the gods, to representative of the gods to the people. This is, perhaps, the more general logic of political hierarchization.

Contemporary peripheries

One might want to contrast what is occurring in the centres of the global system with the situations in the peripheries or semi-peripheries. The states of Africa explored in this volume, while quite variable, demonstrate the nature of state crisis, when it is dependent on the control of exportable resources that are most often monopolized by the postcolonial political class, and where such monopolies disintegrate as a result of the crisis in the centre. In most African post-colonies, the state itself is primarily a rentier, living on the proceeds afforded by multinational corporations that exploit local resources, not least oil, minerals and diamonds, though baseline income is often from development aid. All of this wealth contributes to what has been called 'flight capital', and contributes to the rise of internal conflicts in such states. In many so-called Third World situations, the political order is dependent on external political and, especially, financial support. Following the end of the Cold War such support has declined markedly, leading to severely weakened state control, and increasing political conflict and violence.

The reasons are variable, though in fundamental respects the outcomes are surprisingly similar. There are, of course, new global tendencies, not least the expansion of China into Africa, Latin America and the Pacific, where a replay of imperial strategies has become prevalent. This is to be expected from the global shifts of power that are occurring in the world system, even if a new centre-periphery structure has not emerged (as yet). The complexity of the global field is best captured in countries like Indonesia, the largest economy of Southeast Asia, which would be classified by most as a semi-periphery or rapidly developing country with a diverse economy, much of it dependent on foreign investors, Singapore, Japan and increasingly China. The Indonesian state as discussed in two chapters in this volume is clearly deeply penetrated by multinationals that have disaggregated power in one sense, even if other aspects of state power have been maintained, especially the military. The basic fragility of the Indonesian political order is clearly expressed in the difficulties of governing a multi-political and multi-societal order with its own centre and peripheries. The nationalization of subjectivities would still seem to be limited to the Javanese core, and reinforced by the emergence of a new middle class. Kapferer and Wijeyeratne's Sri Lankan case demonstrates how the crisis of a Buddhist state is transformed into a religious war of ferocious proportions, in which, as Kapferer has shown previously, political conflict is embedded in sorcery, and larger social conflicts are directly embedded in the subjectivities of individual actors. This is clearly in contrast with the nation-state structure, even if the crisis situation there is linked to the crisis in world hegemony.

Mapping the global framework

These contemporary states are not merely, I would argue, separate entities to be understood in isolation from one another. They are linked in the larger complexes of relations that characterize a global system in critical transformation.

The panorama of differences, reduced simplistically here to three basic types, is an attempt to indicate the interconnectedness of the current transformations. Attempts to create larger economic unions, as in Canada-US-Mexico and the more integrated political unions such as the EU, are clearly under pressure from the increasing demands for autonomy of member states and a declining sense of belonging to larger units. Just as states that have already been outsourcing much of their governmental activities to private firms have lost much of their accountability, larger political unions of any sort are now subject to rising demands for more local sovereignty. This is a tendency to fragmentation that is a primary expression of declining hegemony. In areas of rising hegemony, especially China where both economic and political expansion are salient ingredients, the tendency to integration rather




Figure 3 The differential field of declining hegemony.

than fragmentation is dominant. The state is clearly an autonomous structure, but it has cultivated a strong nationalist loyalty that, in spite of strong class conflict, has for the most part prevailed. In the peripheral zones, the situation is one of political crisis, internal warfare and economic collapse. The state here tends to become a corporate actor among others within the same territory that compete for control of resources.

This is not a pretty picture, and there are, of course, positive developments, probably quite localized, that might give cause for 'hope', a word that has become so popular in an era of seeming hopelessness. But as some of us have argued (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Ekholm Friedman 1980, 2005) it's not the first time around, so maybe we shouldn't be terribly surprised. Though if the goal is not merely to understand the world but to change it, a clear understanding is absolutely crucial. And we have a long way to go, assuming that the system doesn't catch up with our attempts to research and thus gain insight into its workings, before it's too late.

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The territorially sovereign nation-state – the globally dominant political formation of Western modernity – is in crisis. Though it is a highly heterogeneous assemblage, moulded by different histories involving myriad socio-cultural processes, its territorial integrity and sovereignty are always contingent and related to the distribution and organization of authority and power, and the state's position within encompassing global dynamics.

This volume attends to these contingencies as they are refracted by the communities and populations that are variously incorporated (in conformity or resistance) within their ordering processes. With ethnographically grounded analyses and thick description of locales as various as Russia, Lebanon and Indonesia, a vital conversation emerges about forms of state control under challenge or in transition.

It is clear that the politico-social configurations of the state are still taking new directions, such as extremist populism and a general dissatisfaction with the corporatism of digital and technological revolutions. These are symptoms of the dilemmas at the peripheries of capital growth coming home to roost at their centres. Such transformations demand the new forms of conceptualization that the anthropological approaches of the essays in this volume present.

A fascinating and timely collection that dwells on the unsettled nature of contemporary relationships between 'state' and 'society'. Drawing on case studies from beyond the heartland of political theory, contributors refuse to treat global phenomena as generic and focus instead on the specific social relations that constitute the varied possibilities and limits of contemporary state power.

Penny Harvey, Professor of Social Anthropology, University of Manchester

This is political anthropology on a truly large canvas. The standing question about how 'state' and 'society' relate, and whether the distinction between them makes sense in the first place, is tackled deftly through the lenses of varying conceptions and practices of power and resistance.

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Cover image: ice cliffs at the end of the Barne Glacier (H.G. Ponting, Captain Scott's Antarctic Expedition, 2 December 1911).

ISBN 978-1-907774-50-8
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